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Abstract 
 
New developments in science and technology are promoted through projections of 
anticipated benefit that justify research, help secure funding and institutional, political and 
public support, and encourage technology diffusion.  This thesis explores the strategic 
influence of constructs of expected benefit through analysis of the claims advanced for two 
technology fields in New Zealand:  genetic modification and wind energy.  The ways benefits 
are framed, and the kinds of returns and outcomes that are promoted, have major implications 
for technoscience.  Some technology pathways and applications are supported and fostered, 
while others are rejected or marginalised. 
 
The “downstream” impacts and potential risks of scientific innovation have received 
extensive academic and policy analysis, while the benefits claimed for R&D and new 
technologies have largely been taken for granted.  However, science and technology futures 
have recently been addressed in an emerging field of international scholarship – the sociology 
of expectations.  This thesis follows technoscience trajectories back “upstream”, to better 
understand the work of benefit framings in legitimating and valorising innovation in two 
sectors in New Zealand.  Understanding the dynamics of such optimistic projections is crucial 
for publics, interested groups, practitioners and policy-makers engaging with the challenges 
of contemporary technoscience. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Science;  technology;  innovation;  expectations;  benefits;  genetic 
modification;  wind energy;  New Zealand. 
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Prologue 
Possums, science, and unanswered questions 
 
The origins of this thesis – and my focus on the claims of expected benefit that build support 
and legitimacy for science research and technological innovation – go back to questions that 
caught my attention more than a decade ago, in a very different context.  From 1997 to 2004 I 
worked as Principal Investigator for the New Zealand Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment (PCE).1  One of the projects I led for the PCE was an inquiry into issues 
involved with the potential introduction of a radical new kind of technology – a controversial 
application of genetic modification (GM).  This project explored the intended use of GM for 
biological control of the Australian brushtail possum (Trichosurus vulpecula), a major 
environmental pest in New Zealand;  the biocontrols aimed to disrupt fertility and thus 
contribute to reducing possum numbers in the landscape (Parliamentary Commissioner for 
the Environment 2000).2  Escalating public concerns and protest about GM, and about the 
wide dispersal of poisons for possum control, prompted the PCE’s interest. 
 
The debates at that time about the possible use of GM were fiercely intense.  Public and 
policy-world engagement with GM in New Zealand and internationally was dominated by 
polarised politics that pitted advocates against opponents of the new technology.  There were, 
however, a number of questions which received little attention in those early days of New 
Zealand’s engagement with GM;  many issues were effectively eclipsed by more urgent 
concerns around risk and its management, regulation, consultation processes, and public 
involvement in policy and decision-making.  As the PCE’s project team grappled with New 
Zealanders’ responses to the prospect of an invisible, self-disseminating biological 
technology that would shut down normal breeding and render its targets infertile, I kept 
coming back to some of the underlying questions that were not being explored in the 
immediate debate.  My curiosity centred around the significance of the purposes and ideals 
driving development of a controversial new technology such as a GM biocontrol.  The 
                                                 
1 The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (www.pce.parliament.nz) is independent 
of the government of the day, reporting directly to Parliament through the Speaker of the House.  Established 
under the Environment Act 1986, the PCE’s role is to monitor and assess the effectiveness of New Zealand’s 
systems for environmental management and sustainability, and to investigate and report on matters of 
environmental importance. 
2 The biocontrols research is discussed in detail in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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reasons advanced for this particular use of GM were fundamentally different from other 
proposed applications, such as herbicide-tolerant crops that were focused primarily around 
commercial and agronomic objectives.  The biocontrols research targeted inarguably noble, 
public-good goals – to help get rid of the millions of possums that infest New Zealand and 
wreak havoc on indigenous biodiversity and ecosystems.  Did such altruistic intentions make 
a difference for publics, policy-makers and science funding?  Was the purpose of saving 
threatened native birds and forests appreciated as a more worthy kind of justification than 
commercial profit-making for developing a potentially risky new technology? 
 
The aims of the PCE’s study were to advise government on improved environmental policy 
and consultation processes, and to identify key criteria of acceptability for the various 
biocontrol methods being considered (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 
2000, pp 83-90).  Our project team enjoyed an often challenging process gathering a wide 
range of information and views.3  But that investigation was not the place to address deeper 
issues around the implications of different kinds of purpose underpinning R&D and 
innovation. 
 
A year after the biocontrols project, New Zealand engaged in an extensive process of 
consultation and public discussion for the inquiry of the Royal Commission on Genetic 
Modification (RCGM).4  Again, although there was intense debate around issues of risk from 
GM organisms, there was little critical engagement with questions around the framings of 
anticipated benefit used to argue for this technology’s development and possible use in New 
Zealand.  Broad claims of the profits, improvements and efficiencies expected from various 
applications of GM were advanced in submissions and evidence, and reiterated in the 
                                                 
3 As was the practice with all such “big-issue” investigations at the PCE, the biocontrols project canvassed a 
diversity of interests and perspectives.  These included:  farming, science, national and regional government, 
bioethics and animal welfare groups, activist groups opposed to GM, conservation organisations, the 
biotechnology industry, the pest control industry, urban and rural communities, and tangata whenua (the 
indigenous people of Aotearoa – New Zealand) (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2000, pp 6-
9). 
4 The Royal Commission was established as part of the arrangements between Labour and the New Zealand 
Green Party in the formation of a government in 1999 (McGuinness et al. 2008b, p 9).  Its task was to 
investigate and report on strategic options available to New Zealand with GM, and appropriate statutory, 
regulatory and policy provisions.  A series of formal hearings and consultation meetings and a public 
submission process resulted in the Commission’s finding that the ‘exciting promise’ offered by GM was such 
that the country should ‘proceed with caution’ to ‘preserve opportunities’ (Royal Commission on Genetic 
Modification 2001a, pp 2, 6).  The PCE was granted ‘Interested Person’ status in the Commission’s hearings 
process and provided extensive evidence based significantly on our work on the possum biocontrols study.  I 
attended many of the hearings and other Commission consultation sessions as an observer and contributor. 
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RCGM’s report.  But there was disappointingly limited analysis of such projections, 
particularly in comparison with the exhaustive deliberations around risk and the potentials for 
adverse outcomes.5 
 
As a participant in these official processes, I became interested in the ways that many actors 
in policy and research arenas – usually but not exclusively the proponents of particular 
interests in technoscientific fields – based their approach on a relatively uncritical acceptance 
of the claimed benefits of applications of GM.  Challenges to such assumptions were 
primarily manifested in assertions of the possible risks involved – environmental, public 
health, economic, and to New Zealand’s exports and international reputation – and arguments 
about the assessment and appropriate management of such risks.  But there was little scrutiny 
of the projections of future benefits that were put forward as validation for the policy or 
commercial decisions to pursue this new technology. 
 
I grew more interested in these dimensions of science and technology processes through 
further PCE work, notably a project on the role of science in environmental policy and 
decision-making (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2003a).  In this study 
too, fundamental assumptions of the benefits and beneficence of scientific R&D were largely 
taken as beyond critique or questioning.6  Another thought-provoking experience was when I 
represented the PCE office at a Sustainable Energy Forum hosted by the Shell corporation in 
Wellington in the early 2000s, where a group discussion led to the question:  “Why isn’t 
every roof in New Zealand covered in solar energy panels and mini wind turbines?”  Neither 
the men in smart suits from Shell nor the forum attendees from various government agencies 
had answers to that. 
 
My fascination with science and technologies, and the values and purposes behind them, 
evolved over several years into the questions driving this thesis.  I have no formal training in 
science or engineering, but considerable experience in the work of words, images, ideas and 
narratives through my previous work in literary, marketing, journalism and policy worlds.7  I 
                                                 
5 The Commission’s report and subsequent GM policy in New Zealand are discussed in Chapter Six. 
6 A personal turning point of my years in the PCE office was the profoundly significant moment when I was 
required to remove (under protest) the word “epistemological” from the draft science-issues report, such 
dimensions being deemed unnecessary and inappropriate for policy-oriented analysis of science processes. 
7 The ways the research for this thesis has been framed and influenced by my personal history are acknowledged 
in Chapter Four. 
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can quickly glaze over with too much technical detail, and have little patience for a lab bench 
– but I get really interested when scientists and engineers start expanding on the reasons why 
they do what they do, and the goals and ideals that give them confidence that what they do is 
worthwhile. 
 
Blokes in boiler suits and Bruno Latour 
For the last three years of writing this thesis, I have enjoyed a sunny office space in a small 
engineering workshop in a semi-rural community just north of Christchurch.  “Real 
technologies” go on all around me here – showers of welding sparks, forklifts trundling huge 
steel structures dangerously close to my window, and oily machinery being dismantled 
outside my door.  It has been a privilege to have this kind of environment for my exploration 
of the arcane complexities of the discourses and social construction of technoscience.  These 
men (and the one female mechanic at the garage next door), engaged in the pragmatic, dirty 
business of technologies “in action”, have helped keep my study thoroughly grounded.  The 
abstract questions I have been engaged with on my laptop are in many ways very remote 
from what they do with bits of clanking metal, intricate pipework and chugging motors.  But 
it has been important to keep in view (literally) the point that technologies exist in the actual 
world, and that their efficient functioning and genuine purposefulness are crucial for people 
to get things done. 
 
Both dimensions – the theoretical and the practical – are central to the effectiveness of 
science and technology.  I very much value the insights I have gained in my academic 
research into R&D and innovation processes.  Once you have been exposed to the critical 
analysis of technoscience paradigms and practice, no apparently innocent artifact can ever be 
the same, however familiar and taken-for-granted.  Each time I drive over the vicious speed 
bumps on the roadway through the Canterbury University campus I think of Bruno Latour 
and his explanation (also provoked by campus traffic control systems!) of how society’s 
norms are enforced and made tangible in such seemingly innocuous objects (Latour 1999, pp 
186-190).  But my own awareness of the socially constructed nature of technological 
systems, and the rich diversity of scholarship addressing this, is tempered by continual 
reminders of the superficiality of most contemporary engagement with technoscience.  It 
worries me that there is so little interest in these dimensions of science and technology, and 
so little questioning of the implications for our everyday lives and for the future, even 
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amongst people who are thoughtful and sceptical on other important social issues.  It irritates 
me that the “Technology” sections in the news media are all about electronic gadgets and 
games, the most trivial kinds of consumer toys.  It astonishes me that New Zealand 
universities encourage enrolments in science and engineering with no requirement that 
students undertake even a basic orientation in the sociology of science and technology.  And 
it seems dangerously reckless to me that policies and business commitments for R&D and 
innovation are often made with only the most cursory analysis (typically for trade-off 
purposes) of the meanings of development, the qualitative dimensions and longer-term 
societal implications. 
 
The blokes in grimy overalls outside my window probably don’t really need a deep 
philosophical engagement with Latour – or Bourdieu, Winner, Sarewitz, van Lente, Bijker, 
and the many other scholars whose thinking has contributed to my own.  And in contrast to 
the unproven, speculative nature of the innovations studied in this thesis, the technologies in 
which my neighbours exercise their knowledge, skills and creativity are long-established, 
mature fields.  Nevertheless there is an authenticity to their work that is perfectly attuned to 
the real benefits of what they do.  In comparison to the rhetorics, politics and positioning 
strategies I deconstruct in my little office – the grand claims made for technoscience, 
innovation and the “knowledge economy” – the relationships between activity and purpose, 
practice and outcome, are very direct.  Rodney fashions iron and aluminium into useful, 
strong and beautiful structures;  Gavin, Paul, Nick and Donna fix cars, trucks and our ageing 
utes to run sweetly and safely;  Slim and Jeremy organise wells, pumps and intricate filtration 
systems to deliver reliable potable water for rural households, farm irrigation and livestock.  
The benefits are clearly, immediately evident. 
 
But as my research has found, the correlations between the intentions claimed for 
technoscience and the actual trajectories of R&D and innovation processes are often rather 
more complicated, qualified, contingent and opaque.  The work of this thesis has only 
reinforced the concerns that began for me with the unanswered questions around research 
into possum biocontrols.  It has made me even more certain of the importance of careful 
scrutiny, thoughtful analysis and independent critique of all the claims and framings, the hype 
and hope, the confident forecasts and official pronouncements – indeed, of everything that is 
taken for granted in the promotion and legitimation of technoscience. 
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Chapter One 
The benefits of science and technology 
 
Introduction 
In every historical and prehistorical era, life has been unavoidably technological.  
From stone tools and digging sticks through to the printing press, steam engine and 
20th-century assembly-line, humans and prehumans have applied intelligence, skill 
and ingenuity to the challenges of survival (Norman 1976; Adams 1991; Brown 2002; 
Dugan 2003; Fagan 2004; Misa 2004; Edgerton 2008).  The entire fabric of 
contemporary existence depends upon the accumulated knowledge, products and 
promises of science and technology in their myriad forms – in energy and transport, 
food production, medicine and health, environmental management, education, 
communications, and societal infrastructure at every level. 
 
In recent decades, academic attention has turned to analysis of science and technology 
as dynamic processes for the production of knowledge and diverse products, artefacts 
and complex sociotechnical systems.  Work in science and technology studies and 
related fields has developed awareness of the multi-faceted and socially constructed 
nature of science and technology.8  These domains are shown to involve much more 
than the scientific and technical and to be closely inter-related with social, political, 
sectoral, commercial, economic, ethical and epistemological dimensions. 
                                                 
8 The distinctions and relationships between science and technology, as professional fields with their 
respective approaches, objectives, modes of practice, criteria for success, and public perceptions, are 
the focus of ‘long-running definitional disputes’ (Greenberg 2001, p 4).  This thesis follows 
Greenberg’s recognition that science and technology are best understood as zones along a spectrum, 
most clearly differentiated at their extremes:  science aims to create knowledge, whereas technology 
development applies knowledge in the production of artifacts, technical systems and processes.  
However scientific and technological dimensions are more often inextricably intertwined in iterative 
research and development (R&D) pathways, working back and forth between the pursuit of 
information and the requirements of technological purpose.  Rip (1992, pp 231-233, 258) describes the 
continuum between science and technology, or knowledge and artifact, using a metaphor of the two 
partners in a dance.  In this thesis, the terms ‘science’ and ‘technology’ will be used when appropriate 
for activities and entities at the respective ends of the spectrum;  the term ‘technoscience’ refers to 
hybrid modes and processes where it would be counter-productive to try to disentangle the scientific 
and technological aspects.  Latour (1987, pp 174-175) dismisses artificial definitional boundaries, 
describing technoscience as ‘all the elements tied to the scientific contents no matter how dirty, 
unexpected or foreign they seem’. 
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This thesis focuses on the promotion of scientific and technological development 
through the claims and scenarios of anticipated future benefit that are used to justify 
research and development (R&D) and to encourage the diffusion of innovations.  
These are explored via analysis of the projections of expected benefit advanced for 
two fields of technological development in New Zealand:  genetic modification (GM) 
of animals and plants for a range of agricultural, commercial and environmental 
purposes;  and generation of electricity using turbines to harness wind power. 
 
Like any societal enterprise, science and technology are supported and validated by 
positive narratives that highlight the appeal of particular projects, the profits and 
worthy outcomes that are expected, and the relief anticipated from resolving needs, 
inadequacies or problems.  Such enthusiastic projections of future benefit are 
important strategic resources, instrumental in securing funding and institutional, 
political and public support for ongoing R&D.  The plausibility and attractiveness of 
expected benefits are all the more important when there is uncertainty or controversy 
around a particular project or technological field.  Furthermore, the overall enterprise 
of technoscience is generically validated by broader patterns of assumption of the 
utility, profitability and desirability of dealing with diverse societal and environmental 
issues through scientific and technological means. 
 
The ways future benefits are framed, and the kinds of returns and outcomes that are 
valorised in technoscience, have major implications for the kinds of priorities 
followed in R&D and the kinds of technologies, systems and practices that result.  
The orientation of research and technological innovation around particular kinds of 
goals can be strongly influential – some technological pathways and applications are 
supported and fostered, others are rejected, delegitimated, or marginalised to “fringe” 
status.  Assertion of the kinds of projected benefits that answer the expectations and 
interests of dominant actors and groups in technoscientific and policy fields is crucial 
for the relative success or failure of potential innovations. 
 
There has been extensive academic, sectoral and policy analysis of the dynamics of 
technoscience processes, the complexities of sociotechnical systems, practices and 
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communities, and the interactions of societal groups with technoscience.9  However 
the frameworks of optimistic expectation – the particular benefit claims and 
assumptions of broader technoscientific beneficence that drive processes of 
technoscientific development – have as yet received only limited critical, political, 
sectoral or public attention.  Much analysis and policy has focused on the 
consequential impacts of research products and technologies after release, either 
encouraging diffusion and market uptake, or addressing potential adverse effects and 
unintended consequences through risk management.  While risk debates are important 
and enlightening, nevertheless they engage with the “downstream” implications of 
technoscience innovation, well after research has begun, funds have been invested, 
and commitments established.  Considerable effort is expended on post hoc analysis 
and negotiation of possible negative impacts, while the projections of benefit 
justifying particular R&D directions are largely taken for granted and rarely 
questioned by practitioners, policy actors and publics. 
 
However, the significance of projections of future outcomes from science and 
technology has become the focus of analytical scrutiny in an emerging field of 
international scholarship, the sociology of expectations (for example, van Lente 1993; 
Brown et al. 2000a; Brown & Michael 2003; Borup et al 2006).  As yet there is little 
awareness, amongst policy and institutional actors or wider communities, of this 
academic work or its insights into the ways expectations validate, influence and foster 
technoscientific development.  Nor is there much recognition of the importance of 
understanding how projections of future benefit shape present-day research priorities 
and technology trajectories.  A key starting point for this thesis is that such 
understanding is crucial for publics, interested groups, and official and sectoral actors 
to engage effectively with the many challenging issues around the development and 
deployment of technoscience. 
 
This thesis takes engagement with technoscience back “upstream” to investigate the 
significance of benefit framings in the processes of scientific and technological 
innovation.  The origins of technology trajectories lie in the concepts of progress, 
improvement, advantage, problem-solving and profit that drive R&D.  The thesis 
                                                 
9 These literatures are surveyed briefly below, and discussed in more detail in Chapters Two and Three. 
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focuses on the constructions of expected benefit deployed in two technological fields 
in New Zealand, GM and wind energy, and explores how benefit projections have 
influenced the evolution of those technologies and their applications in this country. 
 
The research problem 
The problem this thesis addresses is the lack of comprehensive critical engagement 
with the projections of benefit that justify and valorise technoscientific innovation in 
the early 21st century.  This lack of engagement is clearly evident in the analytical 
and policy frameworks and in broader public engagement with science and 
technology in New Zealand and internationally.  This is additionally problematic in 
highly contested technology arenas – such as proposed applications of GM, or 
transitions to renewable energy technologies such as windfarms. 
 
This is a significant problem because particular concepts or narratives of 
technological benefit are central to the evolution, application and outcomes of the 
technologies they are used to promote.  Benefit framings have a powerful influence on 
the kinds of research pursued, the kinds of technology options considered useful or 
practical, the amounts of taxpayer dollars invested in R&D and institutional and 
regulatory systems, and the actual products and processes eventually manifested in 
our landscapes, agriculture, foodstuffs, medicines and essential infrastructure. 
 
This problem has salience in several arenas – including government policy, the 
strategic development of scientific research institutions, environmental and interest 
group advocacy, and local community action – where technological innovation is 
often the site of sustained contestation.  Without more thorough scrutiny of the goals 
or benefits asserted as justification for particular research orientations, or of the ways 
such expectations legitimate and strengthen favoured fields, technoscientific 
trajectories are, by default, driven by the values and objectives of the proponents of 
those R&D programmes.  Principal among such frameworks are ubiquitous narratives 
of science and technology as prerequisites for unlimited progress and economic 
growth (Sarewitz 1996; Cohen et al. 2001; Greenberg 2001). 
 
 5 
In his analysis of the power relations inevitable in technoscientific fields, Bourdieu 
(2004, pp 35, 62-63) highlights the hegemony enjoyed by dominant actors with the 
strategic resources and status to assert their particular interests and frameworks of 
value as norms within the field.  Publics are relegated to the status of awed and 
grateful recipients of the technology and its outcomes, an enrolment that Winner 
(1986, pp 5-10) describes as ‘technological somnambulism’.  With little scrutiny of 
the framing and functioning of promissory benefit claims in the promotion of 
particular innovations or developments, dominant groups’ interests and projections of 
benefit are perpetuated, and alternative discourses and technological benefits are 
marginalised.  As Foucault (1972, 1980, 1994) argues, the assertion of certain 
versions of reality and value – or ‘regimes of truth’ – is an ongoing ideological 
process through which existing social, political and economic arrangements are 
maintained and the appeal and legitimacy of other options are diminished. 
 
A lack of critical understanding of the ideas and assumptions shaping technology 
trajectories might be judged as irresponsible given the myriad implications of 
contemporary innovations and changes:  ‘Vast transformations in the structure of our 
common world have been undertaken with little attention to what those alterations 
mean’ (Winner 1986, p 9).  But policy and public discourse around technoscientific 
innovations and their application remain ‘stubbornly innocent’ of scholarly analysis of 
the socially constructed, embedded nature of knowledge, artefacts and technological 
systems (Sarewitz 2004, p 386).  Some studies highlight this lacuna as a major risk.  
Williams (2005, p 17), acknowledging the increasingly political nature of 
technoscientific change, argues for careful scrutiny and ‘more balanced attention’ to 
the full spectrum of issues, actors, interests, interpretations and values frameworks 
involved in ‘high technology futures’.  Bourdieu (2004) insists on the necessity of 
comprehensive reflexive awareness of the power relations and social and ideological 
frameworks that drive technoscientific development.  The European Commission 
(2007, pp 15-16, 41, 54, Chapter 7) recommends improved engagement and 
awareness of the taken-for-granted ‘imaginaries’ that rationalise societal investment 
in R&D and innovation.  The Commission identifies ‘an essential neglected role for 
clarifying and deliberating the crucial assumptions and commitments which frame 
ostensibly “neutral”, “objective” scientific activities’ (2007, p 83).  And Wynne 
(2003, pp 9, 25) calls for more constructive involvement and debate around: 
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…the trajectories, driving purposes, proper conditions, and other implications 
of such major scientific-technological commitments, before their impacts have 
already been created… to identify questions which have been inadvertently 
pre-empted and concealed in the forms of knowledge and technology which 
emerge… [and] social issues which may be lying unseen and unresolved 
beneath the superficial appearance of scientific determinism. 
 
Addressing the research problem – sites of inquiry 
This thesis addresses the problem of limited critical understanding of the significance 
of benefit claims for new technologies by analysing the constructions of expected 
benefit advanced for two fields where technological innovation has been 
enthusiastically promoted in New Zealand – GM and wind energy. 
 
These two fields offer productive opportunities to address the work of benefit claims, 
although GM and generating electricity from wind are very different kinds of 
technology.  GM aims to delve into and manipulate the most fundamental levels of 
biophysical reality in ways previously impossible, to produce living organisms with 
qualities and characteristics that would not otherwise occur.  GM deliberately sets out 
to make radical interventions in the natural order, targeting lucrative outputs in the 
form of specialised plants, animals and biological substances (Gottweis 1998; Rifkin 
1998; Hindmarsh & Lawrence 2004b; Hindmarsh 2008).  Generating electricity from 
the wind is in comparison a rather conservative technology, merely harnessing 
existing elemental forces.  The only alterations are to the landscapes and communities 
in which turbines and associated infrastructure are sited (Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment 2006a, 2006c).  The basic commodity product delivered by this 
technology, electricity, is no different from that produced by other generation systems 
such as hydro dams or gas or coal fired plants (Sustainable Energy Forum 2005; 
Ministry of Economic Development 2006a; New Zealand Government 2007; Pernick 
& Wilder 2008).  But despite these basic ontological differences between the two 
technoscience fields, it is useful to compare them in terms of the claims of expected 
future benefit advanced by their proponents – the promissory discourse, projections 
and strategic framings of meaning constructed around the technologies, as distinct 
from the technologies themselves. 
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Although not new in the global context, both technologies are innovations in the New 
Zealand context.  Their adoption and diffusion in this country require major shifts in 
the usual taken-for-granted modes of doing things.  The distinction between 
technoscience process and product is a useful clarification (Jasanoff 2005a);  while 
the end commodity or outcome is not necessarily radically new (vegetables, pest 
management, pharmaceutical compounds, electricity), the means of delivery involves 
significant change from the status quo.  The relevance for this thesis of these 
technoscience fields in New Zealand is not only in the products and services they 
offer, but also in the changes required for them to be developed and deployed – 
changes that must be justified with sufficiently convincing benefit projections.  Both 
innovations have significant uncertainties and unknowns as to their acceptability and 
diffusion, their actual performance, and the longer-term effects (environmental, social 
and economic) involved in their adoption in New Zealand.  They both attract fierce 
controversy and arouse intense concern amongst the public and interested groups.  
Each requires the development of new knowledge and capacities, systems and 
practices, infrastructure, policy, governance and regulatory frameworks, funding, and 
public involvement processes.  Thus the trajectories of GM and wind energy in New 
Zealand offer valuable insights into the persuasive work of benefit claims in creating 
and contributing to a momentum for change. 
 
Another key factor in the choice of these technoscience fields is that GM and wind 
energy advocacies employ promiscuous modes of appeal.  Each is promoted in 
relation to both economic and commercial objectives, and idealistically disinterested 
public-good goals such as health, environmental sustainability and general societal 
wellbeing.  These technologies’ representations in policy, sectoral and public 
discourses are based in a mix of fundamentally different, even incommensurate 
constructs of intended benefit.  However there has been little critical attention to these 
divergent, indiscriminate framings of purpose and expectation, or to the prioritising of 
particular kinds of interests and value frameworks.  This thesis’ analysis of the 
patterns of justification of R&D and innovation in the two fields in New Zealand 
allows interrogation of this heterogeneity and its implications for technoscience 
development. 
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The comparison of disparate research fields or communities is a practical way to 
identify and assess the frameworks of meaning underpinning science and technology.  
As shown by Knorr Cetina (1999) and by Borup and Konrad (2004) in analyses of 
differing scientific ‘cultures’, contrasting the goals, orientations, practices and 
assumed values typical of each field can be highly revealing.  Other studies develop 
an understanding of broader issues by teasing out differences and shared patterns 
across a range of diverse technoscience areas;  for example, Collins and Pinch (1998a, 
1998b) address a rich spectrum of cases, from cold fusion to Pasteurisation, the space 
shuttle, AIDS, and military technologies in the Gulf War. 
 
Exploration of the benefit claims deployed in support of GM and wind energy 
technologies in New Zealand cannot consider these fields in isolation from the wider 
societal discourses and values frameworks that govern their orientation and 
application.  The thesis addresses projections of benefit from these technologies in 
relation to the norms, myths, assumptions and beliefs that shape science and 
technology trajectories (Winner 1986; Midgley 1992; Sarewitz 1996; Feenberg 1999; 
Greenberg 2001).  The development pathways of GM and wind energy technologies 
show clearly the influence – both enabling and constraining – of such broader societal 
narratives and general concepts of the purposes, potentials and qualities of science 
and technology.  Two such narratives are prominent in the framing of anticipated 
benefits for these fields both in New Zealand and internationally:  firstly, the 
utilitarian economic mode of commercial profitability;  and secondly, the imperatives 
of environmental sustainability. 
 
A broad diversity of analytical and theoretical literatures informs the approach of this 
thesis in addressing the problem of limited attention to expectations in science and 
technology;  these are discussed in the following three chapters.  But the focus of this 
investigation has been strongly shaped by the thinking of two Frenchmen – Pierre 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1990; Robbins 1991; Calhoun et al. 1993; Bourdieu 1999; Brown 
& Szeman 2000; Webb et al. 2002; Bourdieu 2004; Grenfell 2004), and Michel 
Foucault (Foucault 1972, 1980, 1994; Mills 2003; Prior 2004; Motion 2005; Weaver 
et al. 2006; Motion & Leitch 2007; Powers 2007).  Their work has provided practical 
tools and guiding principles for this exploration of the work of benefit projections for 
technoscientific innovation.  Bourdieu’s analysis of the dynamics of social and 
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sectoral fields, in terms of the characteristic habitus of actors and the strategic 
utilisation of symbolic and other forms of capital, offers a robust framework for 
locating specific benefit constructs within their larger contexts.  And Foucault’s focus 
on discourse as the ongoing expression and perpetuation of power relations endorses 
the centrality of rhetorical and strategic positioning in the development, promotion 
and diffusion of new technologies. 
 
Aims 
The primary aim of the thesis is to conduct a critical analysis of the constructions of 
expected benefit that legitimate and shape technological innovation in GM and wind 
energy in New Zealand.  The purpose of this analysis is to understand the influence of 
such benefit framings on research and development trajectories and the diffusion of 
new technologies.  This aim addresses the problem of limited critical attention to the 
ways in which claims of benefit shape policies and decisions, and influence the 
viability and uptake of various technology options. 
 
Supporting this objective and sharpening the focus of inquiry are the secondary aims 
of the thesis: 
1. To explore the ways benefit projections are used as strategic resources in the 
promotion and justification of innovation in contested technology domains, 
specifically with respect to the development and diffusion of particular GM 
and wind energy applications in New Zealand. 
2. To identify and analyse the different registers or qualitative modes of benefit 
in the framing of technoscientific developments (for example, remote future 
benefits of minimising climate change via renewable energy technology as 
distinct from short-term local benefits of commercial profitability of a large 
windfarm). 
3. To identify the fields, sectors and discursive contexts in which different 
frameworks of scientific and technological benefit are deployed and given 
recognition and acceptance (for example, policy, institutional and professional 
fields, commercial business environments, publics and communities). 
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Research questions 
My exploration of the work of benefit claims in the development of GM and wind 
energy technologies in New Zealand is informed by a suite of open-ended inter-
related questions.  These establish a research framework that both focuses on the 
specific claims advanced for particular applications within the two technology fields 
in New Zealand, and orientates and interprets these claims within the larger contexts 
of academic and policy engagement with technoscience. 
 
 How are innovative technologies – such as GM and wind energy in 
New Zealand – framed, positioned and promoted?  Which framings 
and values are advanced by particular groups and actors? 
 What ideals and principles are featured in this promotion to enhance 
the appeal of technoscientific innovation to publics, interested sectors 
and decision-makers?  How do these ideals and values shape the 
development and use of new technologies?  What broader societal 
discourses and narratives are used to validate and valorise the 
expected benefits of the technologies? 
 What kinds of benefits and profits are projected from the 
technologies’ development and application, and which groups and 
interests are targeted or assumed as beneficiaries? 
 What institutional and policy framings, and what practices and 
assumptions of research, policy and regulatory agencies, inform the 
construction of expected benefits and the development of the 
technologies? 
 What kinds of problems, needs and imperatives are referenced in 
advocacy for innovation as requiring the new technologies for their 
solution or amelioration? 
 How are the framings of expected benefit of one technological option 
used strategically to marginalise other technology alternatives and 
potential benefits, and to diminish their appeal or perceived viability? 
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The research approach encapsulated in this series of questions gives both flexibility 
and precision, allowing the identification of key aspects of the ways projections of 
future benefit shape technoscience trajectories, and the significance of the values 
frameworks and assumptions of particular groups and interests.  The thesis 
methodology and process are discussed in detail in Chapter Four. 
 
The next section briefly surveys the official and sectoral environments for science and 
technology in New Zealand, and the orientations of the major areas of academic 
analysis of technoscience fields.  To date, benefit claims for R&D and innovation 
have been largely taken for granted in these domains, and accepted, deployed and 
perpetuated in technoscientific development processes with little critical scrutiny.  
The remaining sections of this chapter address the significance of the thesis, its scope 
and focus, and its structure. 
 
The neglect of benefit projections 
The New Zealand context 
Science and technology, and the opportunities believed to derive from investment and 
development in prioritised fields, are highly valued in New Zealand as in most 
nations.  Governments, public institutions, universities and the private sector assert 
the centrality of science and technology to the nation’s economic prosperity and 
quality of life.  This reflects the modernist narrative of progress and profitable 
improvement that has underpinned Western capitalism since the Industrial Revolution 
and earlier (Winner 1986; Mokyr 1990; Lowenthal 1995; Sarewitz 1996; Greenberg 
2001; Wilsdon & Willis 2004). 
 
In New Zealand this confidence in progress is enshrined in official policy, and 
manifested in an array of institutional, statutory, regulatory and funding provisions to 
support and foster scientific and technological activity.  A predominant focus on 
expectations of economic profitability and growth from technoscientific innovation 
runs strongly through policy and sectoral discourse (Cartner & Bollinger 1997; Leitch 
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& Davenport 2005; Macdonald et al. 2011).10  The value of investing in research and 
technology development is a driving principle or legitimating narrative in policy for 
science and technology generally (New Zealand Government 1996, 2002), and for 
particular fields or sectors (New Zealand Government 2001, 2003; New Zealand 
Trade and Enterprise 2005; New Zealand Government 2007, 2010).  Research 
institutions, science sector advocacy bodies, and organisations representing specific 
disciplinary and professional interests in New Zealand all share the same core belief 
in the essential importance of science and technology to the nation’s future.  For 
example, the Royal Society of New Zealand articulated its commitment to 
technoscientific advance in a determinedly visionary Manifesto document: 
Our science system – embracing innovation, research, science and technology 
– supports all that we seek to achieve in our national life:  prosperity, health, 
sustainability and credibility.  Without a healthy science system we will 
always fall short of those goals (Royal Society of New Zealand 2007, p 8).11 
 
Various government agencies have had responsibility for policy to guide New 
Zealand research and innovation through the first decade of the 21st century (the 
period covered in this thesis).12  Actual R&D activity, and strategic direction-setting 
and decision-making for research in particular technoscience fields, is devolved to the 
Crown Research Institutes (CRIs).  These autonomous state-owned entities each focus 
on a specific research domain, and are tasked with developing knowledge and 
innovations for the benefit of the nation.13  With all these agencies, technoscience 
                                                 
10 These dimensions of New Zealand’s R&D policies and sector orientations are particularly strong in 
biotechnology, and are discussed in detail in Chapter Six. 
11 Established in 1867, the Royal Society works under its own enabling legislation to advance and 
promote science and technology in New Zealand.  It undertakes a broad range of advocacy, 
educational, publishing, advisory and science-sector support roles (www.royalsociety.org.nz ). 
12 These agencies include:  the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (MORST) setting overall 
policy directions;  the Foundation of Research, Science and Technology (FRST) managing science and 
technology funding streams;  other ministries such as the Ministry of Economic Development (MED) 
with responsibility for the nation’s energy policy, and the Ministry for the Environment (MFE) dealing 
with climate change and sustainability;  and regulatory bodies such as the Electricity Commission 
(EC), overseeing New Zealand’s electricity industry, and the Environmental Risk Management 
Authority (ERMA) managing assessment and approval of new organisms and hazardous substances.  
Some of these agencies have more recently been restructured.  In 2010 the Electricity Commission was 
replaced by the Electricity Authority (www.ea.govt.nz ).  In 2011 ERMA was restructured into the 
Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) (www.epa.govt.nz ).  Also in 2011, MORST and FRST 
were amalgamated into the Ministry of Science and Innovation (www.msi.govt.nz ), and in 2012 
further restructuring was announced to combine this agency with the MED and other government 
departments responsible for trade, industry, commerce and labour, to form a new “super-Ministry”, the 
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (www.mbie.govt.nz ). 
13 The CRIs were created in 1992 from the former Department of Scientific and Industrial Research.  
Their role and purposes are defined in the Crown Research Institutes Act 1992, which requires both 
commercial viability as business entities, and that research is undertaken for the benefit of the nation 
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policy is predicated upon the fundamental worthiness and positive value of scientific 
and technological development, as a necessary requirement firstly for economic 
growth and competitiveness, and also for broader societal wellbeing. 
 
Analysis and theory 
Most policy-world and academic analysis of scientific innovation and technology 
development, both in New Zealand and internationally, has focused on four principal 
areas:  issues of risk and risk management;  the character and dynamics of 
sociotechnical systems;  public understanding of science and citizens’ engagement 
with approval and risk management processes;  and the diffusion of innovation.14 
 
While the discussion and conceptualisation of risk from science and technology are 
sometimes posed in relation to the intended benefits, the predominant emphasis of 
analysis and critique has been on describing, ameliorating and communicating risk 
subsequent to approval or release (for example, Beck 1992; Krimsky & Golding 
1992; Tenner 1997; New Zealand Association of Scientists 1998; Beck 1999; Perrow 
1999; Slovic 2000a; Ericson & Doyle 2003).  Public opinion surveys have canvassed 
the relative acceptability of various technoscientific developments, and explored the 
values and concerns behind citizens’ agreement or unease about certain technological 
applications (Coyle et al. 2003; Cook et al. 2004; Cook & Fairweather 2005, 2006; 
Hunt & Fairweather 2006).  However, such surveys present prospective products or 
technologies for acceptability ranking with minimal or no consideration of their 
implicit purposes or societal contexts. 
 
                                                 
(CRI Act s5).  In addition, CRI activities are framed within a Statement of Core Purpose required by 
government in 2010 to provide ‘a clear, explicit and enduring strategic role’ for each institute 
(http://www.morst.govt.nz/current-work/CRI-Taskforce/Statements-of-core-purpose ).  The work of 
each CRI is based around a productive sector of the economy or a grouping of natural resources;  for 
example, AgResearch focuses on biological science for agriculture, Scion on forestry and wood 
products, and the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) on marine and 
freshwater systems and resources (http://www.morst.govt.nz/rst-links/crown-research-institutes/).  The 
three CRIs with most significance for this thesis are AgResearch, Plant and Food Research (formerly 
Crop and Food Research) which focuses on science for crops and vegetables, and Landcare Research 
(Manaaki Whenua) oriented around science for sustainable land management;  their projects in GM 
livestock, vegetables and pest control are discussed in Chapter Six. 
14 Chapters Two and Three provide more detailed discussion of these literatures in terms of their 
relevance for the construction and deployment of projections of benefit from technoscience. 
 14 
The emphasis on risk management in academic, policy and professional domains has 
deflected attention from other dimensions of science and technology development.15  
Risk assessment and mitigation methodologies – the reasons for caution and strict 
regulation – have dominated many technoscientific fields.  But there has not been an 
equivalent critical focus on the originating impetus for R&D enterprises – the reasons 
for enthusiasm and investment, for taking a risk in the first place.  Attending to the 
concepts of projected benefit driving technoscientific trajectories has effectively been 
foreclosed by the more pressing demands of anticipating and managing possible 
adverse outcomes: 
[W]e possess far better developed tools and criteria for thinking about the 
potential… risks of a new technology and how they may be reduced than [for] 
considering social benefit…  The issue of promised social benefits has been 
systematically excluded from established regulatory processes (Williams 
2005, p 17). 
 
A growing field within risk studies centres on processes for better communication 
between technical elites and publics, and on ways to recognise or to manage the 
concerns of citizens, environmental and health groups, and some scientists and policy 
actors about potentially risky developments (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1992; Wynne 1992; 
Sclove 1995; Cronin 2003a; Gough 2003a).  Recently there have been calls for 
improved ‘upstream’ consultation and public engagement about new science and its 
applications, particularly nanotechnology (Wilsdon & Willis 2004; Macnaghten et al. 
2005; Wilsdon et al. 2005; Kearnes et al. 2006; European Commission 2007; Pidgeon 
et al. 2009).16  However, this literature, focused on advocacy for citizen participation, 
offers only limited critical analysis of the frameworks of anticipated benefit used to 
justify technoscientific development. 
 
An extensive field of science and technology studies explores the intricacies of 
science and technology development as sociotechnical systems.  These analyses 
explain the complex interactions and dynamics of societal, sectoral and technical 
realms.  Key theoretical frameworks include Actor Network Theory (Latour & 
                                                 
15 There has been little reflexive consideration of the effects of the dominance of risk framings in 
official and public discourses around technologies and their application (Winner 1986, pp 148-154). 
16 Williams (2005, pp 15-16) notes that the widespread assumptions about such ‘upstream’ focus – that 
it will enhance public acceptance of technoscientific innovations and help to forestall controversy and 
opposition – are as yet unproven. 
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Woolgar 1979; Latour 1987, 1992; Law 1992), and the social construction of 
technological systems (Bijker et al. 1987; Hughes 1989; Bijker & Law 1992a; Bijker 
1995; Kline & Pinch 1999; Hughes 2004; Dattée & Weil 2007).  Other work has 
developed valuable analytical concepts such as technological regimes or paradigms 
(Dosi 1982; Green et al. 1999; Perez 2002; Barben 2007; Vanloqueren & Baret 2009), 
and technology pathways and life cycles (Garud & Karnøe 2001b; Kaplan & Tripsas 
2008).  Other science and technology scholars have focused on institutional, structural 
and governance dimensions of science and technology (Gibbons et al. 1994; de la 
Mothe 2001; Nowotny et al. 2001; de la Mothe 2004), or on epistemological cultures 
and ideals (Midgley 1992; Lenoir 1997; Knorr Cetina 1999; Lightman et al. 2003).  
This work illuminates the richness of science and technology as inextricably 
embedded in human social constructs and value frameworks, but the influence of 
benefit projections on the directions and practice of technological research and 
development has thus far received little attention. 
 
A vast range of theoretical work has also developed around the public understanding 
of science.17  This has been accompanied by an expanding literature on public 
involvement in science and technology decision making.  Matters highlighted in these 
areas of science and technology studies include processes for citizens and user groups 
to be recognised and heard, and to participate in the management of science and 
technology (Frankenfeld 1992; Funtowicz & Ravetz 1992; Irwin 1995; Sclove 1995; 
Rappert 1999a; Macnaghten et al. 2005; von Hippel 2005; Kearnes et al. 2006; 
European Commission 2007).  Other concerns include balancing and bridging the 
differences between elite or expert science and lay knowledges (Ravetz 1986; Otway 
1992; von Winterfeldt 1992; Wynne 1992, 1996; Slovic 2000c; Schot & De la 
Bruhèze 2003), and improving communication about science and technology and risk 
(Nelkin 1995; Gregory & Miller 1998; Allan et al. 2000; Priest 2001; Cronin 2003a; 
Gough 2003a; France & Gilbert 2005).  The insights emerging through this literature 
build understanding of the ways science and technology are discursively and socially 
constructed and contested.  However, there has been little analysis of the dynamics of 
                                                 
17 Advocacy for improved public understanding of science and technology is often predicated on the 
assumption that this is a prerequisite for public support and acceptance of new developments and 
products.  This framework of belief, the (in)famous Deficit Model, has been comprehensively 
challenged, but still persists in much science and policy discourse (Wynne 1992; Irwin 1995; Irwin & 
Wynne 1996; Sarewitz 1996; Wilsdon et al. 2005; Kearnes et al. 2006). 
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benefit projections in public interactions with science and technology, or of the 
diverse and divergent framings of value underpinning different groups’ and sectors’ 
concepts of benefit. 
 
Articulating the intended positive outcomes of research and technology development 
is logically the business of business, and researchers associated with different sectors 
and with economic policy.  There is a considerable and insightful literature on the 
diffusion of technological innovation to maximise adoption and commercial 
opportunities.  This work is useful in its exploration of the processes of development 
and spread of innovations through particular sectors and wider societies (Utterback 
1994; Dosi & Lovallo 1997; Bassanini & Dosi 2001; Garud & Karnøe 2001b; Allen 
2003; Franklin 2003; Hargadon 2003; Rogers 2003; Chakravorti 2004; Petrick & 
Echols 2004; Coburn 2006; Montalvo 2006; Berkun 2007; Van de Ven et al. 2008), 
and its analysis of the dynamics of the economic dimensions of science and 
technology trajectories (Rosenberg et al. 1992; Rosenberg 1994; Mowery & 
Rosenberg 1998).  The distinction between radical, disruptive science and technology 
and more conventional developments is a key finding (Gooley & Towers 1996; 
Christensen 1997).  However, the majority of these studies focus on the diffusion 
process and on fostering markets, acceptance and profitability for promising new 
products.  Their commercial and promotional orientation gives little scope for 
questioning the assumptions of benefit and desirability underpinning technoscientific 
innovation:  ‘Such “why” questions about adoption have seldom been probed 
effectively by diffusion researchers’ (Rogers 2003, p 115). 
 
Of more direct relevance to the research concerns of this thesis is the emergent 
literature focusing on expectations in science and technology fields (for example, van 
Lente 1993; Brown et al. 2000a; Brown & Michael 2003; Sturken et al. 2004; Brown 
2006).  This work analyses the strategic and performative functions of expectation 
and promise in the promotion and introduction of new science and technology.  The 
importance of projections of future outcomes from science and technology is 
emphasised by van Lente (1993, 2000) and colleagues in the Netherlands and the UK 
(Brown et al. 2000b; Brown et al. 2003; Borup & Konrad 2004; Brown et al. 2005).  
These scholars trace the influence of projected futures in technology trajectories, 
helping to secure funding and other political and sectoral support.  Other studies 
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analyse the rhetorical construction of futures, and their role in building persuasive 
visions and narratives to foster acceptance and uptake of innovation (Brown 2000; 
Deuten & Rip 2000; Wyatt 2000; Nye 2004; Turkle 2004; Hedgecoe & Martin 2008).  
The wider societal, sectoral and ideological dimensions of science and technology 
expectations have been outlined by Winner (2004), Sarewitz (1996), and others 
(Michael 2000b; Hedgecoe & Martin 2003; Lightman et al. 2003; Sturken & Thomas 
2004).  And the Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes at Arizona State 
University has a specific focus on analysing the impacts and effects of science and 
technology, and linkages with desired societal outcomes.18 
 
There is, however, little awareness in New Zealand policy and science and technology 
environments, or in wider public discourse, of this work on expectations and the 
justificatory frameworks underpinning technological innovation.  Two modes or 
stances towards technoscience prevail:  the enthusiastic embracing of R&D and new 
technologies and products as the pathway to economic prosperity and growth, or 
sceptical opposition based around issues of potential risks and inadequate public 
engagement with technoscientific decision-making processes.  This typical 
polarisation offers little opportunity to develop understanding of the dynamics of 
research and technology trajectories, and the ways benefit projections influence 
technoscientific developments, policies, orientations and outcomes. 
 
Significance 
This thesis aims to redress the lack of critical attention to constructions of benefit 
from scientific research and technology development, via discussion of the benefit 
claims advanced for two technological fields in New Zealand.  The thesis contributes 
to the emergent literature on technological expectations, bringing a unique New 
Zealand perspective to the recent international work addressing these important 
dimensions of science and technology.  My analysis of the role of benefit claims in 
the trajectories of GM and wind energy in New Zealand is a specifically local 
application of – and an addition to – emerging international theory on expectations in 
science and technology.  The thesis makes a novel contribution by linking the 
                                                 
18 See http://www.cspo.org/ . 
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concepts developed in this new research field to specific New Zealand technology 
innovations.  This study is also intended as a contribution to the broader academic 
fields of the sociological study of science and technology, with relevance and interest 
both for New Zealand scholarship and for those studying similar issues of 
technological development elsewhere in the world. 
 
The thesis also develops a preliminary conceptual toolkit for the critical analysis and 
deconstruction of new scientific and technological developments, that may be useful 
for citizens, interested groups and research, policy and regulatory communities in 
their interactions with these processes.  By focusing on framings and discourses of 
expected benefit, the thesis offers a different analytical approach for engagement with 
issues of technological innovation and social and environmental futures, an approach 
that has not yet been undertaken in the New Zealand context.  Understanding how 
benefit projections are strategically deployed will add to the critical repertoires of all 
actors in contested technology innovation fields, and help the development of more 
critically informed and socially useful debate. 
 
Scope and focus 
Given that this thesis addresses the role of expectations of benefit in advancing 
technological innovation, it is also important to have clear expectations about the 
thesis itself. 
 
The focus of this inquiry is strictly around the discursive and strategic constructions 
of expected benefit from technology developments in two fields, GM and wind 
energy in New Zealand.  Other important aspects of technological innovation are 
considered only briefly and only from the perspective of how they might better inform 
analysis and understanding of the work of benefit claims.19  These include such 
strongly developed and interesting academic fields as the analysis and assessment of 
risk, the democratic participation of publics in processes of technology approval, or 
the interactions and relationships forming technoscientific networks. 
 
                                                 
19 Issues of methodology and focus are discussed in Chapter Four. 
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There are also important constraints of time and space on the methodological aspects 
of the research.  This study concentrates on only two selected technological fields – 
GM and wind energy – and furthermore, on particular projects or exemplary cases 
within those fields in New Zealand.20  The focus on these examples facilitates 
appropriate depth and detail in the analysis, but there are inevitably limitations in the 
New Zealand location and the choice of these technologies.  Many other interesting 
and potentially fruitful examples of scientific and technological benefit framings, both 
in New Zealand and internationally, might equally have been useful for analysis – for 
example such innovation-rich technoscience fields as nanotechnology, biofuels, 
sustainable architecture and building construction, or mobile communications. 
 
A number of studies have used ethnomethodological approaches – where a social 
scientist is ‘embedded’ within science and technology institutions or laboratories to 
study practice and paradigms at close range (for example, Latour & Woolgar 1979; 
Knorr Cetina 1999).  However, this technique was neither possible nor appropriate for 
this project’s focus on the larger societal and sectoral frameworks of expected benefit 
underpinning science and technology development.  Nor were the methods of 
quantitative surveys and questionnaires suitable for this study’s inherently qualitative, 
exploratory approach.21 
 
The third area where the scope and approach of this research should be clarified is its 
stance towards the phenomena and issues under consideration.  This study might be 
assumed to be based in an anti-science or anti-technology stance.  But exploration and 
critique of the discourses of benefit driving new technoscientific developments is not 
the same as opposition or hostility to innovation.  The thesis is not intended as fuel for 
activists campaigning against GM or windfarms.  However, neither does this research 
aim to advocate for scientific and technological innovation, whether generically or for 
particular fields or cases.  While focusing on the benefits anticipated from new 
                                                 
20 The original scoping for the thesis also considered a third technology field – intensive irrigation for 
the conversion of dry agricultural landscapes to dairy farming.  It was soon obvious that this would be a 
thesis topic in itself and the decision was made to focus on GM and wind energy. 
21 The principles underpinning the choice of a qualitative methodology are discussed in detail in 
Chapter Four.  While many practitioners in the two technology fields in New Zealand were interviewed 
for this thesis, discussions were necessarily open-ended and wide-ranging, given the lack of previous 
academic attention to issues of benefit projections and the freshness of these questions to interviewees. 
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science and technology might suggest a purpose of promotion or endorsement, such 
assertions and assumptions are the subject of this thesis, not its objective. 
 
Furthermore, the thesis does not assess the actual validity of any of the claims of 
expected benefit offered by advocates for technological innovation in the two fields in 
New Zealand or generally.  This would require extended timeframes and specialist 
expertise in arcane technological, economic and policy areas.  Moreover, debunking 
science and technology ‘hype’ is, while an interesting and entertaining process, not 
the focus of this thesis (Konrad, 2006).  Evaluating actual outcomes against earlier 
plans or projections is a long-term task for investors and managers of science and 
technology programmes.  The focus of this thesis is on the immediate, present-day 
performative work of assertions of future benefit.  The future is inherently contingent 
and uncertain, and hopeful claims or projections of future states cannot be reliably 
substantiated until some later point in time.  The thesis can only consider the 
influence of such rhetorical and strategic constructions on current science and 
technology development processes. 
 
The thesis structure 
This chapter has introduced the questions and problems that will be explored in the 
thesis.  These aspects of technoscience processes have received little attention to date, 
although the influence of projections of intended benefit on R&D and innovation is 
often profound.  The focus of this research on the workings of benefit claims in the 
fields of GM and wind energy development in New Zealand is intended to contribute 
towards knowledge of these dimensions of science and technology. 
 
Chapters Two and Three survey the academic literatures.  Chapter Two focuses on the 
frameworks of belief and expectation that shape societal enterprises such as 
technoscience development.  Embedded and naturalised in the paradigms and values 
of fields, these patterns of orientation are manifested in common narratives or myths 
that guide and govern activity.  Chapter Two describes three such stories of science 
and technology – framings of R&D as the source of prosperity and societal wellbeing, 
as a desperate competitive race, and as a teleological linear progression.  Chapter 
Three explores the strategic side of benefit projections in technoscience processes, 
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and the performative work of expectations in legitimating research and innovation, 
and securing support for development activity. 
 
Chapter Four outlines the methodology of this thesis, and the theoretical approaches 
from which I have drawn useful tools and principles for my analysis of benefit claims 
in the two New Zealand fields.  This chapter describes my engagement with the 
academic literatures and primary documents, and discusses the process of interviews 
with sector actors. 
 
Chapter Five tells the story of the introduction of wind energy technologies in New 
Zealand.  The promotion of this innovation in the New Zealand electricity sector, and 
in the international evolution of the wind industry, is strongly associated with 
environmental benefits.  However the chapter shows that the pragmatic requirements 
of business interests have been powerfully influential on the diffusion of wind energy, 
which has largely been established in the form of large commercial windfarms that 
align with the priorities of dominant groups.  Alternative modes of this technology 
offering other kinds of benefits have had limited uptake, and are relegated to “fringe” 
applications. 
 
Chapter Six follows the justification of GM research in New Zealand through multiple 
projections of anticipated benefit and multiple strands of research.  The various areas 
of scientific endeavour in this field demonstrate the heterogeneity of benefit claims;  
however, New Zealand’s regulatory systems for research on new organisms establish 
a relatively narrow range of criteria for approval.  Work on GM vegetables and on 
biopharmaceutical potentials from GM livestock is associated strongly with economic 
objectives, although health and environmental benefits are also claimed.  The 
uniquely New Zealand application of GM techniques to develop radically new 
biocontrol tools for environmental pest management, was focused around the primary 
aim of biodiversity protection.  But this research was also mixed with economic 
frameworks of value, in the intended contribution of the proposed biocontrols to the 
New Zealand dairy industry. 
 
Chapter Seven cuts across the two technoscience fields to consider some of the 
underlying issues.  This chapter explores the strategic association of benefit claims 
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with various drivers, needs and problems as incentives for innovation.  The 
differences and tensions between economic and altruistic, public-good frameworks of 
intended benefit are discussed.  This chapter concludes by considering the 
vulnerabilities of benefit claims, when despite the confidence typical of sector 
rhetorics and positioning, the momentum of R&D programmes can not be sustained. 
 
Chapter Eight offers a brief assessment of the key findings of the research, and 
suggests ways forward where the thesis might contribute to further scholarship and to 
the challenges of community engagement with technoscience innovation processes. 
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Chapter Two 
Frames and narratives 
 
Introduction 
This thesis investigates expectations of future benefits from new technoscience 
developments, and explores the implications of these constructs of benefit for R&D 
trajectories and the kinds of technologies that result.  The focus is on benefit claims 
advanced for two fields of innovation in New Zealand, GM and wind energy, and the 
ways these projections are framed within the broader contexts of societal attitudes and 
institutional support for science and technology. 
 
This chapter and the next develop the theoretical basis for this assessment of benefit 
claims for technological innovation.  Chapter One briefly surveyed a range of studies 
of science and technology, and argued that the significance of benefit projections in 
technology advancement has not yet received much detailed academic scrutiny.  The 
thesis now returns to the scholarly literatures, to identify key theoretical insights for 
understanding the significance of benefit expectations for science and technology 
generally, and for particular developments in GM and wind energy in New Zealand. 
 
The construction and deployment of projections of expected benefit from 
technoscience are inherently matters of ideology and rhetoric, of ‘how people are 
made to believe and behave and… how to persuade others’ (Latour 1987, p 30).  
Benefit claims are reifications – scenarios of desirable future states, and strategic 
expressions of purpose and intent.  Analysis of such abstract, contingent, relational 
constructs requires attention to frameworks of meaning and value – the norms, ideals, 
interests and power relations governing the activity and orientation of technoscience.  
This chapter and the next bring together a synthesis of theoretical approaches to 
provide a foundation for the thesis’s exploration and analysis of these phenomena in 
the two New Zealand fields.  Interpretational tools are drawn from the sociologies of 
expectation and of science and technology, from studies of the diffusion of 
innovations, and from studies of discourse and power. 
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This chapter focuses on the patterns of assumption and expectation that shape 
technoscience innovation.  Widely shared amongst actors in science sectors, policy 
environments and the wider public, these guiding narratives or frameworks of 
meaning are deeply embedded in the practice and orientation of fields.  They are 
thoroughly naturalised, and taken for granted as part of science and technology 
processes and outcomes.  Reflecting the priorities, perspectives and interests of 
different social and sectoral groups, such patterns can be powerfully influential – 
although they are not uncontested, with considerable heterogeneity in the framings of 
purpose and value shaping technoscience.  Some narratives, however, have long been 
established as “master stories” of science and technology, dominating sectoral and 
societal expectations, and determining the direction of R&D trajectories.  The chapter 
discusses three dominant narratives with particular salience for benefit projections:  
technoscience as the essential driver of economic growth and societal wellbeing;  
technoscience as an urgent, ruthlessly compulsive competition;  and technoscience as 
a rational process of linear, teleological development. 
 
The next chapter then addresses the theoretical dimensions of the performative work 
of constructs of benefit for technoscience.  The focus in Chapter Three is on benefit 
projections as strategic resources for the advancement of R&D and innovation – 
valuable assets in contested, competitive science and technology domains.  That 
chapter surveys scholarly analysis that illuminates the role of benefit claims in 
securing societal, sectoral and political support for research and new technologies.  As 
the stories of GM and wind energy in New Zealand will show in Chapters Five and 
Six, the assertion of anticipated benefits is central to the processes through which 
some technological options achieve acceptance and uptake rather than others. 
 
Making meaning 
Every society, community or specialist group is both constituted within and shaped by 
a suite of foundational beliefs and assumptions about itself, its purposes and activities.  
The contexts for any human enterprise begin with structures of meaning that sustain 
direction and commitment, signal ideals and aspirations, and foster identity and group 
cohesion.  Ubiquitous and enduring, these core beliefs exert enormous influence;  
Bourdieu (2004, p 15) describes them as ‘the equivalent of a language or a culture: 
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[determining] the questions that can be asked and those that are excluded, the 
thinkable and the unthinkable’.  Such structures are central to the concepts of value, 
utility and desirability that underpin projections of future benefit from particular 
activities or societal choices.  They are thus the logical starting point for analysis of 
the benefits anticipated from science and technology. 
 
Many sociological and political studies have explored the significance of such deeply 
embedded ideological frameworks,  examining the ways they shape and affirm 
activity, purpose and expectations.  Such structures of belief are often termed 
“myths”, indicating their symbolic, cultural, emotional and psychological power 
(Sarewitz 1996, p 10-13; Holton 2000, pp 88-89).  For Midgley (2003, p 4) such 
frameworks of meaning are both teleological, asserting the goals and ideals towards 
which activity is oriented, and epistemological, ‘shaping the world-pictures that 
determine… the standards by which we judge what is possible and plausible’ 
(Midgley 1992, p 15).  Myths are useful as essential hermeneutic frameworks that 
assist sense-making, establish priorities and enable decisions and action:  ‘The way 
that we view the world determines the way that we draw our maps;  the way we draw 
our maps will determine the paths we can follow’ (Sarewitz 1996, p 191).   Analyses 
of these kinds of societal frameworks highlight their close inter-connections with 
power and the interests of dominant groups (for example, Fiske 1998, p 306; Hall 
1998, pp 1050-1052).  A key theme is the way such constructs and patterns are 
rendered invisible, normalised and naturalised as “common sense” or “the way things 
are”.  Hall (1998, pp 1055-1057) describes this as ‘the reality effect’: 
[T]he inventory of traditional ideas, the forms of episodic thinking which 
provide us with the taken-for-granted elements of our practical knowledge…  
this “deep structure” of presuppositions [is] rarely made explicit and [is] 
largely unconscious. 
 
The construction of value and meaning is a central concern in the work of Michel 
Foucault (1972, 1980, 1994; Mills 2003; Motion & Leitch 2007).  A Foucauldian 
critical approach questions ‘what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, 
unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought’ are the basis for practice and societal 
orientations (Leitch & Motion 2007, p 72).  Foucault’s analysis of the dynamics of 
power in discourse and institutional structures illuminates the processes by which 
norms, knowledge and legitimacy are socially produced (Foucault 1980, pp 89-90, 98-
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99, 114, 131-133; Mills 2003, pp 5, 23-28, 55-65; Motion 2005, pp 505-506; Leitch & 
Motion 2007, p 75).  For Foucault, discourse is an active, purposeful exercise: 
[D]iscourse is not a slender surface of contact… between a reality and a 
language… Of course, discourses are composed of signs;  but what they do is 
more than use these signs to designate things… [Discourses are] practices that 
systematically form the objects of which they speak (Foucault 1972, p 54). 
 
Discourse, in a Foucauldian sense, is understood as much more than texts, statements 
and other communications that articulate and convey meaning.  Mills (2003, p 55) 
describes discourse as ‘a system which structures the way we perceive reality… [and] 
constrains our perceptions’;  Motion and Weaver (2005, p 52) explain it as ‘the 
vehicle through which power and truth circulate’.  Foucault argued that every society 
or group functions according to its own ‘regime of truth’ (1980, p 131), the kinds of 
discourse and expectation that are accepted and valorised, establishing ‘a symbolic 
and constitutive system that structures knowledge and social practice’ (Weaver et al. 
2006, p 18).  He stressed the ways that particular discourses of science, at various 
periods through history, determine the boundaries of possibility: 
[S]hared presuppositions and theoretical frameworks which organise thought, 
representation and categorisation…  discursive frameworks and pressures 
which operate across a social body and… condition how people think, know 
and write (Mills 2003, p 63). 
 
Such frameworks are thoroughly entrenched in the activities, ideals and assumptions 
of the group or community holding them, having ‘a solidity and a normality which it 
is often difficult to question’ (Mills 2003, p 56).  But for Foucault, it was crucially 
important to expose and challenge such taken-for-granted patterns, and the power 
relations they perpetuate:  ‘There is a battle “for truth”, or at least… a battle about the 
status of truth and the economic and political role it plays’ (Foucault 1980, p 132). 
 
The inevitability of these kinds of frameworks is also central to the sociological 
theory of Pierre Bourdieu, who considered that ‘all perceptions, visions, beliefs, 
expectations, hopes, etc, are socially structured and socially conditioned’ (2004, p 95).  
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus encapsulates the internalised systems of meaning 
shaping beliefs, expectations, identity, institutions and practice – in a word, all that is 
habitual: 
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[A] system of acquired dispositions functioning on the practical level as 
categories of perception and assessment or as classificatory principles as well 
as being the organizing principles of action (Bourdieu 1990, p 13). 
 
Habitus is embedded in the assumptions and values of individual actors and groups, 
and functions largely subconsciously as a taken-for-granted suite of norms and ideals 
(Webb et al. 2002, pp 33-34, 38-40).  The patterns that comprise habitus are often 
beneath reflective awareness;  according to Grenfell (2004, pp 166-167), they ‘hide 
their provenance, the values they represent, and the interests they ultimately serve’.  
Comprehensively internalised, habitus influences outcomes in the absence of any 
specific intention or overt imposition (Bourdieu 1990, pp 11-12, 107-109; Calhoun 
1993, pp 71-74; Bourdieu 1999, pp 109-111; Holton 2000, pp 88-89).22  It is 
expressed in guiding narratives that establish (or presume) direction and purpose, and 
determine the ideas and activities that are acceptable, praiseworthy or even plausible 
within a group, professional field, or community (Bourdieu 1990, pp 108-111; 1999, 
pp 108-109, 113; Grenfell 2004, pp 25-29, 129, 166-167).23 
 
The particular habitus of science is the focus of Bourdieu’s analysis of the practices 
and norms of research communities (2004, pp 38, 41-42).  He shows strongly 
influential frameworks of thinking orienting the direction and practice of research, 
and constraining options and possibilities.  These patterns of expectation are, 
however, ‘largely invisible and never questioned’ (2004, p 65).  Moreover, the 
scientific habitus demands not merely competence in the field or specific discipline, 
                                                 
22 The way such dispositions or value frameworks are socially acquired is central to their effectiveness 
in guiding action and legitimating orientations.  Habitus is absorbed through an ongoing process of 
lived experience in the culture or field, and exposure to that group’s characteristic modes of action and 
ideas of appropriateness (Bourdieu 1990, pp 9-14, 90-91; Robbins 1991, p 107). 
23 Habitus encapsulates the “fit” between people and the social and professional communities within 
which they live and function.  Robbins (1991, p 54)explains these symbiotic linkages as ‘a reciprocal 
relationship between the structures of thought within a society and the institutional structures which 
both reflect and generate the thought’.  For Bourdieu, habitus becomes evident in the dynamics of 
fields – the social groups whose actions, identities and institutions express and perpetuate these norms 
(Bourdieu 1990, p 14; Calhoun 1993, p 72; Postone et al. 1993, pp 2-3, 6; Bourdieu 2002, pp 299-300).  
A basic principle is the co-construction of fields and habitus in the ongoing interactions between 
paradigms and practice, orientations and structure (LiPuma 1993, pp 15-17; Postone et al. 1993, p 4; 
Grenfell 2004, pp 27-28).  This mutual interaction is a feature of other models, notably Giddens’ theory 
of structuration (Giddens 2002).  His work explains the structure of fields as ‘both the medium and the 
outcome of the practices that constitute [social] systems’ (2002, p 238), and highlights the ways 
structure both constrains and enables action (Craib 1992, p 34; Kaspersen 2000, p 43).  Other studies 
also draw attention to the two-way mutual influence of interconnections between structure and action, 
frameworks and orientations, in relation to the evolution of technological systems (for example, 
Winner 1986, pp 47-50; van Lente 1993, pp 30-32; Barben 2007, p 56). 
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but also a fundamental faith in the worthiness and utility of science generically (2004, 
p 50).  Such ingrained assumptions of the inherent value of technoscience – as a way 
of relating to the world, developing knowledge and addressing societal needs – run 
deep in the discourse of research and policy communities, and help to sustain 
projections of future benefit from R&D and innovation. 
 
Bourdieu’s critique of science as a ‘a field like others’ (2004, p 3) takes concepts 
developed in analyses of other social worlds as equally pertinent in research sectors 
(Postone et al. 1993, p 3).  The New Zealand science and technology sectors studied 
in this thesis – and their associated political, policy, corporate, professional and 
stakeholder communities – comprise an inter-related cluster of fields characterised by 
the kinds of ideological and normative patterns discussed in the work of Foucault and 
Bourdieu.24  Studies of technoscience processes and trajectories highlight the ways 
that orientation and purpose are shaped by such frameworks, deeply internalised by 
actors and in institutional structures in these fields.  For example, Seidman (2004, p 
60) explains the powerful influence of such patterns of expectation on R&D 
processes: 
Reality is always filtered through… a series of assumptions about the nature of 
the world…  These overarching, cohering frameworks are… pivotal in 
scientific research.  They guide our problem selection;  they frame what we 
see. 
 
Critical analysis of the dynamics of science and technology has produced a range of 
models to explain practice and developments in these fields.  Kuhn’s concept of 
scientific paradigms, originally argued in the early 1960s, has been enormously 
influential (Kuhn 1996).25  Analysing the emergence and evolution of major 
frameworks of meaning, purpose and utility in scientific work, Kuhn defines a 
paradigm as ‘the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by 
                                                 
24 For Bourdieu, fields extend beyond the immediate professional groups or sites to encompass wider 
social networks and frameworks (Bourdieu 2004, pp 32-33).  Fields are broadly defined as the diverse 
contexts that sustain identity and practice:  ‘a series of institutions, rules, rituals, conventions… 
which… produce and authorise certain discourses and activities’ (Webb et al. 2002, pp 21-22). 
25 The general applicability of this concept to other fields is acknowledged in Kuhn’s 1969 “Postscript” 
to his original work (Kuhn 1996, pp 208-209).  The usefulness of Kuhn’s paradigm model to describe 
technological developments is well-recognised (for example, Michael 2000a, p 6; Kaplan & Tripsas 
2008, p 793; Vanloqueren & Baret 2009, p 972). 
 29 
members of a given community’ (1996, p 175).26  Kuhnian paradigms comprise more 
than just knowledge and systems of knowing;  they incorporate professional and 
institutional structures and cultures, practices, goals and objectives, expectations, and 
assumptions of the value and benefit of particular science programmes.  Paradigms 
guide the directions and trajectories of research activity, establishing which kinds of 
problems, methods and solutions are considered significant, useful, and 
epistemologically legitimate at that time in that field (1996, pp 37-38, 109, 184).27 
 
The normative aspects of scientific and technological frameworks are highlighted in 
numerous studies.  Shared mindsets and assumptions of actors within development 
and innovation fields determine the kinds of questions and goals given priority, and 
the kinds of benefits sought:  ‘A technological paradigm defines an idea of “progress” 
by embodying prescriptions on the directions of technological change to pursue and 
those to neglect’ (Vanloqueren & Baret 2009, p 972).  These underlying patterns of 
expectation are manifested through narratives, ‘imaginaries’, ‘stories’ or ‘maps’ for 
technoscientific development, guiding decisions and policies and constraining actors’ 
concepts of what might be possible (Marcus 1995, pp 3-4; Sarewitz 1996, pp 190-
191; Van Dijck 1998, pp 10-23; Deuten & Rip 2000, p 77; Kearnes et al. 2006, pp 13, 
16-17, 28-33; Sunder Rajan 2006, Chapters 3 & 5).  The European Commission 
(2007, Chapter 7) focuses on the influence of such ‘master narratives’ and 
‘imaginaries’ of science and technology: 
These are not ‘merely’ stories or fictions.  They are an important part of the 
cultural and institutional fabric, of taken-for-granted aspects of social order…  
[T]hey intersect dynamically with the material, institutional, economic, 
technical and cultural forms of society… and reinforce collective 
aspirations…  [Narratives] tacitly define the horizons of possible and 
acceptable action… [and] serve simultaneously as prior framing, starting 
point, justification, and mode of sense-making for the policy domain 
(European Commission 2007, pp 12, 73, 76). 
 
Particular ‘visions’ or framings of potential can have profound effects on the kinds of 
goals envisaged and the technoscientific pathways followed by entire sectors 
                                                 
26 Kuhn also acknowledges a second meaning of the term ‘paradigm’ as the past achievements of 
research which, as exemplars, serve as a basis for the solution of problems in normal, as distinct from 
revolutionary, science (1996, pp 179, 187). 
27 The processes of a ‘paradigm shift’, where an established framework comes under pressure and 
eventually changes to a new mode and orientation, are discussed in Chapter Three. 
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including research teams, industry, and policy and regulatory systems (Hedgecoe & 
Martin 2003, pp 331, 349, 355-357).  Incorporating crucial assumptions about the 
future and about potential alternatives, such interpretive frames govern the evaluation 
of options, and determine the plausibility of possible projected solutions and benefits 
(Kaplan & Tripsas 2008, pp 791-792).  For Davies Burns (2000, pp 302-303), the 
distinctive discourse of a particular technoscientific field: 
…stabilizes a technology by internalizing uncritical acceptance of its practices 
and compliance with its values and beliefs…  [A]n established technological 
Discourse delineates a circumscribed region of the “search space” for 
conceivable innovations (capitalisation in original). 
 
Such frameworks have enduring influence from their basis in the social and 
psychological realms described by Bourdieu as habitus.  Tenaciously embedded 
within R&D fields and in policy and public discourses, these paradigmatic constructs 
serve deep societal needs, offering reassurance, confidence and optimism in the 
capacities and effectiveness of technoscience.  Van Lente (1993, pp 150-152; 2000, 
pp 44-46) borrows a term from linguistics, ideographs, for such conceptual structures;  
self-sufficient encapsulations of more complex drivers, they are sufficiently flexible 
to achieve wide acceptance and legitimacy.  Such frameworks’ durability can be seen 
as a circular self-perpetuating process driven by a collective investment in their 
credibility:  ‘Myths are often more satisfying to us than the truth, which explains their 
longevity and resistance to facts:  we want to believe that they’re true’ (Berkun 2007, 
p 6).  Addington (2003, p 104) suggests that the deeply entrenched ‘ideological 
underpinnings’ of some technologies mean that these systems, and expectations 
associated with them, are ‘not allowed to fail’.  The seductive power of such 
structures of belief about research and technological innovation helps to explain their 
persistence in the face of such challenges as inadequately managed risks, inequitable 
distribution of benefits and problems, or simple failure of a technology to deliver 
(Tenner 1997; Franklin 2003; Berkun 2007, pp 136-144).28  These frameworks of 
assumed value and benefit have a resilience quite independent of the actual outcomes 
of R&D and the performance of innovations (Wynne 2003, p 6; Grossman 2004, pp 
                                                 
28 Some analyses focus sceptically on such patterns of faith in terms of their function in helping secure 
finance and support for technoscience.  Greenberg (2001, p 6) critiques them as ‘self-serving political 
myths and fables of science’.  Mirowski (2012) describes the dynamics of R&D promotion as a ‘Ponzi 
scheme’.  Similar patterns are identified behind the self-generating momentum of the (in)famous 
Moore’s Law for the incremental expansion of capacities in computer technology:  ‘[the law] may be 
true because we insist that it be so’ (Barlow 2004, pp 181-182). 
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191-193; Seidman 2004, p 60).  For Sarewitz (1996, p 10), the confidence of policy-
makers and publics in technoscience is sustained by: 
powerful and oft-heard arguments that… are widely subscribed to and 
commonly repeated, even though they are not derived from well-developed 
empirical or theoretical foundations.  They are, at root, expressions of 
ideology and tools of political advocacy, accepted and expressed as truth. 
 
To sum up, the strongly normative influence of frameworks of expectation in 
technoscientific fields is a key factor in the processes by which concepts of benefit are 
affirmed in the advancement of R&D and technological innovation.  The kinds of 
benefits asserted as justification for developments in GM and wind energy in New 
Zealand emerge from the broader frameworks of purpose prevailing in these fields 
and for science and technology generically.  In turn, benefit projections for particular 
technology options contribute to the consolidation and hegemonic acceptance of those 
wider narratives. 
 
Such frameworks of expectation and value are tenaciously pervasive forces in 
technoscience in New Zealand and internationally.  However, such patterns are rarely 
recognised or acknowledged.  Their influence – on framings of intended benefit, 
research trajectories and technology applications – is largely subliminal, taken for 
granted as part of the process of technoscientific development.  Nevertheless, they are 
unavoidable – in the overall orientations of R&D, in the stated purposes and intended 
outcomes of science programmes and particular technology applications, and in 
broader claims of the generic societal beneficence of technoscience.  Assumptions of 
the worthiness of some research pathways and technology applications, and the 
diminished credibility or appeal of less favoured alternatives, are already pre-
established within these paradigmatic contexts. 
 
Chapters Five and Six follow the influence of such priorities as economic 
competitiveness, and the utilitarian application of innovation to solve environmental 
problems.  Developments in New Zealand are patterned within wider societal and 
sectoral frameworks of assumption that determine perceptions of utility and benefit, 
and strengthen the appeal of some options and applications over others.  With wind 
energy, sector expectations of commercial profitability and political imperatives 
related to global environmental sustainability have resulted in this technology finding 
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acceptance in the form of large centrally-feeding windfarms.  Belief in the necessity 
of sustaining an active biotechnology capacity in New Zealand has supported GM 
research activity.  These technologies’ trajectories, the forms they have taken in New 
Zealand, and the kinds of benefits claimed for their development, reflect the 
presuppositions of the fields in which they have evolved.  But there is seldom any 
acknowledgement of the ways these larger social and sectoral frameworks of meaning 
and value have shaped the directions and outcomes of R&D in these fields.  As 
Wynne (2003, p 7) points out, New Zealand has given little attention to ‘the implicit 
social and cultural assumptions embedded in scientific and technical knowledge-
production processes’. 
 
Heterogeneity 
Technoscience is motivated and legitimated by powerful conceptual and values 
frameworks embedded in particular R&D fields, and more widely in perceptions 
across public and policy domains.  However, such frameworks are far from 
monolithic, encompassing diverse interests and perspectives and a spectrum of actors, 
institutions and practices.  Studies of the social construction of technologies draw 
attention to heterogeneity.  Recognition of multiple sources and channels of influence 
on science and technology trajectories is important for analysis of the work of the 
benefit projections that justify and valorise innovation.  The promotion and 
positioning of new technologies are driven by multiple criteria and affected by 
different, divergent, or even incompatible frameworks of value and expectation.  The 
stories of wind energy and GM in New Zealand, discussed in Chapters Five and Six, 
trace the influence of various contesting interests and concepts of future benefit 
bearing upon these fields and technologies. 
 
Some models of technoscientific processes focus on specific research and technology 
domains as communities of practice.  The historical evolution of scientific research 
and engineering as distinctive communities – professional cultures with their own 
standards, orientations and identity – has been extensively analysed (for example, 
Mokyr 1990; Pickering 1992; Shapin 1994; Lenoir 1997; Misa 2004; Woodhouse 
2006).  Specialist fields are shaped by their own suite of assumptions: 
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[E]ach discipline having its own traditions and national particularities, its 
obligatory problematics, its habits of thought, its shared beliefs and self-
evidences, its rituals and consecrations, its constraints [and] specific forms of 
censorship… the whole set of presuppositions inscribed in the collective 
history of the speciality (Bourdieu 2004, p 94).29 
 
In a comparative study of two scientific disciplines, experimental high energy physics 
and molecular biology, Knorr Cetina (1999, pp 9, 246-249) analyses their unique 
‘epistemic cultures’ – the conventions, modes of practice, research assumptions, 
ontologies and institutional systems characteristic of each field.  Controversial fields 
such as climate change research or genetic science are further subdivided, riven by 
contesting perspectives and disciplinary approaches (Sarewitz 2004, pp 389-392).  In 
technology development domains, similar patterns are found constraining and 
legitimating evolving trajectories (Fairtlough 2000, pp 267-268, 275-276).  The 
concept of technological regimes, an evolutionary economics model developed by 
Nelson and Winter and by Dosi (Dosi 1982; van den Belt & Rip 1987, pp 136-137; 
Mokyr 1990, p 274; Nelson 2000, p 67), explains structures of strategic orientation 
across industrial sectors.  A technical community’s typical activities, knowledge, 
priorities and strategies emerge from processes of competition and in turn shape 
future trajectories of development and economic growth. 
 
The concepts of anticipated benefit that are utilised to justify and valorise innovative 
technological developments are firmly embedded within these kinds of professional 
and disciplinary frameworks.  Chapters Five and Six discuss benefit projections for 
GM and wind energy in New Zealand, showing the strong influence of the cultures 
and expectations of the respective practitioner communities.  The interests of 
biotechnology research institutions are closely intertwined with projections of generic 
benefit from their work.  In the electricity sector, the commercial expectations of 
established generation companies have shaped the prevalent form of wind energy 
technology in the New Zealand environment. 
 
                                                 
29 Bourdieu’s exploration of social and political science alongside other scientific fields is central to his 
concept of the practitioner’s reflexivity (Robbins 1991, p 158; Bourdieu 2004, Part III).  However 
distinguished between different research disciplines, from the kinds of knowledge and ontologies 
accepted in such fields as physics or chemistry, to the ‘idées-forces’ or symbolic representations 
characteristic of fields working with political and ideological phenomena (Robbins 1991, pp 138-141). 
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However, R&D development processes and technoscientific benefit claims must also 
engage with the wider community.  Many studies extend the scope of analysis beyond 
narrowly scientific or technical domains to consider technoscience as interconnecting 
with broader social, sectoral, economic and political contexts.  These domains are the 
spaces within which benefit claims circulate.  They can be described as arenas (Renn 
1992b), in which expectations and intentions are resources strategically deployed to 
further the interests and strengthen the positions of those advancing them. 
 
Studies have highlighted the formation of extended socio-technical networks, where 
actors, institutions and resources cohere in alignment of interests and goals around the 
benefits intended from a technology or a research field (for example, Hughes 1989, pp 
51-55; Cozzens 1990, pp 168, 170; Bijker 1995, pp 49-50; Green et al. 1999, pp 778, 
783; Garud & Karnøe 2001a, pp 10-11, 20, 31; Hedgecoe & Martin 2003, pp 330, 
341-342, 355).30  Many analyses of technoscience fields develop similar themes and 
models, outlining the involvement of heterogeneous groups and actors in ‘hybrid 
socio-technical formation[s]’ (Green et al. 1999, p 783).31  Models of networks of 
influence, where strategic alliances and resources are deployed to support (or hinder) 
the advance of technological innovation, are developed in several studies (for 
example, Collyer 1997, pp 198-199; Rappert 1999a, pp 3-4; Chakravorti 2004, pp 
470-477; Van de Ven et al. 2008, pp 150-154).  Focusing on the political values 
inherent in artefacts and systems, Winner (1986, pp 22-29, 47-55) traces the far-
reaching interactions between technologies and different societal groups.32  And 
                                                 
30 The conceptual frameworks of Actor Network Theory (ANT) incorporate multiple dimensions within 
the socio-technological matrix (Latour & Woolgar 1979; Latour 1987, 1992; Law 1992; Latour 1996).  
Societal interests, natural and epistemological phenomena, and the artefacts themselves – humble items 
such as door keys, speed bumps and seat belts – are equally salient:  ‘technical, scientific, social, 
economic, or political considerations have been inextricably bound up into an organic whole…  The set 
of postulated associations is the context that gives each entity its significance’ (Callon 1987, pp 84, 95).  
While ANT is an exciting analytical approach, this thesis uses other theoretical frameworks more 
suited to my focus on the paradigmatic and ideological dimensions of R&D and innovation, as 
explained in Chapter Four. 
31 Some studies categorise groups with interests in technoscience;  for example, Vanloqueren and 
Baret (2009, p, 972-979) distinguish the following groups engaging in their respective ways with 
agricultural technologies:  policy actors, markets, regulators, lobby groups, consumers, farmers, private 
and public sector researchers, and science journals.  Borup and Konrad (2004, p 4) indicate the 
potential for differing assumptions and engagement of institutional policy makers, and engineers and 
researchers.  Kaplan and Tripsas (2008, p 792) analyse the different frames and roles of producers of 
technology, users, government agencies, the media, standards bodies and industry associations. 
32 Winner’s interpretation of the political influences in his famous example of the Long Island highway 
bridges (Winner 1986, pp 22-23) has, however, been challenged as ‘counterfactual’ (Joerges 1999). 
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Kaplan and Tripsas (2008, pp 791-798) work from a basic technology life-cycle 
model to explore the influence, at each phase of the cycle, of the assumptions, needs 
and benefit-seeking of interested groups.33 
 
Social constructivist analytical theory for technoscience systems insists upon a wide-
ranging approach to recognise the range of interests that make up technological 
‘ensembles’ or ‘webs’ (Bijker 1987, pp 171-172; Pinch & Bijker 1987, p 40; Bijker 
1995, pp 15, 273-276).  The stories of such diverse artefacts as bicycles, Bakelite and 
fluorescent lighting show how a technology acquires multiple meanings, forms and 
applications – and multiple constituencies – through the stages of its development.  
Bijker (1995, p 6) insists that ‘technologies are shaped and acquire their meanings in 
the heterogeneity of social interactions’.  Each interested group brings its own 
perspectives, assumptions and requirements to its engagement with technology 
(Funtowicz & Ravetz 1992, pp 262-263; van Lente 1993, pp 46-51; Michael 2000a, 
pp 6-9; Garud & Karnøe 2001a, p 10; Borup & Konrad 2004, pp 2-4; Williams 2005, 
p 12).  Decision criteria for assessment of a technology’s effectiveness and usefulness 
vary depending on the worldviews and priorities of different groups (Nelson 2000, p 
71; Dattée & Weil 2007, pp 579-591).  Bijker (1995, p 77; emphasis in original) 
argues that ‘[t]he meanings given by a relevant social group actually constitute the 
artifact’.  Such value frameworks can also change over time.  Judgements of the 
desirability or success of a technology are inherently provisional, subject to shifts and 
changing circumstances in society at large and in the expectations of interested groups 
(Bijker 1995, pp 270, 280-281; Williams 2005, p 14; Berkun 2007, p 28). 
 
Analysis of wind energy and GM in New Zealand shows that innovation is supported 
by a range of concepts or projections of benefit, each appealing to and consistent with 
the needs, assumptions and desires of particular groups (Brown et al. 2000b, p 6).  
Diverse values and interests, changing over time, have influenced the trajectories of 
                                                 
33 The life-cycle metaphor or model of evolutionary technological change distinguishes four iterative 
stages in the development of a technology:  variation or diverse options in a phase of ferment and 
uncertainty;  the emergence of a dominant design by processes of selection and stabilisation;  a phase 
of retention marked by incremental improvements within the dominant paradigm;  and a discontinuity 
phase where the status quo is disrupted, assumptions change and new possibilities emerge, leading into 
a new phase of ferment (Kaplan & Tripsas 2008, pp 790, 794).  This has similarities with concepts 
from complexity theory, such as Gunderson and Holling’s “figure-8” panarchy model for the dynamics 
of systemic change (Gunderson & Holling 2002). 
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research and technological applications (or intended applications) in these fields in 
New Zealand.  Chapters Five and Six follow a sometimes uneasy mix of economic, 
sectoral, social and environmental ideals driving these technologies’ evolution in New 
Zealand.  Integration of these disparate frameworks of value and benefit is achieved 
by positioning technoscientific innovation in relation to particular political and 
institutional interests.  Sectoral priorities are particularly evident in the promotion of 
some of New Zealand’s GM research programmes, where the maintenance of 
biotechnology capacities is argued to be a benefit in itself. 
 
No single paradigm, interest group or framework of expectations shapes these 
technologies and their assumed benefits – they are protean, hybrid, many-faced in the 
complex process of securing support, validation and acceptance:  ‘A technology isn’t 
one single character;  it’s a city, it’s a collective, it’s countless’ (Latour 1996, p 227).  
Nevertheless some frameworks of belief about technoscientific R&D and innovation 
are consistently prominent, thoroughly entrenched in the discourse of practitioner 
communities, in policy and in wider public perceptions.  Deuten and Rip (2000, p 68) 
describe the emergence of ‘master stories’ that establish status and purpose for 
technological developments, providing connections between the roles and concerns of 
diverse actors, enabling activity if also constraining it in certain directions.  The 
remaining sections of this chapter discuss three dominant ideological constructs or 
narratives for technoscience.  The importance of these master stories for GM and 
wind energy, in the projections of benefit used to advance these technologies in New 
Zealand, will be explored in Chapters Five and Six below. 
 
Technoscience tales 
The goose that lays golden eggs 
The concept that science, technology and innovation are essential for a society’s 
wellbeing and advancement is one of the most ubiquitous and firmly established 
frameworks of assumption in technoscientific domains and in wider public discourses 
(Winner 1986, p 5; Sarewitz 1996, pp 122, 131; Meikle 2003, p 152; Rogers 2003, p 
110; Woodhouse & Sarewitz 2007, p 139).  The technologies transforming society are 
celebrated as ‘a series of advances that have allowed humanity progressively to 
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escape the constraints of its environment’ (Sarewitz 1996, p 129).  Such triumphal 
achievements become their own justification: 
We have so much history with innovation as the driving force for our culture, 
economy, and psychology – from the cotton gin and Industrial Revolution to 
the personal computer and the Internet Age – that our confidence in innovation 
approximates a faith:  when in doubt, innovate (Berkun 2007, p 139).34 
 
The concept of positive forward progress is thoroughly embedded within science and 
technology domains as a ‘grand narrative’ that dominates perceptions, policy and 
discourse (Sarewitz 1996, pp 117-120; Bingham 2008, pp 112-113).  The belief that 
research and technological innovation are required to deliver prosperity and wellbeing 
is the first of Sarewitz’s ‘myths’ of contemporary science and technology, the ‘myth 
of infinite benefit’ (1996, pp 10, 17-29).  Widespread in the promotion of R&D, this 
framework of belief ‘uniformly assumes a causal linkage between progress in science 
and technology and progress in society’ (Sarewitz 1996, p 4).  Rip (1992, pp 233-234) 
notes the persistence of the mythical constructions of science as ‘the source of all 
good things… the horn of plenty’, and of technology as ‘the magic wand… the means 
to achieve, supposedly in an unproblematic way, whatever we want’.  He describes 
the common perception of technoscience as ‘the goose that will produce golden eggs, 
as long as it is fed properly’ – highlighting the implicit qualification of support and 
funding for R&D activity. 
 
Faith in scientific and technological advance as a necessary requirement to generate 
material abundance, economic security and societal improvement has long been 
‘conventional wisdom’ or ‘the normative mode of Western understanding’ 
(Lowenthal 1995, pp 386, 390).  The history of this belief evolves from the ebullient 
technological optimism of the 18th and 19th centuries (Winner 1986, pp 44-47; 
Feenberg 1999, pp 1-2; van Lente 2000, pp 43-44; Misa 2004, Chapters 3, 4 & 5; 
Barben 2007, p 58).  These patterns of expectation intensified through the second half 
of the 20th century.  Some analyses (eg Greenberg 2001, Chapter 3; de la Mothe 
2004, pp 531-532; Hård & Jamison 2005, p 255; Barben 2007, p 58) refer to the 
legacy of Vannevar Bush’s Science: The Endless Frontier.  This influential manifesto 
                                                 
34 Some studies acknowledge the ‘Whiggishness’ inherent in such teleological framings of 
technological history (Latour 1987, p 100; Mokyr 1990, p 15; Feenberg 1999, p 81). 
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insisted that prosperity and quality of life are dependent on well-resourced science 
and technology sectors: 
Advances in science when put to practical use mean more jobs, higher wages, 
shorter hours, more abundant crops, more leisure… higher standards of 
living… the prevention or cure of diseases...  But to achieve these 
objectives… the flow of new scientific knowledge must be both continuous 
and substantial (Bush 1945, Chapter 1: Scientific Progress is Essential).35 
 
Studies follow a shift in expectations of scientific purpose and practice, from a focus 
on knowledge generation valued as a worthy end in itself, to a utilitarian justification 
of technoscience as delivering a practical service to society (Funtowicz & Ravetz 
1992, pp 255-258; Sarewitz 1996, Chapter 7; Gieryn 1999, p 357; Brown 2000, pp 93, 
103-104; de la Mothe 2004, pp 531-533; Barben 2007, pp 58-63).36  The meaning of 
scientific activity is renegotiated from curiosity-driven research to the enabling of 
profitable new applications (Kearnes et al. 2006, pp 27-28).  Funtowicz and Ravetz 
(1992, p 255) summarise the new orientation:  ‘Problems were chosen… with a view 
to applicability [and] solutions [were] evaluated similarly’. 
 
The progress paradigm is now well-established in policy frameworks, both in New 
Zealand and internationally, as ‘government[s] pursue science and technology policy 
as a primarily economic strategy’ (Thorpe 2008, p 78).37  The expectation that 
technoscience guarantees economic growth and security runs strongly through policy 
debates, advocacy for funding, and strategic foresight programmes for R&D (Sarewitz 
1996, pp 119-120; Rappert 1999a, pp 1-4; Greenberg 2001, pp 399-401; de la Mothe 
2004, pp 528, 530; Williams 2005, p 5).  Wynne (2003, p 6) describes the assertion of 
‘implacable normative commitments to commercial exploitation even of frontier 
scientific promises’.  There is an extensive range of studies on the economic and 
commercial benefits anticipated from scientific research and new technologies, 
                                                 
35 Bush’s report, delivered to the US President at the close of WWII, argued for ongoing government 
support for science and particular governance structures.  Although its specific recommendations were 
not implemented, it has been enormously powerful in shaping the culture, roles and expectations of 
scientific research and technology development in the US and internationally for the last six decades 
(Greenberg 2001, pp 42-58). 
36 This framing is not uncontested, with many, often passionate, arguments in defence of the need for 
independent, disinterested, “basic” science research.  To give just one example, Callon (1994, p 397) 
argues that science is a public good in itself, and ‘should be protected from market forces’. 
37 These patterns of belief are consistent with wider societal values frameworks, notably the 
expectations of ongoing growth and wealth creation that underpin contemporary economic paradigms 
(Winner 1986, p 108; Sarewitz 1996, pp 122-3, 191; Barben 2007, pp 59-60). 
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predicated on ‘the key role of technological advance in driving economic growth’ 
(Nelson 2000, p 67).  This dominant narrative is the basis for analyses of the 
dynamics of profitable innovation trajectories aimed to foster successful business 
ventures (for example, Mokyr 1990; Kamann & Nijkamp 1991; Utterback 1994; 
Christensen 1997; Garud et al. 1997; Mowery & Rosenberg 1998; Martinelli 2001; 
Hargadon 2003; Hindle & Yencken 2004; Talke 2007; Van de Ven et al. 2008).  The 
instrumental relationships between technoscience and economics have been theorised 
as an evolution from “Mode 1” to “Mode 2” research (Gibbons et al. 1994; Gibbons 
2001; Nowotny et al. 2001), and, borrowing an image from biotechnology, as a 
“Triple Helix” intertwining the activities and interests of business, academe and 
government (Leydesdorff & Etzkowitz 1998; Benner & Sandström 2000; Leydesdorff 
2000; Shinn 2002; Etzkowitz 2003). 
 
In New Zealand, confidence in the projected economic benefits of R&D and 
innovation is reflected in official technoscience policy and in specific strategies for 
GM and energy (New Zealand Government 1996; Royal Commission on Genetic 
Modification 2001a; New Zealand Government 2002, 2003; Ministry of Research 
Science and Technology 2005b, 2006a, 2007; 2007, 2010, 2011a).  Studies of the 
discourses of these fields, and of developments in New Zealand’s governance and 
institutional structures for science and technology, highlight an increasing dominance 
of economic and commercial priorities over the last two decades (Cartner & Bollinger 
1997; Leitch & Davenport 2005; Motion 2005; Motion & Weaver 2005; Goven 2006; 
McGuinness et al. 2010; Macdonald et al. 2011).  The framing of R&D around 
perceived economic imperatives has been particularly strong in the legitimation of 
GM research in New Zealand, and the influence of these narratives is discussed in 
detail in Chapter Six. 
 
The assumed inextricable links between technoscientific progress and other societal or 
commercial outcomes are often idealised generically (Winner 1986, pp 44-46; 2004, 
pp 34-37; Williams 2005, p 8).  Jasanoff (2005b, p 197) observes that utilitarian 
science is ‘automatically coded as a “public good”… [in a] friction-free vision of 
service to humanity’.  But Sarewitz (1996, p 119) identifies two ways that benefits are 
assumed to flow from technoscience – either directly from the focused application of 
research and technology to specific problems, or indirectly via ‘catalysis of economic 
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growth and rising standards of living’.  The equation, or elision, of commercial profits 
and business competitiveness with generic societal benefits is a common assumption 
of economic framings of justification for technoscience.  As Weaver and Motion 
(2002, pp 329, 340) explain:  ‘In a market-driven political economy the public interest 
and the market are constructed as one and the same… the “public interest” has been 
subsumed by corporate and market interests’.  Analysing industry perspectives on 
technological innovation, Henderson et al (2007, p 25) identify a powerful ‘market 
rationality’ which juxtaposes the ‘altruistic collective benefits of improved global 
health from [new technoscience]… with the self-interest of the financial benefits 
expected to accrue… for the industry shareholders’ (italics in original).38  The 
strategic interweaving of economic benefit claims with broader social interests – and 
the tensions between these divergent framings of technoscientific purpose – are clear 
in the trajectories of wind energy and GM in New Zealand, discussed in Chapters 
Five, Six and Seven below. 
 
The concept of technoscientific inevitability is a strong contributing strand in the 
narrative of ongoing progress.  Technological developments and their projected 
benefits are rhetorically constructed as unstoppable certainties, inexorably on the way, 
regardless of doubts, opposition or uncertainties in the present:  ‘the key question is 
not whether a certain option will be pursued, but rather when it will come… there is 
really no choice but to push ahead’ (Brown et al. 2000b, pp 4, 9; emphasis in 
original).39  Acceptance of a new technology and its claimed benefits is similarly 
projected as only a matter of time (Brown et al. 2000b, p 9; Nye 2004, p 160; Sturken 
& Thomas 2004, p 3).  In the performative discourses promoting technoscience, such 
oncoming futures are strongly optimistic;  these narratives assume the most idealised, 
utopian outcomes (Sarewitz 1996, pp 7, 10, 18; Nye 2004, p 171; Winner 2004, pp 
34-37; Berkun 2007, p 137). 
 
The grand progress narrative is a key dimension of the persuasive power of 
projections of benefit from particular research programmes or technological 
                                                 
38 The typical elision of economic with societal interests has been strongly contested (for example, 
Mirowski & Sent 2005; Mirowski & Van Horn 2005; Goven 2006).  McGuinness et al (2012, pp 2-5, 
9) argue the need for ‘greater compatibility’ of New Zealand’s science system with the public interest. 
39 The use of imperative verbs – “will” and “must” – is typical of this rhetorical mode (Brown et al. 
2000b, p 9; Winner 2004, p 37; McNally & Glasner 2007, p 262). 
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applications.  Faith in the delivery of prosperity, profits and better lives through 
technoscience provides a supportive context for benefit claims for GM and wind 
energy in New Zealand.  For GM research in particular, this powerful myth sustains 
ongoing institutional and political support with the promise of commercial returns and 
other sectoral benefits.  The introduction of wind energy into New Zealand is justified 
in official policy and corporate promotions as satisfying increasing demand for 
electricity as the fundamental requirement of a thriving economy and societal 
wellbeing.  These technologies’ advance via the narrative of prosperity and progress 
will be illustrated in Chapters Five and Six. 
 
Running with the Red Queen 
Closely intertwined with concepts of technoscientific advance as essential for societal 
progress is the principle of competition as a driving force in science and technology 
domains.  The Red Queen myth frames scientific research and technology 
development as a race run at relentless speed, where the first challenge is simply to be 
able to stay in the contest. 40  This encompasses not merely rivalries between research 
and engineering teams and companies, but competitive striving on a grand generic 
scale.  Technoscience is conceptualised as a frantic contest to be first to deliver 
knowledge, innovation and commercial returns in an environment of desperate 
Darwinian struggle:  ‘The world is a hostile place where nation-states and 
corporations battle each other for supremacy’ (Rappert 1999a, p 5). 
 
The Red Queen imperative has a powerful effect on official policies, with 
governments and research and technology institutions concerned to demonstrate 
                                                 
40  This metaphor is taken from Lewis Carroll’s children’s classic Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 
and Through the Looking-Glass: 
Just at this moment, somehow or other, they began to run… and the Queen went so fast that it 
was all she could do to keep up with her:  and still the Queen kept crying, ‘Faster! Faster!”…  
And they went so fast that at last they seemed to skim through the air, hardly touching the 
ground with their feet, till suddenly, just as Alice was getting quite exhausted, they stopped, 
and she found herself sitting on the ground breathless and giddy…  Alice looked around her in 
great surprise. ‘Why, I do believe we’ve been under this tree the whole time!  Everything’s 
just as it was!’  ‘Of course it is,’ said the Queen:  ‘what would you have it?’  ‘Well, in our 
country,’ said Alice, still panting a little, ‘you’d generally get to somewhere else – if you ran 
very fast for a long time, as we’ve been doing.’  ‘A slow sort of country!’ said the Queen.  
‘Now here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.  If you want 
to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!’ (Carroll 1939 (1871), pp 
141-143, emphasis in original). 
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competitiveness and credibility in innovation and “cutting-edge” knowledge:  ‘the 
perceived need to ‘keep up’ in the global race to develop [new technologies]’ 
(Kearnes et al. 2006, p 35).  The European Commission (2007, pp 14, 52) notes that 
the European Union’s 2000 Lisbon Agenda, aiming to develop ‘the world’s leading 
knowledge-based economy’ in ten years, intensified pressures to develop marketable 
commodities from research.  Godin (2004, p 1226) describes a ‘political obsession’ 
with competitiveness in R&D, and Hacking (1986, p 11) outlines the belief of 
governments that: 
… early participation in new technologies is axiomatic for maintaining a 
leadership and thereby creating future wealth and employment…  no-one 
wants to be left on the starting line. 
 
The taken-for-granted assumptions comprising the Red Queen imperative serve as a 
‘rhetorical device’ in policy and strategic planning (Rappert 1999a, pp 5-6).  What is 
seen to be at stake is nations’ economic performance – even their economic viability – 
as well as the prestige of the country and its R&D (Wilsdon & Willis 2004, p 20; 
Brooks 2005, p 364; Barben 2007, pp 61,63; Henderson et al. 2007, pp 23-24).  
Framing R&D and innovation as a fierce global contest justifies the assertion of 
politically-determined priorities in promising areas of research, and engagement in 
profitable science and technology fields:  ‘those areas that might be most up-and-
coming and likely to have a broad economic impact’ (Barben 2007, p 61).41  This has 
been a strongly influential pattern in policy for GM development in New Zealand, 
with government support and regulatory systems being based in the claimed necessity 
of the country’s science institutions and production sectors maintaining capacities and 
international reputation in this technoscience field;  the influence of these framings of 
justification is discussed in detail in Chapter Six. 
 
The imperatives established by the Red Queen are framed as unavoidable, equivalent 
to the ruthlessness of biological evolution:  ‘Species that fail… become extinct’ 
(Mokyr 1990, pp 282-283).  Competition is seen as an inevitability:  ‘Complacency is 
not an option… those unable to step up to the challenge of competition today will face 
decline’ (Rappert 1999a, pp 5-6).  Howells (1994, p 2) explains these patterns of 
                                                 
41 Analyses of nations’ respective competitiveness, and of the economic, social and political criteria 
and systems considered necessary as drivers of improved performance, are often oriented towards 
fostering investment in competitiveness (for example, Zanakis & Becerra-Fernandez 2005) 
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compulsion in terms of the dynamics of radical competition theorised by Schumpeter:  
‘strik[ing] not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of existing firms but at 
their foundations and their very lives’.42  The threat posed by faster, more well-
resourced R&D competitors is the “stick” behind the “carrot” of economic success 
from technoscientific innovation;  this chronic threat is expressed as a fear of being 
‘left behind’ or of ‘losing competitiveness’ (Abramovitz 1986, p 396; Froggatt & 
Rankine 1999, p 466; Forbes 2006, pp 76-77; Kearnes et al. 2006, p 35; Birch 2007a, 
pp 95, 107).43  The psychology of competitiveness creates a compulsion, a ‘crisis to 
be part of the phenomenon’ where the prospect of missing out demands investment in 
potentially lucrative R&D fields (Coburn 2006, p 60; Hindmarsh 2008, p 36). 
 
At national levels, the incentives are political as well as economic and scientific;  
Winner (1986, p 46) outlines the dominant rationale of economically-driven 
technoscience:  ‘unless a society keeps pace… it will lag behind its competitors, a 
precondition of cultural decline’.  Technoscience is conceptualised as an ‘unstoppable 
train’ (van Lente 2000, p 57).44  Given such momentum, failure to keep up with the 
latest technoscientific advances is feared as resulting in an ignominious slide into 
poverty and societal misery:  ‘the only alternative to progress is “decadence”’ 
(Bingham 2008, p 114).  The European Commission (2007, pp 23, 25) describes a 
‘winner takes all’ mentality: 
                                                 
42 Voelpel et al (2005, pp 37-40) develop a slightly different version of the Red Queen analogy, arguing 
that the pressures of competitiveness keep R&D locked into existing modes, running faster but getting 
nowhere, when businesses should embrace new ideas and practices. 
43 The corresponding positive incentive is the prestige and influence – and the continual insecurity – of 
being at the front of the pack.  Vannevar Bush’s passionate argument for post-war investment in 
science and technology insisted that one key benefit from and purpose for supporting R&D was ‘to 
maintain a position of world leadership’ (Bush 1945, Chapter One: Scientific Progress is Essential).  
Studies of the dynamics of innovation in business also stress the considerable advantages of first-mover 
status;  more competitive enterprises which capitalise most rapidly on new opportunities and practices 
are presented as enjoying not only significant commercial success but also the ability to influence the 
evolution of R&D communities and the future trajectories of technoscientific development (Utterback 
1994; Rogers 2003; Van de Ven et al. 2008, pp 176-177). 
44 An invidious dimension of the Red Queen myth is the concept that technoscientific change is itself 
accelerating exponentially (Michael 2000b, pp 31-32; Sunder Rajan 2003, pp 88, 92-93; Misa 2004, pp 
xvi-xvii, 273; Hindmarsh & Lawrence 2004b, p 36; Forbes 2006, pp 69, 75-76; Bingham 2008, p 115).  
The need for competitive striving is further intensified as actors, institutions and nations perceive the 
rate of scientific discovery and technological innovation to be speeding up relentlessly:  ‘[T]he 
assumption that change is taking place at an increasing pace… at such a rate that no university, 
government or business is unaffected…  change is itself a virtue, necessary because of intense 
pressures’ (Rappert 1999a, pp 5-6).  However, Tudge (2000, pp 288-289) observes that:  ‘Science and 
technology seem to progress at a bewildering pace.  But… in reality complex technologies take 
decades or centuries to unfold…  Scientists exaggerate the speed of progress because they need to 
attract government grants and venture capital’. 
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[A] diagnosis that we are in a world competition and that Europe will not be 
able to afford its social model if it is not in the race…  those who are late 
won’t have any place…  “we must move forward if we are not to fall behind”. 
 
The Red Queen myth has significant effects on the framing of expected benefits from 
technoscientific innovations in New Zealand, and on the structuring, regulation and 
resourcing of research, notably in biotechnology.  Active, credible competitiveness in 
prioritised fields such as GM is assumed as an unquestionable imperative in 
government policy and institutional strategy.  New Zealand’s capacity to participate in 
the “race” of cutting-edge technoscience is asserted as a benefit in itself, an obligatory 
commitment essential for the country’s future development, economic viability and 
international reputation.45  Chapter Six discusses the influence of this framing of 
sectoral benefit – the compulsion to maintain competitive R&D capabilities as a first-
order outcome regardless of the other products, knowledge and profits that might be 
delivered – in the trajectories of GM research in New Zealand.46 
 
Walking the line47 
An enduring narrative in scientific and technological fields is the framing of practice 
and standards within a paradigm of rational, neutral, impersonal objectivity.  One of 
the major ways in which technoscience distinguishes itself, its practitioners and its 
products from other societal endeavours is by positioning research knowledge and 
technologies as based in “cold hard facts” – rigorously tested and empirically verified, 
free from any partisan values and biases.  This defining narrative of technoscience 
persists despite scholarly analysis of the ambivalence, contingency, uncertainties and 
socially constructed nature of these fields and knowledges (Wynne 1992, pp 278-283; 
Feenberg 1999, Chapter 4; Rappert 1999a, p 10; Rampton & Stauber 2001, pp 2-3; 
Bourdieu 2004, pp 19-28).48 
                                                 
45 A typical example of such patterns is the rhetoric of a biotech industry lobby group, quoted by 
Motion and Weaver (2005, p 58):  ‘If we do not allow… research to continue in New Zealand, we all 
pay the price.  To cease the hard work would have an unprecedented negative impact on our economy 
and on our critical position in the knowledge economy’. 
46 However, these patterns are not evident in the evolution of wind energy, where New Zealand has 
taken a position as a “fast adopter” of the latest international developments in turbine technologies;  
this difference is discussed in Chapter Seven. 
47 With apologies to Johnny Cash. 
48 This principle of objectivity is itself a product of the conventions, methods and norms, or the habitus, 
of science fields (Gieryn 1999, p 25; Bourdieu 2004, pp 71-83).  Reliance on such frameworks of 
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The narrative of clinical rationality characterises technoscience as precise and strictly 
controlled, and thus a predictable, effective management tool (Kearnes et al. 2006, p 
32).49  The principle of control via stringent empiricism is closely linked with the 
generic claim of technoscience to control and manipulate nature (Davies Burns 2000, 
p 305; Sarewitz & Woodhouse 2003, pp 74-75; Levidow & Carr 2007, pp 409-410).  
The salience of this myth for analysis of the benefit projections advanced for 
technological innovation is in the implicit, and often explicit insistence that 
technoscience delivers outcomes and understanding that are more robust and more 
reliable than other ways of knowing and engaging with reality (Gieryn 1999, pp 354-
358).  The authoritativeness inherent in this framing of technoscience establishes a 
context of dependability and confidence for the findings and benefit claims of R&D 
and innovation (Grenfell 2004, p 133).  Chapters Five and Six follow the assertion of 
this narrative in the promotion of GM and wind energy technologies in New Zealand, 
as practitioners in these research and policy domains deploy reassuring rhetorics of 
objectivity and certainty around their work and its intended benefits and outcomes. 
 
Narratives presenting R&D and technology diffusion as a purposeful linear 
progression are a common manifestation of this paradigm.  There is widespread 
recognition, by both actors in these fields and analysts of technoscience, that the 
actual realities of these processes are iterative, chaotic, complicated, contingent and 
serendipitous (Deuten & Rip 2000, p 66; Nelson 2000, p 74; Barry 2002, p 152; 
Williams 2005, pp 5-6; Dattée & Weil 2007, pp 579-586, 595-599; Van de Ven et al. 
2008, pp 23-37).  Nevertheless the model persists of a tidy sequence of distinct phases 
– from basic or “pure” scientific research, through development targeting a particular 
application, to the eventual release of a technology and its marketing and 
dissemination (Pinch & Bijker 1987, pp 22-23; Sarewitz 1996, pp 97, 124; Wilsdon et 
al. 2005, p 35; Kearnes et al. 2006, pp 17, 27; Pielke 2007, pp 77-78, 80-87; Van de 
Ven et al. 2008, pp 3-4, 8).  Linear narrative structures simplify complex processes by 
focusing attention on one successful strand or trajectory (Deuten & Rip 2000, pp 68, 
                                                 
instrumental efficiency and neutrality is an effective way to protect technoscience from larger and 
messier questions of social value (Winner 1986, pp 46-57; Sarewitz 2004, pp 388, 397-398). 
49 Bourdieu (2004, p 24) gives a version of a table of wryly humorous “translations” of common 
phrasings in formal science discourse, and what actually happened in the lab. 
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79; Turkle 2004, pp 19, 22).50  These framings link the earlier stages of a project 
through to an eventual goal or future benefit, attributing direction and asserting 
teleological intent, even if retrospectively (Kuhn 1996, pp 138-139).51  The beneficial 
virtue or desirability of the proposed outcome is inherent in its being posited as the 
end point of the process.  In the policy, regulatory and institutional framings of GM 
technology in New Zealand, discussed in Chapter Six, the processes from research 
through to eventual application of new products or techniques are often framed as 
such a linear sequence.  This has facilitated approval of GM research projects as a 
separate stage from the projected outcome;  official support has been legitimated in 
the recognition of benefits in the form of knowledge and skills as necessary earlier 
steps along a linear pathway. 
 
Use of quantification as a way of presenting the issues and intended beneficial 
outcomes of technological innovation is another common means by which the 
narrative of rationality is sustained.  Analysing the political and strategic work of 
quantification in relation to scientific and technological developments, Porter (1995) 
describes the ways advocates for particular research and innovation options attempt to 
defuse uncertainty and controversy via the use of ostensibly objective non-partisan 
quantitative frameworks.  These discursive tools are useful in tactical efforts to 
counter disunity, distrust or outright opposition to a technology or its diffusion: 
A decision made by the numbers… has at least the appearance of being fair 
and impersonal.  Scientific objectivity thus provides an answer to a moral 
demand…  Quantification is a social technology… having more to do with 
moral economy than theoretical rigor (Porter 1995, pp 8, 49-50) 
 
However, such framing of technological issues in the language of numbers is often an 
indication of vulnerability in political and sector domains arising from controversy 
and contested values (Porter 1995, pp 199, 215).52  The stories of wind energy and 
GM in New Zealand, discussed in Chapters Five and Six, show the promoters of these 
                                                 
50 Other options, implications and uncertainties are dismissed as irrelevant or extraneous, or simply 
retrospectively ignored (Deuten & Rip 2000, pp 66-68, 70; Kearnes et al. 2006, pp 72-73). 
51 Linearity often appears in metaphorical form in the presentation of research and technology 
development as a journey or a quest (Deuten & Rip 2000, pp 66, 82; Van de Ven et al. 2008, pp 21-22).  
This metaphor emphasises the idea of purposeful forward movement towards a destination or goal, and 
recognises that R&D processes can be lengthy and arduous. 
52 The historical evolution of this mode of technoscientific engagement with the world has been traced 
back to the Middle Ages (Crosby 1997; Cohen 2005). 
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technologies frequently resorting to quantitative modes of presentation.  But, as 
discussed in Chapter Seven, both rational, quantitative framings and more creative, 
qualitative discursive forms are important in the construction of sufficiently 
persuasive projections of expected benefit to justify investment and acceptance of 
new technologies. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has drawn from a broad range of studies of science and technology 
processes and sociological theory, to develop a basis for this thesis’s analysis of the 
ideological and values frameworks that underpin technoscientific development in two 
fields in New Zealand. 
 
Constructs of anticipated benefit from technoscientific innovation are inevitably 
framed within, and perpetuate, the worldviews and interests of heterogeneous actors 
and groups.  These dispositions and orientations are deeply embedded and normalised 
within ongoing practice in particular fields, in policy, sectoral, institutional 
discourses, and in wider public perceptions of science and technology. 
 
Chapters Five and Six examine projections of benefit advanced for GM and wind 
energy in New Zealand, showing how the claimed outcomes and purposes of R&D 
and innovation in these fields are shaped within the prevailing frameworks of 
expectation.  Assumptions about the benefits of science and technology are grounded 
in such resilient myths as ongoing progress, economic profitability, urgent 
competition, national prestige, clinical rationality, and linear purposefulness.  These 
powerful narratives contribute to supportive societal, political and sectoral contexts 
for innovations such as GM and wind energy in New Zealand.  The importance of 
such generic ideological frameworks is evident in the formal policies and processes 
sanctioning R&D and technology diffusion in GM and electricity generation, and in 
the perspectives of practitioners and decision makers in these fields. 
 
The next chapter surveys theoretical insights into the strategic power relations 
governing science and technology fields.  Chapter Three builds from the ideas about 
technoscientific paradigms and narratives discussed above, to consider the dynamics 
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of change in contested fields, and the manoeuvres deployed to assert and strengthen 
the position of dominant technological options.  The performative work of benefit 
claims for technoscientific innovations such as GM and wind energy is central to 
these processes. 
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Chapter Three 
Strategies and positioning 
 
Introduction 
Technoscientific development is validated by influential constructs of belief and 
expectation that determine the orientations, objectives, norms and practice of fields.  
These frameworks are hegemonically entrenched in communities of interest – such as 
the biotechnology sector, the wind energy industry, and associated policy and 
governance bodies in New Zealand – and in wider public perceptions of science and 
technology.  Such patterns of assumption are central to the framing of benefits 
anticipated from R&D and innovation, and in turn, are reinforced by the benefit 
claims advanced for particular research programmes. 
 
Understanding the ideological frameworks, myths and narratives that shape and 
sustain technoscience is key to understanding culture and practice in these domains.  
But further exploration and analysis are necessary to account for the priority given to 
favoured technologies, research areas and applications, and the persuasive force of 
influential concepts of benefit.  Green et al (1999, p 782) distinguish the paradigmatic 
from the strategic aspects of R&D and technology diffusion: 
Paradigms and trajectories offer some understanding of how technological 
growth proceeds, but they do not explain how some technologies come to be 
selected in preference to others, or how some succeed where others fail. 
 
Why do some kinds of technology have irresistible appeal for policy, research and 
business communities, regardless of their value or acceptability to other groups and 
wider publics?  Why are some kinds of benefits upheld as so desirable and important 
that development of these trajectories is virtually inevitable?  Why are other 
technoscientific options, and the benefits projected from them, given little credibility?  
For Brown et al (2000b, p 4), the challenge is ‘to understand how it is that some 
[technological] futures come to prevail… [and] how other futures are marginalised’. 
 
This chapter explores scholarly analysis of the strategies and power relations 
governing science and technology fields;  it focuses on the dynamics of change in 
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contested fields, on the drivers behind innovation, and on the performative work of 
benefit claims in these processes.  A central question is the assertion of dominant 
technoscientific options and applications – associated with particular kinds of 
expected benefit – over possible alternatives.  Persuasive benefit projections are 
crucial resources for the advancement of technoscientific research and innovation.  In 
Bourdieu’s terms (Bourdieu 2004, pp 55-61; Grenfell 2004, pp 28-29, 173), benefit 
claims are valuable symbolic capital – essential to confer legitimacy on technoscience 
fields and projects, to maintain funding and official support for R&D and diffusion, 
and to market new technologies to interested sectors and wider society. 
 
Projected future benefits that align with the priorities and expectations of established 
interests have significantly greater traction, in policy and decision-making domains, 
than options requiring radical new configurations and value frameworks.  This chapter 
considers analyses of conservatism and inertia in technoscientific systems, in terms of 
the central role of benefit projections in overcoming entrenched modes and generating 
momentum for change – or at least for research towards potential change.  Research 
programmes and policies are justified via the projection of suitably attractive expected 
benefits, but it is also useful for sector actors and agencies to link R&D and new 
technology potentials with a sufficiently demanding problem for which innovation is 
positioned as the solution.  As will be seen in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, these 
strategic dimensions are strongly evident in the trajectories of wind energy and GM in 
New Zealand.  The complex inter-relationships between claims of benefit from 
research and innovation in these fields, and the imperatives of existing systems and 
practices, show new technoscience developments as inextricably embedded in their 
wider social, sectoral and political contexts – from the immediate requirements of 
commercial competitiveness to the inter-generational challenges of environmental 
sustainability. 
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The work done by benefit projections 
The perceived value, desirability and beneficial outcomes of research and new 
technologies, and the claimed pertinence of technoscientific innovations to societal 
needs, priorities and wellbeing, are powerful assets in the framing of R&D policies 
and programmes.  Studies of expectations in science and technology highlight the 
ways such constructs or scenarios of future outcomes serve pragmatically 
instrumental purposes in the present. 
 
A key study focusing on the performative work of future claims in technoscientific 
development processes is Harro van Lente’s detailed analysis (1993) of the role of 
expectations in three innovation domains.  Optimistic projections of anticipated or 
intended results are shown contributing to strategies of ‘agenda-building’ in 
technology fields – indeed, in the case of membrane technology, helping to create the 
field itself (1993, Chapter Three).  Van Lente models a progressive ratcheting-up of 
expectations – opportunities are built into promises, which then become compelling 
requirements, establishing momentum and demanding commitment (1993, pp 147-
150, 182-184, 195-201).  Discourses about intended technoscientific futures actively 
work to create those futures: 
[T]he statement itself alters social reality…  [E]xpectation statements are not 
only representations of something that does not (yet) exist, they do something:  
advising, showing direction, creating obligations (1993, p 191; emphasis in 
original). 
 
The stories of GM and wind energy in New Zealand, discussed in Chapters Five and 
Six, show the purposeful construction of compelling futures as a key dimension of 
these technologies’ advancement.  GM is framed as bringing New Zealand science 
and agriculture into “the Biotech century” and creating major economic growth;  wind 
farms are promoted as a solution to increasing demand for electricity and to the 
challenges, both environmental and political, of global climate change. 
 
Studies of research and innovation processes and policy highlight the importance of 
strategic constructions of anticipated future outcomes in the immediate positioning of 
new technology developments: 
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[E]xpectations mobilize the future into the present…  they perform a real-time 
purpose in shaping present day arrangements…  they incite, block, justify… 
[and] shape the plot…  expectations are crucially constitutive, especially in the 
early stages of innovation (Brown et al. 2003, p 3; emphasis in original). 
 
Sufficiently persuasive projections can have profound effect:  ‘performatives… prove 
themselves by transforming the world in conformity with their perspective on the 
world’ (Latour 1996, p 194; emphasis in original).  The influence of expectations on 
technology trajectories has been described as a process of ‘colonisation’ (Brown et al. 
2000b, pp 3-4).  The concepts, associated values and symbolic meanings that 
underpin projected technoscientific visions or scenarios can lead to very different 
kinds of outcome (Wyatt 2000, pp 111, 116, 122; Winner 2004, pp 38-41).  Particular 
framings of expectation can influence R&D orientations and the entire complex of a 
technology – its form, applications, scale, targets, intended users or audiences, 
funding, pace of development, institutional support, and marketing (Geels & Smit 
2000b, p 147; Hedgecoe & Martin 2003, pp 331, 334, 340, 349, 354-355; Lave et al. 
2010, pp 664, 669). 
 
Concepts of anticipated benefit and of the generic worthiness of technoscience are 
constructed in discourse, through a repertoire of narratives, imaginaries, scenarios and 
metaphors.  These rhetorical dimensions are fundamental to the persuasive influence 
of benefit claims:  ‘inventors and corporate research departments create not only 
products but compelling narratives about where these things will fit into our lives’ 
(Nye 2004, p 160).  Language, stories and imagery are the means by which abstract 
future outcomes are reified to achieve performative power in contested fields (Mulkay 
1993, pp 723-7; Brown et al. 2000b, pp 5-6, 10; Mol & Law 2002, p 19).  Such 
framings are more than merely description or imaginative representation – they are 
significantly constitutive of societal and technoscientific domains and trajectories 
(Lakoff & Johnson 1980, pp 3, 236, 243-246; Coffey & Atkinson 1996, pp 62-63, 85-
86; Deuten & Rip 2000, pp 6-7; Callon 2002, pp 199-200).  Metaphors and narratives 
establish enduring frameworks of meaning, value and purpose for technoscience.  The 
stories help shape the forms and applications perceived as useful and desirable, and 
influence the power relations associated with R&D and technology diffusion (Nye 
1997, pp 3, 6, 179-180; Brown 2000, pp 92-93; Michael 2000b, pp 22, 28; Sturken & 
Thomas 2004, pp 3, 7-14; Williams 2005, pp 3, 6-7, 17). 
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The repertoires of innovation and technology promotion rely on well-established 
conventions and rhetorical modes that are widely accepted within research and policy 
communities, used in diverse contexts from formal policy to the popular media, and 
rarely challenged (Nelkin 1995; Gregory & Miller 1998; Meikle 2003, p 152; Nelkin 
& Lindee 2004; Nye 2004, p 171; Williams 2005, pp 3, 17).  Reductiveness and 
generalisation are standard in the idealising of ‘radically simplified’ technoscientific 
futures and expected benefits (Mulkay 1993, p 728).  Nye (1997, pp 179-189; 2004, 
pp 171-172) distinguishes a suite of archetypal ‘American Technological Narratives’ 
within which people make sense, optimistically or fearfully, of the systems and 
innovations shaping their world and their lives.53  Drama is often constructed through 
framings that attribute polarised values to technoscientific processes, actors and 
artefacts.  For example, the metaphorical construction of R&D developments as 
battles, where a technology and its proponents must fight through adversity and 
resistance before achieving “victory”, is a common mode which bolsters actors’ sense 
of worth and commitment (Deuten & Rip 2000, pp 67, 81, 82).54  Framing 
technoscience objectives and practice in such terms helps to maintain a kind of “high 
ground” for practitioners and advocates, especially when R&D and innovation are 
being pursued in domains marked by controversy and opposition. 
 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven explore the rhetorics associated with promotion of 
expected benefits from GM and wind energy, and technoscience generally, in New 
Zealand.  Discourses around GM in this country have followed patterns typical of the 
rhetorics of biotechnology internationally, from the framing of broad utopian futures 
and economic profits through to “gee-whiz” excitement.  Such tactics feature more 
                                                 
53 The six narratives are categorized according to predominantly positive or negative orientations.  
Utopian narratives include:  the Natural, where technologies are considered natural outgrowths of 
society;  the Ameliorative, where technologies improve the quality of life;  and the Transformative, 
where innovations radically reshape social reality.  Dystopian narratives are:  the Hegemonic, where 
some social groups use technologies to control others;  the Apocalyptic, where new technologies bring 
doom and disaster;  and the Satiric, where innovation entails unexpected negative consequences (Nye 
2004, pp 171-172). 
54 Casting researchers, engineers or technologies as heroes – devoted to the noble cause of the projected 
benefits of the project – is a powerful rhetorical and psychological tactic (Latour 1996, pp 118-119).  
When research programmes fail or are discontinued, the metaphor shifts to cast the technology or 
project as a tragic hero, unloved and misunderstood (Latour 1996, pp 200-202, 248-249, 293-296; 
Deuten & Rip 2000, pp 69, 82).  Such patterns are evident in the promotion of GM in New Zealand, 
where strong public opposition has resulted in considerable defensiveness amongst researchers and 
policy and institutional actors. 
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strongly in the promotion of GM in New Zealand than in the advancement of 
renewable energy.  Nevertheless, wind energy is marketed using dramatic visual 
imagery and the moral imperatives of environmental sustainability, to position this 
technology in relation to national and global discourses of public good. 
 
Scenarios of the future are necessities for success – even for survival – in the present 
(Bijker & Law 1992b, p 107; Michael 2000b, pp 21-22; Nye 2004, pp 160-161; 
Wajcman 2008, p 814).  The performative work of benefit claims is conceptualised in 
terms of commercial leverage, with technoscientific ‘promises’ described as the 
‘currency’ necessary to secure a mandate or social contract for research and 
innovation (van Lente 2000, p 53).  Brown et al (2003, p 6) explain technology 
futures projections via an extended metaphor: 
[A] political economy of expectations [and] transactions… quasi-markets, 
where anticipations have a substantive value [and] can even be understood as 
tradable assets whose value lies only in the future, and whose investment 
burdens are borne in the present. 
 
The instrumental relationships between constructs of intended eventual benefit and 
the current requirements of technoscience processes are indicative of the conjectural, 
contingent, uncertain nature of much R&D.  The trajectory of an emerging technology 
or research area depends upon participants’ and publics’ evaluations of its likely 
prospects.  Claimed future outcomes are central to securing institutional, sectoral and 
political protection for development work on as yet unproven new technologies.55  
Anticipated benefits are assiduously promoted – and indeed often inflated or 
exaggerated – to foster positive perceptions of emerging fields or untried innovations 
(Geels & Smit 2000a, pp 881-882; European Commission 2007, pp 24-25; Van de 
                                                 
55 Studies of research and innovation processes highlight the strategic value of niches – protected 
spaces within which new technoscientific ideas can be developed.  These logistical and institutional 
spaces, created through the choices and policies of research organisations, firms or governments, can 
be crucial in establishing a secure starting point for R&D trajectories, and building acceptance and 
knowledge of the innovation amongst relevant groups in the field (van Lente 1993, pp 20, 59-60, 197-
199; Latour 1996, pp 44-46; Kemp et al. 2001, pp 270-275, 288-289).  Expectations of future benefit 
help to create a privileged space within which a new idea or research pathway – with as yet low 
performance characteristics, and unable to compete in normal markets – can be fostered and become 
profitable (van den Belt & Rip 1987, p 141; Utterback 1994, pp 92-93; Geels & Smit 2000a, pp 879-
881; Vanloqueren & Baret 2009, p 981).  Such development work can be slow and unpredictable 
(Christensen 1997, pp 150-151, 178-179), but an initially modest niche application can be the basis for 
a ‘march upmarket’ to achieve a significant sector share (1997, pp 101-108). 
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Ven et al. 2008, pp 30-34).56  But support must be sustained by ongoing faith in the 
projected benefits amongst key groups and wider publics. 
 
Benefit claims are chimerical abstractions, articulations or reifications of optimism 
and intention (Mulkay 1993, pp 724-725).  They are rhetorical and political 
suppositions, ‘constituted through an unstable field of language, practice and 
materiality’, and thus subject to contestation (Brown et al. 2000b, p 5).  Despite the 
confidence with which expected technoscience benefits are usually asserted 
(Grossman 2004, pp 188-193; Winner 2004, p 37), such conjectural phenomena are 
inherently vulnerable in the ongoing dynamics of fields.  The most enthusiastic claims 
can be eroded or discredited by disappointing performance or simple failure, or by 
shifts in the power relations and politics of the field;  they can be relegated to 
obsolescence or ignominious marginalisation as other, more appealing futures gather 
stronger social, political, financial and symbolic force (van Lente 1993, Chapter 2; 
Latour 1996, Chapters 3 & 7, and Epilogue; Geels & Smit 2000a, pp 877-880; 2000b, 
pp 129, 142-146; Franklin 2003; Rogers 2003).  Some of the hopeful claims advanced 
for GM and for wind energy technology in New Zealand, discussed in Chapters Five, 
Six and Seven, show this kind of susceptibility to contestation or dissipation.  Despite 
confident earlier promotion, many of New Zealand’s GM research programmes, and a 
number of windfarm proposals, have later been quietly discontinued or not pursued 
beyond regulatory approval, suggesting the fragility of insufficiently persuasive 
projections in ruthless political and economic environments. 
 
To understand the workings of benefit claims for technoscience, it is useful to 
consider these domains – including research and innovation practitioners and their 
associated policy and governance communities – in terms of sociological analyses of 
the dynamics of fields.  Theorists such as Bourdieu outline the ways that such 
domains are inherently competitive, sites of ongoing struggle and insecurity, defined 
by the unequal distribution of power and other resources (Bourdieu 1990, pp 55, 111; 
Calhoun 1993, p 64; LiPuma 1993, pp 16-17, 23; Beasley-Murray 2000, p 102; 
                                                 
56 These patterns are strongly evident in the institutional and policy discourse around GM research in 
New Zealand, discussed in Chapters Six and Seven.  In this country, GM has not yet advanced beyond 
lab research and field trials, and the real-world effectiveness and marketability of applications of this 
technoscience have not been tested.  Wind energy technologies, however, now have a well-established 
track record in the New Zealand electricity generation industry, as detailed in Chapter Five. 
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Bourdieu 2002, pp 289-291; 2004, pp 33-35, 58-61; Seidman 2004, p 149).  Options 
and effectiveness depend upon the diverse assets Bourdieu describes as symbolic 
capital – tangible and intangible resources that help to advance the interests and 
strengthen the position of those enjoying them:  ‘capital… entails the capacity to 
exercise control over one’s own future and that of others.  As such, it is a form of 
power’ (Postone et al. 1993, p 4).57  In fields of technoscientific innovation such as 
GM and wind energy in New Zealand, benefit claims are valuable capital for R&D 
actors, assets that help to ensure the strongest position and best prospects in the field. 
 
Bourdieu distinguishes three basic kinds of capital:  economic, social, and cultural 
(Calhoun 1993, p 70; Guillory 2000, p 28; Webb et al. 2002, p 22).  Scientific capital 
is also identified as a particular form of symbolic capital governed by the structures 
and assumptions of research fields (Webb et al. 2002, pp 80-81; Bourdieu 2004, pp 
33-34, 55, 59).58  The different forms of capital are convertible from one dimension of 
influence to another;  intangible, qualitative kinds of symbolic capital inevitably 
correlate with financial advantage (Calhoun 1993, p 69; LiPuma 1993, p 29; Beasley-
Murray 2000, p 102; Guillory 2000, pp 28-29; Webb et al. 2002, p 22; Bourdieu 2004, 
p 55).  The economic mode has particular dominance, underpinning the strategic 
value of other kinds of capital (Lash 1993, pp 200-201; Grenfell 2004, p 113).59 
 
Bourdieu’s recognition of the economic dimensions inherent in other kinds of 
strategically useful capital – such as the perceived beneficence of R&D oriented 
around objectives valorised by society or a particular field as worthy or important – is 
salient for analysis of the performative work of technoscience benefit claims.60  Such 
                                                 
57 Such resources are generally described as symbolic capital, because their meaning, and the 
advantages they confer, depend on the norms and expectations of the field (Grenfell 2004, p 28).  
Bourdieu’s idea of capital differs from more conventional political or economic understandings of 
capitalism.  While there are similarities in his analysis of actors strategically manoeuvring assets for 
maximum advantage, Bourdieu distinguishes his concept from economics, which is relegated to merely 
an example of the broader patterns pertaining in all fields (Guillory 2000, pp 22-25). 
58 Scientific capital can be further defined as of two kinds:  capital of ‘strictly scientific authority’, and 
capital of influence and professional and institutional status which strengthens financial and political 
advantage in the field’s interactions with society (Bourdieu 2004, p 57; Grenfell 2004, p 173). 
59 Foucault (1980, pp 88-89, 101) also recognises the ‘economic functionality of power’ and the 
unavoidable links ‘between power and commodities, power and wealth’. 
60 Numerous other analyses also highlight the dominance of economic frameworks of value and 
expectation in technoscientific processes, promotion and discourse (for example, Cohen et al. 2001, pp 
145-146; Le Heron 2003, pp 122-123; Motion 2005, pp 506-509; Forbes 2006, pp 75, 83; Kleinman & 
Kinchy 2007, pp 196, 198, 203; Lave et al. 2010, pp 660-662; Bruni 2012). 
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inter-connections between symbolic or qualitative values and economic value are 
evident in the framings of anticipated benefit advanced for GM and wind energy in 
New Zealand.  Chapters Five and Six show how the immaterial values associated with 
these technologies – GM’s glamour as an ambitious “high” technology, and wind’s 
appeal as an environmentally sustainable form of energy – are translated into 
pragmatically commercial benefits.  Projected profits from products derived from GM 
feature strongly in biotechnology policy and institutional discourse.  And the 
economic competitiveness of large windfarms has been strongly influential in 
establishing corporate and political commitment to this form of the technology in 
New Zealand. 
 
To sum up this section, the future benefits projected from technoscientific R&D and 
innovation perform important work in the present.  These claims’ value as symbolic 
capital is fulfilled in the immediacy of the strategic advantage, legitimation and 
leverage they provide to research pathways and new technologies, regardless of 
whether or not their promises are eventually achieved over the longer term.  Although 
they project out into the future, their principal role is in the “now” – in contested 
fields characterised by uncertainty, chronically limited funding, and continual 
jockeying for political and institutional support and public acceptance.  Constructs of 
expected benefit can be powerfully influential on the evolution of research fields and 
innovations, but they are also vulnerable to challenge or erosion.  Frameworks of 
economic value predominate in policy and institutional discourse, and are closely 
intertwined with other more qualitative framings of anticipated benefit and utility. 
 
If a key function of benefit claims is to assert the worthiness of a particular 
technology, application or scientific research area, this inevitably involves positioning 
it favourably in comparison to existing systems and alternative options.  How do 
benefit claims contribute to processes of change and uptake of innovation, and help to 
shift practice and expectation from the status quo into new modes?  The next section 
considers the work of benefit projections in the dynamics of change in technoscience. 
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From flexibility to alignment and closure 
A multiplicity of groups and interests form technoscientific fields, and bring diverse 
priorities and perspectives to their engagements with science and innovation.  
According to Latour (1996, p 173), ‘technological projects are deployed in a variable-
ontology world’.  As discussed in Chapter Two, the significance attributed to research 
and technology developments is dependent upon the values, criteria and expectations 
of heterogeneous parties.  R&D pathways, and changes to new technoscientific 
modes, may be constructed and contested within divergent, even incommensurate 
frameworks of meaning (Bijker 1995, p 279).  The anticipated benefits that justify 
research and innovation are qualified by the interests, agendas and ambitions of 
particular groups, and a technological field may be the site of multiple competing 
ideals and objectives (Latour 1996, pp 79, 137; Brown et al. 2003, pp 5-6; Borup & 
Konrad 2004, pp 3-4; Dattée & Weil 2007, p 579).  The trajectories of GM and wind 
energy in New Zealand are influenced by the expectations of different groups ranging 
from research institutions and corporations to environmentalists, farmers, sufferers of 
chronic disease, and, inevitably, politicians. 
 
Shifts in meaning and value occur as protagonists endeavour to assert and stabilise 
their particular rationale for a given technology, and to direct that technology’s 
trajectory into pathways conducive to their interests (Law 1987, pp 111-114, 129-130; 
Bijker & Law 1992a, pp 3-11, 291-293; Bijker 1995, pp 48-50, 279-280; Kline & 
Pinch 1999, p 113-114).  This fluidity, where differing meanings and qualities are 
associated with an evolving technology, is described as ‘interpretative flexibility’ 
(Pinch & Bijker 1987, p 27; Bijker 1995, pp 75-77, 119, 236, 270). 
 
Such multiplicity of concepts and potentials is more evident in the earlier stages of 
development of a technology or a scientific research programme, when, as Latour 
(1996, p 48) explains, ‘reality remains polymorphous’.  There are still, theoretically, a 
range of possible options as to how research might unfold, how the technology might 
be deployed, the forms it might take, and the ends it might target (Latour 1987, p 104; 
Pinch & Bijker 1987, p 28; Bijker & Law 1992a, pp 7-8; van Lente 1993, pp 47-49; 
Hughes 1994, p 101; Utterback 1994, pp xviii, 23; Bijker 1995, p 280; Van Merkerk 
& Van Lente 2005, p 1095).  Kaplan and Tripsas (2008, pp 791, 794-5) note the 
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richness of this phase of ‘ferment’ generating variation and potential.  These times in 
technology development are described as full of opportunity:  ‘complex bundles of 
innovation ideas [where] the process diverges into multiple, parallel, and 
interdependent paths of activities’ (Van de Ven et al. 2008, p 10). 
 
Inherent in such uncertainty, however, is a need for resolution.  Brown, Rappert and 
Webster (2000b, p 8) suggest that the ‘indeterminate character’ of technological 
futures, and the struggles between ‘competing innovation agendas’, drive an impetus 
to construct shared frameworks and priorities through official policy and Foresight 
programmes for R&D.61  Hughes (1989, p 52) argues that: 
…one of the primary characteristics of a [technological] system builder is the 
ability to construct or to force unity from diversity, centralization in the face of 
pluralism, and coherence from chaos. 
 
Alignment of the interests and paradigms of relevant actors in the field is a key factor 
in the success of R&D trajectories and innovation diffusion.  Kaplan and Tripsas 
(2008, pp 791-4, 799) insist that achievement of a collective frame of meaning, 
resolving divergent and competing perspectives, is an essential prerequisite for a new 
technology to become established.  Van Lente (1993, pp 34, 50-51, 70, 111) also 
highlights the crucial importance of ‘interlocking’ of expectations and R&D activity.  
Latour’s analyses of technoscientific networks (1987, 1992, 1996, 1999) show the 
importance of alignment of diverse interests – as well as the cooperation of physical 
and natural phenomena and epistemological data – to secure maximum credibility, 
momentum and durability for an R&D programme and ‘make dissent impossible’ 
(Latour 1987, p 103).  In the trajectories of GM and wind energy in New Zealand 
detailed in Chapters Five and Six, such alignment has often been (ostensibly) 
achieved via official government policies, sanctioning technoscientific directions 
through formal strategies for development in particular sectors.62 
 
                                                 
61 Some studies highlight contests between divergent alternative framings of possible technoscience 
trajectories (for example, Kleinman & Kinchy 2007; Davenport & Leitch 2009; Vanloqueren & Baret 
2009). 
62 Such politically-driven agenda-setting is, however, often strongly contested and critically 
deconstructed (for example, Cartner & Bollinger 1997; Davenport et al. 2003; Le Heron 2003; Genus 
& Rogers-Hayden 2005; Motion 2005; Goven 2006; Davenport & Bibby 2007; Leitch & Davenport 
2007; Rogers-Hayden & Jones 2007; Davenport & Leitch 2009; Bloomfield & Doolin 2011). 
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Alignment leads to the consolidation of a shared meaning for a research field or new 
technology – a collective understanding of its value and benefits, and its most 
appropriate and advantageous applications – which satisfies the needs, priorities and 
expectations of key participants.  Development pathways are analysed as processes of 
iterative negotiation through interactions in the field (Utterback 1994, p 26; Bijker 
1995, pp 270-271; Bourdieu 2004, pp 14-17, 65-73, 80; Chakravorti 2004, p 481; 
Grenfell 2004, pp 172-173).  Eventually a version of the technology emerges that can 
be described as “dominant”, gaining stronger support and wider acceptance than 
alternative modes (Pinch & Bijker 1987, p 44; Utterback 1994, pp xviii, 23-29; Bijker 
1995, pp 51-52, 85-88, 270-271; Green et al. 1999, p 783; Van Merkerk & Van Lente 
2005, pp 1095-1096; Berkun 2007, p 29; Kaplan & Tripsas 2008, p 794).  Closure is 
reached with the consolidation of development processes around a particular form, 
application and function of the technology or field – associated with particular kinds 
of benefits, values and expectations (Pinch & Bijker 1987, p 27; Rappert 1999a, pp 3-
4; Garud & Karnøe 2001a, pp 10-11, 31; Brown et al. 2003, p 5).  Future 
developments are then oriented around the “successful” model, and a trajectory 
established (Utterback 1994, pp 50-51; Green et al. 1999, p 782; MacKenzie & 
Wajcman 1999, p 19; Garud & Karnøe 2001a, pp 4-5; Kaplan & Tripsas 2008, pp 
790, 794). 
 
The dominant framing becomes the norm, retrospectively accepted as the ideal or goal 
of the development process, and absorbed into the expectations and practice of the 
field.  Bijker (1995, p 85) draws a parallel with scientific controversies, where 
underdetermined meanings are resolved via negotiation to a consensus:  ‘from then on 
only one interpretation is accepted by all.  Such a closure is not gratuitous, but has far-
reaching consequences:  it restructures the participants’ world.  History is rewritten’.  
Bourdieu (2004, p 75) also highlights the universalisation or neutralisation that results 
as the contingent specific origins of a new idea or technology are obliterated in its 
acceptance into the established orthodoxies of the field;  the innovation ‘become[s] 
anonymous, subjectless… independent of the historical agent who produces it and the 
social conditions of which it is the product’. 
 
These patterns are evident in the evolution of GM and wind energy in New Zealand, 
discussed in Chapters Five and Six, and in the kinds of projected benefits that 
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underpin the orientation of dominant technology modes in these fields.  GM research 
in this country has largely followed paths set by the international biotech industry, 
focusing on agronomic goals through development of herbicide-resistant vegetable 
crops, and on production of potentially lucrative pharmaceutical compounds in the 
milk of GM livestock.63  And wind energy has been accepted and deployed in New 
Zealand in forms established in the US and Europe as the norm for this technology – 
large industrial-scale windfarms feeding a centralised grid. 
 
Despite some studies’ analyses of collective shared meaning-making, the process of 
reaching closure and securing acceptance of change is often intensely manipulative, 
and such struggles are invariably political (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1992, pp 262-263; 
Kaplan & Tripsas 2008, pp 791, 798).  Beder (1991, pp 226-229, 251-253) argues that 
the apparent closure of technoscientific differences depends on power relations and 
inequalities;  she shows that power ‘enables some groups to control negotiation and… 
arbitrarily limit interpretative flexibility’ (1991, p 227).64  Bijker (1995, pp 262-264, 
279, 283) also highlights the ways that dominant groups, or powerful amalgamations 
of vested interests within a field, ‘insist upon [their] definition of both problems and 
appropriate solutions’ (1995, p 276).  Green and colleagues (1999, p 786) observe 
that:  ‘the rate and direction of technological change result[s] from the ability of some 
actors to shape technologies to their own preferred ends.’  For Bourdieu, fields’ 
evolution is dominated by those with the greatest symbolic capital.65  More powerful 
groups are able to assert their particular interests and consolidate their position as 
leaders in the field (Bourdieu 2004, p 35; Grenfell 2004, p 28).66  Symbolic capital is 
the foundation for influence over norms and practice: 
                                                 
63 The exception was the research into the potential application of GM to develop a biocontrol for 
possums (a major environmental pest in New Zealand), discussed in Chapter Five.  This use of GM 
technology would have been unique in the world in that its primary focus was on public-good benefits 
from improved ecosystem management and biodiversity protection. 
64 Beder identifies five ways in which disputes of interpretation, legitimacy and value may be resolved:  
closure through loss of interest or abandonment;  closure through force, where an external authority 
imposes a decision;  closure through consensus even though the option adopted may not necessarily be 
the most effective choice;  closure through negotiation, again not necessarily around the best solution 
but where compromise is accepted in order to end the debate;  and the ideal process of closure through 
sound argument, where participants agree on the most appropriate solution (Beder 1991, pp 227-228). 
65 Such advantages are cumulative:  ‘The scientific field gives credit to those who already have it’ 
(Bourdieu 2004, p 56). 
66 Symbolic capital also offers dominant players and institutions power over the relative positions of 
others, allowing stronger groups to establish and enforce boundaries around the field, to set criteria for 
settling controversies, and to delegitimate or marginalise alternatives (Bourdieu 1990, pp 37, 135; 
Robbins 1991, pp 97, 100; Lash 1993, pp 197-199; Bourdieu 2002, pp 294-295; Webb et al. 2002, pp 
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The dominant players are those who manage to impose the definition of 
science that says that the most accomplished realization of science consists in 
having, being and doing what they have, are and do (Bourdieu 2004, pp 62-
63). 
 
The workings of power in the assertion of particular meanings and values as “truth” 
and “knowledge” are also a central concern for Foucault (1972, 1980, 1994).  His 
focus was on the interconnections and mutual reinforcing of power and discourse, 
showing how the interests of the powerful are privileged and perpetuated in the 
circulation of discourse (for example, 1980, pp 93-94, 101-102, 118-119, 131-133).  
Foucault notes the effects of power in processes of scientific change, highlighting ‘the 
problem of the regime, the politics of the scientific statement’ (1980, p 112).  
Discursive constructs – such as framings of expected benefit from technoscientific 
R&D and innovation – orient knowledge, perceptions and beliefs around the interests 
of dominant groups (Hook 2001, p 2; Mills 2003, pp 72, 79; Motion 2005, p 505; 
Motion & Weaver 2005, pp 50-52).  Foucauldian analysis also highlights the ways 
that such agenda-driven discourse works to exclude or delegitimate alternative values 
and voices (Gaventa & Cornwall 2001, p 71; Mills 2003, pp 54, 72, 76; Davenport & 
Leitch 2009, pp 946-947). 
 
Studies of technoscientific development recognise that there are losers, as well as 
winners, in such processes of strategic positioning and change.  The success of one 
particular framing of an innovation or research area has the corollary that other, 
different possibilities are foreclosed.  Alternative modes of a new technology – and 
the benefits and positive outcomes that might be derived from those other options – 
are often marginalised by the ascendancy of the dominant form (Hughes 1989, p 52; 
Brown et al. 2000b, p 13; Edwards 2008, p 184).67 
                                                 
23, 152; Bourdieu 2004, pp 35-36, 58, 62; Grenfell 2004, p 134).  These patterns are reflected in the 
policy and regulatory processes for GM and wind farms in New Zealand, discussed in Chapters Five 
and Six (for example, Leitch & Davenport 2005; Goven 2006; Hindmarsh & Du Plessis 2008; Kurian 
& Wright 2010). 
67 Early forms of an innovation, such as the penny-farthing bicycle, effectively disappear as new 
versions of the technology emerge that are more in alignment with the interests of key social groups 
(Pinch & Bijker 1987, pp 28-46; Bijker 1995, Chapter 2).  But historical studies of technology 
“contests” – such as the displacement of steam-powered vehicles by the gasoline engine (eg Arthur 
1999) – note that the ascendancy of a particular technological mode may not occur because of any 
inherent superiority in performance or meeting societal needs (van Lente 2000, p 56; Brown et al. 
2000b, p 10; Nye 2004, pp 167-168).  Such “victories” can be due to complex and arbitrary 
conjunctions of random events and influences that create patterns of increasing returns for the 
retrospectively “better” option:  ‘[I]n 1914 there was an outbreak of hoof-and-mouth disease [which] 
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The dominance of favoured modes or fields is enabled via the assertion of narrowly-
focused frameworks of reference for policy and discourse.  Studies of science and 
innovation processes trace the influence of hegemonically normalised constraints that 
limit the range of perspectives, options, criteria, information, and expected benefits 
deemed relevant to the evolution of a research pathway or a technology and its 
application.  Such “fencing off” defuses potential challenges, minimises obstacles and 
uncertainties, and censors out alternatives, thus privileging presumed or intended 
technoscience trajectories. 
 
Gieryn’s analysis of boundary work in science domains (1999, pp x-xii, 4, 6-10) 
develops an extended cartographic metaphor.  The borders around technoscience need 
constant defending, and are continually challenged and renegotiated (Fisher 1990, p 
101; Gieryn 1999, pp 14-15).  Determining what is recognised and valorised within 
technoscience frameworks is also a process of exclusion, an assertion of power and a 
claim on support and resources (Cozzens 1990, pp 164-168; Fisher 1990, pp 98-99, 
112-113; Gieryn 1999, pp 12-13, 23, 29).  Boundaries serve an important protective 
function for technoscientific enterprise, but can also limit opportunity (Hargadon 
2003, p 72).  Validity and prestige may be accorded to some technological modes and 
objectives, but other promising options and potential benefits are eclipsed, relegated 
to the margins of discourse and policy processes, or trivialised in non-threatening 
minor applications.  This has been the fate of alternative applications of wind energy 
technologies in New Zealand, discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
The issues and perspectives most likely to be delegitimated in such boundary 
processes are the complex, fuzzy subtleties of social, political, ethical and spiritual 
dimensions, qualitative considerations, and questions around the perception, meaning 
and significance of research and innovation (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1992, p 253; 
Sarewitz 1996, pp 158-160; 2004, pp 397-399).68  Reliance on such blinkered 
                                                 
led to the withdrawal of horse troughs – which is where steam cars could fill with water.  It took the 
Stanley brothers about three years to develop a condenser and boiler system that did not need to be 
filled every thirty or forty miles.  But by then it was too late.  The steam engine never recovered’ 
(Arthur 1999, p 112). 
68 Boundaries are maintained around technoscientific agendas not only through assertion of the 
dominant mode of scientific rationality (Habermas 1971; Beck 1999; Feenberg 1999), but also through 
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functional thinking – where broader societal implications and values frameworks are 
neglected or excluded – is identified as a common pattern in technoscience processes 
(Geels & Smit 2000a, pp 878-879; Wilsdon et al. 2005, pp 25-26, 53, 56; Kearnes et 
al. 2006, pp 19, 23; Berkun 2007, pp 62, 98; Woodhouse & Sarewitz 2007, pp 139, 
141).69  Winner (1986, pp 4-5, 46-55, 172; 2004, pp 38-41) analyses technological 
and engineering domains as shaped within severely limited frames of reference which 
establish de facto ‘regimes of instrumentality’ and preclude consideration of social, 
ethical and public-good dimensions.  These patterns are strongly evident in the 
framing of GM and wind energy in New Zealand, discussed in Chapters Five and Six.  
Public debate and formal regulatory processes for GM research and releases have 
been dominated by ostensibly scientific modes of risk assessment.  Windfarm 
proposals have also been promoted and decided according to a limited spectrum of 
criteria, and other dimensions (such as the concerns of local communities) have been 
minimised, neutralised or over-ruled. 
 
To summarise, the effective assertion of sufficiently persuasive benefit projections is 
essential for alignment and closure in technoscience change processes.  Benefit 
framings must not only be convincing as the justification for technoscientific R&D;  
they must establish a narrative of value and meaning powerful enough to advance one 
interpretation of the technology as the dominant mode, and to discredit or diminish 
the appeal of alternatives.  Chapters Five and Six trace the ascendancy of certain 
framings of anticipated benefit in the trajectories of GM and wind energy in New 
Zealand.  Options associated with attractive economic potentials have achieved 
dominance – lucrative pharmaceutical and agronomic applications of GM, claims of 
the revitalisation of production sectors, and profits from competitively large-scale 
windfarms.  Other possible R&D and innovation trajectories – and the different kinds 
of benefits, goals and criteria driving alternative technoscientific modes – have little 
traction in the political, institutional and sectoral arenas where policies and decisions 
are made. 
 
                                                 
the seductive persuasiveness of framings of benefit anticipated from technological innovation (Spigel 
2004, pp 139-140; Sturken & Thomas 2004, pp 3, 8, 10, 12; Turkle 2004, pp 22-28). 
69 Such narrowing of the scope of matters that are given validity and included in the consideration of 
technological and scientific issues is the focus of critique in studies of processes of public engagement 
around risk (Beck 1992; Wynne 1992, 1996; Beck 1999; Kearnes et al. 2006; Levidow & Carr 2007). 
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Lock-in and inertia 
Alignment of technoscientific developments around a dominant mode, with the 
effective closure of uncertainty around potential alternatives, can be the point at 
which technologies or research fields begin to ossify.  Successful technoscientific 
applications or modes become entrenched, and block evolution of fresh ideas and new 
possible benefits.  Analysing structures of power in 20th century technology, Winner 
(1986, p 29) explains: 
Because choices tend to become strongly fixed in material commitment, 
economic investment, and social habit, the original flexibility vanishes for all 
practical purposes once the initial commitments are made. 
 
The paths of GM and wind energy in New Zealand demonstrate such tensions.  As 
Chapters Five and Six show, the inertial weight of established technological 
paradigms, systems and infrastructure exerts significant influence, restricting the 
range of potential uses and benefits envisaged from these innovations.  Particularly in 
electricity generation, existing technological frameworks (both physical infrastructure 
and institutional and policy expectations) have imposed significant constraints on 
opportunities to maximise the benefits of wind energy. 
 
Such inertia is an inherent aspect of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (Bourdieu 1999, pp 
109-111);  the familiar modes and paradigms shared within a group or field can limit 
awareness and openness to future options.  Economic interests and status are also 
strong factors;  Bourdieu identifies an inherent conservatism, where resistance to 
innovation results from the protection of ‘the distribution of the chances of profit’ 
(Bourdieu 2004, p 62).  In his classic study of scientific paradigms, Kuhn (1996, pp 
24, 64) describes the conservatism of established frameworks of expectation and 
practice, circumscribing the boundaries of inquiry and possibility: 
No part of the aim of normal science is to call forth new sorts of phenomena;  
indeed those that will not fit the box are often not seen at all…  novelty 
emerges only with difficulty, manifested by resistance. 
 
Technology development and diffusion are often strongly patterned within existing 
frameworks of meaning and application (Mokyr 1990, pp 261-262, 266-267; Arthur 
1999, p 107; Chakravorti 2004, pp 475, 477; Van Merkerk & Van Lente 2005, pp 
1095, 1097; Dattée & Weil 2007, pp 584-585; Vanloqueren & Baret 2009, pp 977, 
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980).  Priorities, expectations and solutions are framed within current modes of 
thinking and value (Utterback 1994, pp xv, xxviii, 50-51; Christensen 1997, pp xxiii, 
xxvi-xxvii, 35, 64, 100, 259).  Collective commitment to prevailing paradigms and 
networks is powerfully influential (Deuten & Rip 2000, p 77; Brown & Michael 2003, 
pp 14, 16).  The established norms, beliefs and goals of the field, and compliance to 
the dominant technological mode, are reinforced by incentives and institutional 
processes (Green et al. 1999, pp 781-782; Hargadon 2003, pp 116, 184; Petrick & 
Echols 2004, pp 83, 86, 96; Kaplan & Tripsas 2008, pp 799-801; Van de Ven et al. 
2008, p 209).  There can be significant commercial pressures to recoup sunk 
investments (van Lente 2000, p 60; Van de Ven et al. 2008, p 92).  The priority is 
protection of previous achievements:  ‘security, risk aversion, and optimization of the 
status quo eventually become dominant positions’ (Berkun 2007, p 62).70 
 
These patterns are strongly evident in the evolution of GM and wind energy in New 
Zealand.  Policy and institutional frameworks for the development of these 
technologies have focused around existing concepts of benefit and necessity – the 
assumption that electricity generation will be undertaken by large corporations for 
commercial profit, and the belief that GM will foster the competitiveness and 
reputation of New Zealand agriculture, the basis of the country’s economy, via new 
high-value products and improved efficiencies. 
 
The inertia of paradigms and expectations is closely intertwined with the inertia of 
physical artefacts and infrastructure:  ‘[Technological systems] are like ocean liners, 
once they are on course and at full speed, they have considerable momentum and 
therefore take a long time to change direction (Gooley & Towers 1996, p 5).  
Analyses of path dependence in technology trajectories emphasise the narrowing of 
options created by pre-existing systems and structures (David 1985, p 332; Gooley & 
Towers 1996, pp 3, 8; Williams 2005, p 13).  Bassanini and Dosi (2001, pp 41-47) 
                                                 
70 Such behaviours are not confined to contemporary systems and processes.  The Renaissance political 
theorist Niccolo Machiavelli observed:  ‘There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous 
to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of 
things.  For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order’ (Machiavelli, The Prince 
(1532), cited in Berkun 2007, p 56). 
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offer a diverse range of illustrations for the theme that ‘history matters’.71  Garud and 
Karnøe (2001a, pp 25, 30) argue for a more active, future-oriented approach in ‘path 
creation’, but nevertheless recognise the constraints of ‘initial conditions’ and 
‘structurational processes’ on technological development. 
 
The stories of GM and wind energy technologies in New Zealand have been 
powerfully shaped by such historical patterns.  In the trajectory of wind energy in 
particular, the demands of New Zealand’s extensive electricity infrastructure, as well 
as assumptions of the industry, policy actors and publics, have significantly 
influenced the opportunities and diffusion of this technology.72  With GM, the 
systemic effects of inertia have been more a consequence of the relative scale of New 
Zealand’s research community;  R&D has primarily followed directions already well-
established by multinational technoscience corporations. 
 
Radical change 
A key factor in the dynamics of technoscience is the degree of change, relative to 
current systems and paradigms, involved in development and uptake of an innovation.  
Normal practice, via incremental expansion or refinement of accepted knowledge and 
applications, is very different from ‘revolutions’, where previous assumptions must be 
significantly changed or even abandoned (Kuhn 1996, Chapters III and IV; Bourdieu 
2004, pp 14-17, 80).  Such differences are evident in the trajectories of GM and wind 
energy in New Zealand.  More revolutionary modes of technoscientific change have 
found very limited acceptance and support:  ‘the more radical and disruptive an 
innovation and the less its compatibility with existing practice, the slower its rate of 
adoption’ (Rogers 2003, p 247).  The forms of these technologies that have become 
the dominant mode in New Zealand – and the benefits that have been prioritised and 
valorised in justification of these developments – are more conservative options, most 
compatible with conventional frameworks of value in those sectors. 
                                                 
71 The configuration of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard is commonly used to demonstrate the 
intransigence of physical technological structures and associated practices (David 1985; Utterback 
1994, pp 5-7, 24-5, 49; Garud & Karnøe 2001a, pp 3-4; Rogers 2003, pp 10-11). 
72 This kind of ‘lock-in’ or entrenchment in large electricity networks – including major technological 
infrastructure for production and transmission, as well as complex networks of public and private 
organisations, stakeholders and consumers – is featured in several international studies (Winner 1986, 
p, 53, 57; Hughes 1989, pp 76-79; Wilsdon & Willis 2004, p 31; Woodhouse & Sarewitz 2007, p 143). 
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The crucial distinction is between ‘routine’ and ‘radical’ innovations (Gooley & 
Towers 1996, pp 5-7), or between ‘sustaining’ and ‘disruptive’ or ‘discontinuous’ 
technologies (Christensen 1997, pp xviii, 16, 80, 112, 150-151, 252).  Hedgecoe and 
Martin (2008, p 820) describe two broad registers of expectation in genomics and 
biotechnology discourses:  the contextual, claiming continuity between innovation 
and earlier technoscience, and the transformational, asserting a radical break with the 
past and revolutionary new potentials.  And Michael (2000b, pp 27-30) discriminates 
between accounts of the future that extend present-day conditions and values, and 
more substantive utopian visions of techno-social possibility. 
 
Radical or disruptive alternatives are deeply challenging to mainstream paradigms, 
requiring major changes to beliefs and value systems as well as to practices, routines, 
knowledge requirements, regulatory processes, physical structures and relations 
within the field.73  As Hargadon (2003, p 10) points out, such change involves 
considerable risk and disruption: 
Breakthrough innovations cause [technological] networks to shift 
dramatically… New technologies [can render] obsolete not just old objects, 
but also the people and ideas linked to them and, in a chain reaction, the 
complex organisations and markets that grew up around these combinations. 
 
A central factor in change processes is that the perceived benefits of new technologies 
must outweigh the challenges of adoption (Coburn 2006, pp 10, 23-25);  there are 
particular difficulties for new technologies that require change through an entire 
support system or infrastructure (2006, pp 84, 102).  Protection of profitable interests 
results in understandable opposition to developments seen as revolutionary or extreme 
(Hughes 1989, p 59).  Not surprisingly, technology development and diffusion 
processes are often more successful when they conform with established paradigms, 
infrastructure and systems (Utterback 1994, chapters 7 & 9; Gooley & Towers 1996, 
p 8; Hargadon 2003, pp 60-61, 191-192; Rogers 2003, pp 1-5, 7-11; Berkun 2007, p 
55).  As Coburn (2006, p 43) argues, innovations ‘are much more likely to be adopted 
                                                 
73 Schumpeter’s theories of the economic dimensions of technological development highlight the 
principle of ‘creative destruction’ (Mokyr 1990, pp 6, 147, 261, 282-283; Garud & Karnøe 2001a, p 6; 
Van de Ven et al. 2008, p 211).  Such dramatic change is described as ‘innovational transilience’, when 
established industries, markets and professional sectors are made obsolete by new technologies 
(Fairtlough 2000, p 270). 
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if they offer incremental adjustments… and not complete deviations from life as we 
know it’.  The status quo offers more favourable prospects for new technologies that:  
‘simply build on what is already there, requiring… change in only subtle, nearly 
invisible ways’ (Van de Ven et al. 2008, p 171).  The form of wind energy that has 
become dominant in New Zealand – large windfarms feeding the central grid – 
illustrates these themes.  Radically different applications of wind technology, such as 
distributed generation via small community-based installations or independent 
domestic turbines, are perceived by the industry and policy-makers as requiring too 
great a reconfiguration of existing systems and infrastructure.  As discussed in 
Chapters Five and Seven, decentralised wind energy systems are promoted as offering 
societal benefits that are insufficiently compelling to sector decision-makers and 
political interests to warrant major disruptions and expense. 
 
Achieving compatibility with existing technological systems and organisational 
structures can require significant changes in the concepts of benefit, value and 
purpose shaping an innovation and its application.  Becoming mainstream usually 
involves (re)framing a new technology or research field within economic criteria of 
instrumentality, efficiency and profitability, and can result in the loss or compromise 
of other modes of potential benefit (Winner 1986, pp 47-57; Hawken 1993; Hård & 
Jamison 2005, pp 270-271, 279, 285-291; Hess et al. 2008, 482-487; Vanloqueren & 
Baret 2009, p 980).  Such strategic framing – positioning the projected benefits from 
new technologies within established sector paradigms, particularly the economic – is 
itself a valuable dimension of symbolic capital in technology development fields 
(Bourdieu 2004, pp 33-34; Grenfell 2004, pp 113, 167).  The increasing adoption of 
wind technologies for electricity generation in New Zealand is in part due to the 
ability of advocates in both industry and policy domains to position the dominant 
form of this innovation as compatible with existing infrastructure and with the 
priorities of powerful groups. 
 
Gaining acceptance for new technologies and their projected benefits requires not 
only consistency with the field’s conventions and frameworks of expectation, but also 
the involvement of actors or advocates with appropriate conformity to the norms and 
culture of the dominant groups.  Rogers (2003, pp 305-6, 382) emphasises the 
importance of ‘homophily’ – similarity of style, background, and experience – for 
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credibility and effectiveness in promoting the benefits of a new technology.  
Confidence and trust between people with similar histories, styles and thinking in 
R&D and technoscience fields is a key aspect of gaining consensus (Knorr Cetina 
1999, pp 202, 258-259; Rappert 1999a, pp 3-4, 9-10).  Bourdieu emphasises the 
importance of habitus – or the “fit” between actors and fields – in such strategic 
positioning.  Insiders, thoroughly habituated to their field and its norms and frames of 
meaning, enjoy greater influence than ‘the marginal, the heretics, the innovators, who 
are often situated on the boundaries of their disciplines’ (Bourdieu 2004, p 43).  
Dattée and Weil (2007, p 583) observe that innovative technologiess are more likely 
to be seen positively when introduced by firms with high status and ‘institutional 
weight’.  Outsiders with few connections in the field or sector are ‘often disdained 
and… the information they generate is just not considered as relevant’;  technological 
communities focus as much on advocates’ credibility and conformity to the norms of 
the field as on product performance (Dattée & Weil 2007, p 596).  The trajectories of 
GM and wind energy in New Zealand have been strongly influenced by the attribution 
of authority and reliability to mainstream actors and institutions – and to the framings 
of expected benefit they advance – and by the corresponding difficulties for advocates 
of alternative applications offering different kinds of potential benefit. 
 
The imperative of imperatives 
Given the challenges of overcoming the inertia of established technological systems, 
particularly when R&D and innovations are perceived as radically disruptive, a major 
dimension of the performative work of benefit claims for technoscience is to identify 
suitably compelling problems, needs or inadequacies for which the new technology 
offers a solution.  It may seem perverse for this thesis – an exploration of the benefit 
claims advanced to justify technoscientific innovation – to focus on dysfunction and 
difficulty.  But problems, real or perceived, current or projected, urgent or chronic, are 
inextricably intertwined with the construction and value of projected technological 
benefits.  Problems provide impetus for change, benchmarks for assessments of value, 
and motivation for investment, through ‘the two-fold practical orchestration of present 
problems and future solutions’ (Brown 2000, p 89).  Sturken and Thomas (2004, pp 8-
9) suggest that projections of future benefits and improvements from technoscience 
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perpetuate a ‘childlike relationship to technology’, where ‘[t]echnology is consistently 
posed as that which will alleviate our sense of lack and fulfil our needs’. 
 
In his analysis of the dynamics of scientific paradigms, Kuhn (1996, p 77) highlights 
the importance of crises as a ‘necessary precondition’ for the emergence of new ideas 
and frameworks of value.74  In the ongoing activity of fields, anomalies and new 
information challenge existing paradigms;  such disjunctions may be given weight by 
associated broader social and epistemological developments (1996, pp 52ff, 69, 82).  
Kuhn (1996, p 92) reiterates the importance of a ‘sense of malfunction’ indicating that 
‘existing institutions have ceased adequately to meet the problems posed by an 
environment that they have in part created.’ 
 
The strategic work of problem definition, and its inherently political, negotiated 
nature, are crucial in securing and maintaining support for technology development 
(Funtowicz & Ravetz 1992, pp 262-263; Deuten & Rip 2000, p 69; van Lente 2000, p 
55; Michael 2000b, p 22; Berkun 2007, p 10; Levidow & Carr 2007, p 409).  The 
importance of a compelling problem to instigate momentum for research and change 
is highlighted in a number of studies;  for example, Van de Ven et al (2008, pp 10, 30) 
describe the genesis of innovation: 
Concentrated actions to allocate resources and initiate innovation development 
are triggered by “shocks”, not mere persuasion…  When people reach a 
threshold of sufficient dissatisfaction with existing conditions, they initiate 
action…  [N]ecessity, opportunity and dissatisfaction are the major 
preconditions that stimulate people to act. 
 
Rogers’ model of the generation of new technologies (2003, pp 137-140, 171-172, 
189) begins with the identification (or creation or encouragement) of a problem or 
need as the incentive for R&D.  Coburn (2006, pp 17-20, 53, 86, 160) poses a 
spectrum of various levels of need and urgency, distinguishing between deep ‘core’ 
crises and those manufactured or ‘inspired’ by marketing and other sectoral and 
societal pressures.  Even abstract, broadly generic framings of need can create a sense 
of compulsion that helps to justify support for research and innovation.  A notable 
example of such wide-ranging constructs is the Red Queen imperative, discussed in 
                                                 
74 Although his model of paradigm shifts was developed to explain processes in scientific research 
fields, Kuhn specifically acknowledges its usefulness and “wide applicability” in other domains (Kuhn 
1996, p 208). 
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Chapters Two, Six and Seven – the conceptualisation of technoscientific innovation, 
and particularly GM, as a desperate high-stakes competition.  This narrative asserts a 
general presumption of the necessity of involvement and striving in this R&D field, 
both for scientific prestige and for vaguely-defined economic and social outcomes.  
The demand established by such patterns of belief and expectation is far from an 
immediate crisis, yet can be no less powerful a driver for policy and research sectors;  
the Red Queen imperative has legitimated the active participation of New Zealand 
research institutions in GM work, irrespective of specific environmental, agronomic 
and medical problems targeted by these projects. 
 
Technoscientific benefit claims are phenomena existing in the future, and the needs 
and difficulties they aim to address may also be projections forward in time.  The 
concept of a ‘presumptive anomaly’ – an anticipated problem predicted to arise at 
some eventual future time – was initially suggested to explain innovation in the field 
of aeronautics, and the impetus for aircraft engineers to develop a completely new 
technology, the turbojet (Hughes 1989, p 75; van Lente 1993, pp 51, 86-87; Bijker 
1995, pp 278-279).  The expectation of different, more challenging conditions and 
criteria for technological performance in the future establishes an ‘imagined context… 
generated by extrapolation’ (van Lente 2000, p 58).75  Predicted needs or 
inadequacies, even in the remote future, can have as much influence as any present 
situations in justifying R&D activity and innovation;  as Constant (1987, p 225) 
observes: 
The old system still works, indeed still may offer substantial development 
potential, but science suggests that the leading edge of future practice will 
have a radically different foundation.76 
 
                                                 
75 Michael (2000b, pp 24-25) discusses the relative influence on present day decision-making of near 
and distant futures:  ‘what are the respective impacts of measuring a future’s distance from the present 
in terms of weeks, in terms of parliamentary sessions, in terms of a technological age? … Long 
distance would diffuse urgency:  there is no dire need to do anything immediately, and in the 
meanwhile “we” can wait for technology to develop fixes.  Contrariwise, if this future is situated close 
by, then action is needed immediately’. 
76 Van Lente (1993, pp 164-169) extends these ideas to outline the phenomenon of ‘self-justifying 
technologies’, innovations that are legitimated via circular ‘tautological’ constructs of anticipation and 
inadequacy.  His example of high-definition television technology illustrates the principle where R&D 
processes are driven by invidious comparison with projected future intentions:  ‘[T]he main 
shortcoming of the present system is that it is not HDTV.  The present system is deficient exactly to the 
degree that it does not live up to the projected characteristics of HDTV.  The present is measured by 
the yardstick of the technological promise, and found wanting’ (1993, p 167). 
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The development of wind energy technology in New Zealand demonstrates the strong 
motivation that can be asserted by a future crisis – the enormous environmental, social 
and intergenerational challenges of global climate change.  As discussed in Chapters 
Five and Seven, problems that may not have their full impact for decades to come are 
used to justify significant technological change in the present. 
 
The trajectories of GM and wind energy as innovative technologies in New Zealand 
demonstrate the usefulness of problems and needs in overcoming inertia and forcing 
fields into different modes.  The identification of urgent present problems – or 
anticipated future ones – as drivers for development of new technologies is the “flip 
side” of the strategic work of benefit claims.  For without a crisis of sufficient severity 
as an imperative for decision-makers and communities to consider other kinds of 
options, a new technology will have a much harder pathway to acceptance and 
diffusion.  Would the claimed benefit exert a powerful enough “pull” to justify R&D 
and bring about change without a corresponding problem “push”? 
 
As Chapters Five and Seven show, political recognition of the necessity of responding 
to global climate change created a new framework of value for wind energy as an 
environmentally sustainable form of electricity generation.  Chapters Six and Seven 
explain how research into possible GM technologies for possum biocontrol and 
horticultural production was justified by the limitations and adverse effects of current 
environmental management methods.  Other GM research claimed goals of alleviating 
suffering from chronic diseases via production of pharmaceutical compounds, 
boosting economic performance in struggling production sectors, and securing New 
Zealand’s position in relation to the perceived international competitiveness of the 
Red Queen imperative, introduced in Chapter Two.  Projection of a satisfactory 
benefit is only one dimension of the validation and advancement of new 
technoscience.  Equally important is recognition of a big enough crisis – or looming 
future problem – demanding resolution. 
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Conclusion 
The successful promotion of technoscientific innovation and change requires the 
resources – symbolic as well as institutional and economic – to assert and sustain a 
sufficiently convincing framework of meaning and value for the technology or 
research, and to persuade policy and sectoral decision-makers and publics of its 
desirability and utility.  Central to this process is the creation and circulation of 
projections of expected benefit from innovations such as GM and wind energy 
technologies – strengthened and made more appealing through imagery, narrative and 
metaphor.  Benefit claims are assets in the contested fields of R&D and technology 
diffusion, but they are also constraints, influencing and limiting the possible forms 
and applications of new technologies and the kinds of outcomes that are envisaged 
and supported. 
 
The ascendancy of some applications of new technologies – and the priority accorded 
to some kinds of benefits and beneficiaries – result from the power relations and 
negotiations that are inherent in such fields, and from the histories of previous 
technological developments and socio-political frameworks.  Innovations that are 
consistent with the interests and paradigms of dominant groups, and can be smoothly 
integrated with existing technological systems, are more likely to find acceptance and 
uptake, despite the potential for important and attractive societal benefits from other 
more radical technological options.  However, the identification of a significant 
problem or difficulty, either in the status quo or in the future, can help foster 
commitment to R&D and innovation, with the projected solution posited as the 
incentive for change. 
 
These processes are evident in the evolutions of GM and wind energy in New 
Zealand, detailed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.  However, while such patterns are 
fundamentally strategic and political, it is important to acknowledge that they are not 
necessarily the result of deliberate Machiavellian tactics on the part of actors and 
institutions in the respective fields.  There may indeed be purposeful efforts to 
position these new technologies as positively as possible, to emphasise benefits and 
applications conducive to the interests of dominant groups, and to highlight urgent 
problems intended to be addressed via these innovations’ development and diffusion.  
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But this thesis considers such manoeuvres as primarily outcomes of the patterns of 
disposition described by Bourdieu as habitus – the internalised beliefs and 
assumptions of participants in technoscientific fields, taken for granted via their 
involvement in ongoing practice and acceptance of shared norms and orientations.  As 
discussed in Chapter Two, such frameworks of value and expectation are largely tacit, 
beneath conscious awareness, and deeply embedded as “the way things are” in the 
field (Bourdieu 1999, pp 108-111). 
 
The next chapter turns to the framing assumptions underpinning this thesis itself, and 
outlines the methodologies adopted for this analysis of the work of benefit claims in 
technoscientific innovation. 
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Chapter Four 
The means to the end 
 
Introduction 
Any construction – such as this thesis – depends for stability and coherence on its 
design and the methods of its assembly.  This chapter outlines the methodology 
developed for my research and analysis of the materials, information and ideas 
gathered.  With most aspects of the process there were several possible 
methodological options or theoretical frameworks, and this chapter explains why I 
chose certain approaches and why I considered others less useful.  It also describes 
some of the practical challenges that arose, particularly in relation to the interviews. 
 
The focus for this thesis – technological benefit claims and their performative role in 
research and innovation – is central to the rationale for the research methodology 
employed.  Firstly, the sociology of technoscientific expectations is a relatively recent 
scholarly field and there were few precedents or models to follow.  Therefore an open, 
exploratory approach was taken, giving flexibility as the investigation evolved.  And 
secondly, the phenomena under investigation are abstractions, provisional, mutable, 
multi-faceted social constructions articulated within the value frameworks and power 
relations of heterogeneous groups.  This required a constructivist stance to recognise 
and accommodate multiple meanings, interests and perspectives. 
 
The choice of GM and wind energy as sites of inquiry into projections of benefit is 
discussed in Chapter One.  These technoscience fields are diverse, complex 
assemblages of artefacts and actors, ideas and values, politics and practices.  Benefit 
claims are associated with particular cases and applications, but also have wider 
implications for the field and for science, technology and innovation generically.  This 
chapter outlines the conceptual framework used to distinguish different levels of 
significance of the benefit claims advanced in the two fields. 
 
The discussion then shifts to the rationale behind my engagement (in the previous 
three chapters) with the academic literatures, and the principles underpinning my 
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selection of primary documents from the GM and wind energy sectors and wider 
technoscience discourse in New Zealand.  I describe the methods used to review and 
analyse these texts and the transcripts of my interviews with key sector actors.  The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the actual process of my direct interactions 
with these science and technology actors, as I met with them to explore their thinking 
about research and innovation and the benefits anticipated from their work. 
 
Framing the investigation 
This thesis ventures into territory where there is as yet little in the way of established 
research traditions.  While there has been considerable academic analysis of science 
and technology fields and the dynamics of innovation (as discussed in the preceding 
three chapters), the particular questions explored in this thesis have not previously 
received extensive scrutiny.  A few studies have discussed expectations in specific 
technoscience fields – for example, insulation and membrane technologies and high-
definition TV (van Lente 1993), pharmacogenetics (Hedgecoe & Martin 2003), 
computers (Turkle 2004), transportation systems (Latour 1996; Geels & Smit 2000a), 
or nanotechnology (Kearnes et al. 2006; Pidgeon et al. 2009).  However much work in 
the sociology of expectations deals with projected futures at more generic levels.  
Most studies outline the broad principles of the performative work of technoscience 
expectations, with only brief references to particular cases or the salience of different 
kinds of outcome framings (for example, Michael 2000b; Brown et al. 2003; Borup & 
Konrad 2004; Winner 2004). 
 
As this thesis addresses aspects of technoscience where analytical conventions and 
theoretical canons have yet to become established, an exploratory methodology is 
appropriate.  Such a topic area necessitates a process of discovery, described by 
Patton (1990, p 40) as ‘openness to whatever emerges [without] predetermined 
constraints on outcomes’.  An initial scoping of the research problem was necessary to 
clarify the focus of inquiry without specifying any particular standpoint in relation to 
the issues, ‘beginning not with a hypothesis but with a research situation’ (McGhee et 
al. 2007, p 3).  The principle of pragmatic flexibility continued through the research, 
in response to the ideas, information and contexts encountered as the project 
developed (Denzin & Lincoln 2003, pp 5-9). 
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The approach taken in this thesis owes a major debt to the methodologies of grounded 
theory, a commonly-used framework for inquiry in social science (Suddaby 2006, p 
633; Bryant & Charmaz 2007, p 1).  Originally developed by sociologists Glaser, 
Strauss and Corbin in the 1960s, grounded theory challenged prevailing disciplinary 
assumptions at that time, particularly the empiricist methods, aims and conventions of 
the natural sciences that many considered were also necessary for good social 
research (Charmaz 2006, pp 4-7; Bryant & Charmaz 2007, pp 7-8; Charmaz 2009, p 
128).  The core principle of grounded theory is that knowledge and theory evolve in a 
“bottom-up” process, derived from and grounded in the data as it is gathered;  this is 
the reverse of a “top-down” process where existing knowledge or theory is elaborated 
through data generated for the specific purpose of testing a predetermined hypothesis 
(Suddaby 2006, p 635; McGhee et al. 2007, p 5; Charmaz & Bryant 2011, p 295).  
Charmaz (2006, p 169) explains the distinction: 
The theoretical framework [in grounded theory methods]… emerges from 
your analysis and argument about it.  In contrast, researchers who use a 
traditional [methodology] invoke an established theory and deduce hypotheses 
from it before conducting their studies…  their theoretical framework is 
already there.77 
 
The inductive, evolutionary approach of grounded theory is an obvious choice for 
research in an exploratory topic area (Pidgeon 1996, p 80).  Grounded theory methods 
work iteratively as the research materials are collected and analysed simultaneously.  
Key tools include the techniques of coding or categorising, and interpretational 
memo-writing (Pidgeon & Henwood 1996, pp 87-88, 91-94; Charmaz 2002, p 677, 
683-690; Bryant & Charmaz 2007, pp 16-19; Charmaz & Bryant 2011, p 292).  The 
continual ‘immersion’ of the researcher as material accumulates – through ongoing 
comparison and review of the developing interpretations – encourages reflexivity 
about the evolving analysis and allows new directions to develop (Charmaz 2002, pp 
678-681; 2006, p 178; Henwood & Pidgeon 2006, pp 347, 349; Suddaby 2006, pp 
634, 639).  These techniques were useful (and the principles underpinning them were 
reassuring) through the thesis process, as information accumulated and possible 
                                                 
77 In an early interview for this thesis (Interview 49), my modus operandi was challenged by a 
prestigious science policy advisor, trained in the physical sciences, who assumed that the inquiry had to 
be focused around testing a specific hypothesis about technology benefits;  the idea of an open 
exploratory process was completely alien to his expectations. 
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theoretical frameworks were explored.  Some ideas initially seemed promising but 
later proved unhelpful;  one such disappointment was an early attempt to model 
technoscience benefit projections as a “180-degrees mirror-image flip” of constructs 
of risk, adapting the established theoretical frameworks of risk assessment (for 
example, Krimsky & Golding 1992; Slovic 2000a).  Other emerging ideas were, 
however, only strengthened through the ongoing process of discussion and data-
gathering.  For example, the strategic importance of a sufficiently compelling societal 
demand as a driver of technoscientific innovation – the problem “push” corresponding 
to the “pull” of projected benefits – was continually affirmed and consolidated as the 
research proceeded.78 
 
The second principal reason for the qualitative research methodologies used for this 
thesis is that the phenomena being studied are intrinsically “fuzzy” or non-empirical, 
comprising a heterogeneous assortment of intangible constructs, meanings and values 
frameworks, inextricably situated in diverse social and sectoral contexts. 
 
Four ‘paradigms’ for qualitative inquiry are identified by Guba and Lincoln (1994, pp 
105-109), research frameworks determined by different ontological, epistemological 
and methodological assumptions:  positivism, post-positivism, critical theory, and 
constructivism.  For the multiple, qualified, underdetermined entities that are the 
focus of this thesis, constructivism seemed to me to be the only useful approach 
(Guba & Lincoln 1994, pp 109-110; Pidgeon 1996, p 85; Charmaz 2002, p 678).  
Considerable academic debate has been generated around the fundamental tensions 
between empiricist modes, and ways of working and knowing that recognise and 
integrate the socially constructed nature of whatever we call “reality” (for example, 
Latour & Woolgar 1979; Latour 1987; Burawoy 1998; Feenberg 1999; Hacking 1999; 
Yearley 2005).  This thesis, however, deals not with questions of scientific knowledge 
but with the hypothetical futures conjectured about the development and application 
of such knowledge – inherently unprovable, speculative ‘conjurations’ (Sunder Rajan 
2006, p 34).  Furthermore, as outlined in Chapter Two, the meanings and value of 
anticipated benefits from technoscience are inevitably situated and conditioned by the 
ideological frameworks and power relations of the actors advancing them (Latour 
                                                 
78 The interconnectedness of benefits and problems is discussed in Chapters Three and Seven. 
 81 
1996, pp 169-170; Gieryn 1999, p 27).  In my view, a relativist ontology is the most 
practical way to deal with such shifting, partisan, Protean terrain (Guba & Lincoln 
1994, p 113; Rappert 1999b, p 708). 
 
The methodological field of constructivist grounded theory offers an approach that 
accommodates these complexities (Charmaz 2003, 2006, 2009).  Developed in 
response to the implicit positivism of “classic” grounded theory methods – presuming 
an external reality awaiting discovery, and a neutral, detached, objective observation 
process where solid “facts” are separated from values – this approach recognises that 
the phenomena being studied and the researcher and other actors involved in the 
process are situated within and shaped by their contexts and belief systems (Charmaz 
2002, p 677; Timmermans & Tavory 2007, p 500; Charmaz 2009, pp 137-141; 
Charmaz & Bryant 2011, pp 292-293).  Meaning and methodological strategies are 
also acknowledged as constructions, outcomes of ongoing interactions between the 
researcher and the research material (Pidgeon 1996, p 75; Bryant & Charmaz 2007, p 
10; Mruck & Mey 2007, pp 525-526). 
 
A constructivist framework requires attention to the ways the project is affected by 
the researcher’s background and experience, knowledge of the topic area and the 
field, professional and scholarly practices, values, beliefs and perspectives (Suddaby 
2006, p 640; McGhee et al. 2007, pp 8-9; Mruck & Mey 2007, pp 518-519).  These 
dimensions of the researcher’s life influence both the approach to the topic and issues 
under consideration, and expectations of the research process itself (Clarke 1990, p 
15; Pidgeon 1996, p 83; Warren 2002, p 97).  Bourdieu (2004, p 89) insists on 
reflexivity in social science as ‘epistemological vigilance’, a central part of the 
researcher’s habitus and modus operandi.  Dismissing ‘the illusion of the absence of 
illusion, of the pure, absolute, “disinterested” point of view’, Bourdieu advocates a 
comprehensive process of ‘objectivation’ of researcher and research activity as 
embedded in their social, scholastic and disciplinary contexts (2004, p 94).  Such 
reflexivity can be valuable in the research process: 
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[E]xperience linked to one’s social past can and must be mobilized in 
research, on condition that it has previously been submitted to a rigorous 
critical examination…  It allows one to understand the game instead of 
undergoing it or suffering from it…  [A]ny social experience… can be 
converted from a handicap into capital, so long as it is mastered through 
analysis (Bourdieu 2004, pp 113-114). 
 
With this thesis, the ongoing obligations of reflexivity highlight many ways in which 
the research has been influenced by me as the researcher.  As explained in the 
Prologue, my professional background includes seven years with a parliamentary 
agency investigating and advising on environmental management issues, where every 
day demanded delicate negotiation through diverse, often conflicting perspectives, 
agendas and versions of reality.  My approach to this thesis was also informed by my 
earlier academic work in English literature, where my Masters’ thesis on Chaucer’s 
Canterbury Tales dealt with the rich, often intensely ironic interactions between the 
different pilgrims’ stories and personalities.79  Also relevant were my years involved 
in the media and marketing and public relations industries, where I became acutely 
aware of the ways meaning and perception can be manipulated to satisfy particular 
interests and perpetuate particular worldviews.  These experiences have given me a 
strong personal affinity for the principles encapsulated in constructivism, as a 
practical way to engage with the world’s multiplicity and complexity.  And they have 
left me with a deeply sceptical distrust of the simplistic and the taken-for-granted 
(Foucault 1980, 1994; Powers 2007). 
 
Another significant factor in the evolution of this thesis was that my previous 
academic experience was in literature, history and classics, rather than social or 
political science, or the natural or physical sciences.  Prior to this thesis, my 
knowledge and familiarity with such science fields was acquired in situ, working in 
various roles in policy, advocacy and environmental management.  This lack of 
formal training in either mode of science has, however, given me some distance from 
the disciplinary habitus and assumptions of the fields which I am studying and in 
which this thesis is located.  At times this “outsider” position has seemed a handicap;  
more often though it has been an advantage, giving me a relatively pragmatic 
                                                 
79 Cooper, R 1985, Lowsy Jogelours: Art and Craft in Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, MA thesis in 
English, Victoria University, Wellington. 
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perspective in my encounters with technoscience actors and my analysis of their 
framings and representations of their work.80 
 
The concept of ‘empathic neutrality’ allows for recognition of the researcher’s 
personal history, objectives, beliefs and framing assumptions while still retaining a 
non-judgemental, non-partisan stance (Patton 1990, p 41).  The intensively contested 
nature of the two fields explored for this thesis – wind energy and GM – highlighted 
the importance of ongoing attention to my own values and assumptions.  In some of 
the interviews and other discussions as the research developed, people took for 
granted that I would have either positive or hostile views about windfarms or GM.  
Not surprisingly my personal views about the various potential applications of these 
technologies are contingent, ambivalent, endlessly qualified and continually shifting.  
My inability to adopt a solidly “pro” or “anti” position – or my acceptance of 
indeterminacy as a practical working position on such questions – has been 
challenging at times in my interactions with some research participants.  However, 
such partisanship is the subject of this thesis, not its raison d’etre. 
 
A key aspect of reflexivity is a focus on the intended purposes of the research.  Some 
approaches, such as ‘critical theory’ or ‘action research’, have the explicit aim of 
transforming existing situations, policy and practices through trenchant critique and 
strategic interventions (Guba & Lincoln 1994, pp 109, 112; Cassell 2005, pp 169, 
171).  Such objectives must be predicated upon judgements of the inadequacies or 
iniquities of the status quo, and confidence that the alternatives promoted through the 
research are achievable and desirable.  In the shifting terrain of technoscience benefit 
projections, dealing with reifications of abstract, conditional future states, I felt 
increasingly that any such certainty would be pure hubris. 
 
With a constructivist approach, the aims of inquiry are more modest – not to advance 
any particular agenda, but to develop understanding of the multi-faceted, situated 
nature of the phenomena under scrutiny, and to formulate ‘more informed and 
sophisticated constructions and [more awareness] of the content and meaning of 
                                                 
80 The implications of interviewees’ perceptions of my status as an “insider” due to my experience in 
the Wellington bureaucracy, or an “outsider” with no formal science background, are discussed below. 
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competing constructions’ (Guba & Lincoln 1994, pp 112-113).  Winner (1993, pp 
367-376) advances a fierce critique of constructivism, arguing that focusing attention 
on the diversity of meanings and interests in technoscience results in an evasion or 
abdication of responsibility in relation to crucial moral and political questions.  
However, other scholars have endorsed the usefulness of improving understanding of 
such dimensions.  Rappert (1999b, p 708) highlights the importance of social science 
research providing actors with ‘concepts and analytical frameworks [and] aiding in 
the identification of problems hitherto marginalised’.  Wynne (2007, pp 493-496, 500) 
dismisses supposed boundaries between instrumental STS work, intended to influence 
policy in particular directions, and more ‘reflective cultural critique’.  Sceptical 
investigation of the taken-for-granted frameworks of meaning, expectation and 
enculturation in technoscience domains is valuable and valid academic activity – both 
in itself, and in terms of the complementarity of such analyses with more targeted 
policy-oriented projects.  An ongoing long-term agenda for STS is to encourage 
awareness of and reflection on such deeply entrenched patterns in science and 
technology, as the basis from which change might evolve (2007, pp 492, 496, 500-
501).  Wynne highlights the open-endedness necessary in such a mission: 
[T]his alternative witness does not point to alternative completed forms of 
policy or social order;  but as a matter of principle only to questions, and cues 
– openings, not final forms (2007, p 500). 
 
In this thesis, the aim of my exploration of the normative and performative work of 
benefit claims for innovation in GM and electricity generation in New Zealand is not 
to promote specific benefits, value frameworks or paradigms for technoscience.  The 
analysis of benefit projections in these fields are intended to be useful as ‘witness to 
those larger historical-cultural issues and challenges that need to be recognized and 
addressed’ (Wynne 2007, p 496). 
 
Sites of inquiry 
Innovation in the fields of GM and wind energy in New Zealand is promoted through 
a range of different kinds of anticipated benefit – public good goals in health and 
environmental quality, commercial returns for companies and organisations, and 
improvements for the national economy.  The heterogeneity of benefit projections 
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associated with these technologies is paralleled by the fields’ complexity and richness 
as promiscuous assemblages. 
 
In exploring claims of future benefits for GM and wind energy, this thesis follows the 
principles established in studies of the social construction of technology, to consider 
the diverse physical artefacts, actors and institutions, practices and mindsets, 
discourses and policies that constitute the sociotechnical networks of each field 
(Bijker & Law 1992a; Bijker 1995).  But my focus is on the paradigmatic dimensions 
– the meanings and values associated with innovation in these two fields in New 
Zealand – rather than on networks per se.  Actor Network Theory is a valuable tool 
for analysis of technoscience processes and the relational aspects of knowledge 
production and technology use (for example, Callon 1987; Latour 1987, 1992; Law 
1992).81  As the thesis evolved, however, I concluded that this theoretical framework 
was less suitable than constructivism to address the dimensions of benefit projections 
that I found most compelling.82  Nevertheless some key concepts of Actor Network 
Theory were valuable in developing my approach – for example, the importance for 
technoscience projects of aligning with powerful interests, and artefacts’ vulnerability 
when network support fluctuates (Latour 1996). 
 
As domains or sites for investigating benefit projections, GM and wind energy 
technologies in New Zealand have multiple dimensions of significance.  They are 
physical objects and practices in the world, as well as conceptual categories that 
encompass a range of interests, communities, meanings and values (Ragin 1992a, pp 
8-10).  These fields are empirically particular, firmly grounded in the specificity of 
their New Zealand contexts, but also serve as examples of broader technoscience 
processes with relevance for other situations, technologies and sectors (Walton 1992, 
                                                 
81 Application of Actor Network Theory to questions of projected benefits of technoscience innovation 
would doubtless lead in interesting directions.  There would be rich potentials for analysis of the 
interplays between the diverse actors and non-human actants in GM and wind energy – which might 
feature cows, proteins, laboratory equipment, field trial fences, the DNA configurations responsible for 
multiple sclerosis, possums, fungal diseases of vegetables, the bovine tuberculosis bacillus, chemical 
residues in soils, supermarkets, rural streams, turbines, lightweight metal alloys, meteorological 
forecasting technologies, transmission lines, household electrical appliances, and 4WD vehicles. 
82 Rip (1992, pp 261-262) considers that Actor Network Theory has limited usefulness for engaging 
with the influence and performative work of expectations in technoscience, arguing that ANT ‘focuses 
on processes as if legitimations were irrelevant [and] neglects the search and expectation part of 
technology dynamics’. 
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pp 121-124).  Studies of particular cases, stories and situations can be indicative of 
larger patterns (Ragin 1992b, p 225; Burawoy 1998, pp 5, 14-16).  The conceptual 
model below (Figure 1) maps the degrees of specificity and generality in the analysis.  
GM and wind energy in New Zealand are the fields within which particular cases and 
examples are located – specific applications or forms of these technologies.  Each 
case and example is supported by benefit projections, strategic constructions aligned 
with wider frameworks of societal and sectoral value.  The nested, interlinking levels 
of meaning associated with the cases are in turn indicative of key aspects of the 
dynamics of technoscience processes. 
 
Figure 1: 
Technoscience field Genetic modification Wind energy 
Case GM crops Wind farms 
Example Plant&Food Research’s 
herbicide-resistant onions 
Meridian’s West Wind 
project at Makara 
Benefit claims Agronomic production 
efficiencies, profits for 
growers and agrichemical 
companies 
Locally produced “green” 
electricity for the Wellington 
region, profits for the 
generator 
Value frameworks Appealing to economic 
interests of established 
sector groups and 
multinational corporations 
Appealing to regional 
identity, NZ’s international 
commitments, public 
environmental awareness and 
commercial profitability 
Implications Power of economic elites to 
exploit commercial 
potentials of R&D and 
override public concerns 
about GM foods 
Power of increasing social 
and political recognition of 
climate change issues to 
improve acceptability of 
renewable energy 
technologies 
 
Discussion of the interactions between these different levels is also informed by the 
principles of middle range theory, the focus of recent attention in science and 
technology studies (Wyatt & Balmer 2007).  Theories of the middle range were 
originally advocated by Merton (1949 (2007), 1957) as a practical solution to what he 
considered to be extreme positions in sociological theory-making at the time, the 
orientation towards either ‘production of descriptions or production of theories of 
everything’ (Wyatt & Balmer 2007, p 621).83  Middle range theory avoids ambitious 
                                                 
83 Merton criticised the social sciences of the time for aiming for grand unified theories that would 
explain and accommodate ‘all the observed uniformities of social behaviour, social organization, and 
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grand abstractions or untheorised empiricism (Rappert 2007, pp 693-694, 698).84  It 
focuses on delimited sites and problems (Merton 1957, p 108; Weick 1989, p 521; 
Geels 2007, pp 628, 635), yet allows for conceptual flexibility and accommodation of 
diverse perspectives (Wyatt & Balmer 2007, p 623).  Middle range research 
emphasises engagement with particular fields or societal situations (Merton 1949 
(2007), p 452; Hine 2007, p 653; Wyatt & Balmer 2007, p 621), and encourages the 
development of theoretical insights with some relevance for practice (Geels 2007, pp 
630, 646).  As Rappert (2007, p 708) explains, the aim is to focus on: 
…the social and political commitments made in situations of uncertainty and 
disagreement… to initiate a line of sceptical questioning attentive to the 
contingencies of analysis that can provide a basis for further questioning of 
conventional claims. 
 
The principles underlying the middle range approach resonate with this thesis’s focus 
on claims about GM and wind energy in New Zealand, and with the research goals 
outlined in Chapter One – to develop understanding of the work of benefit 
projections, as a resource for further critical engagement with the worlds of R&D and 
technology innovation (Denzin 2001, pp 24, 43). 
 
Within these frameworks of purpose for the thesis, the research activities entailed 
engagement with relevant literatures and primary documents, a series of interviews, 
and an analysis of these materials and information.  These processes are the focus of 
the rest of this chapter. 
 
Lost in a good book – the literatures and texts85 
One of the most important dimensions of the thesis process, for me as the researcher, 
has been the opportunity to immerse myself in a wide range of literatures and texts.  
This contextualising of issues and information was not encouraged in my previous 
work in Wellington policy environments, where concepts and strategies were 
                                                 
social change’ (1949 (2007), p 448), a quest he described as ‘extravagant… premature and apocalyptic’ 
(1949 (2007), p 453).  The alternative, where research focused down narrowly on the data itself, he 
found equally unsatisfactory and unproductive of meaningful theory:  ‘the opposing strategy of 
constructing inventories of low-level empirical propositions’ (Geels 2007, p 628). 
84 The principles of this research framework are not dissimilar to Austrin and Farnsworth’s (2005, p 
161) interpretation of Latour’s methods and aims as a ‘relativist sociology’ deliberately avoiding the 
‘pretensions’ and presumptions of theory-making. 
85 With apologies to Jasper Fforde. 
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advanced and deployed in technoscience domains without any reference to what 
scholars like Bourdieu, Bijker, Kuhn, Latour, Sarewitz or Winner might have said 
about them.  The requirements of thesis reading have been a wonderful luxury. 
 
A key issue in the development of Grounded Theory methodologies is the relationship 
between the empirical data and relevant literature.  Debate about inductive methods 
has focused on the deferral of reference to theoretical and analytical literatures to 
avoid ‘forcing’ the analysis and to allow unprejudiced ‘emergence’ of interpretation 
from the empirical data (Suddaby 2006, pp 634-635; Bryant & Charmaz 2007, pp 16, 
25; McGhee et al. 2007, pp 3, 8; Mruck & Mey 2007, p 518).  However it is argued 
that such purist methodological ideals are unrealistic;  reflexivity acknowledges the 
researcher’s situatedness and experience informing inquiry from the outset (Charmaz 
2004, p 501; Timmermans & Tavory 2007, p 499).  Early familiarity with relevant 
literatures is important to clarify and guide developing research pathways without 
committing to any particular theoretical position (Henwood & Pidgeon 2006, pp 349-
350; McGhee et al. 2007, pp 4-8).  As Bryant and Charmaz (2007, p 20) advise, ‘an 
open mind does not imply an empty head’. 
 
The grounded theory method is an iterative process, moving between the established 
literatures and the accumulating research materials, between the theoretical and 
empirical dimensions (Henwood & Pidgeon 2006, p 347; Suddaby 2006, p 639; 
Timmermans & Tavory 2007, pp 499-500).  This kind of symbiotic mix was an 
efficient tactic given the exploratory nature of my investigation.  In practice, I 
followed parallel trajectories – weaving together the work of interviews and transcript 
analysis, immersion in science and technology studies and associated literatures, and 
surveys of the vast range of primary materials from relevant agencies and science 
institutions. 
 
The practicalities of analysis involved an ongoing sequence of distillations of the 
ever-expanding materials.  The initial reviews of the interview transcripts and primary 
texts identified basic patterns in the framing of expectations of technoscience, 
highlighting issues or constructs that reappeared in numerous locations.  Moving back 
and forth between the interview transcripts and the primary documents focused 
attention on frequently-occurring phrases and concepts, and on the links between 
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these patterns and the institutional and policy-agency sites in which they are 
manifested.  Categories and themes identified in this process included:  the powerful 
influence of economic growth and competitiveness (the Red Queen imperative) as 
drivers for R&D and innovation;  the importance of environmental sustainability;  the 
value placed on advancing scientific knowledge as a benefit in itself;  the symbiotic 
mixing of commercial and public benefits, whether in aspirations for pharmaceutical 
innovations, pest control technologies, or green energy generation;  and the 
persistence of the deficit model in various forms in interactions between sector actors 
and others around the presumed benefits of technoscience and innovation. 
 
Simultaneous reading in the STS literatures offered theoretical frameworks to help 
explain the situations unfolding in the New Zealand technology stories.  For example, 
immersion in Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1990, 1999; Webb et al. 2002; Bourdieu 2004; 
Grenfell 2004) at the same time as interviews with senior ministry officials was useful 
in understanding the dynamics of those interactions.  Some of the sector actors I 
interviewed made valuable recommendations;  a biotech research scientist loaned me 
Franklin’s Why Innovation Fails (2003) and expanded on its themes in relation to 
New Zealand R&D.  And a venture capital manager investing in local technoscience 
startups insisted I read Christensen’s (1997) work on radical innovations;  this cast 
light on patterns of wind technology uptake in the New Zealand electricity sector. 
 
The key concepts from the primary material and the literatures were developed and 
refined through an extensive process of annotating the margins of interview 
transcripts, writing notes, memos and outlines, and building lists of references.86  
Large sheets of paper were filled with increasingly complicated mind-maps to 
diagrammatically explore the distribution and inter-connections of themes, and to 
organise the primary research material within theoretical frameworks derived from the 
academic literatures.87  These notes and mind-maps were transformed into the 
tentative structuring of lines of argument, and eventually the outlines of chapters.  The 
                                                 
86 I chose not to use computer programmes (such as NVivo) for this process.  By the time such tools 
were available to me, I had already advanced significantly through the analysis, and repetition of this 
work for the sake of a transition to electronic methods did not seem efficient. 
87 When working on investigations of complex issues at the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment, such analytical exercises regularly covered whiteboards with intricate detail, and 
were known as “horrendograms”. 
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discipline of selection has been a major challenge throughout;  there are a wealth of 
interesting and important questions to be explored in the domains of GM, wind 
energy, technoscience and innovation in New Zealand, some of which are indicated in 
Chapter Eight.  The focus on constructs of expected benefit, and their performative 
work in these domains, anchored the research process.88 
 
The academic literatures canvassed for this thesis have been outlined in the preceding 
three chapters.  I found it valuable to spread the net widely, to gather insights, ideas, 
arguments, cases, models and theoretical frameworks relating to science and 
technology and innovation generally, GM and wind energy in particular, and 
governance, policy, politics, social construction, history and philosophy in these 
domains.  The specific literature on technoscientific expectations was a major focus 
(notably, van Lente 1993; Brown et al. 2000a; Sturken et al. 2004), but I also found 
crucially salient material in more general studies.  The literatures on the two fields of 
inquiry were interesting for their differences:  there is an exponentially greater amount 
of commentary, analysis and debate on GM than on wind energy.  Furthermore much 
of the work on GM is marked by the partisanship characteristic of this field and its 
intensely contested politics, focusing around matters of risk, safety and public 
engagement.  Selectivity was necessary, particularly in the GM area. 
 
The range of texts accumulated as primary data for the thesis (along with the 
interview data) is almost as diverse as the academic and theoretical materials.  I 
concentrated on New Zealand texts produced by agencies and organisations involved 
in science and technology generally, and GM and wind energy specifically;  some 
international examples were also included in the analysis.  The texts include policy 
documents and official strategies, legislation, politicians’ speeches, conference 
presentations, website materials, media releases, annual reports, statements of intent, 
                                                 
88 Ideas and issues that are interesting but not directly relevant to my topic are indicated in footnotes.  
Many themes or strands of academic analysis were interesting in their own right even though I found 
them to be only peripheral to the issues addressed in this thesis:  for example, explorations of the 
complexities of technoscience networks, whether framed within Actor Network Theory or other 
conceptual frameworks (for example, Hughes 1983, 1989; Ziman 2000; Law & Mol 2002; Hughes 
2004);  studies of communication and media treatment of science and technology (Nelkin 1995; 
Anderson 1997; Gregory & Miller 1998; Priest 2001; Cronin 2003a, 2003b; Gough 2003c; France & 
Gilbert 2005);  discussions of apparent patterns of technological determinism (Winner 1977; Smith & 
Marx 1994);  or histories of science and technology (Norman 1976; Mokyr 1990; Petroski 1999; 
Brown 2002; Gribbin 2002; Dugan 2003; Fagan 2004; Misa 2004; Hård & Jamison 2005). 
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regulatory agencies’ evaluations and reports, court cases, promotional brochures and 
advertisements, and interpretational signage at windfarm sites. 
 
When studying primary texts, a constructivist approach draws attention to multiple 
levels of significance and contextual relations (Guba & Lincoln 1994, pp 110, 113; 
Pidgeon 1996, p 80; Charmaz 2009, pp 138-139).  The most obvious level of meaning 
is in the immediate content, but methodological theory also highlights the importance 
of texts’ development, uses and functions, and strategic role in the fields in which 
they are deployed.89  The primary texts from New Zealand technoscience sectors 
surveyed for this thesis are more than mere statements or accounts.  Like the 
interviewees, texts are situated constructions, shaped by their environments and 
discursive frameworks, and oriented towards particular purposes and interests (Prior 
2004, p 320; Motion & Weaver 2005, pp 50, 52-53; Atkinson & Coffey 2011, pp 78-
80).90  Texts can be understood as resources in social and sectoral processes and 
power relations (Leitch & Davenport 2005, pp 891-893; 2007, pp 44, 59; Prior 2011, 
pp 94, 96, 106).  In terms of Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts discussed in Chapter 
Three, textual representations in strategic fields are a kind of symbolic capital.  In the 
often contentious domains of GM and wind energy in New Zealand, these aspects of 
the documents – their origins and intended roles in technoscience trajectories – are 
often highly salient.  An obvious contrast might be an official national strategy, 
setting directions and goals for an entire sector (for example, New Zealand 
Government 2003, 2007), compared with advocacy statements from an industry lobby 
group or company (for example, New Zealand Wind Energy Association 2005; 
Meridian Energy 2005d; Orion Energy 2006; NZBio 2008b, n.d.). 
 
Texts also function normatively, asserting and maintaining certain versions of reality 
in terms of the strategic ends for which they are produced and deployed (Atkinson & 
                                                 
89 Theorists in critical discourse analysis (CDA) give useful insights for engaging with such 
constructions and the frameworks underpinning them (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Swales 1990; Fowler 
1996; Gee 1996; van Dijk 1996, 1997; Jaworski & Coupland 1999; Fairclough 2001; Gee 2005; Woods 
2006).  In developing the research methodology for this thesis, I did not consider that the strong text-
focus and specific methods of CDA would be practical;  however the broad principles of CDA (such as 
scepticism, recognising contexts and situatedness, and following power) are consistent with my 
approach and were influential in my more thematic interpretation of the work of benefit projections. 
90 The originators of Grounded Theory, Glaser and Strauss, describe documents as equivalent to human 
research participants (Prior 2011, p 94). 
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Coffey 2011, pp 78-79).  Foucault (1972, p 54) describes the creation of meaning via 
‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’.  As Prior (2004, 
pp 321, 325) observes: 
…a text instructs us how to see the world, how to differentiate the parts within 
it, and thereby provides the means by which we can engage with the world… 
[discourse] restricts, limits and arranges what can and cannot be said about the 
phenomena within its domain. 
 
The textual materials surveyed for this thesis demonstrate the particular frameworks 
of value and meaning supported by their representations of GM, wind energy, 
technoscience and innovation.  Whether aiming to perpetuate dominant, established 
social and sectoral interests, or to challenge and oppose such hegemonies and promote 
alternatives, the primary texts circulating in technoscience fields in New Zealand are 
never neutral.  The following chapters of this thesis, looking into the stories of GM 
and wind energy and the benefit claims advanced for them, show the performative 
nature of documentary representations and discourse in these sectors (Weaver & 
Motion 2002, pp 326-328, 339; Henderson et al. 2007, pp 10, 13-14, 28; Davenport & 
Leitch 2009, pp 943-947).  Texts work to position these innovations as favourably as 
possible, to legitimate them and align them with the priorities and interests of 
influential groups – or conversely, to diminish their credibility and desirability in 
arenas of public and sectoral perception. 
 
In the survey and analysis of diverse texts for this thesis, there was often a numbing 
repetitiveness in the framings and statements – even the specific wordings – about 
GM, wind energy and technoscience and their projected future benefits.  The same 
concepts appeared over and over again, particularly in official policy documents.91  
While this created some difficulties, in terms of a tension between efficiency in 
multiple citations and faithfulness to the empirical materials, I found these patterns in 
the documents to be useful in themselves.  They confirm the prevailing habitus or 
paradigmatic frameworks governing activity and orientation in these sectors, 
discussed in Chapter Two (Green et al. 1999; Bourdieu 2004; Dattée & Weil 2007; 
Vanloqueren & Baret 2009).  The repetitions demonstrate these texts’ embeddedness 
in social and political domains. 
                                                 
91 Leitch and Davenport (2007, p 46) describe these texts as ‘highly formulaic’. 
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The next section turns to my engagement with the human actors who produce these 
documents, and the ways in which the interviews conducted for this thesis sought to 
develop a deeper appreciation of the ideas “between the lines” of the texts – the 
concepts of expected benefit that justify and motivate technoscience in New Zealand. 
 
Let’s give ‘em something to talk about – the interviews92 
At the centre of this thesis are the people engaged in R&D and innovation, the 
institutions and firms in which they work, and the beliefs and values they hold about 
their activities and the purposes of that work.  These frameworks are expressed, 
explicitly and tacitly, in documents and formal discourse, as discussed above.  But to 
grapple with the complex subjectivities of actors in the fields under scrutiny, the most 
effective method is the interview. 
 
The individuals targeted for interviews for this thesis were identified because of their 
leading positions in the fields of wind energy and GM and in New Zealand science 
and technology policy.  They represent a range of institutional and professional 
situations, and are all to some degree expert “insiders” in the GM and wind sectors 
and the wider technoscience community in New Zealand.  Given the exploratory 
approach of this thesis, I decided the most practical method was to canvass the 
thinking and experience of active, established participants in these domains.93  
Research via “expert interviews” or “elite interviews” is an efficient means of probing 
the workings of specialist communities or sectors, and the power relations and 
hegemonic systems of value and meaning through which they function (Odendahl & 
                                                 
92 With apologies to Bonnie Raitt. 
93  Broad surveys of public attitudes towards science in general and particular technological 
developments such as GM and nanotechnology have been conducted from time to time by official 
agencies and academic researchers in New Zealand (for example, Gamble et al. 2000; Coyle et al. 
2003; Hunt et al. 2003; Cook et al. 2004; Cook & Fairweather 2005; Ministry of Research Science and 
Technology 2005c; Cook & Fairweather 2006; Hunt & Fairweather 2006).  These studies offer useful 
insights, but take a different approach from this thesis in their presentation of technoscientific 
innovation and the presumed benefits, and of publics and their positions, as relative “givens”, evaluated 
via detached, neutrally objective methods (Burawoy 1998, p 12).  Some studies delve into some 
dimensions of respondents’ demographics and general beliefs and values, and relate these contexts to 
positive or negative attitudes towards new science and technology applications.  However in this thesis 
I have taken a more interpretative approach to explore the construction and performative work of 
expectations of technoscientific benefit within the specialist sectors and New Zealand policy fields. 
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Shaw 2002, p 314; Conti & O'Neil 2007, pp 65, 67; Bogner et al. 2009, pp 2, 6; 
Bogner & Menz 2009, pp 47-48, 52). 
 
New Zealand’s technoscience communities are fairly small, and the choice of 
technology fields for study in the thesis determined the logical targets.  I sought 
interviews with individuals at the most senior levels of their organisation – chief 
executives, chairs or board members, science programme leaders, policy managers – 
and with senior researchers, project managers and practitioners actively working on 
new developments in their fields.  Nobody approached for an interview rejected my 
request to meet with them;  indeed, the process was remarkable for my interviewees’ 
generosity in making time to talk about the ideas of benefit driving their work.94  This 
availability is somewhat at odds with some of the methodological literature on 
researching elites, where difficulties in gaining access, and tight time constraints, are 
highlighted (Odendahl & Shaw 2002, pp 299-300, 305-309; Conti & O'Neil 2007, pp 
67-71).  Sector actors’ willingness to be involved may be partly attributable to 
perceptions of my background, as discussed below;  with many there was simply a 
genuine enthusiasm for their field, and for an opportunity for in-depth discussion of 
the ideals motivating their work. 
 
The range of interviewees covers the two technoscience sectors and the background 
environment of policy and regulatory institutions in New Zealand.  Sixty individuals 
were interviewed.95  Twenty-one were involved in GM research, policy, regulatory 
oversight or biotech industry development.  Twenty-three were engaged in wind 
generation and alternative energy, in policy and regulatory roles, sector advocacy, 
researching new energy options, or managing windfarm projects.  Sixteen 
interviewees’ interests and experience in technoscience were more generic, including 
policy analysis and advice, managing R&D funding (both from government agencies 
and private investment firms), communications and business development.96  There 
                                                 
94 Some interviews were restricted according to busy executives’ diaries, but even the briefest of these 
was an hour long.  Other sessions were extended, wide-ranging discussions taking several hours. 
95 Only thirteen of these were women, perhaps reflecting the gender imbalances typical of science and 
technology (Cronin & Roger 1999; Etzkowitz et al. 2003; Ellemers et al. 2004; Blickenstaff 2005; 
Etzkowitz et al. 2008).  However these individuals had achieved high status in their fields, and included 
the Chief Executive of a government ministry, the former Chairperson of the Board of a large energy 
company, and senior managers in regulatory agencies and research institutions. 
96 Since the interviews were conducted, some interviewees have moved on from the roles they occupied 
when I met with them, and many of the official agencies have been restructured. 
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was considerable overlap, with many interviewees targeted primarily for their 
expertise or position in a particular sector commenting freely on wider issues of 
science and technology and future potential benefits from innovation. 
 
The range of organisational and institutional locations of the interviewees reflects the 
diversity of the two sectors and New Zealand’s science and technology communities.  
The agencies and businesses from which interviewees were drawn include:  policy 
ministries (MORST, MFE, MED), and other government agencies (FRST, EECA, 
AHB, FSANZ);  parliament (PCE);  regulatory agencies for the two technology fields 
(ERMA, the Electricity Commission);  organisations working to advance a particular 
sector or perspective (Royal Society of NZ, NZBio, Horticulture NZ, Canterbury 
Manufacturers’ Association, Canterbury Employers’ Chamber of Commerce, NZ 
Green Party);  Crown Research Institutes (AgResearch, Crop & Food, Landcare 
Research, Industrial Research);  universities (Auckland, Canterbury, Victoria, 
Massey);  large electricity companies (Meridian Energy, Orion Energy, Mainpower);  
smaller alternative energy systems companies and consultancies (including Windflow 
Technology and Energy3);  and representatives of venture capital investors in 
technoscience innovation.97 
 
Selecting and contacting potential interviewees was a sequential process.  The first set 
of conversations, scoping out the research topic, was conducted with a few key 
individuals in science and technology policy agencies.  Subsequent interviewees were 
approached because they occupied key positions in New Zealand R&D and 
technoscience domains;  some were specifically recommended to me in a “snowball” 
process.  Several interesting connections occurred spontaneously in the best tradition 
of scientific serendipity, through encountering people at conferences, or as fellow 
participants in strategic processes such as the Navigator Network, a futurewatch 
project organised by the (then) Ministry of Research, Science and Technology 
(MORST).98  All interviewees were approached on the basis of their capacities as 
                                                 
97 The interview schedule is given as Appendix 1. 
98 At the time of my research interviews, the Navigator Network was actively pursuing a wide-ranging 
scanning process of emerging technoscience developments with relevance for New Zealand (Cameron 
et al. 2008).  Close involvement of scientists with key policy agencies and representatives of sectors 
such as health, agriculture and environmental management was intended to focus attention on science 
and technology issues “coming over the horizon”.  Subsequently, in the merger between MORST and 
FRST and the more recent restructuring of the Ministry of Science and Innovation, the Navigator 
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spokespersons for their organisations and their professional experience and 
knowledge of their fields. 
 
My former status and experience at the PCE office (discussed in the Prologue and 
above) was a significant asset in organizing interviews – in Bourdieu’s terms, my 
background in policy worlds was crucial symbolic capital (Bourdieu 2002, pp 289-
291; 2004, pp 34-35, 58-59).  This was advantageous in terms of my existing 
networks;  twelve interviewees were already well known to me.99  With interviewees I 
had not met before, being able to introduce myself and my research in the context of 
my earlier role as a Wellington “insider” was often important in establishing 
credibility and smoothing the approach to senior executives and policy managers.  My 
Wellington work had also given me considerable experience in “cold-calling” – the 
process of contacting complete strangers, negotiating with personal assistants and 
other gatekeepers, and efficiently introducing myself and the topic under 
investigation.  Sensitivity and skill in such aspects of research processes are 
highlighted in the methodological literature (Odendahl & Shaw 2002, p 305-308; 
Conti & O'Neil 2007, pp 69-70; Stephens 2007, p 206). 
 
Each interviewee was emailed a brief introduction to the thesis research, well in 
advance of our scheduled meeting.100  This explained the focus on anticipated benefit 
from technoscience innovation, and outlined the range of questions informing my 
investigation.  Few interviewees followed the list of questions very closely.  Each 
discussion was unique;  I chose to allow the conversations to follow their own natural 
course rather than attempt to impose an arbitrary structure or formal sequence of 
questions (Charmaz 2002, p 679; Odendahl & Shaw 2002, pp 310-311; Conti & 
O'Neil 2007, p 70).101  Nevertheless, most interviews ended up covering the full range 
of themes posed in the introductory email. 
                                                 
Network is no longer operational and futurewatch activities have been ‘put on hold’ (advice from MSI 
Communications section, 28 March 2012). 
99 I had already had extensive involvement with most of the researchers working on possum biocontrols 
through the PCE’s Caught in the Headlights study, discussed in the Prologue and Chapter Five 
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2000). 
100 This is attached as Appendix 2. 
101 Another personal advantage I enjoyed in undertaking this research was the extensive experience I 
had gained interviewing people in a range of contexts for investigations undertaken by the PCE Office.  
Each PCE study involved an exhaustive information- and opinion-gathering process, taking project 
teams into various settings from executive boardrooms and Ministerial offices through to marae 
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All the interviews were conducted face-to-face, giving maximum opportunity for 
interaction and spontaneity, and for sensitivity to the tacit, non-verbal dimensions of 
the interactions (Burawoy 1998, pp 7, 15; Stephens 2007).  While many interviewees 
were based locally in Christchurch, Lincoln and the Canterbury region, the research 
took me throughout New Zealand for meetings in policy and corporate environments 
in Wellington, and offices, labs and wind energy sites in Auckland, the Waikato, 
Palmerston North, Otago and rural Southland. 
 
I found that a relatively loose semi-structured interview process was effective given 
that the research topic – concepts of benefit expected from technoscientific innovation 
– is territory that had not yet been specifically traversed amongst New Zealand 
science and technology communities.  The exploratory nature of my inquiry meant 
that I adopted an interpretative interview approach, with the goals both of obtaining 
information and of traversing the views and experiences of each individual (Warren 
2002, p 83; Bogner & Menz 2009, pp 46-48).  An organic, open-ended format in each 
discussion meant that the flow of ideas was more spontaneous and natural, reflecting 
the concerns and priorities of each interviewee (Pidgeon & Henwood 1996, pp 89-90; 
Charmaz 2002, pp 676, 678-681; Warren 2002, pp 86-87; Stephens 2007, p 206).  
Some interviewees made considerable digressions, some of which were extremely 
revealing and entertaining.  Some of these apparent digressions were in fact useful for 
the thesis inquiry, although they could never have been anticipated in advance in the 
form of a structured question. 
 
Most interviews began with an initial explanation of the focus of my research, and an 
opening query about the interviewee’s work.  After these preliminaries, the talk was 
invariably sustained by interviewees’ enthusiasm for their particular branch of science 
or technology, and for the potentials and opportunities it offered.  Conversations with 
active practitioners – scientists researching GM and engineers working on alternative 
energy technologies – were full of rich technical detail.  A biocontrol research 
                                                 
kitchens, farm paddocks, industrial plants, schoolrooms and protest sites.  The role required engaging 
with an incredible mix of people, encouraging them to tell their stories and share their ideas, often in 
situations of intense conflict and controversy, where suspicions ran high and resolution was uncertain.  
That experience was invaluable in the thesis process. 
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manager at AgResearch in Invermay showed me through the enclosures where captive 
possums roosted in fragrant pinetree cuttings, and opened a freezer to display the 
grisly remains of sparrows and joeys as proof that possums are carnivorous.  The site 
manager at a Meridian windfarm, under construction at the time, spent a whole 
afternoon driving me up and over steep ridgelines in his 4WD ute, and walking me 
around the massive concrete foundation structures to show me the giant turbines in 
various stages of installation. 
 
In all the interviews, when time was running out or the discussion drawing to a natural 
close, I finished with the same open-ended question:  ‘In the best of all possible 
worlds, what would be your vision for your technoscience field, and for science and 
technology generally, for the future?’  The responses were often fruitful in allowing 
interviewees to stretch their imaginations and build personal scenarios;  ideals of 
societal, qualitative public-good benefit came strongly to the forefront, and the 
economic criteria often dominant in many interviewees’ professional and sectoral 
value-frameworks faded into the background. 
 
Many interviewees expressed appreciation of the opportunity to talk about the goals 
and purposes of their work, and to explore the issues posed by my research focus;  
they welcomed a chance to consider aspects of their work that are seldom directly 
addressed, and to come at things from a different perspective (Conti & O'Neil 2007, 
pp 73-74).  There was a strong sense that, while the frameworks of value and benefit 
underpinning particular fields are powerful motivations both individually and for 
professional communities, there are few places where these dimensions of 
technoscience can be acknowledged, explored and discussed.  Furthermore, given the 
contested, controversial nature of both GM and windfarm developments and the 
vehement opposition encountered by most R&D teams, there was for some 
interviewees almost a sense of relief that a social science researcher was focusing not 
on the conflicts and risks but on the intended benefits. 
 
The intensely polarised, adversarial nature of GM science influenced my interaction 
with some individuals in this field, who assumed that my research must be based in 
either a pro- or anti-GM stance.  Some spoke with considerable bitterness about what 
they perceived as public and media misinterpretation of the ideals and beneficent 
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purposes driving their work, shifting into implicit lobbying mode in the hope that, 
because it was addressing technoscience benefits, my thesis would “take their side” in 
ongoing debates.102  I dealt with such enlistment efforts by maintaining neutrality in 
the flow of the discussion, on the principle that downplaying my own position (or lack 
of it), and giving priority to the interviewee, would allow maximum openness for 
them to express their particular perspectives (Conti & O'Neil 2007, pp 74-77). 
 
As well as assumptions of partisanship, some interviews were marked by the power 
dynamics inherent in those actors’ elite status in their sector.  This occurred in 
meetings with individuals working in GM, a field marked by major contestation and 
defensiveness, but also in some general technoscience and policy interviews.103  
These patterns seemed habitual in those experts’ interactions with “outsiders” or 
laypeople, and were manifested in displays of authoritativeness, patronisingly 
simplistic explanations of science or regulatory systems, and judgements based in the 
Deficit Model of science communication.  A few interviewees tended to lecture me, 
delivering generic “scripts” about their work and their field, obviously familiar 
discursive tactics intended to override controversy and assert authority and “expert” 
status (Stephens 2007, p 208).  Issues of power in the interview situation have been 
analysed in terms of the relationships between researcher and subject and the 
implications for the evolving discussion (Burawoy 1998, pp 7, 22-23; Odendahl & 
Shaw 2002, pp 310-311; Cassell 2005, p 170; Conti & O'Neil 2007, pp 67, 71-73; 
Bogner & Menz 2009, pp 68-69).  However, basing my research in a constructivist 
approach enabled me to observe such demonstrations as research material in 
themselves, interesting rather than offensive, revealing the characteristic habitus of 
some technoscience elites.  As Denzin (2001, p 25) explains:  ‘the interview functions 
as a narrative device which allows persons who are so inclined to tell stories about 
themselves’. 
 
                                                 
102 Despite equally intense controversy around windfarm proposals, discussed in Chapter Five, these 
patterns and assumptions that the thesis would take an advocacy position were not evident in any of the 
wind energy sector interviews. 
103 Some interviewees assumed that because I am not formally trained as a scientist, I would have little 
knowledge or understanding of technical matters, R&D processes, or issues such as risk or 
environmental effects. 
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Many other interviews, however, were meetings of equals where dialogue flowed 
with natural spontaneity, and mutual recognition of key issues was marked with 
considerable irony and humour.  Such rewarding discussions were not only with 
interviewees whom I already knew;  many “cold-call” meetings produced lively and 
highly productive interactions.  While these sessions were more creative, all the 
interviews were shaped by interaction effects (Charmaz 2002, pp 677-678; Warren 
2002, pp 83-84; Cassell 2005, pp 168, 176; Bogner & Menz 2009, pp 45, 55-57).  The 
flow of semi-structured discussions, and the immediacy of face-to-face meetings, 
allowed maximum attentiveness “in the moment” to the thinking and personality of 
each interviewee in their engagement with me as the researcher and with my topic. 
 
The interviews were conducted primarily in 2006 and 2007.  However due to 
unforeseen interruptions that necessitated time out from the thesis work – including 
illnesses, surgery and long months on crutches, family crises and funerals, and the 
disruptions of the Canterbury earthquakes – the analysis and drafting were completed 
between 2010 and mid 2012. 
 
The focus of my thesis on questions of professional and sectoral interest, and the 
choice of interviewees who were spokespersons for their organisations, meant that the 
research was exempt from the formal requirements of the University of Canterbury’s 
Human Ethics Committee.104  Nevertheless it was agreed in advance with each 
interviewee that a complete transcript would be emailed to them so they could review, 
amend or remove any comments they might reconsider, and make any additions they 
wished.  This reflected the interactive principles of co-constructive knowledge 
generation underpinning my research approach, and demonstrated respect for the 
professional situations of the interviewees in their institutions and fields (Odendahl & 
Shaw 2002, pp 313-314; Warren 2002, pp 88-89; Charmaz 2004, p 504).  All 
interviewees were comfortable with this arrangement.  Some did edit their transcripts, 
usually to tone down comments made in strong or colourful terms.  Subsequent to the 
                                                 
104 Under the University’s Human Ethics Committee’s 2004 policy and guidelines (part 4) the 
principles for research include informed and voluntary consent, and respect for rights of privacy and 
confidentiality.  Part 3 of the regulations provides for exemptions from the more formal consent 
requirements for interviews, when (3(b)) the interviews are conducted with public figures or 
professional persons in the areas of their duties or competence, and (3(f)) when the research involves 
case studies of business organisations and institutions and does not involve gathering personal 
information of a sensitive nature about or from individuals. 
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interview process, it was agreed in discussions with my supervisors that, further to 
these agreements with the interviewees, it would be appropriate to maintain the 
anonymity of individual participants, to protect these actors’ confidentiality and their 
positions in their sectors and professional communities (Odendahl & Shaw 2002, p 
313).  Accordingly the interview citations in Chapters Five, Six and Seven refer to 
individuals only in terms of their roles and fields. 
 
All the interviews were included in the analysis process, but not all have been cited in 
the thesis.  Some discussions merely confirmed ideas and experiences already 
powerfully articulated by others.  Henwood and Pidgeon (2006, p 358) explain 
theoretical saturation as the point where additional material makes no further 
contribution to the analysis.  Stern (2007, p 117) describes saturation as ‘when the 
learner hears nothing new’.  Some discussions are not specifically cited because they 
provided no information or ideas that were not already available in the published 
documents or policy of the institution or sector.  Such patterns indicate the embedded 
nature of those interviewees in the habitus of their field, perpetuating the frameworks 
of value and assumption shaping thinking and orientation in the domain.105  Some 
interviews have not been cited because, as the thesis evolved, those discussions 
proved less relevant than originally anticipated.  As Stern (2007, p 118) explains, 
analysis of interview transcripts should develop interpretation rather than description;  
he recommends ‘a search and seizure operation looking for cream in the data’.  I trust 
that my interviewees will appreciate their position in the larger process, and my 
gratitude for their generosity in sharing their ideas and experience with me for this 
thesis. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the “how” and “why” of my investigation process.  Given 
the rich heterogeneity of the two technology fields that are the sites of this study – 
complex networks of social, physical, technical, epistemological and teleological 
phenomena – a constructivist approach proved to be a practical way to accommodate 
the diversities I encountered “in the field”.  An open, exploratory methodology was 
                                                 
105 Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is discussed in Chapter Two. 
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adopted, following the principles of constructivist grounded theory.  The research and 
analysis took their own shape as the material accumulated and the interpretation 
evolved.  Insights and principles from other theoretical frameworks, including Actor 
Network Theory and middle range theory, were valuable in developing my approach 
to the issues around technoscience benefit claims, the tactics and business of 
undertaking the research, and my aims for the thesis and its usefulness to others 
engaging with science and technology. 
 
Metaphors can be an efficient way to clarify experience (Lakoff & Johnson 1980).  
Denzin and Lincoln (2003, pp 4-11) describe the development of qualitative research 
methodologies as a strategic ‘bricolage’, combining different methods, techniques and 
traditions in a pragmatic response to ‘the specifics of a complex situation’.  I have 
benefited from a wide range of academic studies – mainly analyses of technoscience 
and methods for social science research – as I constructed my own pathways through 
the thesis process.  Gieryn (1999, pp 6-12) develops an extended metaphor of 
cartography to explain the ways fields are described and understood, and at times my 
research has felt like a map-making expedition through untamed jungles.  However 
the creative dynamics of thesis work suggest also another metaphor offered by Denzin 
and Lincoln (2003, p 9):  ‘researchers all tell stories about the worlds they have 
studied…  the product [is] a performance’. 
 
The next three chapters show this methodology in action, following projections of 
expected benefit as they justify and influence R&D and innovation in the domains of 
GM and wind energy in New Zealand. 
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Chapter Five 
Gone with the wind106 
 
Introduction 
The introduction of wind energy in New Zealand since the mid-1990s illustrates the 
strategic framing of expected future benefits to promote technological innovation 
within an established sector.  The benefits projected in support of wind energy include 
environmental, commercial, political, societal and technical outcomes associated with 
the interests and value frameworks of different groups, and with different forms or 
applications of the technology.  Wind energy has been utilised in New Zealand in 
different ways by individual property owners, by small private companies developing 
modest stand-alone turbine systems, and by major State-owned enterprises building 
extensive industrial-scale generation facilities.107 
 
Analysis of the social construction of technologies highlights the inevitable influence 
of the paradigms, expectations and power relations of actors and groups.  Claims of 
benefit, positioning an innovation such as wind energy to appeal to powerful interests, 
are important strategic resources for proponents and developers, as discussed in 
Chapter Three.  Projecting positive outcomes from a new technology justifies policy, 
commitment and expenditure, and helps break through the inertia of existing systems 
and assumptions (van Lente 1993; Latour 1996; Sarewitz 1996; Green et al. 1999; 
Brown et al. 2000b).  Predictions of benefit also help counter controversy and 
opposition to innovation;  wind energy projects in New Zealand and internationally 
have often met with fierce resistance from local communities and environmental 
groups (Ansley 2006; Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2006a; Barry 
2007; Smith & Klick 2007; Graham et al. 2009; Coddington 2010).108 
                                                 
106 With apologies to Margaret Mitchell, Clark Gable and Vivien Leigh. 
107 To date, the other technoscientific innovation addressed in this thesis, genetic modification, has only 
been used in New Zealand as a research tool in the lab or in contained field trials. 
108 Opposition is driven by a range of concerns, including:  effects on landscapes, views, ecosystems 
and local communities (including property values);  noise and low frequency effects;  “flicker” effects 
from the shadows of spinning turbine blades, or “disco” reflection effects;  impacts on bird life;  and 
opposition to large commercially-driven developers and corporate control of electricity infrastructure 
(Asmus 2001, pp 137-142, 164-173; Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2006a, pp 34-
35, 40-61; Kaltschmitt et al. 2007, pp 344-347; Dawson & Spannagle 2009, pp 404-405; European 
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This chapter analyses the strategic and performative functions of benefit claims in the 
discourses around windfarms and wind technology in New Zealand.  Two frameworks 
of projected benefit have predominated in the advancement of wind generation in 
New Zealand over the last decade and a half:  environmental sustainability and 
commercial profitability. 
 
The chapter traces the ways that expectations of wind energy are closely interwoven 
with environmental ideals.  This may find expression in the independence of a small 
stand-alone turbine powering a remote lifestyle farm, in the branding and marketing 
of major corporations, or in the carefully negotiated provisions of a statutory 
amendment or government policy document.  As a renewable form of generation, 
wind energy provides important additional “green” benefits as well as the basic 
product, electricity.  Political and public recognition of the challenges of global 
climate change have strengthened the advantages of wind energy relative to fossil-
fuel-based generation, and enabled wind technology’s advancement by building 
support in political domains where its appeal to sustainability and inter-generational 
ethics translates into strategic advantage. 
 
But wind systems also deliver a commodity product, electricity, and this chapter 
follows the dominance of frameworks of commercial benefit associated with one 
application of wind technology – large corporate-owned windfarms feeding electricity 
into the national grid.  The evolution of technological innovation is inevitably shaped 
within the context of existing systems, processes and institutions, and wind energy in 
New Zealand has accommodated itself to established structures and expectations in 
the electricity sector.  Other more radically innovative ways of using wind turbines, 
such as stand-alone systems or community-based distributed generation networks, are 
associated with other kinds of projected societal and environmental outcomes.  These 
                                                 
Wind Energy Association 2009, pp 329-335, 403-408; Fanchi 2010, p 169; Toke 2010, pp 20-21; 
Burton et al. 2011, pp 532-562).  While protests against proposed wind energy developments raise 
interesting and important questions around citizen engagement with technology, and public 
participation in planning and decision-making for technological innovation (Bell et al. 2005; Devine-
Wright 2005; Apt & Fischhoff 2006; Devine-Wright 2007; Hindmarsh 2010), such issues are not the 
main focus of this thesis. 
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modes of the technology have been relegated to secondary or marginal applications, 
or dismissed altogether in the New Zealand electricity sector. 
 
Before turning to the detail of wind energy’s introduction in New Zealand, the next 
section provides a brief outline of the evolution of this technology and its rapid global 
advance over the last three decades. 
 
You’ll be blown away109 
Humans have harnessed the power of the winds to facilitate various tasks for 
centuries.110  But wind energy is seen as an innovation in the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries because of this technology’s significance in its social, economic, technical 
and political contexts.  As well as the obvious differences – between wind turbines 
and other means of making electricity, or between a sleek contemporary turbine and a 
traditional windmill – the characterisation of wind energy as a “new technology” 
results from its representation, and the discourses, values and assumptions associated 
with it.  Bijker (1995, p 6) recognises the importance of these contextual 
interconnections: 
[O]ne should never take the meaning of a technical artefact or technological 
system as residing in the technology itself.  Instead, one must study how 
technologies are shaped and acquire their meanings in the heterogeneity of 
social interactions. 
 
Analyses of electricity generation and transmission systems, such as Hughes’ studies 
of large electricity networks (1983, 1989, 1994, 2004), show how their evolution is 
closely inter-related with wider frameworks of meaning and expectation, as the 
                                                 
109 This phrase closes Meridian Energy’s 2012 television advertisements featuring dramatic imagery of 
the windfarm at Makara, Wellington;  viewers are encouraged to visit the Meridian website and learn 
more about the advantages of wind energy and the company’s focus on renewable generation. 
110 Windmills are a medieval technology, imported from the Moslem world, which became widespread 
across Europe in the twelfth century (Mokyr 1990, pp 45, 59-60; Asmus 2001, pp 25-26; Nelson 2009, 
pp 1-4; Ngô & Natowitz 2009, p 211).  Wind was first utilised for electricity generation in the late 
1880s when Ohio inventor-entrepreneur Charles Brush built a turbine with 144 rotor blades made of 
cedar wood driving a 12 kW generator (Asmus 2001, p 38; Danish Wind Industry Association 2003).  
Turbines were common in the US mid-West and California until the middle of the 20th century for 
pumping water and providing energy to farms remote from transmission networks (Asmus 2001, pp 28-
32, 39-40; Nelson 2009, pp 2-5; Tubbs 2011, Chapter 4; Dodge n. d.).  In Europe, turbine technology 
was developed from the turn of the 20th century to produce electricity for local authorities (Nelson 
2009, pp 5-9; Ngô & Natowitz 2009, p 213).  In 1904 the Society of Wind Electricians was founded 
and the Journal of Wind Electricity initiated by Danish engineer Poul La Cour (Danish Wind Industry 
Association 2003). 
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technology comes to:  ‘embody… economic, political, and social characteristics that it 
needs for survival’ (1989, p 62).  Vasi (2010, pp 11-14, 22, 30-32, 50, 192-193) 
identifies social norms and values and political support as critical for acceptance and 
uptake of an innovation such as wind energy.  Other studies also highlight the 
diversity of perspectives and interests involved in energy technologies, and the 
complexities of change processes (Jacobsson & Johnson 2000, pp 630-633; Foxon et 
al. 2005, pp 2123-2125; Jørgensen 2005, pp 720-722; Bergek et al. 2008, pp 576-577; 
Sarewitz & Cohen 2009, pp 8, 22). 
 
Such dimensions are recognised in discourse around the strategic development of 
New Zealand’s electricity sector.  The Energy Panel of the Royal Society of New 
Zealand (2006a, p 7) acknowledged the significance of factors such as economics, 
governance systems, and public and industry perceptions for the deployment of new 
technologies.111  The need for integration of a range of considerations and community 
interests was highlighted by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 
(PCE) (2003b, pp 35-43; 2006a, pp 34-61, 109-117).  The PCE’s energy-sector 
advisor, interviewed for this thesis, summed it up: 
It’s not so much the technology but also how it’s applied, the context or the 
philosophy or the gestalt around it… it’s the social construct that’s around it as 
well (Interview 10, 16/8/2006). 
 
The benefits projected from a new technology such as wind energy, the ways it is 
promoted, and the forms it takes, derive from and affirm these broader frameworks of 
meaning and value.  Contemporary applications of wind energy technology have 
evolved since the 1980s in association with increasing awareness of environmental 
sustainability and constraints on the world’s dependence on fossil fuels.  The 
international wind energy industry has gone from strong growth through the 1980s 
and 90s to enjoy “hypergrowth” at the turn of the 21st century (Wüstenhagen 2006, pp 
480-483).112  With increases in global installed generating capacity averaging over 
30% per annum since the mid-90s, the wind energy sector is celebrated as an exciting 
                                                 
111 See www.royalsociety.org.nz .  The Energy Panel of sector experts was established ‘to provide 
scientific and technological leadership for a secure and sustainable energy future for New Zealanders 
and our economy’ (Royal Society of New Zealand 2005, p 1). 
112 Global generating capacity from wind technologies increased from 2.5 GW in 1992 to 94 GW in 
2007 and 121 GW at the start of 2009 (Nelson 2009, p 10; Quaschning 2009, p 165; European 
Renewable Energy Council 2010, pp 98-99; Vasi 2010, p 4). 
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success story with enormous further potential (Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment 2006a, pp 28-33; Ngô & Natowitz 2009, pp 216-219; Belhomme et al. 
2010, pp 103-104; Maczulak 2010, pp 97-98; Vasi 2010, pp 4-5, 24-25; Lever-Tracy 
2011, pp 68-70; New Zealand Wind Energy Association 2012, pp 10-11). 
 
The rapid global spread of wind energy has been associated with incremental design 
improvements for both turbines and windfarms, which give increased commercial 
competitiveness (Asmus 2001, p 4; European Renewable Energy Council 2010, p 99; 
Junginger et al. 2010, p 73; Vasi 2010, pp 17-18; New Zealand Wind Energy 
Association 2012, pp 6, 15, 21).  But support for and expansion of wind energy are 
more significantly due to this technology’s strong positioning as a “green” way to 
produce electricity (Jacobsson & Johnson 2000, pp 625-627; Dawson & Spannagle 
2009, p 400; Belhomme et al. 2010, p 104; European Renewable Energy Council 
2010, p 95).  The European Wind Energy Association (2009, p 309) outlines the 
merits: 
Wind energy is a clean and environmentally friendly technology…  Its 
renewable character and the fact it does not pollute during the operational 
phase makes it one of the most promising energy systems for reducing 
environmental problems at both global and local levels…  Wind energy… not 
only reduces emissions (of other pollutants as well as CO2, SO2, and NO2), it 
also avoids significant amounts of external costs of conventional fossil fuel-
based electricity generation. 
 
The significance of these environmental advantages at this particular point in history 
is explored by Vasi (2010).  He explains the “greening” of the global electricity 
industry in relation to recent decades’ rising environmental awareness and activism.  
Highlighting the importance of alignment with government policy and with the 
interests and expectations of key groups (2010, pp 29-32, 50-51, 192-194), Vasi 
follows the evolution of wind energy as closely linked with societal and political 
recognition of climate change and pollution (2010, pp 13-15, 33-36, 187-188).  
Bergek and colleagues (2008, pp 581-582) describe the legitimation of renewable 
energy technologies as a process of ‘changing problem agendas at the societal level 
[that] alter the weight of different performance criteria and the power of different 
arguments’.113 
                                                 
113 The importance of climate change as a compelling imperative for change in energy systems both in 
New Zealand and internationally will be discussed in more depth in Chapter Seven.  Acceptance and 
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The story of wind energy in New Zealand also reflects the influence of increasing 
public and political awareness of environmental issues over the last twenty years.  
Wind technologies advanced strongly in New Zealand through this time, when 
environmental sustainability and the challenges of global warming were becoming 
increasingly prominent concerns.114  The situation in this country, where most 
electricity was already produced from renewable sources via hydro and geothermal 
systems, differs from the pattern elsewhere in the world where electricity is often 
heavily dependent upon fossil-fuel and nuclear technologies.115  Nevertheless, wind 
energy’s “clean green” credentials have been significant in the promotion and 
legitimation of this innovation in the New Zealand energy sector (Sims 1996; New 
Zealand Wind Energy Association 2012). 
 
Beyond the particular interests of various sectors and groups, wind energy technology 
also has a powerful symbolic function.  Standing out boldly in the landscape, tall 
modern turbines are dramatically iconic structures to rival the historical hydro dams 
as evidence of New Zealand’s technological sophistication and green consciousness.  
Local communities have identified proudly with the wind structures on their 
hilltops.116  Photos of sleek white turbines, often starkly silhouetted against a clear 
blue sky, are regularly featured in industry materials (Meridian Energy 2004, pp 8, 30, 
46; 2005a, back page; Mainpower 2006) and policy documents (Ministry of 
                                                 
uptake of new technologies such as wind energy have been strongly influenced by the strategic 
positioning of their projected benefits alongside sufficiently urgent societal needs or problems for 
which the technology is promoted as a solution – a dialectical co-construction of crisis and response 
(Kuhn 1996; Brown 2000). 
114 A trial turbine was installed at Brooklyn high above Wellington in 1993, and New Zealand’s first 
windfarms, in the Wairarapa and Manawatu, followed in 1997 and 1999 (Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment 2006a, pp 23-25).  In the first decade of the 21st century, eleven new windfarms 
and major extensions to existing installations were established, and twenty proposals were developed to 
the point of seeking resource consent (http://www.windenergy.org.nz/nz-wind-farms/). 
115 New Zealand has historically enjoyed a high proportion of its electricity from renewable sources 
with the government’s extensive investment in hydro technology through the middle decades of the 
20th century.  However, as discussed below, there are severely limited potentials now for further hydro 
developments and in recent decades New Zealand has provided additional generation by developing 
technologies utilising oil, coal and gas resources. 
116 The main shopping street of Brooklyn, the Wellington hill suburb where a trial turbine was installed 
in the early 1990s, features coloured pavement tiles with a bold stylised turbine as a symbol of 
community identity (Meridian Energy 2005d).  And Te Apiti, the windfarm on the ridgeline above 
Palmerston North, has achieved such iconic status within the region that in 2006 the Manawatu rugby 
team was re-branded as “the Turbos”, with a team logo of three spiralling turbine blades 
(www.manawaturugby.co.nz). 
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Economic Development 2006b, front cover; New Zealand Government 2007, front 
and inside covers).  Though perceived by some as visual pollution of ridgelines and 
other natural sites, the elegant turbine structures are evocative symbols of progress in 
a new 21st–century modernity, icons of a marriage of contemporary technology and 
environmental principles. 
 
Green energy in New Zealand 
The benefits associated with wind energy as an environmentally friendly technology 
are major drivers of its acceptance, both in small-scale local modes and in the form of 
large industrial-scale commercial windfarms.  These benefits are often intangible 
qualities, derived from deeply-held personal values and ethics, and impossible to 
assess quantitatively.  Nevertheless they are powerfully compelling in different ways 
for different groups and actors – individuals, energy companies and developers, and 
government. 
 
For environmentally conscious individuals, the choice of wind power for their 
household, farm or business is an expression of personal ideals and a contribution to 
improving the future of the planet.  Awareness of global and local environmental 
issues, and a commitment to a sustainable lifestyle, are the incentives for installing 
small turbines and associated technologies (Black 2009, p 20).  A consultant who 
designs such systems described this kind of client as intensely conscious of the 
constraints of the world’s limited resources and ‘passionate’ about doing their bit 
(Interview 6, 18/7/2006).  Such value frameworks also drive many industry actors and 
advocates for wind and other sustainable energy technologies.  The knowledge that 
the technologies they work with are making a positive contribution to New Zealand’s 
efforts towards sustainability can be a powerful motivation.  Many of the sector actors 
interviewed for this thesis expressed a strong personal commitment underpinning their 
work.  A Christchurch turbine designer and promoter of wind energy described his 
acute sense of the challenges of planetary sustainability as central to his efforts to 
change the electricity industry (Interview 31, 28/4/2006).  Policy actors in sector 
agencies were unabashed about sharing their personal beliefs in the importance of 
environmental sustainability (Interviews 10, 43 and 56).  And a Meridian Energy 
windfarm manager acknowledged: 
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Working for a company that you believe in what you’re actually doing, you 
know, these issues out there, global warming, climate change, all these things 
get thrown in to the mix and you know, I’m pretty proud of the company and 
the way they’ve taken a stand and are going for sustainable energy, yeah, it’s a 
big driver (Interview 26, 21/11/2006).117 
 
The green benefits of wind energy technology have also been significant in company 
positioning.  Meridian has developed a strategic brand of environmental commitment, 
promoting a strong identity as a green electricity provider using only renewable 
generation technologies.118  A Meridian executive explained the company’s approach:  
‘You don’t just pay lip service to [sustainability], you get in boots and all, and… 
actually demonstrate that’ (Interview 40, 8/12/2006).  The choice of wind 
technologies, and promotion of the environmental advantages of wind energy, are 
central to Meridian’s corporate brand (Meridian Energy 2004, 2005a).  Other 
electricity companies have also developed environmentally responsible profiles, 
highlighting investments in renewable generation, undertaking audits of 
environmental performance, and encouraging customer awareness of energy 
sustainability (for example, Mainpower 2006; Orion Energy 2006; Contact Energy 
2008).119  Such corporate strategies provoked skepticism from some in the sector as 
calculated primarily for market advantage in attracting environmentally conscious 
consumers.  An industry consultant explained the marketing focus:  ‘If you’re looking 
at two products that are maybe the same price, you go with the green one’ (Interview 
55, 7/12/2006).  And a policy manager at the Electricity Commission identified: 
                                                 
117 Meridian Energy (www.meridian.co.nz ), a State-owned enterprise, is one of the biggest electricity 
generation companies in New Zealand.  It has developed three major windfarms – Te Apiti in the 
Manawatu, White Hill in Southland, and West Wind at Makara, as well as ‘the world’s coolest wind 
farm’ at Ross Island in Antarctica, powering Scott Base and McMurdo Station. 
118 www.meridianenergy.co.nz/AboutUs/.  The company’s office building on the Wellington waterfront 
is a model of environmentally efficient design (Meridian Energy 2005c, p 4).  The state-of-the-art 
building serves as: ‘a practical demonstration that good environmental principles and commercial 
imperatives are not mutually exclusive’ (www.meridianenergy.co.nz/AboutUs/NewWellingtonoffice/).  
The offices were recognised with a Five Star rating from the New Zealand Green Building Council 
(www.nzgbc.org.nz/images/stories/downloads/public/knowledge/casestudies/Meridian_Building.pdf). 
119 Mainpower New Zealand (www.mainpower.co.nz ) owns and operates the electricity distribution 
network through the North Canterbury and Kaikoura regions.  The company’s generation strategy for 
the region (Mainpower 2006), focuses on renewables and demonstration projects for community-level 
distributed generation.  Its Rangiora office building features a frontage of solar panels.  Orion New 
Zealand (www.oriongroup.co.nz ) owns and operates the electricity distribution network in central 
Canterbury.  Servicing an 8,000 sq km area that includes many remote farming districts, Orion offers 
advice on stand-alone generation for remote locations as an alternative to expensive grid connection.  
Contact Energy (www.contactenergy.co.nz) is a private company established with assets from the 
former government-owned generating infrastructure in 1996.  As well as generating around 25% of 
New Zealand’s electricity, it also provides much of the country’s natural gas and LPG.  Contact has 
proposals for two large windfarms in the Waikato. 
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…a demand pull… by New Zealanders who value renewables as part of their 
non-commercial judgements.  From a commercial point of view organisations 
will recognise that need, just like any commercial market, and make products 
to satisfy that… because there’s economic value in doing so (Interview 41, 
7/12/2006). 
 
There is also direct economic value in the environmental benefits from wind energy in 
the form of financial mechanisms such as carbon credits.  Green values and the long-
term public benefits of responsible technological options are translated into monetary 
value through the complex transactions of emissions trading (New Zealand 
Government 2007, p 10; 2010, p 18).120  Carbon credits secured on the international 
carbon market can be significant for the economic viability of new developments, and 
are acknowledged as an incentive for deploying renewable technologies.  The sale of 
emissions credits to the Netherlands government provides an additional revenue 
stream for the Te Apiti windfarm (Meridian Energy 2004, p 44).  Such additional 
returns can be decisive, as the manager of a Meridian windfarm admitted: 
We’ve got $5 million worth of carbon credits associated with this project…  
now if we didn’t have those this project would be underneath the line, so 
carbon credits played a big part (Interview 26, 21/11/2006). 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, Bourdieu’s analysis of the different modes of 
symbolic capital – strategic assets such as the projected benefits and positive qualities 
of a technological innovation – recognises the ways that qualitative capital translates 
into and overlaps with economic values (Calhoun 1993, p 69; Bourdieu 2004, p 55).  
The New Zealand electricity industry’s conversion of wind energy’s environmental 
benefits into profitable market share, crucial top-up funding, and attractive corporate 
branding illustrates this advantageous mutability. 
 
The appeal of wind energy as a “clean green” technology has helped build societal 
support for this innovation.  However sector actors interviewed for this thesis 
considered that such benefits were meaningful for only a small minority of the public.  
Information about global environmental problems – notably Al Gore’s movie An 
Inconvenient Truth – was acknowledged as fostering some interest in energy 
                                                 
120 However a recent review criticises New Zealand’s emissions trading scheme as weak and 
ineffective (WWF New Zealand 2012, p 9). 
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alternatives (Interviews 43, 56 and 60).121  But the sector view was that most ordinary 
consumers are neither sufficiently well informed nor concerned about environmental 
issues to prioritise renewable energy.  In the experience of the industry, for the 
majority of the public the source of their power is largely irrelevant.  So long as they 
can turn on lights, heat and appliances, how the electricity is generated is a remote 
abstraction, mostly taken for granted.  As a Mainpower development manager 
observed:  ‘most people actually don’t give a toss one way or the other;  they just 
want to flick the switch and have it work’ (Interview 38, 20/4/2006).  Questions of 
price were seen as more compelling drivers of energy choices.122 
 
Beyond the ideals of strongly committed individuals, the marketing of electricity 
companies and the economic incentives of emissions trading, the environmental 
benefits of wind energy also translate into significant political advantage.  The 
principal benefit of this technology in political and policy domains is its contribution 
to improving the percentage of New Zealand’s energy derived from renewable energy 
sources, thus helping to fulfil the country’s international commitments to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in response to climate change.123  The goal of minimising 
New Zealand’s need for environmentally unfriendly forms of electricity generation is 
consistently emphasised in government reports and policies (Ministry of Economic 
Development 2006b, 2006c; Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2006c, 
pp 37-38; New Zealand Government 2007, pp 6, 59; Ministry for the Environment 
                                                 
121 The salience of global climate change as a major problem creating an impetus for technology 
change is discussed further in Chapter Seven. 
122 The limits of consumers’ ideals-based values frameworks, where choice of green technologies is 
predicated upon altruism or a sense of duty in response to appeals to save the planet, are recognised in 
some marketing fields:  ‘[T]he gap between green concern and green consumerism is pretty vast’ 
(Pernick & Wilder 2008, pp 273-275). 
123 In 2002 New Zealand ratified the Kyoto Protocol, committing to reduce the country’s greenhouse 
gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2012 (Ministry of Economic Development 2006a, pp 2.8-2.9, 4.1-4.7; 
Ministry of Research Science and Technology 2006a, p 21).  New Zealand’s policies are outlined at 
www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/climate/international/ .  More recently the National government has projected 
targets of a 50% reduction in emissions from 1990 levels by 2050, and, under the agreements made at 
Copenhagen in 2009, emissions reductions between 10% and 20% below 1990 levels by 2020 (New 
Zealand Government 2010, p 17).  However a recent sobering evaluation of New Zealand’s 
environmental performance against its international sustainability commitments from the 1992 Rio 
Earth Summit (WWF New Zealand 2012, pp 8-11) strongly criticizes the levels of actual achievement, 
noting overall increases in greenhouse gas emissions, and, as at 2010, in emissions from the electricity 
sector relative to 1992 levels:  ‘The hard data show that greenhouse gas emissions have been steadily 
rising since 1992 with no policy measures in place, or on the horizon, that will set emissions on a 
downward trajectory’ (WWF New Zealand 2012, p 32).  In 2012, ten percent of New Zealand’s 
greenhouse gas emissions was produced by electricity generation via thermal power plants 
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2012, p 51). 
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2008), and by the research sector developing energy policy (Royal Society of New 
Zealand 2005, pp 1, 7; Ministry of Research Science and Technology 2006a, pp 9, 13-
17, 35; Royal Society of New Zealand 2006b, p 17).124 
 
The next section outlines the policies and institutional structures governing the New 
Zealand energy sector.  How have the claims of benefit advanced for wind energy 
technologies been received in these domains? 
 
Power structures 
The structure and governance of New Zealand’s electricity sector have, inevitably, 
affected the trajectories of different applications of wind energy technology in this 
country.  As outlined in Chapter Two, technoscience developments are framed within 
prevailing institutional and policy arrangements, and the values, orientations and 
expectations these formal systems reflect (Green et al. 1999; de la Mothe 2001; 
Jasanoff 2005a; European Commission 2007; Vanloqueren & Baret 2009).  Inherent 
in each sector’s governance systems are strongly normative patterns of perception of 
constraint, possibility, utility and opportunity.  These frameworks of assumption have 
particular salience for the introduction of a new technology such as wind energy. 
 
Future projections and planning for New Zealand’s energy sector are predicated on 
ongoing increases in demand for electricity (Ministry of Economic Development 
2006a, pp 3.4-3.7; 2006c, pp 7, 49; Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 
2006c, p 12; New Zealand Government 2007, p 72; New Zealand Wind Energy 
                                                 
124 Coal and gas fuelled generation technologies comprised one-third (34.2%) of New Zealand’s total 
electricity generating capacity in 2008, but due to increased renewables-derived generation coming 
onstream, the proportion of coal and gas fuelled electricity fell to 27.3% or just over a quarter of New 
Zealand’s capacity in 2009 (Ministry of Economic Development 2009, 2010).  However over the three 
decades from 1975 to 2005 the proportion of New Zealand’s electricity derived from renewable 
sources declined by approximately 10%;  increases in renewable capacity did not keep pace with the 
increase in total electricity generation, with the majority of increased demand over this period being 
met by thermal generation (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2006b, pp 30-32; 
Graham et al. 2009, p 3348).  Furthermore, there are major constraints on future hydro development in 
New Zealand, with the best dam sites already long-established, and formal recognition and protection 
of significant conservation values of other river ecosystems (Royal Society of New Zealand 2005, p 14; 
Ministry of Economic Development 2006a, pp 8.1-8.2; Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment 2006c, p 13; 2012).  As a Commissioner at the Electricity Commission observed:  ‘the 
easy hydro has been used up, so now it involves building dams in more difficult places or more 
sensitive places as far as the environment’s concerned’ (Interview 9, 31/10/2006). 
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Association 2012, pp 4-5).125  Assumptions of continuing growth and expansion in the 
sector are consistent with the dominant metanarrative of societal improvement and 
economic progress (discussed in Chapter Two), and the centrality of electricity to this 
expected advance (New Zealand Government 2010, pp 1-2).126 
 
The governance provisions specify objectives and guiding principles for New 
Zealand’s electricity system, and are profoundly influential on sector strategies.  
Commercial profitability, efficiency and competitiveness are requirements established 
in policy and legislation, and in the institutional and industry structures set up in 
sweeping sectoral reforms of the 1980s and 90s.127  Before the reforms, New 
Zealand’s electricity system was almost totally controlled by central government 
acting in the national interest, owning large generation plants, notably the South 
Island and Waikato hydro stations, and the national transmission grid.  The broader 
public benefits of electricity, and the state’s duty to develop and finance infrastructure 
to meet rising demand, were fundamental principles (Parliamentary Commissioner for 
the Environment 2003b, p 16; 2005a, pp 15-16; Ministry of Economic Development 
2006a, p 2.3).  Providing electricity as an essential public service was a strong social 
and political priority, acknowledged by an energy systems consultant looking back 
rather nostalgically from the perspective of 2006: 
Those hydro plants [built in the 1950s and 60s] were highly uneconomic, you 
know;  they would never have been built in today’s environment…  That’s the 
wonders of central planning…  People believed in the common good back 
then (Interview 55, 7/12/2006). 
 
                                                 
125 This is consistent with projections of global energy requirements.  The last two decades of the 20 th 
century saw global energy demand increase by 20%;  fossil-fuel-based production dominated this rise 
(Jacobsson & Johnson 2000, p 626).  Global demand for electricity is projected to continue to grow 
from 17.3 trillion KWh globally in 2005 to 33.3 trillion KWh in 2030 (Vasi 2010, p 185). 
126 Counter to expectations of growing demand are initiatives undertaken by government agencies and 
energy companies to encourage energy conservation and efficiency, and thus reduce pressure on 
infrastructure and generating capacity;  programmes include subsidised eco-lightbulbs, home insulation 
and efficient heating systems (www.energywise.govt.nz). 
127 The reform process was itself a product of the particular ideologies of that era, part of larger public 
sector changes driven by neoliberal free-market economic theory.  Most of New Zealand’s large 
electricity generators are State-owned enterprises;  the SOE Act 1986 s4(1)(a) establishes as the 
principal objective of SOEs that they ‘operate as successful businesses’ and are ‘as profitable and 
efficient as comparable businesses that are not owned by the Crown’.  This focus is only somewhat 
moderated by s4(1)(c) which requires SOEs to ‘exhibit a sense of social responsibility by having regard 
to the interests of the community… and by endeavouring to accommodate or encourage these when 
able to do so’. 
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The transition from a public service ethic to a semi-privatised market-oriented system 
occurred over more than a decade from the mid-1980s.128  Core principles behind the 
restructuring were to maximise profits, minimise costs, and encourage competition 
(Ministry of Economic Development 2006a, p 2.3).  Another guiding principle was 
the separation of government’s role from the managerial and strategic decision-
making of State-owned enterprises and private firms.  Direct government intervention 
to achieve particular benefits or outcomes, whether via hands-on management or 
targeted incentives, was rejected in favour of a deregulated market system: 
[I]nvestment decisions are made by individual firms in response to 
commercial drivers…  [The government’s role is to provide] the right 
economic framework through an efficient market, effective infrastructure and 
supportive regulation (New Zealand Government 2007, pp 62, 71).129 
 
Nevertheless the government imposes broad-level requirements over the ostensibly 
independent sector agencies.  Legislation and policy, principally the New Zealand 
Energy Strategy (New Zealand Government 2007, 2010, 2011a), establish clear 
directions as to the outcomes expected.130  Other formal mechanisms set goals for 
demand-side efficiency and establish policy frameworks for new developments.131  
Through the period covered by this thesis, regulation of the sector was the 
responsibility of the Electricity Commission.132 
                                                 
128 The reform process included:  replacement of the Ministry of Energy with the Electricity 
Corporation, a State-owned enterprise (SOE), in 1986;  the deregulation of the sector in the early 1990s 
and the separation of Transpower as another SOE to own and manage the national distribution grid;  
later in the 1990s, splitting up the country’s generation resources amongst three SOEs and the fully 
privatised Contact Energy, and introducing a competitive wholesale trading market for electricity;  and 
the establishment of the Electricity Commission in 2003 to provide regulatory oversight of the sector 
and electricity pricing (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2003b, pp 15-17; 2005a, p 
16; Ministry of Economic Development 2006a, p 2.3).  The Electricity Commission was in its turn 
disestablished in October 2010 to be replaced by the Electricity Authority, which is to focus more on 
market-related issues under the 2010 Electricity Industry Act (www.ea.govt.nz ). 
129 This distancing of government from sector activities is reiterated in the 2011 version of the Energy 
Strategy.  The government’s function is defined as ensuring ‘effective and efficient’ energy markets, 
although there is a shift toward allowing more active interventions:  ‘The Government’s role in both 
industry development and in energy efficiency is to provide incentives and information, and to help 
remove barriers to markets operating effectively’ (New Zealand Government 2011a, p 4). 
130 Consultation for the 2007 version of the NZ Energy Strategy was under way at the time of the 
interviews undertaken for this thesis.  Many of the interviewees were involved in this process. 
131 These policies include the New Zealand Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy (New 
Zealand Government 2001), and the 2011 National Policy Statement on Renewable Electricity 
Generation, which requires the national benefits of renewable electricity to be considered in consenting 
processes for windfarm and infrastructure developments under the Resource Management Act 1991 
(New Zealand Government 2011b). 
132 The principal objectives of the Commission were (a) to ensure that electricity was produced and 
delivered to consumers in an efficient, fair, reliable, and environmentally sustainable manner;  and (b) 
to promote and facilitate the efficient use of electricity.  To achieve this the Commission had to (inter 
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The governance arrangements reflect the priorities and political ideologies of the 
government of the day;  as these wider contexts change, there is a corresponding shift 
in the concepts of benefit and purpose associated with particular technologies.  The 
2007 Energy Strategy (New Zealand Government) shows a strong environmental 
orientation.  It establishes a target for 90% of New Zealand’s electricity to be from 
renewable resources by 2025, asserting this goal as a response to the challenges of 
global climate change and New Zealand’s obligations under the Kyoto Protocol (New 
Zealand Government 2007, pp 6, 17, 22, 59, 71, 78).  Market mechanisms and 
ensuring security of supply of electricity are also highlighted, but the emphasis on 
renewables was a clear indication of the commitment to sustainability policies of the 
Labour government of that time.  The intended technological trajectory was 
unambiguous: 
For the foreseeable future, it is preferable that all new electricity generation be 
renewable, except to the extent necessary to maintain security of supply…  the 
government’s view is that there should not be a need for any new baseload 
fossil fuel generation investment for the next ten years.  The government 
expects all generators, including state-owned enterprises, to take its views into 
account when considering new generation investments (New Zealand 
Government 2007, p 17). 
 
The National government elected in 2008 has taken a rather different approach to the 
energy sector and desired technological pathways.  Its 2010 review of the Energy 
Strategy signalled a shift in focus, giving priority to more intensive development of 
New Zealand’s petroleum and mineral resources to maximise the mining sector’s 
contribution to economic growth (New Zealand Government 2010, p 1; 2011a, pp 1-
3).133  The revised Strategy retains the target of 90% renewable electricity by 2025, 
and expected social and environmental benefits are acknowledged.  But the major 
focus is now on economic dimensions – renewable energy is justified under criteria of 
                                                 
alia) manage risks relating to security of supply, maintain incentives for investment in generation, and 
contribute to climate change objectives via renewables and distributed generation (Government Policy 
Statement, May 2009, www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC_40723.aspx, 
www.electricitycommission.govt.nz/rulesandregs).  In an interview with a senior policy manager at the 
Commission for this thesis, the priorities emphasised most consistently were ensuring security of 
supply and efficiency in the operation of the electricity market (Interview 41, 7/12/2006). 
133 Events subsequent to the Strategy review have somewhat tarnished the reputation of the minerals 
industry in New Zealand.  The Pike River disaster later in 2010, when 29 men were killed in an coal 
mine explosion, was investigated through a Royal Commission of Inquiry which revealed inadequate 
safety provisions and poor commercial performance in the coal industry. 
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efficiency and competitiveness, maintaining the country’s international reputation and 
securing advantage for New Zealand exports (2010, pp 9, 20-21, 27).134  Green energy 
options and innovation are firmly positioned as serving economic development goals: 
Capturing the upside of existing and emerging renewable technologies is a 
source of competitive advantage to New Zealand… [renewables will] help 
make New Zealand more resilient to fluctuating commodity prices, leading to 
improved energy security…  Deploying new energy technologies offers 
significant potential to create wealth… to contribute to an increased rate of 
economic growth for New Zealand…  The Government will prioritise research 
funding to areas… where there is commercial potential (2011a, pp 2, 6, 7). 
 
The respective strategy documents show the same technologies – renewable 
generation from wind and other sources – promoted for different kinds of reasons.  
The anticipated benefits emphasised as the primary rationale for a particular 
technological trajectory reflect the ideological frameworks and priorities of the time.  
Analyses of technological development follow the shifts that occur as protagonists 
seek to assert and stabilise a particular meaning for a given technology consistent with 
their interests (Law 1987; Bijker & Law 1992a; Bijker 1995; Kline & Pinch 1999).  
The shift from an environmental sustainability framework to a predominantly 
economic growth framework – deployed by successive New Zealand administrations 
to justify encouragement of wind generation and other renewable energy technologies 
– demonstrates the contingent, partisan, agenda-oriented nature of benefit projections 
(Latour 1996; Sarewitz 1996; Brown et al. 2003; Winner 2004). 
 
How have the governance and institutional structures for New Zealand’s energy 
sector, shaped within particular political and economic ideologies, influenced the 
achievement of broader societal and environmental benefits from technological 
innovations such as wind energy?  The decentred structuring of New Zealand’s 
electricity industry, with separate competitive commercial entities pursuing their own 
profits, is predicated upon the assumption that such market systems will provide 
optimal outcomes and maximise benefits not only for the respective organisations but 
also for society as a whole:  ‘to grow the New Zealand economy to deliver greater 
prosperity, security and opportunities for all New Zealanders’ (New Zealand 
Government 2010, p 1).  But some in the industry consider that the management of 
                                                 
134 The value of New Zealand’s clean green image for our exports and tourism is well recognised 
(Ministry for the Environment 2001a, 2001b; Coyle et al. 2003, pp 73-77, 89-90). 
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energy services within cost-conscious commercial frameworks, and the lack of direct 
government intervention in support of particular outcomes, has hindered the 
promotion of broader societal benefits.  The former Chair of Orion Energy observed: 
The government has chosen to make it other people’s fault… to hold it at 
arm’s length… It’s part of the whole deregulation thing.  When all of 
electricity was owned by the government, they could have [supported 
renewable energy technologies] more easily…  It’s somehow harder to justify 
now because they say, well, it’s market forces (Interview 12, 17/10/2006). 
 
For some sector actors interviewed for this thesis, the decentralised governance 
structure has diminished opportunities for recognition and pursuit of the benefits of 
new technologies such as wind generation.  The sector is described as fragmented and 
Balkanised, with no shared commitment to societal and environmental benefits that 
are not sufficiently prioritised under the prevailing competitive business paradigm.  
Powerful industry players were criticised as ‘too interested in looking after their own 
patch [and] their own agendas’ (Interview 23, 19/10/2006).  And a turbine systems 
developer argued that the sector lacked clear responsibility for initiating constructive 
change: 
The New Zealand model of government is not one where they embrace the 
notion of incentives [or] subsidies…  There is an awful lot of authority pushed 
downwards, so it’s like both sides looking at each other saying, well, is 
[innovation for public-good benefits] your job or is that my job?  and it’s 
actually quite difficult for people to take leadership (Interview 33, 11/5/2006). 
 
Similar patterns are identified in Europe, where neoliberal market-oriented energy 
policies assert a focus on short-term optimisation of profits.  However analysis of 
innovation processes and transitions to new technologies stress the need for long-term 
iterative processes of learning, heterogeneous evolution and complex societal changes 
(Geels & Smit 2000a, pp 877-880; Rogers 2003; Foxon et al. 2005, pp 2132-2135; 
Jørgensen 2005, pp 722-730; Van de Ven et al. 2008). 
 
There are strong signals in the New Zealand Energy Strategy and other policies that 
environmentally friendly renewable generation via technologies such as wind turbines 
is to be fostered.  But there are also, inherent in the governance and culture of the 
electricity sector, fundamentally divergent expectations around the kinds of purposes 
for which technological systems are developed, the kinds of benefits to be prioritised, 
and the kinds of guidance and direction considered appropriate in the national interest.  
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The disjunction between commercial and non-monetary societal objectives is neither 
absolute nor impenetrable, and, as discussed above, the conversion of environmental 
values into strategic economic and political advantage has been useful in advancing 
wind energy in New Zealand.  Nevertheless, the prioritisation of commercial profit 
focused modes of benefit has affected the evolution of wind energy technologies in 
New Zealand. 
 
The next sections explore the success of one particular application of this technology, 
the mode most compatible with the interests of dominant commercial and political 
groups, and the eclipsing of other potential applications aimed towards other kinds of 
benefit goals. 
 
The dominance of “Big Wind” 
Studies of the development of technological innovation trace the emergence and 
ascendance of a particular form or application of a new technology, understood and 
valued in particular ways, satisfying the needs and expectations of key groups (Bijker 
& Law 1992b; Bijker 1995; Garud & Karnøe 2001a; Brown et al. 2003; Kaplan & 
Tripsas 2008).  Central to this process is the alignment or accommodation of the 
technology, and the benefits and services it offers, with the interests and requirements 
of power in the field.  Other possible development trajectories, and other benefits that 
might be derived from developing innovation in different directions, are marginalised 
in a process of closure and retrospective legitimation around what has become the 
“dominant” mode of the technology (Winner 1986; Pinch & Bijker 1987; Beder 1991; 
Utterback 1994; Woodhouse & Sarewitz 2007; Vanloqueren & Baret 2009).135 
 
From the late 1990s onwards, one configuration of wind energy technology in New 
Zealand has achieved an advantageous alignment with powerful political and 
institutional interests and, despite resistance to some specific projects, general public 
support.  The momentum generated by such alignment around renewable energy was 
acknowledged by the CEO of the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology 
(Interview 1, 6/12/2006) and by a Commissioner of the Electricity Commission: 
                                                 
135 The rich literature developing theoretical analysis of these evolutionary processes is discussed in 
Chapter Three. 
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So it’s been possible to change the way things are done, so there you get the 
coming together, the coalescence of the environmental ideal and the 
economics and the engineering (Interview 9, 31/10/2006). 
 
Achieving such alignment can require significant changes in the frameworks of value 
and purpose shaping a new technology and its application.  Historical analyses of 
environmentally-friendly technologies trace their evolution from an original activist 
ideals base – committed to wide ecological, social, humanitarian and inter-
generational goals – to profitable commercial enterprises firmly oriented within 
contemporary capitalism (Hawken 1993; Hård & Jamison 2005, pp 270-271, 279, 
285-291; Hess et al. 2008, 482-484).  The accommodations necessary for such a 
transition include the repositioning or repackaging of environmental values to fit the 
expectations and modus operandi of business.  Discussing the politicisation of 
environmental concerns in European energy debates through the last third of the 20th 
century, Hård and Jamison (2005, pp 279, 286) conclude: 
[E]nvironmental ideals came to be appropriated by business interests… 
incorporat[ing] environmental concern into the dominant institutional and 
discursive frameworks…  Wind energy was a particularly good example of 
how alternative visions came to be realized by more commercially minded 
actor-networks. 
 
Such adaptive metamorphoses affect not only the physical forms and applications of 
the technology, but also the meanings and benefits associated with it.  The process of 
becoming mainstream can require advocates to conform to different modes of 
discourse and to uphold different values and purposes for the innovation.  This can 
result in compromise, as more radical applications of the technology give way to 
pragmatic tactical expectations.  Hess and colleagues (2008, p 487) observe that: 
At a technical level, the success of alternative technologies and products 
comes at the cost of a… process in which the more politically charged design 
elements and social organizational innovations drop out.  At the discursive 
level, social movements must often pitch critical alternatives in a language that 
reflects the dominant “governing mentalities” that prevail in a particular policy 
arena in order to be heard as credible. 
 
In the New Zealand electricity sector, this kind of reorientation of wind energy has 
resulted in one form of the technology – large commercial windfarms – moving from 
the “greenie” margins to general acceptance in the industry. 
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In the early stages of its introduction in New Zealand, wind technology was generally 
perceived as a “fringe” option, of interest only to committed environmentalists, 
activists and groups with very different value frameworks and personal style from 
conventional industry and policy actors.  Early proponents of wind energy and 
sustainability had little credibility or leverage in the dominant sector paradigm.  As 
the PCE’s energy-sector advisor observed:  ‘a lot of people in the alternatives [were 
seen as] pretty flakey’ (Interview 10, 16/8/2006).136  The CEO of a turbine design 
company described his difficulties in getting traction for arguments for sustainable 
energy technologies in the early 1990s;  despite being ‘very active and vociferous in 
various forums,’ he encountered considerable resistance in the electricity sector and 
policy environment at that time (Interview 31, 28/4/2006).  However one form of 
wind technology, positioned as a solution to the newly recognised issues of global 
climate change, was about to have a major “make-over”. 
 
Changes in the early 2000s in the organisations advocating for renewable energy 
reflected a shift in focus in the sector.137  The PCE’s energy-sector advisor described 
the New Zealand wind energy community’s transition to a slick corporate culture: 
I used to go to the Wind Energy Association meetings back in the early 90s, 
and it was cardigans and sandals, you know, we had square dancing and 
everything, it was great fun…  [Since then] the energy debate in this country 
has been captured by the sharp guys in business suits …  [At the wind industry 
conference in 2003] they were talking billions.  They weren’t talking, “oh, can 
we get this one up and if we build it ourselves can we use Number 8 wire and 
corrugated iron.”  These guys were, “oh we’re bringing in 30 Vestas V90s and 
it’s going to cost us $400 million”… and there were no cardigans any more 
(Interview 10, 16/8/2006).138 
                                                 
136 Asmus (2001) highlights the personalities of many early developer-entrepreneurs in the US wind 
energy industry as eccentric, idealistic, defiantly non-conformist mavericks. 
137 The proponents of locally-based distributed wind energy models split off from the Wind Energy 
Association to amalgamate with the former NZ Photovoltaics Association, rebranded as the Sustainable 
Electricity Association to promote small wind, small hydro and photovoltaic solar energy technologies;  
the SEA became a voice for alternative distributed technology applications, while the WEA was 
oriented more towards large windfarm development (Interview 56).  Vasi (2010, pp 34-35, 194) notes a 
similar ‘transformation’ in the advocacy communities working for green energy technologies in Europe 
and the US, moving from activist modes to become more institutionalised, from challenging 
governments and business to adopting non-confrontational, cooperative tactics, and from promoting 
small-scale technological alternatives to large industrial-scale windfarms. 
138 A Meridian wind project manager explained the importance of the perceived credibility, within the 
established culture of industry and policy communities, of the messengers promoting innovation;  
advocates perceived as “outsiders” are less effective in advancing the benefits of new technologies 
such as wind energy:  ‘You need champions that people [in the industry] can respect…  When you start 
off with scientists and environmentalists, people sort of go “aah, whatever.”  But it’s when you actually 
have people who [sector decision-makers] think “hmm, they actually know what they’re talking about” 
that it starts to build the pace and the momentum’ (Interview 40, 8/12/2006).  The importance of 
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By the mid-2000s, Meridian was positioning wind technology as unexceptional, 
asserting that:  ‘Wind power is no longer an “alternative” source of energy – it is now 
a mainstream and economic form of utility-scale generation’ (2004, p 10).  The CEO 
of Orion Energy also stressed the importance of promoting renewable energy 
technologies as ordinary and unremarkable:  ‘the more we can make it seem as 
mainstream and normal the better’ (Interview 48, 18/7/2006). 
 
The model of an economically efficient, competitive-scale windfarm, feeding 
electricity into the national transmission grid, effectively eclipsed other modes of 
wind technology in New Zealand.  This trend was recognised in an assessment of 
New Zealand’s electricity systems:  ‘the focus of investment in the electricity sector is 
still with “Think Big” large-scale supply-side solutions’ (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment 2006b, p 9).  This is consistent with the standard 
pattern of electricity infrastructure in New Zealand and throughout the world.  
Hughes’ studies of the historical development of large technological systems (1989, 
pp 70-73; 2004, pp 204-205) follow the expansion of electricity networks into 
centralised profit-oriented mass-production networks.  A recent analysis of New 
Zealand’s energy sector acknowledges the typical model for electricity systems: 
For most of the history of wide-scale electricity use the paradigm has been 
large scale central generation with transmission and distribution to the point of 
consumption… institutional and market arrangements have evolved around a 
central large-scale generation model relying on one-way transmission and 
distribution flows (Stevenson 2010, pp 4, 5). 
 
The outcome of this kind of framework for wind technology and its introduction in 
New Zealand has been the dominance of big corporate-controlled generation plants: 
Investment in new energy generation continues to be mostly large scale and 
remote from demand…  To be competitive with other forms of generation, 
investment in wind power… is largely driven by economies of scale.  Projects 
are therefore mostly large scale, in both size of turbines and number of 
turbines in each wind farm (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 
2006a, pp 14, 18). 
 
                                                 
‘homophily’ or compatibility between advocates and audiences is strongly emphasised in Rogers’ 
analysis of the diffusion of innovations (2003, pp 19, 36-37, 305-307). 
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The importance of scale in framing economically attractive applications of wind 
technology was acknowledged by a project manager at Meridian, the company 
responsible for New Zealand’s most extensive windfarms: 
Where Meridian sees its particular niche in the wind industry is at the very 
large scale end, so we’re really focused on delivering the largest possible wind 
developments in New Zealand… where you get the economies of scale and 
you get significant chunks of power out that are really going to make a 
difference (Interview 13, 18/4/2006).139 
 
Scale matters in the dominant model of the commercial windfarm not only in the land 
area covered and number of turbines, but also in the size of the turbines themselves 
(Meridian Energy 2005a, p 2; Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 
2006a, pp 46-47).140  The importance of factors of scale in wind energy technology’s 
shift to economic viability was highlighted by a policy manager at the Electricity 
Commission:  ‘you need to have some kind of economies of scale to get enough 
generation to warrant all the setup costs’ (Interview 41, 7/12/2006).  According to a 
Meridian executive, the ability to build windfarms on a sufficiently major scale was a 
key factor: 
The reason why the costs were coming down was because turbines were 
getting larger and so the economies of scale were becoming more 
appropriate…  We pushed the envelope on the size of the turbines, so we went 
to much larger turbines than had previously been built in New Zealand…  if 
you tried to put smaller ones on the output would be much less but you’d still 
have the same infrastructure costs…  so there’s an optimum size (Interview 
40, 8/12/2006). 
 
The pattern of corporations such as Meridian framing the benefits of wind technology 
as dependent on sufficiently large installations, is wryly noted by others in the sector:  
‘New Zealand’s power generators have always had a think-big mentality’ (Macdonald 
                                                 
139 The scale of many New Zealand windfarms is considerable:  Meridian’s Te Apiti in the Manawatu 
covers 1,150 hectares with 55 turbines generating 90 MW;  the White Hill site in Southland extends 
over an area 8 km by 3 km for 29 turbines generating 58 MW;  and West Wind at Makara has 62 
turbines on a 53 sq km site producing 142.6 MW (www.meridian.co.nz ).  The original proposal for 
Project Hayes in Central Otago was for 176 turbines over a 92 sq km site (Meridian Energy, “How to 
make a submission in support of Project Hayes” pamphlet, 2006). 
140 For example, the Vestas turbines used at Meridian’s White Hill windfarm in Southland are 107 
metres tall, with a steel tower 68 metres tall and rotor blades with a 78 metre diameter sweep.  The 
combined weight of tower and nacelle is 193 tonnes.  Each tower stands in a base structure using 380 
cubic metres of reinforced concrete, or 65 truckloads, with 36 tonnes of reinforcing steel (Discover 
White Hill Wind Farm, 2009, www.meridianenergy.co.nz ).  The 2.3 MW Siemens turbines at Makara 
have towers 67 metres tall weighing 211 tonnes.  The blades have an 80 metre diameter sweep, and 
each foundation structure used 48 tonnes of reinforcing steel (Discover Project West Wind, 2009, 
www.meridianenergy.co.nz ). 
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2008, p 2).  The Sustainable Energy Forum (2005, pp 15, 22) identified the dominant 
large-scale industry paradigm as a constraint on development of alternatives.  The 
CEO of a small turbine company, interviewed for this thesis, compared his approach 
with the mainstream model: 
Big business and government like big fixes, big gigantic fixes…  if you use 
smaller turbines like ours, you don’t shift as much dirt as Meridian does 
(laughs)…  Meridian are good at shifting dirt, they like getting their Tonka 
toys out and building something (Interview 31, 28/4/2006). 
 
And the PCE’s energy advisor observed: 
Meridian, they’ve made it big wind because then it fits the big mentality, 
we’re used to multi-megawatt power stations…  it’s big windfarms compared 
to big hydro or big thermal, because that’s what they’re comfortable with…  I 
think it’s in the nature of [business] to look for that big solution, the capital-
letter Answer (Interview 10, 16/8/2006). 
 
This trend is not unique to New Zealand, with the development of wind energy 
infrastructure globally on increasingly grand scales.141  This pattern reflects Winner’s 
(1986, pp 47-48) principle of the ‘gigantism’ of modern technological systems.  As an 
assessment of green technologies acknowledges: 
Most of the world’s energy today comes from large, centralized, generation 
facilities, including massive power plants… of a size once unimaginable.  
Utilities [work] on a large scale to take advantage of centralized production 
and to leverage existing networks (Pernick & Wilder 2008, p 173). 
 
Analyses of the evolution of wind technology and windfarm systems acknowledge 
exponential increases in scale making this technology more competitive within 
mainstream commercially-oriented value frameworks (Dawson & Spannagle 2009, p 
401; European Wind Energy Association 2009, pp 6, 72-73; European Renewable 
Energy Council 2010, p 99; Junginger et al. 2010, p 73; Vasi 2010, p 18; Burton et al. 
2011, p 525).142  Tracing the trajectory of wind energy in Denmark, Hess and 
colleagues (2008, p 483) observe: 
 
                                                 
141 Wind farms in the US have expanded to awesome dimensions.  The largest include:  Roscoe Wind 
Farm in Texas with 627 turbines (781.5 MW) covering nearly 100,000 acres 
(http://www.eoncrna.com/contentProjectsRoscoe.html);  Horse Hollow, also in Texas (735.5 MW) 
(http://www.nexteraenergyresources.com/content/where/portfolio/pdf/horsehollow.pdf);  and the 
Tehachapi Pass Wind Farm in California, with 5,000 turbines (http://www.ludb.clui.org/ex/i/CA4977/). 
142 Asmus (2001, p 227) notes that the Vestas V-66 turbine, with a tower over 270 feet tall and blades 
reaching 370 feet above the ground, is taller than the Statue of Liberty. 
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The scale of the technology increased.  The transformations of technology 
design involve a process of “complementarization” or redesign that adapted 
alternative… technologies to fit into existing portfolios of industrial 
production. 
 
The framing of the expected benefits of wind technology configurations that satisfy 
the expectations of economic returns and efficiencies of dominant business decision-
makers has been crucial for the acceptance and uptake of this technology in New 
Zealand, and for the form of its application that has become the dominant mode. 
 
The technical and systemic benefits of wind energy are another significant dimension 
of this technology’s commercial appeal.  Wind technologies provide diversity in the 
generating network and are promoted as offering benefits to system managers in 
improving security of supply (Őlz et al. 2007; New Zealand Wind Energy Association 
2012, p 5).143  Ensuring security of New Zealand’s electricity supply is a fundamental 
requirement for the sector, enshrined in formal policy and in strategic planning for 
future developments (Royal Society of New Zealand 2005, p 10; New Zealand 
Government 2007, pp 13, 18, 59-60; 2010, p 13).  Maintaining reliable supply is a 
strong imperative;  a Meridian policy manager explained:  ‘the system is designed so 
the lights never turn off’ (Interview 40, 8/12/2006).  The CEO of Orion Energy 
highlighted the need for dependability in the system: 
All the crises we tend to have in energy are about the lights going out…  
When reliability is threatened, everything else goes out the window…  
Reliability is number one (Interview 48, 18/7/2006). 
 
In its proposal for the Makara wind farm, Meridian argued for the contribution of 
wind technology: 
                                                 
143 The intermittency of wind, and the risks of sudden increases or drop-off in wind speeds upsetting 
system equilibrium, are the subject of considerable debate in the sector;  studies of the dynamics of the 
national grid and ways to protect from catastrophic “cascade failure” from abrupt variations in wind 
generation were a priority for the Electricity Commission at the time of interviews for this thesis 
(Interviews 9 and 41).  A key issue is the overall proportion of generation derived from wind relative to 
other technologies (Electricity Commission 2007; Ministry of Economic Development 2007).  
Nevertheless some policy and sector discourse (New Zealand Wind Energy Association 2005; 
Meridian Energy 2005a, 2005d; Ministry of Economic Development 2006c; Electricity Commission 
2007; Clark 2010), and some industry interviewees (Interviews 9, 33 and 40) consider that the national 
system can be managed or enhanced to withstand such fluctuations.  The Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment (2006b, p 45) reports that ‘New Zealand’s electricity system could cope with 
about 35 percent wind generation at peak demand, based on the installed capacity’.  Research shows 
that New Zealand’s wind resource is more reliable than seasonal rainfall;  improved forecasting 
methods give accurate predictions on an hourly basis (New Zealand Wind Energy Association 2012, pp 
7, 15-16, 18). 
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Electricity is seldom appreciated until it is gone…  New Zealand cannot afford 
to take electricity for granted…  Diversifying the way we generate electricity 
through the development of wind farms and other renewable energy projects 
helps to ensure the security and reliability of New Zealand’s energy supply 
(Meridian Energy 2005b, p 12). 
 
Wind generation is also promoted as a technology that is compatible with New 
Zealand’s existing hydro generation plants, contributing to energy security by 
allowing conservation of water and thus serving as a buffer for the vulnerabilities of 
dry years when hydro lake levels fall (New Zealand Wind Energy Association 2005, p 
2; Meridian Energy 2005a, p 3; Bone 2006, p 26; Ministry of Economic Development 
2006a, p 8.5).  A Meridian project manager highlighted the strategic advantages of 
integrated management of wind and water resources:  ‘the two can work together, you 
can store the wind energy in the hydro lakes’ (Interview 13, 18/4/2006).  This was 
endorsed by a Meridian windfarm manager: 
One of the big things about wind is it’s almost like banking water…  If we got 
sufficient wind capacity into the system then you’ve got more options with 
your hydro system and maintaining that, riding out some of the highs and lows 
and the dry years (Interview 26, 21/11/2006). 
 
The success of the large-scale commercial windfarm as the dominant mode of wind 
energy in New Zealand reflects the compatibility of the concepts of benefit associated 
with this form of the technology with the interests of key commercial and policy 
actors, focused on large-scale production, reliability and revenue, and on satisfying 
shifting political requirements.  This alignment around framings of benefit that appeal 
to powerful groups is itself a beneficial dimension of this mode of the technology, a 
valuable asset in securing acceptance and uptake.  In terms of the theoretical 
constructs developed by Bourdieu (2002, 2004), discussed in Chapter Three, the 
benefit claims advanced for “Big Wind” can be understood as symbolic capital 
providing legitimacy and leverage: 
Those in possession of a high degree of capital have the capacity to project 
strategies which can involve changing the rules of the game whereas those 
without capital have only limited control over their future (Robbins 1991, p 
100). 
 
The next section turns to alternative applications of wind energy technology which 
have enjoyed limited political and industry support and thus remain on the margins.  
These uses of the technology are tolerated in minor niche applications or dismissed 
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altogether, despite advocates’ assertions of significant potential benefits.  These 
configurations of wind technology are valued and defined in relation to different 
concepts of projected benefit from those underpinning the dominant mode of “Big 
Wind”. 
 
Blowing in different directions 
Technologies are far from deterministic, despite perceptions of the autonomous 
momentum of technological development and innovation (Winner 1977; Smith & 
Marx 1994; Guice 1999; Garud & Karnøe 2001b; Woodhouse 2006; Van de Ven et 
al. 2008).  Particular applications or forms of a new technology may be 
retrospectively legitimated as the obvious or intended option, but there are always, at 
various points in the trajectory of R&D and through the diffusion process, other 
possible ways to use and benefit from innovations. 
 
Two alternative applications of wind energy technology in New Zealand are 
important to consider in terms of this thesis’ focus on expectations – small stand-
alone turbines servicing individual homes or businesses, and local community-level 
distributed generation systems where a cluster of turbines provides power for the 
immediate area.  These alternatives are useful in understanding the significance of 
benefit claims in the justification and promotion of new technologies, because the 
projected benefits associated with these uses of wind energy have been insufficient to 
achieve wide societal and sectoral acceptance and uptake of either option.  As 
scholars of science and technology systems have shown, innovation failures can be 
just as revealing as the success stories (Braun 1992; Latour 1996; Geels & Smit 
2000a, 2000b; Franklin 2003). 
 
In New Zealand, small-scale independent wind turbines have been installed to provide 
electricity for remote sites where connection to the transmission grid is extremely 
costly.144  The justification for this kind of technology decision is primarily economic.  
                                                 
144 Transmission costs to remote locations can be prohibitive.  Energy technology engineers 
interviewed for this thesis cited costs of between $50,000 to $100,000 to connect buildings on isolated 
rural sites to the grid (Interviews 6 and 48).  The costs of installing a small turbine are not insignificant, 
but less daunting relative to such connection charges.  A small domestic turbine installation on a 
lifestyle block north of Wellington cost its owners around $18,000 in 2008:  ‘it is expected to take 
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One consultant engineer explained that clients in such isolated locations were not 
necessarily driven by environmental ideals, but simply weighed up the costs of setting 
up their own generating system relative to network connection (Interview 6, 
18/7/2006).  Orion Energy’s CEO described the options for clients building at a 
remote bay on Banks peninsula:  ‘don’t spend your 50 grand on this new powerline, 
go direct to [independent generation technologies]’ (Interview 48, 18/7/2006).  
Mainpower’s generation systems manager outlined the choices for such locations: 
You want to be connected to our network, you would have to pay for us to go 
in and put in poles and wires, so we’d be happy to do that, but maybe the 
alternative would then be to rather than string up a long line is to create some 
distributed generation yourself (Interview 38, 20/4/2006). 
 
The benefits of alternative generation technologies such as wind energy are accepted 
as non-controversial in these kinds of circumstances, where linking to the network is a 
major disincentive, both in New Zealand (Orion Energy 2006; Black 2009, pp 20-21) 
and internationally (Wood 2008, pp 42, 136; European Wind Energy Association 
2009, pp 7, 125-127). 
 
Where grid connection is straightforward and affordable, however, the potentials for 
small independent turbine systems for properties or businesses have as yet had little 
appeal in New Zealand.145  In these situations the cost incentives are heavily weighted 
towards the conventional service.146  Only rare, determined individuals driven by 
                                                 
about seven years of reduced power bills to pay for itself’ (Black 2009, p 20).  The government’s 
energy advice website explains that the costs of an independent generation system will depend on the 
combination of technologies used;  interested householders are advised to expect prices for a middle-
range wind turbine system of between $15,000 and $25,000, plus an additional $3,000 to $10,000 for 
an inverter to convert the electricity from DC to AC (http://www.energywise.govt.nz/how-to-be-
energy-efficient/generating-renewable-energy-at-home/stand-alone-power-systems (as at November 
2010)). 
145 The ideals of autonomy and independence from the corporate-controlled system are also highlighted 
in promotion of stand-alone wind technologies (Barnett 2010, p 21; Stevenson 2010, p 17).  Having 
your own turbine is promoted as giving:  ‘control that’s never before been achieved over how we 
source and manage our energy requirements’ (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 
2006c, p 5).  A Canterbury engineer offered a visionary ideal behind his company’s focus on small-
scale energy systems:  ‘We will increasingly see people take back the ownership and responsibility for 
providing themselves with energy’ (Interview 33, 11/5/2006). 
146 A further disincentive is the complexity and poor economic returns of New Zealand electricity 
companies’ systems for independent small generators to feed back any excess generation (Barnett 
2010, p 20). 
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strong environmental ideals and personal commitment have been prepared to make 
that scale of investment (Black 2009, pp 20-23; Barnett 2010, pp 20-21).147 
 
A more radical alternative configuration of wind energy technology is local 
distributed generation systems, where smaller installations of perhaps only a few 
modest-sized turbines are located within or close to the communities they power.  
This option for utilising wind technology is relatively well-established in Europe.148  
There has been some enthusiasm for dispersed, small-scale wind generation in New 
Zealand (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2006c; Macdonald 2008).  
Principles of sustainability and community involvement drive a model of dispersed 
local-level generation, a radically different technology configuration from the 
established centralised electricity network.  Advocacy for community systems was 
described by an energy analyst at the Ministry of Economic Development as 
idealistically building a ‘new paradigm’ where:  ‘the days of large-scale generation 
are gone [and] we’re going to have small plant dotted all around in communities’ 
(Interview 60, 7/12/2006).149 
 
A range of benefits are advanced for distributed wind technology.  The projected 
advantages of local generation systems include environmental benefits from greater 
utilisation of renewable generation technologies, and improved efficiency by avoiding 
significant losses in extended transmission systems (Parliamentary Commissioner for 
the Environment 2006c, pp 35-38; Wood 2008, pp 123, 136).150  Deferring or 
                                                 
147 There was considerable scepticism amongst some of the industry actors interviewed for this thesis, 
based in pragmatic assessments of the average person’s technical skills and willingness to grapple with 
turbine technology.  A designer of stand-alone systems had found it important to ‘understand the 
client’s personality, how practical they are…  It needs a practical hands-on person to be an owner of a 
wind turbine [and] have the ability to manage anything that might need attention’ (Interview 6, 
18/7/2006). 
148 Community-owned and managed wind energy systems are relatively common in Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Germany (Bolinger 2001; Toke 2005; Toke 2010).  Co-operative structures and 
financial incentive systems have been established to support this kind of application of wind 
technology:  ‘[M]any commercial-scale wind turbines are installed as single units or in small clusters 
distributed across the countryside, or scattered around and sometimes within urban agglomerations. 
And many of these turbines are either owned by the farmers on whose land the turbine stands, or by 
local residents’ (Gipe n.d.).  Wood (2008, pp 121-122) notes the value of supportive government 
policies to help establish local small-scale generation systems. 
149 The MED analyst did not himself consider such an option was realistic. 
150 The amount of electricity lost over lengthy transmission networks in the centralised grid is 
considerable:  ‘Losses are still usually quoted as around 6% for transmission and 6% for distribution 
networks.  These are certainly underestimates…  In New Zealand, almost half the retail cost of 
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avoiding the costs of major infrastructure development is also promoted as an 
advantage of smaller decentralised systems (Hoff et al. 1996).  A Canterbury designer 
of small turbines described this as ‘the lumpy investment problem’, arguing that: 
Lots of little things can add up…  wind power is just perfect from an 
economic and financing point of view because you can do it in 25 MW 
increments which is tens of millions of dollars, as opposed to 500 MW 
increments which are hundreds of millions if not billions… if you do lots of 
little things you don’t need to do the big things, or you can defer them, and 
that has economic value (Interview 31, 28/4/2006). 
 
Such benefits for the overall national generation capacity are promoted by advocates 
for alternative energy technologies: 
If you have 1000 small wind turbines or solar panels… that’s another power 
station that doesn’t need to be built (Prof Ralph Sims, Massey School of 
Engineering and Advanced Technology, quoted in Barnett 2010, p 20). 
 
[I]f every farm had 30kW of generation, which is two of the 15m turbines we 
do, that would give you 2.3 gigawatts of capacity.  New Zealand’s peak load is 
only 6.6GW so that would be a third of New Zealand’s capacity (Tony 
Pearson, Proven Energy wind turbines, quoted in Black 2009, p 22). 
 
Advocacy for distributed generation also emphasises the social outcomes claimed for 
community electricity systems, with optimistic expectations of increased public 
awareness of energy issues, improved demand-side savings, and enhanced democratic 
engagement of ordinary citizens with the technologies that power their lives (Asmus 
2001, p 226; Hoffman & High-Pippert 2005; Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment 2006c, p 41). 
 
The benefits of local wind generation have been also promoted as securing regional 
independence in electricity supply from the generalised national infrastructure.  This 
was highlighted by Canterbury energy company Mainpower (2006, back cover): 
At the moment, our region generates no electricity.  We rely on importing 
electricity from around the country.  There is real potential [for wind 
generation] in North Canterbury and Kaikoura…  Using local resources to 
generate electricity will… help protect [our region] against power shortages. 
 
                                                 
electricity supply to most consumers is attributable to capital and maintenance costs and losses on the 
transmission and distribution network’ (Sustainable Energy Forum 2005, pp 15-17). 
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Meridian’s advocacy campaign for the Makara wind farm also emphasised the 
advantages to local communities, arguing that Makara would provide enough energy 
to power all the households in Wellington, Lower Hutt and Porirua cities (Meridian 
Energy 2005b, p 5).  This focus was acknowledged by Meridian’s project manager: 
The whole concept of the wind farm being able to supply most of 
Wellington’s energy needs is really powerful…  it’s energy being generated 
locally, used locally (Interview 13, 18/4/2006). 
 
Some advocates have advanced the possibility of New Zealand developing a mixed 
technological mode combining both conventional large-scale wind energy and 
innovative, community-focused applications.151  The Parliamentary Commissioner for 
the Environment (2006c, p 13) argued that local energy could ‘complement’ the 
existing centralised system.  A researcher into distributed generation (Barry 2007) 
argued:  ‘Small-scale wind should not be developed instead of large-scale windfarms, 
but rather alongside them.’  An engineer researching alternative energy technologies 
suggested that: 
Local energy services will be provided increasingly by these local 
technologies…  The major power stations and so on will still be there and will 
provide backup and support (Interview 23, 19/10/2006). 
 
And a policy analyst at the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority outlined 
the potentials in using a mix of technological applications: 
[New Zealand] could meet all of our new load growth in electricity for twenty 
or thirty years just from renewables…  some of that would be on rooftops and 
alot of that would be larger windfarms (Interview 43, 6/12/2006). 
 
However the benefits and possibilities of dispersed or decentralised community-level 
uses of wind technologies have as yet gained little recognition in New Zealand.  The 
difficulties in achieving recognition for new ideas and new technology applications – 
appealing to different paradigms and offering different kinds of benefits from the 
expectations of dominant groups, particularly those of large commercially-focused 
companies – were acknowledged by the Royal Society of New Zealand (2006a, p 5) 
in its analysis of microgeneration potentials for New Zealand: 
                                                 
151 Such “both-and” wind energy systems are also promoted in the US and Europe (for example, Asmus 
2001, p 227). 
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[Alternative energy technologies] face a structural problem.  They are not 
beneficial to existing industries because there is no ongoing revenue stream…  
Existing industries have no incentive to provide them. 
 
The challenges inherent in introducing such models into existing generation and 
delivery systems are daunting (Sarewitz & Cohen 2009, p 6).  Resistance is framed 
primarily as based in economic and technical or managerial issues.  There is a wide 
perception across the electricity industry that distributed generation may be a nice 
ideal, but is simply not commercially competitive.152  A Commissioner of the 
Electricity Commission was pragmatic about the economics of devolved community-
level generation, describing it as an expensive ‘pipe dream’ (Interview 9, 31/10/2006).  
Commenting on the sector’s orientation around profitability, the Energy Panel of the 
Royal Society of New Zealand (2006a, p 4) was sceptical about distributed energy’s 
acceptance: 
The benefits of renewable microgeneration are more social and environmental 
rather than economic.  The exclusive focus on a competitive market limits 
changes in generation and supports incumbents. 
 
Mindsets and expectations within the industry are also significant:  ‘Many electrical 
engineers trained in the realm of large scale power generation systems are less willing 
to accept a vision for DG becoming mainstream’ (Royal Society of New Zealand 
2006a, p 3).  A researcher developing stand-alone generation technologies commented 
on the sector’s reluctance to consider different options: 
Alternatives or new techniques are very hard to get accepted, they’re always 
looking for the engineering issues of why it’s not going to be reliable or 
whatever else…  The first [issue] is control, if it’s outside the control of the 
industry… they’re not particularly comfortable with that (Interview 23, 
19/10/2006). 
 
The PCE’s energy-sector advisor also commented wryly on the pattern of political 
and sector support for large commercially-managed technological systems rather than 
decentralised small-scale applications: 
[Major industry actors] were much more comfortable with that model [large-
scale windfarms] because then they would have control.  They didn’t want a 
whole bunch of uncontrolled people out there [with independent generation] 
                                                 
152 The unit price (cents per kW hour) of household scale distributed generation were cited in 2008 as 
approximately 35 cents for a 15 kW mast mounted turbine, 55 cents for a 2.5 kW turbine, and nearly 80 
cents for a 3 kW vertical axis turbine;  these prices are much higher than the conventional retail rates of 
around 21 cents per kW hour (Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority 2008, pp 1-2). 
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contracting with them and setting terms and all that.  No, it’s much better that 
[they] go out there, sell the package, and have the final say…  nobody likes 
consumers in control (laughter) (Interview 10, 16/8/2006). 
 
Despite the efforts and enthusiasm of advocacy groups and the few small companies 
working with local-scale generation technologies in New Zealand, proponents of 
distributed energy systems remain outsider voices in the sector (Black 2009; Barnett 
2010).153  A Christchurch designer of stand-alone systems observed rather bitterly: 
People are struggling to bring forward new technology and not receiving any 
support, or very little…  it seems an extraordinary uphill battle (Interview 6, 
18/7/2006). 
 
And an engineer working on energy alternatives commented on the limited interest 
from established electricity sector actors and government agencies in the potential 
benefits of different kinds of systems: 
Not surprisingly they’re not and they never have been particularly supportive 
of renewable distributed generation [or] working out ways to best integrate 
small scale alternative energies with the network…  You have the government 
sort of saying, “well we’ll chuck a little bit of money in the research end there, 
but we’re not going to give it any clout or any power”…  so renewable 
distributed energy, small scale micro-generation is sort of sitting in a limbo 
(Interview 23, 19/10/2006). 
 
Such uses of wind and other small-scale generation technologies are considered 
beneath the interest of the large corporate actors.  These configurations of wind 
technologies are developed by smaller companies with a mix of commercial and 
environmental motivations, led by committed engineer-entrepreneurs.  Some research 
into local generation has been funded, but the engineer leading one distributed 
technology study suggested that work on such applications was so minimal it was not 
perceived as offering any serious challenge to the dominant industry paradigm: 
The networks say “yeah, put a bit of money into remote stuff because that’s 
not going to affect us”… overall [work on distributed generation] won’t have a 
big impact, it’ll have negligible impact (Interview 23, 19/10/2006).154 
                                                 
153 For example, www.seanz.org.nz , www.powerhousewind.co.nz , www.windflow.co.nz;  also 
www.distributedwind.org. 
154 Research exploring the development of small-scale generation was resourced through the 
Distributed Generation Fund.  However this support was short-lived;  established in 2008-09, funding 
was no longer available in 2010.  Projects undertaken included feasibility studies of different sizes and 
models of turbine for local communities, farms and vineyards (www.eeca.govt.nz/distributed-
generation-fund).  Other trial projects in remote rural communities in Southern Hawkes Bay and the 
East Coast have investigated the potentials for off-grid generation including wind, solar and other 
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The former Chair of Orion Energy described the perception amongst the dominant 
corporate and policy groups in the sector of work on such environmentally- and 
socially-oriented alternatives: 
It’s seen as a soft, soppy sort of do-goodie, not hard research delivery…  the 
soft options, the fringe stuff, the feel-good stuff, nice to have them there 
because it salves our conscience…  they’re thrown little bones to keep them 
happy, but they’re not seen as mainstream (Interview 12, 17/10/2006). 
 
Within the field of electricity generation and energy policy in New Zealand, the 
dominance of large-scale, centrally-controlled technological system models, and of 
values frameworks of commercial competitiveness and efficiency, has effectively 
foreclosed opportunities for independent, locally-focused wind generation.  The 
potential benefits of distributed generation have insufficient weight in sector 
frameworks to be considered relevant except in limited niche applications for remote 
sites where the existing technological configuration – transmission lines linking to the 
national grid – is deemed problematic because of the extreme costs of connection. 
 
Advocates for personal household-level turbine systems and local distributed energy 
systems have gained little traction for these models of wind technology in New 
Zealand despite their assertion of diverse benefits from dispersed generation systems.  
These kinds of benefit are not compatible with the assumptions and orientations of the 
dominant technological mode in this field.  Arguments for the positive outcomes 
anticipated from such alternative possible uses of wind technology appeal to different 
frameworks of meaning and value from those shaping the expectations of key political 
and industry actors.  As Christensen (1997, p 16) observes, such disruptive 
innovations:  ‘offered a different package of attributes valued only in [other] markets 
remote from, and unimportant to, the mainstream.’ 
 
 
                                                 
technologies (http://www.caenz.com/DistGen/DGdownloads/Gardiner.pdf, http://www.irl.cri.nz/our-
research/energy-power/distributed-energy-generation-storage, Interview 23, 19/10/2006). 
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The weight of the status quo 
The introduction of new technologies into well-established sectors has been analysed 
as a process where the benefits or advantages projected from the innovation must 
overcome the inertia of existing ways of doing things, and existing assumptions of 
what can and should be done (Utterback 1994; Gooley & Towers 1996; Christensen 
1997; Hargadon 2003; Rogers 2003; Coburn 2006; Montalvo 2006; Van de Ven et al. 
2008).  Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, discussed in Chapter Two – the entrenched, 
taken-for-granted frameworks of orientation and practice shaping and shaped by 
group interactions over time – is a way to understand the inertial weight of such 
reiterated conventions (Bourdieu 1999, 2004; Grenfell 2004). 
 
Like any established field, the New Zealand electricity sector is characterised by 
participants’ acquiescence to hegemonic norms and expectations, frameworks of 
value and orientation that are perpetuated in institutional and policy structures.  Sector 
actors interviewed for this thesis felt that such conservative patterns have influenced 
the introduction of new technologies such as wind energy.  Past and present systems, 
and the values and meanings they embody, severely limit the range of possible 
alternatives that are considered credible or desirable.  The PCE’s energy-sector 
advisor observed: 
We still have the incumbents set up and the institutional arrangements set up 
to maintain and extend the status quo...  Technologies that can be applied in a 
range of scenarios, a range of ways, when they get incorporated into the 
[system] they get applied just as the old technologies were (Interview 10, 
16/8/2006). 
 
And a researcher into stand-alone generating technological systems commented: 
The supply industry sees conventionally that generating in large scale away 
down the other end of the country, trucking it up the country and expanding all 
your transmission systems and so on, is good because that’s the way we’ve 
always done it (Interview 23, 19/10/2006). 
 
Closely intertwined with the inertia of paradigms and expectations, is the inertia of 
physical artefacts and infrastructure, which is also a significant constraint on the 
development and diffusion of new technological systems and configurations.  Path 
dependence is a concept that encapsulates the powerful influence of previous 
development trajectories (Garud & Karnøe 2001b). The inertial weight of established 
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systems and structures results in a narrowing of options (Jacobsson & Johnson 2000, 
pp 630-633; Sandén & Azar 2005, pp 1559-1560; Sarewitz & Cohen 2009, p 21).  As 
Williams (2005, p 13) explains: 
Prior choices are also important in relation to… large-scale sociotechnical 
systems, in which powerful ‘path dependencies’, and reinforcement between 
the technical features and the broader innovation regime, may result in lock-in 
to particular technology models.  The difficulties of overcoming lock in 
technologies, once entrenched, and in changing technology regimes [results 
from] the close coupling between the design of technical components, the 
institutional context and entrenched operating principles. 
 
The orientation of New Zealand’s electricity system around the national transmission 
grid – transporting electricity from the major generation plants to consumers, running 
the length of the country and under Cook Strait – is a major factor in the siting of 
windfarms.  This was acknowledged by Meridian project managers as a factor in the 
development of Project West Wind at Makara near Wellington: 
While New Zealand’s very windy, the number of places that are actually 
suitable for wind turbines is a much smaller set of that… you need to be close 
to transmission (Interview 13, 18/4/2006). 
 
Wellington is probably the windiest spot in the world and it’s an appropriate 
place for a windfarm inasmuch as it’s close to transmission so you didn’t have 
to build any more infrastructure (Interview 40, 8/12/2006). 
 
The project manager at White Hill windfarm in Southland also acknowledged that: 
…a great advantage to this site is that we’ve got that Powernet local 66 KV 
network, the North Makarewa [to] Headon Bush, it comes up through here… 
It certainly is [important] having close transmission…  You have your losses, 
and the further you are away from transmission to get it into the network, the 
higher the cost (Interview 26, 21/11/2006). 
 
As well as the implications of the grid network for the location of windfarms, there 
are issues of capacity in the larger system.  In the case of White Hill, this was a 
constraint on the scale of the development.  The project manager admitted that, 
although the site could accommodate more turbines, without increased capacity in the 
transmission link future expansion was unrealistic:  ‘We’re limited by the 66 KV 
network, we can only get 58 MW into that system.  Unless that system was upgraded 
[the number of turbines at White Hill] is restricted’ (Interview 26, 21/11/2006). 
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The constraints of path dependence on large commercial windfarms are primarily 
technical.  However for alternative wind energy applications such as distributed 
generation, the obstacles inherent in the existing system are more profound.  The idea 
of reconfiguring New Zealand’s centralised linear grid network to a distributed local 
application of small-scale wind generation technologies is very much at the radical, 
disruptive end of the spectrum of technological innovation (Gooley & Towers 1996; 
Christensen 1997).155  The logistics and costs that would be involved in shifting to 
such a different mode of delivering electricity are a major disincentive.  The systemic 
changes that would be required to accommodate a fundamentally different 
decentralised generation system would be far-reaching and hugely expensive, 
requiring rebuilding not only the electricity generation and transmission infrastructure 
for the whole nation, but also restructuring communities, industry, businesses and 
economic systems around new modes of energy delivery.  The extent of the paradigm 
shift posed by a locally-focused dispersed system was acknowledged by the PCE’s 
energy-sector advisor: 
The only [truly sustainable] solution is one where we actually radically 
redesign our society from virtually the ground up, where we say basically 
everything we’ve been doing for the last hundred years, well that has to go…  
and that means that our cities are the wrong design, our businesses are the 
wrong design (Interview 10, 16/8/2006). 
 
Senior policy managers for the energy sector at the Ministry of Economic 
Development described the challenges of changing from the present established grid-
based network to a dispersed generation model: 
All the networks have been designed to take power from one place and have it 
flow in one direction, and one direction only, and the prospect of it flowing in 
the other direction and at different times and going all over the place…  It 
means you have to rethink the whole design of your network to a large extent, 
and develop new technologies, new control systems.  Who wants to pay for 
that? (Interviews 19 and 60, 7/12/2006). 
 
The pragmatic requirements of integrating new technologies with existing energy 
infrastructure, system configurations and operational constraints have inevitably 
constrained the ways wind technologies have been adopted in New Zealand.  Wind 
energy has not been introduced onto a tabula rasa, but into a long-established field 
                                                 
155 The differences between incremental and radical or disruptive technoscientific changes are 
discussed in Chapter Three. 
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with deep inertia and extensive sunk investments, and perhaps even more importantly, 
with solidly-entrenched norms, assumptions and values frameworks limiting the 
openness of actors and institutions to new options. 
 
The inertia of past and present technological modes is also significant for the strategic 
performative work of projections of benefit from innovations such as wind energy.  
The status quo system narrows the applications in which new technologies can be 
considered acceptable and integrated into ongoing practice, but also asserts a demand 
for the new technology to offer significant benefits or advantages over existing 
arrangements – a strong enough ‘inducement’ for change (Jacobsson & Johnson 2000, 
p 638).  In New Zealand, the satisfactory delivery of electricity via existing systems is 
taken for granted.156  Technological innovation, such as the adoption of wind energy, 
has been justified by its delivering additional benefits answering new frameworks of 
value and need that cannot be satisfied with conventional technologies.  The strategic 
importance of the looming catastrophe of global climate change, for the acceptance 
and introduction of wind energy, is discussed further in Chapter Seven. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the evolution of wind energy technology in New Zealand, 
looking at the framings of expected future benefit that have been advanced in support 
of this innovation.  A broad diversity of claimed benefits have played their parts in the 
legitimation and diffusion of different applications of wind energy – environmental 
sustainability, commercial competitiveness, advantageous market positioning, 
fulfilling New Zealand’s international commitments, and community independence.  
Each of these registers of benefit appeals in different ways to different societal groups 
– corporate executives, policy-makers, people building their dream home on a remote 
coastal site, entrepreneur-engineers, green lifestylers – each with different levels of 
influence in terms of sector power relations. 
 
                                                 
156 Shortages, such as the constraints imposed by dry summers lowering water levels in the Southern 
hydro lakes, and outages, such as the 2006 Auckland blackouts due to a substation fault, are rare 
occurrences but provoke major outrage (for example, Canterbury Manufacturers' Association 2006). 
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A symbiosis between green ideals and the pragmatic demands of technical and 
commercial commodity-production systems has been supported by the discourses and 
benefit projections associated with particular applications of wind energy technology.  
The direction taken by wind generation systems in New Zealand shows the 
importance – for the introduction and establishment of a new technology – of strategic 
positioning that aligns with the requirements and assumptions of dominant political 
and sectoral groups.  The form of wind energy that has found most acceptance and 
become most common in New Zealand is the large corporate-controlled windfarm 
feeding the national grid.  This mode of the technology has achieved legitimacy 
because of a conjunction of factors – technical advancements in turbine design, 
commercial and governance structures in the energy sector, and supportive policy 
frameworks.  Environmental values are convertible into political and economic 
advantage, and this mode of the technology offers benefits that satisfy the 
expectations of powerful sector interests. 
 
Other configurations of wind energy technologies, associated with projected benefits 
of little value or credibility within the dominant paradigm, remain on the margins with 
poor prospects of wider diffusion.  The stories of wind energy’s divergent trajectories 
in New Zealand – the success of “Big Wind” and the relegation of distributed small-
scale generation to “fringe” applications – illustrate the crucial importance of framing 
expected benefits from technological innovation that are compatible with mainstream 
value systems. 
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Chapter Six 
A brave new world157 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the work of projections of anticipated benefit in securing 
commitment and resourcing for R&D in genetic modification in New Zealand.  
Support for GM in this country has inevitably been strongly shaped by global 
framings of this technoscience field and its opportunities and challenges.  The chapter 
surveys the international evolution of GM since the 1970s, tracing the prominence of 
ideals of commercial profit and competitiveness as drivers for investment.  New 
Zealand GM research has largely followed this orientation, being promoted as crucial 
to economic growth and the viability of primary production sectors. 
 
The governance arrangements for GM R&D in New Zealand include requirements 
that such technoscientific innovation activity also delivers public-good benefits for the 
nation.158  The formal regulatory processes under the Hazardous Substances and New 
Organisms Act 1996, while focused largely on issues of risk, also require the expected 
benefits of the work to be taken into account and comprehensively assessed (s6(e), 
HSNO Act;  Environmental Risk Management Authority 1998a).  And the legislation 
establishing the Crown Research Institutes, the agencies conducting the majority of 
New Zealand’s GM work, imposes the obligation that ‘research… should be 
undertaken for the benefit of New Zealand’ (s5(1)(a), Crown Research Institutes Act 
1992).  However, the stories of the various projects discussed in this chapter suggest 
                                                 
157 With apologies to William Shakespeare and Aldous Huxley. 
158 These New Zealand statutes have some similarity to the provisions of the Norwegian Gene 
Technology Act 1993 (ss 1 & 10), which requires that GM organism releases in Norway must satisfy 
criteria of environmental sustainability and ‘benefit to society’ (Myhr & Traavik 2003, pp 319, 327; 
Danish Council of Ethics 2007, pp 47-49; Norwegian Directorate for Nature Management 2011).  The 
practical application of these requirements has been debated, with concerns from biotech industry 
actors that the concept of ‘social utility’ is ‘imprecise and thus non-operational’ (Danish Council of 
Ethics 2007, p 48);  policy analysis considers that evaluations of societal benefits from GM would 
inevitably be subjective and dependent on the values frameworks and interests of different social 
groups (Danish Council of Ethics 2007, pp 55-70, 110).  Another similar focus on social benefit from 
biotech R&D was the recommendation of the UK Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research 
Council’s review of crop science (2004, pp 6, 18, 35-36) for an initiative to promote ‘public-good’ 
plant breeding focused on crops and traits not being developed by commercial interests;  this was 
supported with funding of £15 million in 2009 (Wynne 2012b, p 6). 
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that generic abstracted narratives of economic progress and commercial profitability 
have been the most powerfully influential frameworks of expectation validating GM 
developments in New Zealand. 
 
All GM work in this country to date has been confined to lab research and contained 
field trials;  no GM products or applications derived from New Zealand research have 
yet been released into markets or the environment.159  The outcomes projected from 
GM technoscience for New Zealand are therefore of a different order to the actual 
benefits delivered by wind technology in the form of electricity, revenues and carbon 
credits associated with climate change mitigation.  The principal outputs of GM 
research in New Zealand thus far have been scientific knowledge, proof of concept for 
proposed biotech objectives, and optimistic claims about intended downstream 
developments.  The main strategic benefits have been the ongoing funding, prestige 
and symbolic capital accruing to research institutions and scientists.160 
 
The advancement of GM technoscience in New Zealand has another point of 
difference from the story of wind energy in this country, where a dominant mode of 
that technology, offering a particular suite of benefits, is now well-established.  The 
corporate-owned industrial-scale windfarm is an application of wind technology that 
aligns with the value frameworks and requirements of powerful sector groups.  But 
GM research in New Zealand has been focused around a diverse range of possible 
forms and uses, appealing to heterogeneous interests and advancing a diverse range of 
intended benefits and improvements.  Work has been conducted on vegetable crops 
modified for resistance to herbicides, pests and diseases, or for enhanced processing 
and storage characteristics, flavour and appearance.  Major projects have developed 
livestock modified for the production of pharmaceutical proteins and for milk and 
meat with new characteristics.  Other research has focused on exotic forestry species 
modified for faster growth, and forage plants modified for increased nutrient value 
                                                 
159 Possible exceptions (depending on the definition of “GM product”) are relatively uncontroversial 
non-GM products derived from the processing of GM substances, notably insulin for treating diabetes 
(Royal Commission on Genetic Modification 2001a, p 243).  Rolleston (2005) describes purchasing 
imported cans of chili beans containing GM corn and maize meal from a Woolworths supermarket in 
Canterbury, arguing that with such (labeled) products approved under New Zealand’s food safety 
regulations, the concept of New Zealand being “GM-free” is purely rhetorical. 
160 The distinctions between exogenous benefits – serving a need or delivering an improvement for 
external sectors or actors – and endogenous benefits advantaging the technoscience community itself, 
are discussed in Chapter Seven. 
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and reduced methane emissions from livestock.  No particular application or mode of 
GM technoscience is clearly dominant in the range of research activity in New 
Zealand. 
 
Nevertheless, running consistently through the promotion of GM is the narrative of 
the importance of this technology as an essential component of New Zealand’s 
economic growth and prosperity.  Although only in the research stages in this country, 
GM is legitimated through its rhetorical and political construction as a necessary 
enabling technology for New Zealand’s competitiveness in global marketplaces, via 
development of lucrative new exports and efficiencies in existing production systems.  
Belief in the need for New Zealand to maintain active involvement in GM and 
biotechnology – the Red Queen imperative – runs strongly through policy and sector 
discourse, and this chapter outlines the influence of these patterns on support for and 
regulation of research. 
 
The potential development of GM biocontrols for possums is a uniquely New Zealand 
application of this technoscience.  The biocontrols research was primarily driven by 
ideals of protecting New Zealand’s indigenous biodiversity and forest landscapes 
from this pervasive Australian pest.  These environmental priorities were qualitatively 
different from the goals of agricultural and biopharmaceutical GM R&D, although 
intended environmental benefits also featured in the promotion of some research on 
GM crops.  This chapter examines the frameworks of value and intended benefit 
shaping a diverse range of GM projects in New Zealand and motivating the scientists 
involved.  These constructs of expectation show the persistence of powerful narratives 
of disinterested societal benefit, intertwined with more pragmatic commercial 
purposes in an increasingly economics-dominated technoscience sector. 
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Bigger than physics161 
GM technoscience originated in the early 1970s with the creation of the first 
recombinant-DNA organisms and, simultaneously, of a new entrepreneurial, 
unashamedly commercial paradigm for biology (Watson 2003, pp 108-114; Jasanoff 
2005b, pp 188-189; Sunder Rajan 2006, pp 4-10).  From its beginnings, this elite field 
oriented itself around the ‘economics of technoscientific promise’ as a proudly 
‘promethean’ technology (European Commission 2007, p 24; Salleh 2008, p 233; 
Dryzek et al. 2009, pp 266-267).  Analyses of the dynamics of science and technology 
developments discussed in Chapters Two and Three (for example, Latour 1996; 
Sarewitz 1996; Christensen 1997; Greenberg 2001; Rogers 2003; Bourdieu 2004) 
highlight the dominance of economic, institutional and political interests in the 
evolution of innovation fields.  The practices and priorities of global GM are 
inextricably aligned with and shaped by the expectations of powerful groups 
(Kleinman & Kinchy 2007, pp 197-198; Hindmarsh 2008, pp 10-12, 35).162  The 
science, knowledge and manipulation of genetic materials are framed as sources of 
unprecedented opportunities – promising commercial returns to developers, investors 
and industries, prestige and funding for scientific institutions and researchers, and 
economic expansion and international competitiveness for governments and 
multinational corporations (Hacking 1986, pp 10-11; Gottweis 1998, Chapter 4; Van 
Dijck 1998, Chapter 4).163 
 
Advocacy for this technology claims a range of projected benefits for agricultural 
production, health and nutrition, and environmental management, but expectations of 
financial profit are a dominant theme of GM development:  ‘At no time in history has 
a field of basic science been so quickly commercialised’ (Krimsky 2008, p xvi).  The 
close inter-relationship of biotechnology with entrepreneurial business interests is a 
                                                 
161 This ambitious comparison positions biological technoscience relative to the supremely prestigious 
science field of the 20th century (Dyson 2007, p 1).  Dyson asserts that biotechnology now exceeds 
physics in terms of budgets, workforces, economic consequences, and effects on human welfare. 
162 Analysing governance challenges in global biotechnology, Forbes (2006, pp 78-81) argues that the 
industry advances a new ‘imperialism’.  And Jasanoff (2005b, p 186) critiques GM biopolitics and the 
assumptions of global interests: ‘the modernist, science-promoted vision of progress:  one that begins 
with invention in the labs of wealthy Western nations and then is disseminated by multinational 
corporations, through mechanisms such as high-input industrial agriculture, to the rest of the waiting 
world’. 
163 This has been dependent upon the establishment of new regimes of intellectual property rights and 
private ownership of genetic resources (Rifkin 1998, Chapter Two). 
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distinctive characteristic of this sector relative to other science fields (Pisano 2006, pp 
ix, xii-xiii, 1-4).164  This is based in GM’s promise of knowledge, products, 
substances and living entities with unprecedented earning potential (Hacking 1986, pp 
9-10; Gaisford et al. 2001, p 6; Sunder Rajan 2003, pp 91-92, 96; Watson 2003, pp 
109-110, 122-123; Senker & Chataway 2009, p 184).  The extraordinary revenues 
earned, even as biotechnology companies were first launched, ensured a strong 
commercial orientation (Rifkin 1998, pp 15, 68-70; Lyons et al. 2004, p 96; Glover 
2008, p 11; Hindmarsh 2008, pp 4, 38).  Watson (2003, pp 114, 117) sums up the 
incentives shaping the field: 
Biology was now a big-money game, and with the money came a whole new 
mind-set… [an] evolution from a purely academic mind-set to one adapted to 
the age of big-bucks biology. 
 
Underpinning the development and application of GM are a range of narratives, 
discursive patterns, and positioning strategies (Gottweis 1998, pp 154-155; Sunder 
Rajan 2003, p 110; Kitzinger et al. 2007, pp 204-207; Kleinman & Kinchy 2007, p 
197; McNally & Glasner 2007, p 273).  An obvious pattern is the regular reliance, in 
rhetorical and political construction of GM, on generic affirmations of beneficence.  
Such confidently optimistic assertions are often vague, sweeping statements with little 
detail or evidentiary substance;  nevertheless, they have considerable strategic force 
(Forbes 2006, p 80; Pisano 2006, pp xi, 129; Davies 2007, pp 221-222; Levidow & 
Carr 2007, p 410; Vanloqueren & Baret 2009, p 981).  Van Lente (1993, pp 150-152) 
highlights the advantageous flexibility of such loose discursive constructs in the 
promotion of new technologies.  Leitch and Davenport (2007, pp 44, 59) analyse the 
strategic use of ambiguity to assert apparent consensus around particular policy or 
organisational value frameworks.  GM is constructed as the means to a broadly 
idealistic future, described by Hindmarsh (2008, p 4) as ‘persuasive bioutopian 
narratives or visions of a genetically engineered cornucopia’.  Such discourse, shaped 
by glowing scenarios of a new “Golden Age”, encompasses a comprehensive 
diversity of human and societal needs and desires (Dyson 2007, pp 6-7). 
 
                                                 
164 The hegemonic acceptance of this commodification of science is however not unchallenged (for 
example, Hindmarsh 2000; Goven 2006; Kitzinger et al. 2007; Kleinman & Kinchy 2007; Dryzek et al. 
2009; Herring 2010).  Sunder Rajan (2003, p 97; 2006, pp 4, 117) highlights the ways that the 
corporatisation of biotechnology is contested, ‘frictioned’ and capable of ‘denaturalisation’. 
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The suite of inter-related narratives typical in the promotion of GM technoscience 
includes claims of the power to transform nature in ways previously impossible 
(Danish Council of Ethics 2007, p 21);  as Sunder Rajan (2006, p 114) suggests, ‘the 
magic of [biotechnology] is… the magic of being able to pull rabbits out of hats’.165  
The metaphor of a ‘biotechnology revolution’ assumes a process of dramatic change 
as new knowledge and powers overwhelm existing technologies, practices and ideas 
(Rifkin 1998, pp 1-8; Hindmarsh 2000, pp 541, 544; Nightingale & Martin 2004, pp 
564, 567; Pisano 2006, pp 4, 21-22; Hopkins et al. 2007, pp 566-567).166  Such 
conceptualisations of GM serve to foster perceptions of the field as exceptional, 
dynamic, and thus worthy of investment and political support (Nightingale & Martin 
2004, p 568). 
 
Closely linked with the bio-revolution narratives are confident constructions of GM as 
offering extraordinary power over nature, enabling technoscience to triumph over the 
limitations of ordinary reality and remake the world (Krimsky 2008, p xviii).  
Hindmarsh (2008, p 21) summarises the appeal of these grand claims: 
Life is redesigned and also re-created according to human notions of order, 
hopes and aspirations, ideologies, and images for sale, of perfection and 
control over nature...  The portrayed BioUtopia is free from disease, hunger, 
resource scarcity and ecological degradation. 
 
The origins of these concepts of human mastery over nature are traced back to the 
scientific ideals and methods of Francis Bacon (Rifkin 1998, p 170; Hindmarsh 2008, 
pp 24-26), and earlier still to the work of medieval alchemists (Rifkin 1998, pp 32-35; 
Hindmarsh & Lawrence 2004b, p 29; Kirkham 2008).  Improving upon the world’s 
imperfections is presented in GM discourse as satisfying the ultimate goal of scientific 
endeavour:  ‘The Biotech Century promises to complete the modernists’ journey by 
“perfecting” both human nature and the rest of nature, all in the name of progress’ 
                                                 
165 The sexiness of GM as an elite “cutting-edge” field that will recreate ordinary realities has more 
recently been overtaken by nanotechnology, about which many of the same issues apply, including 
unknowns and risks, public engagement, and a lack of scrutiny of promotional hype (Sarewitz & 
Woodhouse 2003; Wilsdon & Willis 2004; Macnaghten et al. 2005; Kearnes et al. 2006). 
166 However a counter-narrative – of GM as merely an evolution or continuation of long-familiar 
interventions in the natural order – positions this technoscience as no more controversial than brewing, 
baking or farmers’ selection of the most productive crop varieties (Conner & Jacobs 1996, pp 223-224; 
Conner 1997; Hedgecoe & Martin 2008, p 820).  This more reassuring framing of GM developed in 
response to public unease about the risks of the new technology, and the industry’s desire ‘to better 
align society culturally to the biotechnology text…  [and] to close the controversy over the nature of 
genetic engineering as “a reductionist transgression of nature”’ (Hindmarsh 1994, p 187). 
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(Rifkin 1998, p 171).  Gottweis (1998, pp 156-157) identifies a ‘discourse of 
deficiency’ corresponding to this framing of GM;  natural unmodified reality is 
conceptualised ‘in terms of “absences” and of “areas of improvement” in need of the 
intervention of genetic technologies’. 
 
Assertions of broad-ranging confidence in GM technoscience as the solution to 
problems – in farming and food production, health and medicine, and environmental 
management – are a common pattern in the discourse (Rifkin 1998, pp 15-23; Lyons 
et al. 2004, p 103; Birch 2006a, pp 173-175).  Presenting GM as the answer to 
otherwise intractable difficulties, this positioning illustrates the strategic co-
construction of problem and solution, linking the imperative and the innovation in a 
performative symbiosis.167  The concept of ‘salvation’ encapsulates a sense of 
technological innovation as miraculous rescue (Sunder Rajan 2006, p 35, Chapter 5; 
Davies 2007, p 221; Birch 2007a, p 94; Senker & Chataway 2009, p 171).  Jasanoff 
(2005b, pp 187-190) analyses themes of ‘crisis’ and corresponding ‘salvation’ in the 
discourse around Golden Rice.168  The (in)famous claim that GM will solve food 
shortages in the Third World demonstrates this rationalisation (Froggatt & Rankine 
1999, p 465; Hindmarsh 2000, p 543; Gaisford et al. 2001, p 26; Hunt et al. 2003, p 
20; Carter 2007; Glover 2008, pp 20-21; Hindmarsh 2008, p 48).  Despite sustained 
challenges, this claim remains ‘pervasive’ in industry promotions (Brooks 2005, pp 
360, 367, 373);  according to a Monsanto advertisement:  ‘Worrying about starving 
future generations won’t feed them.  Food biotechnology will’ (quoted in Senker & 
Chataway 2009, p 175). 
 
In their sweeping confidence in the capacities of GM to solve problems and satisfy 
human requirements and desires, these narratives provide a seductive resource for the 
advancement of this field and for its proponents to secure the funding and political 
and social support needed for R&D (Evans et al. 2009, pp 46-47, 53).  The ambitious 
visions and imaginaries that have been spun around the potentials of GM from its 
inception are in themselves a valuable asset for the field.  Sunder Rajan (2006, p 34) 
                                                 
167 The significance of such associations is explored in Chapter Seven. 
168 Golden Rice is genetically modified to produce beta-carotene, which converts to vitamin A in the 
body.  It is claimed to help solve the problem of blindness due to widespread vitamin deficiency in the 
developing world (Jasanoff 2005b, pp 183-184; Yonekura-Sakakibara & Saito 2006; Senker & 
Chataway 2009, p 183). 
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analyses ‘the conjuration of corporate promissory futures as… a game that is 
constantly played in the future in order to generate the present that enables that 
future’.  These constructs are a benefit for GM, as well as ostensibly describing the 
benefits that will flow from GM.  They are both normative and performative;  they 
create momentum and establish hegemonic acceptance in science research, industry, 
political and public domains.  Their context is the narrative discussed in Chapter Two 
of technoscience as the irresistible driver of progress, an enduring myth that presumes 
the desirability and effectiveness of innovations (Bingham 2008, pp 112-113). 
 
The promise of GM is often framed in terms of the evolution of this technoscience 
over time.169  The predominant “first-generation” GM applications are a narrow range 
of bulk-commodity crops modified for herbicide- and pest-resistance (Pimentel et al. 
1989, p 606; Boulter et al. 1990; Paoletti & Pimentel 1996, pp 666-667; Duke & 
Powles 2008; Vergragt & Brown 2008, pp 784-785).170  These are acknowledged as 
offering agronomic benefits primarily to large-scale growers and the companies 
holding patents (Gamble et al. 2000, pp 13, 19, 21; Gaisford et al. 2001, pp 9-11; 
Brooks 2005, p 367; Glover 2008, p 26; Herring 2008, p 459).171  As Senker and 
Chataway (2009, pp 172-173) explain: 
Early applications of biotechnology were designed to appeal to farmers rather 
than consumers.  The lack of demonstrable advantages for consumers 
contributed to the difficulties of marketing the technology in Europe… The 
public wanted to see some benefits to society, not just increased profits for 
[multinational corporations]. 
 
                                                 
169 The metaphor of “generations” encourages a concept of the technology as a natural, organically 
sequential process rather than a strategic political and commercial construct. 
170 Herbicide-resistant crops are the most prevalent application of this technology, comprising 75% of 
GM crops worldwide in 2002 (Birch 2007a, p 106);  a review five years later reported that 71% of 
global GM crops were modified for herbicide resistance, 18% for insect resistance, and 11% for both 
herbicide and insect resistance (Danish Council of Ethics 2007, p 23).  A commercial review of GM 
crops from 1996-2004 estimated returns of US$27 billion, with 60% of soybean, corn and canola 
farmers in the US planting GM crops (Rolleston 2006).  The “big four” commodity species – herbicide- 
and pest-resistant soy, canola, maize and cotton – now comprise 99% of global acreage of GM crops 
(Howard 2012, p 4). 
171 GM’s orientation around applications which benefit the interests and profits of corporate-controlled 
agriculture has been criticised as part of a wider dynamic of economic dominance over nature, food 
production and traditional rural relationships with the environment (Rifkin 1998, pp 82-90; Danish 
Council of Ethics 2007, pp 33-35; Senker & Chataway 2009, pp 173-176).  As Tudge (2000, pp 306-
307) observes, these crops: ‘reinforce a system of agriculture that is increasingly monocultural… 
reducing the farmers to subcontractors and focusing profits in fewer and fewer hands…  part of a broad 
strategy to make agriculture even more industrial and to bring it ever more under the control of big 
business’.  And Wynne (2012b, p 10) argues that ‘weed-resistance to herbicides like glyphosate [was] 
designed into GM for market-share and patent-extension, ie concentrated commercial control’. 
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These applications of GM are distinguished in sector discourse from projected 
“second-generation” products which are intended to deliver direct benefits for 
consumers and publics.  The products intended from “second generation” GM include 
foods with improved taste or nutritional content;  medicines, chemicals or energy 
derived from GM crops and animals;  and crops capable of surviving harsh conditions 
via drought or salt resistance (Wolfenbarger & Phifer ; Wall et al. 1997; Gaisford et 
al. 2001, pp 5, 11-13; Loureiro & Bugbee 2005; Yonekura-Sakakibara & Saito 2006; 
Dyson 2007, pp 6-7; Blasco 2008, pp 195-199; Herring 2008, pp 458, 462; Ortiz 
2008; Colson et al. 2011).  Public opinion surveys show consistently that GM is more 
acceptable for medical purposes than food production (Hunt et al. 2003, pp 19, 122; 
Cook et al. 2004, pp xiii, 66; Ministry of Research Science and Technology 2005c, p 
14; Kaye-Blake et al. 2007, pp 17-18; Herring 2008, pp 458, 460; 2010, p 620).172 
 
The actual delivery of the promised “cornucopia” of benefits from GM has, however, 
been strongly challenged.  The extravagant rhetoric is found to be unrelated to 
significant change or innovations, or to the projected financial returns: 
[T]he empirical evidence does not support the existence of a biotech 
revolution.  Nor does the data support the widely held expectation that 
biotechnology is having a revolutionary impact on healthcare or economic 
development (Hopkins et al. 2007, p 566). 
 
Studies of the performance of the biotechnology industry find a major disjunction 
between the grand claims and expectations, and disappointing realities (Hacking 
1986, p 8; Froggatt & Rankine 1999, p 464; Pisano 2006, pp x-xi, 5-6, 116-118, 184-
185; McNally & Glasner 2007, pp 263-264, 271; Birch 2007a, pp 94, 107; Howard 
2012, pp 13, 20).  Low actual success rates are attributed to the complexities and 
uncertainties inherent in research, the lengthy timeframes for development, 
production and marketing of innovations, and the impositions of regulatory processes 
(Tudge 2000, p 238; Rasnick 2003, p 355; Nightingale & Martin 2004, p 568; 
Howard 2012, pp 1-4, 7).  In agricultural biotechnology, the differences between the 
                                                 
172 The importance of urgent drivers for acceptance of technoscientific innovation is discussed in 
Chapter Seven.  Reasons for the higher acceptability of medical applications of GM would include the 
logic that a disease or debilitating condition establishes a strong imperative to seek and achieve relief.  
People with illness and pain have a greater need for solutions, or even for alleviation.  The international 
biotech industry is strongly focused on developing new pharmaceuticals, diagnostics and foods for 
disease prevention (Hedgecoe & Martin 2003; Goven et al. 2008, pp 11-15; Hedgecoe & Martin 2008, 
pp 823-826). 
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benefits projected by GM developers and the areas of actual achievement have raised 
sceptical concern (Brooks 2005, p 367; Glover 2008, pp 2-6, 33).  Senker and 
Chataway (2009, pp 172-3) identify the gap between rhetoric and reality as a key 
factor in public opposition to GM crops: 
The mythology about the revolutionary potential of the technology for feeding 
the world did not match the reality of products which seemed to extend rather 
than transform the chemical inputs era of agriculture. 
 
However, the actual delivery of beneficial, marketable, effective products is only part 
of GM’s commercial appeal.  Sunder Rajan (2003, pp 110, 114) explains the ‘market 
logic’ of biotechnology in terms of the symbolic capital underpinning the industry and 
research communities.  Two inter-related frameworks of value are identified:  
commodity capital, determined by the value of products;  and commercial or 
speculative capital, which recognises value in economic activity and institutions 
regardless of actual outputs (Sunder Rajan 2006, pp 8-10, 14, 111-112).  This second 
dimension of the economic framing of GM technoscience affirms an importance in 
maintaining R&D activity in its own right – a strong dynamic in the New Zealand 
biotech sector.  Development is driven by: 
… not just the production and exchange of commodities… [but] commercial 
activity as an end in itself…  providing it with its own self-perpetuating, self-
sustaining logic…  forms of valuation having not to do with tangible material 
indicators of successful productivity, but with intangible abstractions (2006, 
pp 8-9, 18). 
 
The concepts of societal benefit and avowals of good intentions that are deployed in 
the advancement of GM may be at some remove from actual outcomes and practice of 
the biotechnology industry.  But optimistic framings of GM – as solution, as alchemy, 
as provider of abundance, and as economic bonanza – continue because they serve 
useful services for the field.  These constructs are vital symbolic capital for securing 
the prestige, resourcing and support necessary for continuing research activity.  Such 
idealised projections of benefit and beneficence have been profoundly influential in 
GM’s promotion in New Zealand’s policy and science arenas, establishing significant 
advantages for the field in terms of political and financial backing, regulatory 
facilitation and institutional commitment. 
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“Big-bucks biology” in New Zealand173 
Most New Zealand research in GM, and initiatives in the wider field of 
biotechnology, are politically and discursively framed within a narrative of economic 
growth and competitiveness – the “Golden Goose” myth of technoscientific 
innovation as the key to profits and prosperity, discussed in Chapter Two.174  This 
framing of the opportunities of GM both reflects and contributes to a broader (and 
ongoing) pattern of policy evolution over the years covered by this thesis, where New 
Zealand’s science and innovation systems have been consistently oriented towards 
economic objectives (Cartner & Bollinger 1997, pp 776, 783-784, 788).175  Leitch and 
Davenport (2005, pp 891-893, 896-902) describe the ‘marketization’ of New Zealand 
R&D through a series of purposeful policy shifts, institutional restructuring, and 
discursive strategies.  Successive governments, seeking to create a competitive 
‘knowledge economy’ based in the lucrative potentials of technoscientific innovation, 
have emphasised goals of wealth creation and transformation of New Zealand’s 
economy.  Goven (2006, pp 567, 582) argues that New Zealand science has been 
‘reshaped by the increasing importance of commercial actors and goals’ as research 
priorities focus on ‘imperatives of commercialization and commodification’.  New 
Zealand’s science funding systems, with criteria for research grants based on potential 
marketability of the work, reflect and contribute to such marketization trends – as 
does the statutory requirement that the CRIs operate as commercial entities.176 
                                                 
173 A description of the biotechnology industry from James Watson, one of the scientists responsible for 
the “discovery” of DNA and the development of genetic science (2003, p 117). 
174 The relationships between GM and biotechnology – as discursive terms, as fields, and as technical 
approaches – are complex and often strongly political.  The elision of GM and wider biotechnology is a 
common pattern in policy and sector discourse in New Zealand.  This can be a result of GM being 
consciously positioned as merely one aspect of the ostensibly less risky, more conventional domain of 
biotechnology.  As emphasised in some sector interviews for this thesis, specific GM research work is 
less likely to attract public controversy and opposition when it has a lower profile under the broad 
umbrella term “biotechnology” (Interview 51, 24/7/2006; Interview 54, 9/5/2006).  This term, and the 
still wider framings of “innovation” and “science”, are often used in sector and political rhetorics as 
generic symbols of modernity.  However this blurring of terminology and categories can cause 
confusion, and render relatively opaque the actual extent of GM R&D being undertaken. 
175 The 2011 creation of the Ministry of Science and Innovation, and ongoing shifts in policy, continue 
this focusing process.  In March 2010 the Hon Wayne Mapp, Minister of Research, Science and 
Technology addressed the annual NZBio conference:  ‘Science and innovation are one of the six main 
policy planks that will be at the heart of lifting New Zealand’s economic performance…  Our future 
growth depend[s] to a large extent on generating and using new ideas’ 
(http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/2010+year+science+speech+nz+bio+conference). 
176 Through the time covered in this thesis, most R&D was resourced through the competitive bidding 
systems of the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology (FRST).  Its requirements included a 
strong emphasis on the ‘path to market’ and the endorsement of ‘end users’ of the research (Interviews 
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Confidence in technoscience as the driver of economic rejuvenation – and in 
economic growth from science and innovation ensuring societal wellbeing and other 
qualitative outcomes – runs strongly through the policy and sectoral discourse, 
reflecting the basis of such positions in the ideology of dominant political and 
business groups (Cartner & Bollinger 1997, pp 788, 798; Kelsey 1997, p 11; Goven 
2006, pp 574-576, 585).177  The assertion of benefits is often sweepingly broad, 
reiterating taken-for-granted assumptions.  To give just two examples of the typical 
generalisation:  a 1996 Strategic Overview for the science sector (New Zealand 
Government, pp 2-3) develops from wide claims reminiscent of Vannevar Bush: 
[E]nhancement of New Zealand’s future quality of life will be increasingly 
reliant on scientific knowledge and technological know-how…  [research, 
science and technology] are important to the achievement of prosperity and 
well being for all New Zealand. 
 
And more recently, a ‘summit report’ of opportunities in the ‘bioeconomy industry’ 
opens with a quote from Prime Minister John Key: 
It’s my view that we need to put science at the heart of this National-led 
Government.  If we don’t do that we are simply not going to get the economic 
gains that New Zealand needs and we won’t have the standard of living that 
we deserve.  And it’s not a lot more complicated than that (NZBio 2009, p iii). 
 
Some policy does acknowledge non-monetary aims and outcomes alongside the 
economic focus.  The Strategic Overview recognises science’s contributions to social 
and environmental goals, as well as economic advancement and benefits to industry 
(New Zealand Government 1996, pp 3, 6, 10).  A range of goals are acknowledged in 
a formal clarification of the statutory requirements that publicly funded research must 
                                                 
7 and 47).  The Crown Research Institutes Act 1992 (ss5(2)&(3)) require CRIs to maintain financial 
viability and generate an adequate rate of return for shareholders. 
177 This orientation of New Zealand’s science and technology systems has been contested and resisted 
by many within research and policy communities (Hunt 2003; Leitch & Davenport 2005, pp 904-905).  
Some economic research has specifically contradicted the typically optimistic claims for the economic 
outcomes of technoscience development.  Nevertheless the ‘deep ideological divisions’ within New 
Zealand R&D domains are not reflected in the enthusiastic confidence of the policy documents 
predicated upon the primacy of economic objectives (Leitch & Davenport 2007, pp 43-45, 57).  
Analysis of the increasingly instrumental framing and positioning of R&D notes that although 
questions have been raised in policy debate that challenge such assumptions, these remain unresolved 
and are ‘largely masked or rendered marginal’ in sector discourse, with little impact on the momentum 
of the prevailing mainstream narratives (Cartner & Bollinger 1997, pp 776-777, 789, 796).  Macdonald 
et al (2011, pp 9, 12, 21) assess dialogue initiatives around social concerns about biotechnology and 
their failure to influence policy and industry developments driven by an ‘ideology of marketization and 
commodification’. 
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be ‘for the benefit of New Zealand’.178  This identifies (undefined and generically 
vague) benefits to society and the environment alongside income generation, 
competitiveness, high value exports and increased innovation capacity (Ministry of 
Research Science and Technology 2005a, pp 3-5).  Other policy, however, focuses 
more narrowly on economic value frameworks.  Support for R&D and innovation is 
consistently promoted as essential to rejuvenate the New Zealand economy by 
delivering rapid growth, developing new products and sectors, and revitalising 
existing sectors (for example, Ministry of Research Science and Technology 2000, 
2001; OECD 2007).179 
 
The place of GM and biotechnology in this larger mission was made specific with a 
series of political and policy initiatives through the late 1990s and early 2000s.  The 
report of the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification (2001a, p 3) based its 
conclusions in the perceived importance of GM for New Zealand: 
Technology is integral to the advancement of the world… the human race has 
ever been on the cusp of innovation.  Currently, biotechnology is the new 
frontier.  Continuation of research is critical to New Zealand’s future. 
 
The RCGM considered a spectrum of claims, advanced in the submissions of 
interested parties, of expected benefit from development and use of GM.  These 
ranged widely across agronomic, health and medical, and environmental benefits 
(Royal Commission on Genetic Modification 2001c, pp 49-61, 151-153, 230-236).  
Underpinning most of these projections, and running strongly through the 
Commission’s conclusions, was a driving sense of the commercial returns and 
competitive advantages predicted to flow from GM (2001a, pp 42, 76-80, 108-109, 
139-142; 2001c, pp 55, 257-260).  The Commission highlighted the importance of ‘a 
robust economy’ for the achievement of community wellbeing:  ‘Economic and social 
goals are not mutually exclusive.  They are, in fact, symbiotic’ (2001a, p 12).180 
                                                 
178 The Crown Research Institutes Act 1992 establishes general purposes and principles of operation for 
the CRIs, but does not include definitions or explanations of key terms.  For example, s5(1)(a) merely 
requires that ‘research… should be undertaken for the benefit of New Zealand’;  subsequent sections 
establish more specific criteria for CRIs’ commercial performance (as outlined in Footnote 174 above). 
179 The OECD review of New Zealand’s innovation systems urged that the over-riding objective for 
innovation policy should be to foster ‘market-pulled innovation’, and insisted that knowledge must 
‘contribute effectively to increasing value added in resource-based sectors’ (OECD 2007, p 15). 
180
 This elision of commercial and societal dimensions was explained as characteristic of the 
worldviews expressed in submissions to the RCGM: ‘Most submitters saw New Zealand’s overall 
wellbeing as being dependent on its ability to sustain a competitive and innovative knowledge-based 
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A series of policies through the first decade of the 21st century reiterated and 
reinforced the narrative that GM and biotechnology are essential for New Zealand to 
generate the economic benefits that would in turn ensure other kinds of qualitative 
societal benefits.  The influential Growth and Innovation Framework (New Zealand 
Government 2002, p 5) assumed an interdependence between economic growth and 
generic societal outcomes;  technological innovation would ‘build the momentum for 
an economic success story delivering for all New Zealanders the standards of living to 
which we aspire’.  Biotechnology was prioritised as a key area for government 
support on the basis of its perceived growth potentials and influence across the 
economy (2002, pp 49, 51).181  The following year, the Biotechnology Taskforce 
recommended ambitious sector expansion to boost productivity and export earnings 
and develop lucrative new products (New Zealand Government 2003, p 5).  The 
Taskforce acknowledged the need to balance economic goals with social and 
environmental considerations (2003, pp 38-39), but emphasised commercialisation 
and collaboration between science and business (2003, pp 6, 24). 
 
The government’s Biotechnology Strategy (New Zealand Government 2003) 
reiterated expectations of innovation as the route to improved economic performance.  
The Strategy’s guiding principles include a commitment to ‘focus on outcomes from 
biotechnology that benefit the wealth, health and environment of New Zealanders’, 
and to harness the industry for ‘our economic, social and environmental well-being’ 
(2003, pp 4, 6).  These loosely-defined goals were framed as achievable by focusing 
on commercial development and efficiency in existing sectors (2003, pp 5-6). 
 
                                                 
economy’ (Royal Commission on Genetic Modification 2001c, p 33).  The RCGM’s endorsement of 
these dimensions of expectation has been analysed in terms of such inquiry processes as legitimation 
exercises which ‘maximise gains for key interests’;  the support of major lobby groups such as 
Business New Zealand and Federated Farmers for the RCGM’s conclusions is noted (Rogers-Hayden 
& Hindmarsh 2002, p 43).  Commenting on the neoliberal worldviews shaping the RCGM’s processes 
and findings, Goven (2006, pp 576-578, 587) argues that their equation of the ‘wellbeing of all’ with 
economic growth has the effect of silencing alternative voices and visions of desirable futures, and 
obscuring the political nature of technoscience trajectories. 
181 The other two technologies privileged for intensive development were ICT (information and 
communication technologies) and the creative industries (film-making and special effects) (New 
Zealand Government 2002, pp 7, 49, 51). 
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Economic dimensions are also highlighted in trade and exports policy (New Zealand 
Trade and Enterprise 2005, n.d.), and in policy for scientific research priorities.  A 
“Futurewatch” analysis of biotechnology opportunities and trends assesses various 
GM applications, the likelihood of commercialisation and profitability, and 
timeframes for market entry (Ministry of Research Science and Technology 2005b).  
A review of plant biotechnology emphasised the commercialisation of products, and 
recommended increased government investment in the field on the basis of the 
technology’s claimed importance for the New Zealand economy (Foundation for 
Research Science and Technology 2006a, pp 5-10).  A broader review of New 
Zealand’s ‘biotechnology research landscape’ justified the government’s strategic 
approach and funding increases in terms of economic returns: 
[Support is] primarily directed towards outcome focused research that 
contributes to the New Zealand economy today or will help to grow and 
diversify it in the future… [including] investments assisting the 
commercialisation of biotechnology research (Ministry of Research Science 
and Technology 2006b, p 8).182 
 
These priorities continue through the ‘roadmap’ strategy for biotechnology research in 
New Zealand (Ministry of Research Science and Technology 2007, pp 14-16, 21,30, 
49-51).  The orientation and expectations for R&D are clearly signalled: 
The bulk of the government’s research investments are directed towards 
achieving economic outcomes – fuelling competitive advantages within 
existing industries and building completely new industries (2007, p 27).183 
 
Commercial value frameworks dominate the discourse of the New Zealand 
biotechnology sector (Macdonald et al. 2011, pp 12-13, 18-19).  The industry 
organisation, NZBio, is assiduous in promoting the sector’s achievements and 
commercial opportunities (NZBio 2005b, 2006b, 2006c, n.d.).184  NZBio’s priorities 
                                                 
182 The ‘landscape’ report noted proudly that just over $195 million was invested by government in 
biotechnology research in the 2004-05 year;  approximately half this was spent on targeted and non-
targeted basic research, the other half on outcome-focused research and support for commercialisation.  
The research areas were:  biomedical and drug discovery: 34%;  animal-based biotechnologies: 15%;  
plant biotechnologies: 21%;  and environmental biotechnologies: 10% (Ministry of Research Science 
and Technology 2006b, pp 6-7). 
183 The vocabulary of these policy documents is salutary;  the term ‘investment’ implies an expectation 
of financial returns, compared to other terms that might describe science funding such as ‘grant’ 
(Leitch & Davenport 2005, p 899). 
184 NZBio (www.nzbio.org.nz ) was established in 2003 to represent and foster the biotechnology 
industry in New Zealand.  Replacing the former Life Sciences Network, NZBio’s activities are 
strategically focused on supporting the industry, working to assist the sector’s expansion and 
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are determinedly oriented around business growth for the sector and the nation, as 
emphasised in an interview with the CEO: 
From an economic perspective if we want to have a society that’s prosperous 
in the future we have to be open to accepting new technologies, making the 
most of innovation…  So [NZBio’s focus is on] things like what is the best 
way to increase productivity, generate valuable intellectual property, improve 
technology transfer [and] increase investment (Interview 54, 9/5/2006). 
 
Sector advocacy and promotions consistently emphasise the economic value 
generated by and expected from the field (Ahn et al. 2008, pp 3, 6-8; NZBio 2008b, 
pp 5, 16; Boven 2009, pp 2, 14-15, 27, 60-61; NZBio 2009, pp 5-8, 13).185  A sector 
review (NZBio 2006a) highlights growth in investments, numbers of companies and 
employees, export revenues, and the earnings of New Zealand’s primary production 
industries.186  A follow-up review (NZBio 2008a) praises further commercial growth, 
endorsed by the Minister of Research, Science and Technology as imperative for the 
creation of a “bioeconomy”.187  Sector activities, such as the annual NZBio 
conferences, have a strong focus on the business aspects of science (for example, 
NZBio 2008c).188  The promotions of investment brokers and venture capital 
companies also frame GM technoscience and biotech as attractive propositions for 
significant profit-making.189  This emphasis on the economic dimensions also 
characterises the positioning of New Zealand’s Crown Research Institutes engaged in 
                                                 
consolidation of a conducive operating environment for a diverse range of biotechnology companies 
and institutions (NZBio 2005a, pp 3-8, 17-18). 
185 One industry review report opened with the proud assertion that:  ‘The OECD has estimated the 
potential contribution of the Bioeconomy to New Zealand’s GDP at up to NZ$18.2 billion… in 2030’ 
(NZBio 2009, p iii). 
186 The review summary records:  ‘expenditure on biotechnology increased by more that 20 per cent 
between 2004 and 2005, now totally more than $640 million;  biotechnology export revenue increased 
more than 30 per cent in the same period;  biotechnology contributes $300 million to $400 million per 
year to the New Zealand economy through the primary sector…  biotechnology now employs more 
than 2200 people in New Zealand, in 126 private and public sector entities’ (NZBio 2006a). 
187 The 2008 review records direct government investment of almost $250 million, up from $200 
million in 2005.  Overall biotechnology funding from the Foundation for Research Science and 
Technology in 2008 was $785 million in contracts plus additional capability-supporting contracts 
worth $347 million over their terms.  Private sector funding was over $100 million.  Industry growth 
over 2005-2007 was highlighted:  the number of organisations working in biotech increased by 33% to 
168;  the number of employees increased by 78%;  the net profits of the sector almost doubled;  export 
revenues grew by over 35%;  and the total sector income grew by 23% to $276 million (NZBio 2008a). 
188 The NZBio conferences typically feature sessions on patenting and IP law, licensing, collaborating 
off-shore, business partnering, marketing, and strategic financing (NZBio 2008c). 
189 For example, the Pacific Channel investment group explains that the life sciences projects in their 
portfolio must offer eventual markets for the biotech products under development of between $5million 
and $500million per year (http://www.pacificchannel.com/WhyInvestinLifeSciences/tabid/56.aspx). 
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GM and other biotechnology work.190  For example, scientists from the (then) Crop & 
Food Research institute highlighted the potentials in producing ‘high-value peptides 
with medical applications’ from GM potatoes:  ‘some high-value proteins are 
currently worth $1million per gram’ (Conner et al. 2003, p 13). 
 
Not surprisingly, sector actors interviewed for this thesis reflected these frameworks 
of expectation for the benefits of their work.  A venture capital executive arranging 
finance for technology startups stressed the primary criterion of commercial 
marketability as determining an R&D project’s worthiness: 
Products that sell provide benefit, and I don’t know what the benefits are 
necessarily, it will depend on each person what the benefits are… but most 
products are actually beneficial in some way, shape or form, otherwise they 
won’t sell (Interview 36, 1/12/2006). 
 
This rationale was echoed by the CEO of NZBio: 
Unless there’s a consumer benefit in a technology there’s not a market…  
There’s not a disconnection between consumer benefits, public benefit and 
company benefit;  they’re all very intertwined, because otherwise there’s no 
demand for the technology…  Science is just a science until there’s an 
identified need for a particular technology which is commercialised from the 
science (Interview 54, 9/5/2006). 
 
While other factors such as the satisfaction of being involved in projects for new 
medical treatments or environmental sustainability were part of the motivations for 
investment in science, these dimensions were seen as ‘secondary considerations’ to 
the driving purpose of building successful biotech businesses (Interview 36, 
1/12/2006).  Within the government financing agencies there were similar 
priorities.191  Policy managers at FRST and MORST emphasised the need for research 
proposals to be credibly and closely linked with the requirements of end-users of the 
knowledge or innovation.  Applications have to demonstrate an ‘expected return to 
                                                 
190 For example, AgResearch (2010a) describes its mission as ‘to create sustainable wealth in the 
pastoral and technology sectors through science and technology’, a role it claims is crucial for the 
nation’s economic viability:  ‘AgResearch’s activities are critical in ensuring the prosperity, security 
and sustainability of New Zealand’s pastoral and agri-food sectors.  These sectors are the backbone of 
our economy and their continued success is essential to this country’s living standards.’ The CRI 
projects expected earnings in excess of $150 million per annum. 
191 The principle of orienting research towards economic goals and marketable products extends to 
government facilitation of science-business interactions;  initiatives mentioned in the interviews with 
FRST managers include commercialisation workshops for scientists, schemes to embed business 
studies interns in labs, and requirements in ongoing project monitoring to ensure market relevance. 
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the economy’ and a clear ‘pathway to market’ (Interview 45, 9/5/2006;  Interview 7, 
18/4/2007;  Interview 47, 26/4/2007).192 
 
The ultimate goal of GM within such frameworks of value is the (in)famous “killer 
app”, the hypothetical technoscience application that will be so irresistibly desirable 
and widely marketable that vast fortunes will be earned.  This grail of GM R&D was 
(sometimes rather wistfully) conjectured in some interviews.  A MORST biotech 
policy manager argued that the introduction of a “killer app” with ‘very clearly laid 
out advantages to the consumer’, rather than only benefiting industry, would provide a 
tipping point in public attitudes to GM (Interview 45, 9/5/2006).  A policy manager 
for the horticulture industry highlighted possible health benefits from GM vegetables 
as offering this kind of appeal: 
If I can make a health claim and say, if you eat 500 grams of these potatoes a 
week, I can 99% guarantee you won’t get bowel cancer or breast cancer or 
prostate cancer, wheeeew [whistles], you watch consumption (Interview 22, 
20/4/2007). 
 
But a research manager at Crop and Food suggested rather ironically that more 
superficial attributes might also generate sufficient market acceptance: 
How about a potato that makes you thinner when you eat it, tastes fantastic 
like the best McDonalds fries, and has the properties of Viagra, and gives you 
wonderful skin – you know, if you have beauty, sex, and problems with 
obesity, health problems, if you could design that [laughter] (Interview 2, 
26/5/2006). 
 
Overall, the dominant narrative of GM as ‘big-bucks’ science, valued instrumentally 
for the anticipated commercial returns, has strongly shaped the framing of this 
research field in New Zealand, and legitimated ongoing resourcing and political and 
sectoral support.  But this confidence in the economic benefits of GM technoscience 
has not gone unquestioned.  Some analyses, from both economic and sociological 
perspectives, have sharply challenged the prevailing optimistic narrative. 
 
                                                 
192 The Foundation system evaluated and ranked proposals against four key criteria:  ‘benefits to New 
Zealand’ including financial returns and other business benefits such as regional development and 
employment;  marketability of the products or knowledge to be generated by the research;  science and 
technology benefits to New Zealand, the ‘technical stretch’ or the quality of the science;  and ability to 
deliver, or the skills and capacities of the researchers and institutions (Foundation for Research Science 
and Technology 2006b). 
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Modelling of actual market prospects for GM products is perhaps most disruptive of 
the enthusiastic narratives of “transforming the economy”.  Several analyses develop 
highly sceptical evaluations of the optimistic projections for this technoscience and 
the actual marketability and earning potential of its products.  Studies highlight 
ongoing resistance to GM products of global consumers, major supermarkets and food 
retailers, and the potentially damaging effects of adoption of GM technology on New 
Zealand’s existing exports and international “clean, green image” (Campbell et al. 
2000; Sanderson et al. 2003; Saunders et al. 2003; Howard 2012).193  Kaye-Blake et al 
(2007) scrutinise claims advanced for GM medicinal substances and foods, and 
conclude that, although GM may be ‘touted as the next major development in both 
farming and pharmaceutical production’, information to assess such products’ 
eventual performance is not available (2007, pp ix, 3, 8).  The example of 
recombinant human lactoferrin, produced in the milk of GM cows, is salutary;  the 
limited global potentials for this product are set against predicted losses to New 
Zealand’s dairy and tourism industries from negative reactions to GM production: 
[I]ntroducing a GMO into the New Zealand dairy sector has a potential to 
cause a minimum of NZ$539.6million in losses to the dairy and tourism 
industries.  Thus, such a biopharming endeavour would need to offset those 
losses before it could be viewed as a net positive for the New Zealand 
economy.  Given that worldwide sales of lactoferrin are currently in the tens of 
millions of US dollars, offsetting hundreds of millions of NZ dollars of lost 
exports seems unlikely in the short to medium term (2007, pp 32-33). 
 
Other studies critique the dominant framings of GM and biotechnology and their 
projected economic benefits for New Zealand in terms of their discursive and political 
dimensions.  The purposeful creation of discourse strategies to legitimate GM – and to 
position it as positively as possible in public, political and sectoral debates – is 
described by Weaver and Motion (2002, p 327) as ‘the engineering of public opinion 
on the issue of genetic engineering in New Zealand’.  Analysis of the tactics and 
typical framings of GM discourse reveals the consistent efforts of proponents of this 
technoscience to sustain a Foucauldian ‘regime of truth’ consistent with the values 
and expectations of powerful actors (Motion & Weaver 2005, p 50).  The construction 
of particular meanings for GM and particular visions of its future is explored as a 
                                                 
193 The economic value of international perceptions of New Zealand as a “clean green” environment 
has been strongly endorsed (Ministry for the Environment 2001a, 2001b).  These perceptions are 
important for our export markets and for the tourism industry, which promotes New Zealand as “100% 
pure” (www.tourismnewzealand.com ). 
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rhetorical process that serves the interests of dominant groups (Rogers-Hayden & 
Hindmarsh 2002; Weaver & Motion 2002; Leitch & Davenport 2005; Henderson et 
al. 2007; Leitch & Davenport 2007; Davenport & Leitch 2009; Macdonald et al. 
2011).194  Cronin (2008, p 294) describes the hegemonic acceptance of ‘strategic and 
normative assumptions about the role of biotechnology, now intrinsically tied in to 
future economic development in a knowledge economy’.  And Wynne (2003, pp 6, 
24) identifies the commercialisation of science, and governments’ promotion of 
claims of economic outcomes from technologies such as GM, as dominant influences 
deserving closer attention. 
 
Despite such critique, the privileging of GM R&D and promotion of genetic 
technoscience continued in policy, sectoral and public discourse through most of the 
first decade of the 21st century.  The persistent dominance of framings of GM as an 
essential dimension of New Zealand’s economic viability reflects the alignment of 
this optimism with the interests and agendas of powerful sectoral and political actors.  
The next section of this chapter looks at another technoscience myth that contributes 
to GM’s promotion by economists, politicians and research institutes – the Red Queen 
imperative.  This narrative helps sustain a sense of necessity for active New Zealand 
engagement in GM, and provides a justification for R&D in this field regardless of 
any actual deliverables beyond the lab or field trial perimeter fence. 
 
GM and the Red Queen 
Biotechnology developments in New Zealand have been strongly influenced by the 
conceptual framing of this technology as a rapidly-moving domain of fierce global 
competition.  This construct is a common pattern in many R&D fields, especially in 
the early stages of evolution of new technologies and new paradigms (Burnett et al. 
2009, p 187).  As discussed in Chapter Two, technoscience is perceived as a contest, a 
desperate race where even to participate demands huge commitment, striving and 
                                                 
194 Other analyses of GM discourse and the institutional and political framings of technoscience 
highlight these dimensions from the perspective of public participation;  studies have focused on the 
processes and conclusions of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (Rogers-Hayden & Hindmarsh 2002; 
Goven 2006; Rogers-Hayden & Jones 2007; Hindmarsh & Du Plessis 2008), and the role and 
approaches of the Environmental Risk Management Authority (Cronin 2003b, 2008; Wright & Kurian 
2009; Kurian & Wright 2010). 
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ruthless competitiveness (Winner 1986, p 46; Rappert 1999a, pp 5-6; Kearnes et al. 
2006, p 35).  The analogy with Lewis Carroll’s fictional Red Queen – rushing Alice at 
top speed across the landscape only to maintain their present position – encapsulates 
the urgency and frantic pace central to this framing of technoscientific research and 
innovation (Carroll 1939 (1871), pp 141-143). 
 
From its origins in the 1970s, GM has been heavily influenced by the Red Queen 
imperative.  The competitive drive for primacy in discovery and product 
development, described by Rifkin (1998, p 79) as a ‘scramble for fame and fortune’, 
was fuelled by projections of immense commercial profits and glamorous stellar 
careers.  Intensive publicity around the “race” to sequence the human genome framed 
the creation of scientific knowledge as a contest between research teams (Sunder 
Rajan 2003, pp 95-98; Watson 2003, pp 181-195; Sunder Rajan 2006, pp 2, 16).  The 
enormous expectations constructed around genetic technoscience created a powerful 
sense of urgency to be at the forefront of developments, or at least not to fall behind 
and lose access to the promised returns (Birch 2007a, pp 95, 107).  As Kahane (2009, 
p 54) observes, major waves of technological innovation, once they gather 
momentum, ‘become too big to be missed’.  Claims that existing technologies and 
production processes would be rendered obsolete, combined with the fear that 
competitors would secure the benefits and profits of the new science, built GM into an 
irresistible priority.  For corporations, the drivers were commercial:  ‘[multinationals] 
could ill afford to miss out on what recombinant DNA technology represented, 
namely the very future of pharmaceutical production’ (Watson 2003, p 113).  A 
Monsanto spokesman summed up the compulsive urgency spurring GM R&D:  ‘The 
biggest mistake that anyone can make is moving slowly, because the game is going to 
be over before you start’ (quoted in Bingham 2008, p 111).  Governments worldwide 
established policies, funding and supportive regulatory systems, ‘investing heavily in 
biotechnology and genomics in order to establish a foothold in what is seen as a key 
part of the New Economy’ (Nightingale & Martin 2004, p 565).  Dryzek et al (2009, p 
267) describe the compulsion for governments to facilitate technoscientific innovation 
and diffusion ‘to ensure economic competitiveness in a globalizing world’.195 
                                                 
195 Most First World and many developing nations have given high priority to biotechnology and GM 
research in their science and technology policies.  As Hacking (1986, p 11)explains:  ‘Most 
governments have a positive attitude to the development of new biotechnology…  nations are aware 
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The Red Queen imperative for GM and biotechnology is closely linked with the 
inequities of global power relations (van Vliet 1998, pp 1-2; Froggatt & Rankine 
1999, p 466; Brooks 2005, pp 362, 364; Birch 2007a, pp 94-95; Herring 2008, p 461).  
Gottweis (1998, pp 51-53, 161-162, 196-197) follows political narratives that frame 
biotechnology as a contest between nations.  Accusations of ‘backwardness’ relative 
to GM ‘leaders’ such as the US and Japan justified British and European policies to 
foster increased support for R&D;  biotechnology was claimed to be ‘essential to 
socio-economic development and to surviving the “international high-tech race”’ 
(Gottweis 1998, p 157). 
 
The Red Queen imperative is powerfully influential in the frameworks shaping GM 
research in New Zealand, at least in the programmes oriented towards commercial 
profits via production of vegetables, crops or livestock with new characteristics.196  
The driver of relentless competitiveness is manifested in the strong belief, through 
policy agencies, research communities and sectoral bodies, that it is essential for New 
Zealand to maintain an active capacity in GM.  Such capacity – in R&D institutions 
and infrastructure, and in the expertise and skills of individual researchers – is 
considered an important benefit in itself that justifies investment in this new 
technology.197  This reflects the imperative of ‘speculative capital’ identified by 
Sunder Rajan (2006, pp 8-9) and discussed in the preceding section of this chapter;  
the belief that sustaining ongoing activity in biotechnology is desirable for its own 
sake, regardless of other outcomes that might (or might not) be achieved. 
 
These frameworks of value were firmly established in the findings of the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry on Genetic Modification, which insisted on the necessity of 
building strong research capacities as ‘basic to the establishment of a knowledge 
                                                 
that early participation in new technologies is axiomatic for maintaining a leadership and thereby 
creating future wealth and employment…  The potential applications of biotechnology are so wide that 
no-one wants to be left on the starting line’. 
196 However the Red Queen narrative does not feature in the frameworks of purpose and value 
underpinning the New Zealand research on possible GM biocontrols for possums, discussed later in 
this chapter. 
197 This pattern is in marked contrast to the electricity sector, where apart from a few small companies 
developing their own turbine designs, it is widely accepted that the most appropriate role for New 
Zealand wind energy technologies is to be a “fast follower” and importer of overseas innovations.  This 
difference in expectation will be discussed further in Chapter Seven. 
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economy’ (2001a, p 333).198  Government policy for GM in New Zealand is 
predicated on the belief that ‘standing still is not an option’ (New Zealand 
Government 2003, p 9).  Priorities are to ‘grow’ the biotech sector, strengthen 
capabilities and build critical mass in New Zealand to keep pace with global 
developments (New Zealand Government 2003, pp 3, 5, 16-24; Ministry of Research 
Science and Technology 2007, pp 8-11, 27-31; McGuinness et al. 2008b, pp 8-9). 
 
The Red Queen imperative also runs strongly through the discourses of New 
Zealand’s research community and interested sectors.  Active participation in GM is 
promoted in terms of New Zealand’s economic viability and scientific credibility.  A 
2003 report on future potentials commissioned by Industry New Zealand encouraged 
GM development to ‘signal to the world that New Zealand is a meaningful global 
player in biotechnology’ (Beckman & Goldberg 2003, p 8).199  Sector actors 
interviewed for this thesis in 2006 expressed an acute sense of the demands of 
competitiveness.  The manager of biotechnology research at Crop & Food insisted:  
‘For us to have a part in [GM science] is very important for the whole aspect of New 
Zealand and its reputation as a player in the global market’ (Interview 2, 26/5/2006).  
The CEO of NZBio endorsed the belief that biotechnological innovation is essential 
for New Zealand’s future, ‘and to lock that out, to me it doesn’t seem sensible’ 
(Interview 54, 9/5/2006). 
 
As well as the promised benefits, the perceived threat of New Zealand science and 
production sectors being “left behind” in global technology innovation contests is a 
powerful negative incentive inherent in the Red Queen imperative.  The fear of 
“missing out” on the opportunities and benefits projected from work in GM is deeply 
ingrained.  These themes ran strongly through the submissions of many sectoral 
interest groups to the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification (2001c, pp 55-60, 
220-222).  For example, the NZ Biotechnology Association argued that: 
  
                                                 
198 The option of a GM-free New Zealand was rejected on the rationale that this would cause the 
economy to contract, and our science and industries would not be internationally competitive 
(McGuinness et al. 2008b, p 12). 
199 Industry NZ was the government’s economic development agency, supporting and fostering a wide 
range of business sectors;  in 2003 it was merged with Trade NZ to become NZ Trade and Enterprise 
www.nzte.govt.nz/About-NZTE/Pages/Our-history.aspx ). 
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…if we turned away from genetic modification our country would lose ground 
to the developed nations of the world, and we would all be subjected to a 
decline in our quality of life (Royal Commission on Genetic Modification 
2001a, p 79). 
 
Other submissions raised similar concerns, advocating that New Zealand must be 
‘technologically ready’ to maximise future commercial opportunities (2001a, pp 82-
84).  The threat of other countries’ products ‘beating us to the market’ was a powerful 
incentive:  ‘We will get rapidly behind if we don’t move quickly’ (2001a, p 83).  The 
New Zealand Dairy Board insisted that GM technologies were ‘essential’ to maintain 
competitiveness for the industry and for the national economy (2001a, pp 85-86);  the 
Board emphasised that global competitors were ‘moving fast’ to develop GM 
knowledge and markets, and that New Zealand ‘cannot afford not to be in that race’ 
(2001a, p 83).200  The perception of intense international competition establishes a 
rationale in which New Zealand’s involvement in this technology is argued as an 
unavoidable necessity.  Participants at a 2007 AgResearch workshop asserted that: 
New Zealand agriculture could fall to “Third World” status in 20 years if it 
doesn’t take up genetic modification technology…  If we don’t adopt this 
technology we will be left behind…  If we do not stay in that science as a 
nation it will pass us by and we’ll never regain that (Timmo 2007). 
 
A senior scientist working on GM vegetables at Crop & Food Research, interviewed 
for this thesis, used the Red Queen metaphor to describe the pressure to maintain 
engagement with GM technoscience: 
Ultimately if everyone else is doing something that makes producing a crop 
easier, more efficient, cheaper or whatever, then if we’re not doing it…  It’s 
the classic Red Queen hypothesis, from Alice in Wonderland, you know, if we 
don’t keep running with everybody else then we’re going to fall behind, and 
there are people out there running flat out, so that is the danger (Interview 17, 
17/7/2006).201 
 
The threat of global developments outpacing New Zealand was echoed by other 
interviewees.  The Chief Science Strategist at AgResearch insisted:  ‘if we don’t do 
[GM R&D] we’ll get left behind, and that’s very bad’ (Interview 24, 18/8/2006).  The 
                                                 
200 The New Zealand Dairy Board managed the international marketing and exports of New Zealand 
dairy products, and was enormously influential in the primary production sector;  by the late 1990s it 
was the world’s largest dairy network.  In 2001, following restructuring in the sector, it was merged 
with the major industry co-operatives to become Fonterra (www.dcanz.com/about-nz-dairy-industry). 
201 The Red Queen actually features in Carroll’s sequel Alice’s Adventures Through the Looking-Glass. 
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CEO of NZBio emphasised the importance of sufficient resourcing to support 
professional capacity in GM research in New Zealand: 
[New Zealand biotechnology needs] a critical mass, it needs a decent amount 
of investment… so that you can establish a position in it.  The risk is that if 
you fail to do that then the opportunity’s lost (Interview 54, 9/5/2006). 
 
The manager of a product group at Horticulture New Zealand also highlighted the 
risks of not keeping an active role in GM: 
We’ve got to be there because there’s no use being a backwater in New 
Zealand…  we funded [research on GM veges] because we wanted to ensure 
that our scientists had the capability, otherwise if we don’t have the capability 
we’re in deep trouble when it becomes acceptable (Interview 22, 
20/4/2007).202 
 
The conceptualisation of GM as driven by rapid advance and ruthless competition is 
widespread through policy and sectoral domains, and creates an inescapable 
requirement for New Zealand’s science institutions.  Credible and active engagement 
with GM is seen as absolutely necessary to ensure that New Zealand science and 
production sectors will benefit from the projected advantages of biotechnology and 
remain competitive in global markets.  This narrative of compulsion is a significant 
strategic benefit for the CRIs undertaking research in GM crops and livestock – in a 
conveniently circular logic, their work is supported on the grounds of the necessity of 
support for such work.  The sectoral benefits from this rationale for GM technology, 
endogenous benefits derived by practitioners in this field of research and innovation, 
rather than exogenous benefits to end-users, society or the environment, are discussed 
in the following chapter. 
 
The Red Queen imperative has also been influential in the regulatory processes for 
GM projects in New Zealand.  In the years during which the GM projects addressed 
by this thesis were undertaken, any research, development work or field trials using 
genetically modified organisms in New Zealand required approval from the 
Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA) under the Hazardous 
Substances and New Organisms (HSNO) Act 1996.203  The purpose of the Act is 
                                                 
202 This industry group represents New Zealand’s 7000 commercial fruit and vegetable growers, 
providing strategic direction, promotion and sector advocacy (www.hortnz.co.nz ). 
203 See http://archive.ermanz.govt.nz/no/index.html .  As of 1 July 2011, ERMA was restructured and 
its functions amalgamated within the newly formed New Zealand Environmental Protection Authority 
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firmly oriented towards risk, being to prevent or manage adverse effects of new or 
potentially hazardous phenomena such as GM organisms (s4, HSNO Act).  However, 
consideration of GM proposals also requires that the anticipated economic and related 
benefits from the proposed new organisms are taken into account (s6(e), HSNO Act), 
and the formal assessment processes include recognition and evaluation of benefits as 
well as risks and costs (Environmental Risk Management Authority 1998a, Clauses 9, 
13, 14, 22, 26, 27). 
 
As outlined above, New Zealand CRIs’ GM work was justified under a diverse range 
of anticipated benefits and outcomes.  However the HSNO process guidelines warned 
applicants that wider objectives – the hopes for eventual future benefits or products, 
dependent on successful development and trialling of the organism, and on further 
approval for release or commercialisation – would not carry significant weight in the 
assessment process for specific trials (Environmental Risk Management Authority 
2000a, pp 22-27, 30).  This discounting of longer-term goals was explained as 
necessary due to the inherent contingency of such projections:  ‘at the research stage, 
end-use benefits are often very speculative’ (Environmental Risk Management 
Authority 2004, p 31).  The distinction between such intended outcomes and the 
immediate research was strongly emphasised by the manager of ERMA’s GM 
approval procedures, interviewed for this thesis: 
When applicants come to us they normally come with a very far-looking, far-
reaching, you know, well if all this research pans out then the benefits will be 
we’re going to solve cystic fibrosis… fantastic things are going to come out of 
this.  And we [ERMA] actually have to knock all of that out of our analysis 
and say:  yes, but this particular piece of research… isn’t going to get you to 
that benefit that you’re claiming you’re going to achieve.  You’ve still got alot 
of steps along the way before you get to that ultimate benefit (Interview 30, 
16/8/2006).204 
 
Only outcomes specific to the particular research project could be given weight in 
ERMA’s evaluations.  Two main kinds of outcome were recognised (examples of 
which are detailed in the following paragraphs).  The first comprised new scientific 
                                                 
(EPA), an independent Crown agency responsible for regulation of New Zealand’s environmental 
management;  see http://www.epa.govt.nz/new-organisms/Pages/default.aspx . 
204 This interviewee illustrated her explanation with a whiteboard diagram of a classic linear-model 
process for R&D, headed “Pipeline” and moving from “Proof of concept” through “Lab”, “Outdoor 
development” and “Conditional release” to the last stage of “Product to market”. 
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knowledge in areas relevant for further advances in GM work, such as transgenic 
techniques, gene function, protein expression in milk, and the performance and 
environmental effects of GM plants.  The second area of recognised outcomes was the 
maintenance of capacity and expertise in GM, to support the competitiveness and 
international standing of New Zealand science.  The Red Queen imperative emerges 
as a fundamental rationale for the regulatory agency’s approval of GM research 
proposals.  The priority of sustaining New Zealand capabilities in this technoscience 
serves as a justification of the value of CRIs undertaking such work.  Whether or not 
the “downstream” outcomes projected from the research actually come to fruition or 
not is irrelevant to the evaluation process;  the Red Queen provides a hegemonically 
inarguable framework of value under which the work may be sanctioned. 
 
Despite the constraints imposed by the formal exclusion of contingent future 
projections, and the emphasis on risk mitigation and management, the CRIs’ 
applications were an opportunity to highlight the intended benefits and positive 
outcomes of proposed work.205  Typically, applications optimistically outlined as 
many potential benefits as possible;  the application forms’ structure allowed such 
claims to be reiterated and expanded upon at different points.  For example, 
AgResearch’s 1998 application for work on GM cattle aimed to develop enhanced 
dairy products with improved processing characteristics, greater nutritional value and 
reduced allergenicity, and proteins to be used in drugs to treat multiple sclerosis 
(AgResearch 1998, pp 3, 6, 14, 27-28).  But the Authority drew a careful distinction 
between the research itself and these longer-term objectives:  ‘at this point it would be 
premature to speculate on what those benefits might be’ (Environmental Risk 
Management Authority 1999b, p 12).  The formal appraisal is coolly dismissive: 
The applicant has focussed on the potential benefits that are likely to accrue if 
the desired outcomes from an exploratory contained experiment are realised…  
The health benefits are theoretical since transgenic cattle have yet to be 
developed (Environmental Risk Management Authority 1999a, p 37). 
 
                                                 
205 ERMA’s advice to applicants encourages comprehensiveness and lateral thinking to include as 
many anticipated outcomes as possible:  ‘Identification of risks, costs and benefits involves examining 
all sources of effect [and] potential areas of impact...  The aim is to undertake a systematic and wide-
ranging review’ (Environmental Risk Management Authority 2004, p 10).  Specific advice covers such 
considerations as timing, distribution, and whether the expected benefits of the GM organism accrue 
directly or indirectly to different groups or sectors (Environmental Risk Management Authority 2000a, 
pp 11-13; 2004, pp 17-25; 2005a, pp 9-10, 16-18). 
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Nevertheless, ERMA recognised the value of the scientific knowledge to be gained, 
and the need for New Zealand science to support economic competitiveness: 
The Committee accepts that given the significance of the dairy and wider 
pastoral industries in New Zealand, its research institutions should be at the 
leading edge of research into the genetic factors which control and regulate 
milk production… and of associated biotechnological innovation, including 
recombinant research…  The issue is not so much whether the long term 
benefits outlined will be achieved, but whether research leading to those 
potential benefits is a legitimate and valuable scientific endeavour 
(Environmental Risk Management Authority 1999b, p 12). 
 
The trials were approved on the basis of the intended benefits to technoscientific 
research, and the goal of maintaining capacities in an field deemed necessary for the 
future performance of a production sector critical to New Zealand’s economy.206 
 
The Red Queen imperative was advanced by AgResearch itself in a later application 
for field trials with GM livestock.  This positioned the research in relation to the 
CRI’s stated mission of supporting and improving wealth creation in New Zealand’s 
pastoral sector.207  AgResearch’s plans for a range of GM species targeted research 
objectives as well as ‘breeding and the production of antigens, biopharmaceuticals, 
enzymes, hormones and other products with commercial applications’ (AgResearch 
2007a, p 4).  Arguing that ‘[t]he pastoral sector is the backbone of New Zealand’s 
economy and its continued success is essential to this country’s wellbeing’, 
AgResearch justified its work as necessary for the sector’s ongoing profitability: 
AgResearch has now developed a world leading capability in transgenic 
livestock research and development…  This positions AgResearch and New 
Zealand to take a leading international role in commercial applications of 
transgenic livestock…  It is important that New Zealand is positioned firmly at 
the forefront of the international biotechnology sector, and provides innovative 
products for the dairy industry (AgResearch 2007b, pp 8, 83). 
 
International competitiveness and the perceived rate of GM developments overseas 
were highlighted in justification of working with multiple species: 
  
                                                 
206 The approval was, however, appealed to the New Zealand High Court, which reversed ERMA’s 
decision on technical grounds and required a reconsideration (Bleakley v ERMA [AP 177/00]).  ERMA 
later re-approved the work (Satterfield & Roberts 2008, p 203; McGuinness et al. 2008b, p 32). 
207 AgResearch’s 2020 Science Strategy outlines an ambitious vision for technoscientific prosperity for 
the pastoral sector and the nation, including doubling the value derived from dairy production, and 
developing valuable new product opportunities beyond food and fibre commodities (AgResearch n d). 
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[T]he pace of global research and development using different transgenic 
animals is rapid.  To keep up with global research directions and to take 
advantage of commercial opportunities, AgResearch needs to have regulatory 
approvals in place for a broad range of animal candidates (AgResearch 2007a, 
p 13). 
 
The effects of the Red Queen imperative are also clear in New Zealand work on GM 
vegetable crops.  For example, Crop & Food Research’s 2003 application for a field 
trial of glyphosate-resistant onions projected ambitious future commercial returns to 
the horticulture industry, and benefits to the environment in reduced agrichemical use 
(Crop & Food Research 2003, pp 8-11, 43).  But ERMA dismissed these intended 
outcomes as beyond the scope of the particular field trial (Environmental Risk 
Management Authority 2003, pp 55-56, 86).  The longer-term intentions were not 
considered credible as justification for the trial:  ‘many of the indirect benefits 
identified are speculative, and contingent on the possible development and 
commercial application of this project’ (2003, p 51). 
 
The Roundup-ready onion trial was approved, nevertheless, on the grounds of the 
usefulness of the scientific knowledge that would be gained (2003, pp 51, 75, 82, 86).  
Crop & Food’s application emphasised the importance of a range of goals including 
new information useful for future research (Crop & Food Research 2003, pp 7-13, 
48).  Expected advantages for Crop & Food as an institute were highlighted, with 
reference to years of work creating ‘a niche that is “onion biotechnology”’, and 
broader national benefits were also claimed in ‘help[ing] New Zealand researchers 
stay at the forefront of this particular technology’ and contributing to ‘the expansion 
of New Zealand’s biotechnology capabilities… in order for New Zealand to remain 
competitive in the global economy’ (2003, pp 42, 44-45). 
 
These typical examples of the frameworks of value justifying approval of GM R&D 
in New Zealand illustrate the importance of the Red Queen imperative for this 
country’s research institutions.  The regulatory processes rule out many of the 
projections of future benefit from GM work – intended outcomes for societal or 
environmental good that might justify undertaking such research.  However, framing 
biotech activity and capabilities as worthy and necessary objectives in themselves 
serves to validate GM work.  The implications of such legitimation of endogenous 
 170 
sectoral benefits – while exogenous societal benefits are simultaneously advocated 
and dismissed – are discussed further in the next chapter. 
 
Greening GM 
Much of the GM research undertaken by New Zealand’s science institutes has been 
oriented around commercial values and economic competitiveness, as outlined above.  
Scientific knowledge and innovation are valorised and supported for their presumed 
contribution to the economy and the nation’s prosperity.  However other frameworks 
of value are also evident in the discursive and strategic construction of GM 
technoscience in New Zealand.  As with the positioning of wind energy in the context 
of global climate change, discussed in Chapters Five and Seven, the ideals and 
requirements of environmental protection have been deployed to validate 
biotechnology R&D.  Such “green benefit” framings are associated with three areas of 
GM research in New Zealand:  vegetables modified for resistance to pests, disease or 
herbicide;  forage grasses modified for reduced methane emissions from ruminant 
livestock;  and biocontrols for possums. 
 
Research projects on GM vegetables were undertaken by the (then) Crop & Food 
institute from the late 1990s to the late 2000s.  The environmental benefits envisaged 
from the use of these crops were framed in relation to current agricultural production 
systems and practices.208  The GM vegetables were promoted as a means to limit 
harmful effects and reduce the environmental footprint of contemporary industrial 
growing methods.  Crop & Food’s proposals to field test GM potatoes, onions and 
brassicas highlighted intended improvements via reduced chemical loadings on soils 
and groundwater, as well as other projected benefits such as reduced tillage impacts 
(Environmental Risk Management Authority 1998c, p 30; Crop & Food Research 
2003, pp 8-9; Environmental Risk Management Authority 2006, pp 19, 64-67).209 
                                                 
208 Chapter Seven discusses the co-construction of projected future benefits along with the present-day 
problems for which the technological innovation is advanced as the solution – such as intensive 
chemical use in large-scale agricultural production. 
209 Crop & Food projected that herbicide-resistant onions would reduce herbicide loadings by 70% with 
significant cost advantages for growers:  ‘From an economic viewpoint this saving equates to about 
$500 per hectare of herbicide or about $2.6 million across the country per year’ (Crop & Food 
Research 2003, p 11).  But such claims of reduced agrichemical use from the introduction of GM crops 
have been strongly contested, with evidence that herbicide applications have actually increased as a 
consequence of these crops’ use (Danish Council of Ethics 2007, p 32).  Outwater (2012) reports that in 
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Work on GM forage species, developing transgenic clover and ryegrass, has been 
undertaken by research consortiums involving AgResearch and other major 
companies in New Zealand agriculture.210  There were dual aims for this research – to 
increase nutritional value and thus milk production in the cows grazing on the ‘super-
grass’, and to reduce the methane emissions from grazing livestock, a major 
component of greenhouse gas emissions contributing to global warming (Atkinson 
2010; James 2010; Royal Society of New Zealand 2010; NZ Press Association 2010a, 
2010b, 2010c).211  However, there were strong concerns about the environmental risks 
of even a field trial of these new grasses, and commercial risks with potential adverse 
impacts on New Zealand’s “clean green” image and export markets.  AgResearch 
decided to limit the forage projects to overseas research facilities, citing a lack of 
acceptance of GM, and difficulties gaining approvals under the regulatory processes 
in New Zealand (AgResearch 2010b, pp 39-40; NZ Press Association 2010d). 
 
The intended environmental management benefits among the suite of objectives of 
GM R&D projects were emphasised by many of the biotech sector actors interviewed 
for this thesis.  Some interviewees expressed their strong belief that GM could make 
significant contributions to environmental sustainability, and expressed regret that 
such potentials were not appreciated by the public and ecological advocates.  As a 
Crop & Food scientist explained: 
I was very disappointed to be challenged by environmental groups… yeah, 
and the organic farmers in particular, because what we do, if it could be 
accepted by organic farming it could do so much to help them, so they’ve got 
other ways of controlling pests and diseases, that’s what it was all about…  
                                                 
the USA, ‘rates of glyphosate (in the herbicide Roundup) use on corn, soybeans, and cotton have 
increased by more than 10 percent per year.  It is estimated that GM crops in the United States have 
increased the use of herbicides by 240 million kilos more than what would have likely been used in the 
absence of genetic engineering…  This trend is confirmed by 2010 United States Department of 
Agriculture pesticide data, which shows skyrocketing glyphosate use, accompanied by constant or 
increasing rates of use for other, even more toxic, herbicides… [as] seeds genetically modified to resist 
herbicides have produced weeds resistant to glyphosate’. 
210 Seed company PGG Wrightson contracted Australian science research on GE ryegrass;  
AgResearch, dairy giant Fonterra and other New Zealand agricultural interests formed the Pastoral 
Genomics Group to investigate GE clover and ryegrass (Atkinson 2010; NZ Press Association 2010a, 
2010b). 
211 The issues around the methane emissions from New Zealand livestock have been a highly 
controversial dimension of the country’s response to global climate change:  ‘Livestock “burps” 
produce about 90 percent of the methane that makes up 43 percent of NZ’s greenhouse gas emissions’ 
(NZ Press Association 2010d). 
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and I find that [opposition] rather ironic, yeah, and frustrating (Interview 11, 
8/11/2006). 
 
Researchers working on GM crops described their strong personal commitment to 
sustainability, and the societal benefits of improving New Zealand’s environmental 
management.  These values were central to their work and their identity as scientists: 
What really motivates me is the reduction of pesticide use for the 
environment, benefits to the environment, which should benefit everyone as 
society, as New Zealand in general…  It’s not an economic thing, it’s a 
societal thing, looking after our environment, and that’s what motivated me to 
get into this in the first place…  It wasn’t so much to help Joe Bloggs farmer, 
it was what I could do for the production system as a whole to make it more 
environmentally sustainable (Interview 11, 8/11/2006). 
 
Most people here who are involved in genetic engineering came from a 
background of wanting to do good things for the environment, even card-
carrying members of Greenpeace, you know (Interview 2, 26/5/2006). 
 
Any person that I know in plant biotechnology has got into it because they 
want to do good, they want to try and improve things (Interview 17, 
17/7/2006). 
 
For these scientists, green idealism and goals of improving the environmental impacts 
of agricultural systems were not inconsistent with the economic frameworks of 
commercial competitiveness underpinning policy and institutional expectations of 
GM technoscience.  As seen in the concepts of benefit driving the electricity industry 
and company branding strategies in New Zealand (discussed in Chapter Five), the two 
modes of orientation seemed happily compatible to these sector actos.  A Crop & 
Food scientist argued that while research agencies ‘have the responsibility to their 
shareholders to make a profit, the best way you do that I would think is… to actually 
do good and produce good things’ (Interview 17, 17/7/2006).  The CEO of NZBio 
also endorsed the close interconnectedness of social benefits and marketable products 
for business (Interview 54, 9/5/2006). 
 
The claimed environmental objectives of R&D for GM crops in New Zealand reflect 
increasing awareness of the need for sustainability in agriculture (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment 2004a).  But as discussed in the Prologue, the 
story of biotechnology in New Zealand also features a unique application of GM 
technoscience, focused on completely different kinds of goals from the work on crops 
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and livestock.  More than a decade of research concentrated on GM techniques 
intended primarily to achieve non-monetary benefits for the public good – protecting 
indigenous biodiversity and natural ecosystems by helping to control one of New 
Zealand’s most destructive animal pests, the voracious Australian brushtail possum 
(Trichosurus vulpecula).212 
 
Several research streams and technical options were pursued by the two CRIs with 
interests in environmental management, AgResearch and Landcare Research, and 
university collaborators in New Zealand and overseas.213  The major focus of the 
research was on techniques to disrupt fertility and breeding processes in possums 
(Eckery 2007).214  Such methods as a GM immunocontraceptive were seen as more 
humane and were more acceptable to the public than other possible interventions 
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2000, pp 41, 46, 84; Wilkinson & 
Fitzgerald 2006, pp 17-19, 24-26, 37; Ji 2009, p 22).215  Related strands of research 
investigated the crucial question of how best to disperse the biocontrol into wild 
possum populations.  Potential delivery methods studied included conventional bait 
drops, GM plants, a spray device, or a self-disseminating vector, the possum-specific 
nematode worm Parastrongyloides trichosuri (Cowan et al. 2005; Cowan et al. 2006, 
pp 287-288; Cowan et al. 2008; Walcher et al. 2008; Duckworth et al. 2009; Ji 2009, 
pp 22-23; Cui et al. 2010a; Duckworth et al. 2010; Duckworth et al. 2011). 
 
                                                 
212 Introduced between 1837 and the 1920s with the aim of establishing a fur trade, possums have no 
natural predators in New Zealand and spread rapidly to now infest more than 95% of the country.  
Their ongoing impacts on forest ecosystems, indigenous wildlife and forestry are well documented 
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2000, p 11; Environmental Risk Management 
Authority 2007a, pp 5-6; 2007b, pp 11-12; Ji 2009, p 20).  As carriers of bovine tuberculosis, they also 
pose a major risk for New Zealand’s dairy and meat industries  (Coleman & Fraser 2005, p 81; 
Environmental Risk Management Authority 2007a, pp 6-7; Animal Health Board 2008, pp 4-5, 10). 
213 Administration of the overall programme was coordinated through the National Research Centre for 
Possum Biocontrol, a partnership between the CRIs and key end-user organisations (Animal Health 
Board, Department of Conservation, Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry, and Regional Councils).  It 
was funded by FRST under the Public Good Science Funding category as an outcome based investment 
(OBI).  The OBI objectives included strategic coordination of the overall programme, setting research 
directions and priorities, and providing a focus and communications framework for the various parties 
involved (http://possumbiocontrol.agresearch.co.nz/mediawiki/index.php/Main_Page). 
214 See http://www.landcareresearch.co.nz/research/programme.asp?Proj_Collab_ID=8;  and FRST 
research contracts C10X0218: Genetic and Hormonal Control of Reproduction, and C10X0501: 
Biological Management of Possums (AgResearch), at http://www.msi.govt.nz/update-me/who-got-
funded/. 
215 GM methods aimed at reducing numbers through infant mortality, by interfering with lactation or 
the transfer of natural immunity from mother possums to pouch young, were strongly rejected as 
unacceptably inhumane (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2000, p 41). 
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The proposed biocontrols – involving perhaps the general release of a self-spreading 
GM organism inducing sterility – were intensely controversial (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment 2000, pp i, 1, 83-87; Royal Commission on 
Genetic Modification 2001a, pp 164-165).  Concern about public responses to such 
potentially risky new technoscience underscored the biocontrol team’s ongoing 
obligations to constructive public engagement (Fisher 2006, p 10; Eckery 2007).216  
The pressure to demonstrate safety was intense, but so was the need to secure 
acceptability for the work in terms of the intended benefits of better possum 
control.217  Justification of the potential application of GM technoscience for pest 
control was advanced via two principal framings of environmental benefit – managing 
the risks to New Zealand dairy farming from bovine tuberculosis carried by possums, 
and reducing the effects of possums on native ecosystems and wildlife. 
 
Protection of New Zealand’s unique natural heritage is a powerful if intensely 
contested national ideal.218  Promotion of these islands as a tourist destination, and of 
                                                 
216 Over the years there has been fierce opposition both from local communities and nationally to the 
widespread use of poisons, notably 1080 (sodium monofluoroacetate), spread mostly aerially across the 
landscape for possum control.  Protest action included the high-profile 1996 occupation by local Maori 
blockading access to Department of Conservation reserves at Mangamuka in Northland 
(http://www.royalsociety.org.nz/1996/12/18/protesters-vow-to-stay-put/).  Organised opposition to 
local control projects, and anti-1080 media and information campaigns, continue to the present day (eg, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/~10609368, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/~10656951).  The 
risk of GM controls generating similar, or even more vociferous responses was an ongoing issue for the 
biocontrols research programme. 
217 Given that possums are marsupials, the specificity of the proposed biocontrols was a key factor in 
research around safety.  Possum physiology and breeding processes are very different from eutherian 
mammals, as was emphasised in interviews for this thesis with scientists at Landcare Research and 
AgResearch (Interviews 16 and 37).  Trials were undertaken to test the susceptibility of non-target 
species to the biocontrols (Duckworth et al. 2008).  However the major risk concern was the potential 
effects on Australian marsupial wildlife, including national icon species such as the kangaroo and 
koala, if a GM sterility-inducing biocontrol was somehow conveyed across the Tasman (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment 2000, p 43; Wilkinson & Fitzgerald 2006, p 22). 
218 New Zealand ratified the international Convention on Biological Diversity in 1993, and 
subsequently established a wide-ranging Biodiversity Strategy to fulfil these commitments and address 
the well-documented decline of indigenous wildlife, plants and ecosystems (New Zealand Government 
2000).  Policy for biodiversity protection is predominantly framed in terms of the nation’s duty to 
preserve its extraordinary natural heritage:  ‘New Zealand’s high level of endemic biodiversity makes a 
unique contribution to global biodiversity and places on us an obligation to ensure its continued 
existence’ (New Zealand Government 2000, Executive Summary).  But even under these kinds of 
policy priorities, economic dimensions are also acknowledged in terms of the importance of the 
country’s “clean, green image”: ‘Increasingly, New Zealand’s international reputation and trade 
opportunities will depend on our performance in maintaining a quality natural environment, of which 
biodiversity is a key element’ (2000, Executive Summary).  Some research has been undertaken on the 
economic value of conserving New Zealand’s landscapes and biodiversity, focusing on regional 
economic benefits from the tourism industry, and the contribution of ecosystem services such as 
freshwater filtration and erosion and flood control (Department of Conservation 2006).  Nevertheless, 
the prospects for indigenous biodiversity continue to worsen, with increased numbers of threatened 
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New Zealand’s export products, focuses strongly on our “clean green” brand and 
features dramatic images of lush forests and rich pastoral landscapes.219  But the 
ravages of possums and other environmental pests seriously compromise this 
cherished national identity (Environmental Risk Management Authority 2007a; 
Manaaki Whenua Landcare Research 2008, n d-a, b).  The biocontrol research 
objectives were focused around the ambitious goal of ‘improved management of 
possums in New Zealand such that they no longer threaten native biota’.220  This 
purpose was evident in the strong personal commitment of all the biocontrols 
scientists interviewed for this thesis, that protecting biodiversity is an important and 
valuable purpose – in itself, for the nation and future generations, and in terms of the 
duty of their research institutions to provide science and technology for the public 
benefit.  As one AgResearch scientist explained: 
Ultimately the reason I’m doing this I suppose is that I’m convinced that 
possums will destroy what’s left of the New Zealand environment if they’re 
not dealt with, and that alone is a very potent motivation for doing something 
about the problem.  So to me it’s an absolute imperative… primarily from an 
ecological point of view (Interview 25, 6/12/2006). 
 
The focus on non-economic goals for the public interest was a matter of no little pride 
for some biocontrols researchers:  ‘we’re not in it for commercial gain’ (Interview 16, 
17/5/2006).  The distinction between the biocontrols work and other FRST-funded 
programmes oriented around economic benefits was a strong part of these actors’ 
sense of their identity and mission as scientists:  ‘they’re not viewing it like the 
Foundation product development portfolios where they’re expecting to see millions of 
dollars in revenue generated’ (Interview 18, 7/12/2006). 
 
Working for public-good purposes was seen as a more socially acceptable use of GM 
than crops and livestock;  a technology policy manager described the expected 
response of key interest groups: 
They will be much more favourably disposed towards GM pest control 
technology than towards GM food production technology, because … the 
benefits of GM pest control are to the environment and the public…  Usually 
[the regulatory agency ERMA has] some applicant wanting to plant their GE 
                                                 
species, significant reductions in habitat areas and indigenous vegetation cover, and the risk of 
extinction in the wild for many icon species (WWF New Zealand 2012, pp 20-23). 
219 For example, www.newzealand.com , www.nzte.govt.nz , 
www.fonterra.com/wps/wcm/connect/fonterracom/Our+Business/Sustainability . 
220 National Research Centre for Possum Biocontrol website http://possumbiocontrol.agresearch.co.nz/. 
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cabbages, and they’ve got two people in support and 500 against, but this will 
be slightly different…  So I suspect that the arguments around GM possum 
control might be less difficult than the ones that are currently happening 
around GM food production (Interview 28, 18/4/2007). 
 
Despite the focus on non-commercial goals, possible future opportunities were 
identified for applying the knowledge gained in the possum biocontrols research to 
other animal management problems (Royal Commission on Genetic Modification 
2001a, p 162).  A university scientist suggested lucrative potentials:  ‘the technology 
might be translated to be utilised on the world’s other pests… some money could be 
made in selling that IP’ (Interview 18, 7/12/2006).  Other marketable applications 
were noted by a Landcare Research science manager: 
The technologies we’ve learned will have big applications not only for fertility 
control but also some of the delivery systems will be just as important for 
disease control…  vaccines particularly have an enormous amount of potential 
[and] techniques for controlling wildlife health (Interview 16, 17/5/2006). 
 
While the biocontrols research was strongly characterised as an ideals-driven mission 
working for the benefit of New Zealand’s threatened species and native bush, there 
were significant economic dimensions inherent even in this framework of values.  The 
daunting costs of possum management via existing methods are an ongoing burden, 
and were a major factor in the initiative to develop alternative techniques via GM.221  
The biocontrols were promoted as improving the efficiency and affordability of pest 
management:  ‘the only long-term, cost-effective solution to the possum problem in 
New Zealand’ (Cowan 1996, p 655).  Agencies’ budget constraints mean that 
conventional control programmes are restricted to the most urgent priority areas each 
year.222  While some biocontrol delivery options would require similar operational 
approaches to the current aerial drops of 1080 bait, significant advantage was seen in 
the prospect of a self-disseminating biocontrol that, once introduced, would spread 
                                                 
221 In the mid-2000s, more than $80 million per annum was spent on aerial and ground poisoning 
programmes and trapping of possums (Cowan et al. 2006, p 287);  by 2008, costs of conventional 
control programmes were around $100 million per annum (Cowan et al. 2008, p 573).  Further 
government funding for the national bovine Tb eradication programme was around $87 million per 
annum (Environmental Risk Management Authority 2007a, p 6);  possum control costs were the 
‘biggest single expenditure’ annually for the Animal Health Board in the mid-2000s (Interview 28, 
18/4/2007).  In addition to expenditure by central government and regional councils, significant 
amounts are spent by farmers, landowners and residents on possum control;  in 2000 these costs were 
estimated at $74.8 million per annum (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2000, p 11). 
222 Department of Conservation, Head Office policy manager (Harry Broad), pers comm. May 2012. 
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itself independently in the wild.223  A Landcare Research science manager highlighted 
the potential: 
There is the additional benefit, if we can ultimately go to transmissible control, 
that we can actually control possums over a much wider area than we would 
ever be able to do otherwise, given that money is the limiting factor on pest 
control (Interview 14, 23/4/2007). 
 
A further dimension of the beneficial framing of the proposed biocontrols was their 
compatibility with existing pest management technologies and systems.  As with the 
integration of windfarms into New Zealand’s electricity system (discussed in Chapter 
Five), this innovation was positioned as having the advantage of fitting in alongside 
current pest control processes.  Although the fertility interventions used radical new 
scientific tools in the form of GM, the benefits were framed as extending the 
effectiveness of current poisoning methods, as explained by Landcare Research 
scientists: 
The main use is likely to be in conjunction with large-scale conventional 
control, so you’d knock possums down with toxins and then you’d use fertility 
control to keep the populations down (Interview 14, 23/4/2007). 
 
They’ll both complement each other.  At the moment you use your toxins, 
they drop the numbers right down and then numbers gradually, well quite 
quickly increase, and you have to go back in another four years.  With fertility 
control you might only go back every ten to twelve years (Interview 16, 
17/5/2006). 
 
Improving the outcomes achieved with current pest control techniques was also a high 
priority for the other mode of intended benefit of the biocontrols, reduction of the 
risks of bovine tuberculosis spread by possums.  This goal was determined primarily 
by economic values, in terms of potential losses to New Zealand’s dairy industry and 
threats to New Zealand’s exports and international reputation.224  The government 
                                                 
223 Studies demonstrated the successful establishment of a likely vector for GM biocontrols, the 
gutworm Parastrongyloides trichosuri, through previously uninfected possum populations.  From a 
single release site in North-West Nelson, the parasite spread to infect animals over 8000 hectares of 
forest in just under four years (Cowan et al. 2005; Cowan et al. 2006; Ji 2009).  Subsequent research 
showed that a new P. trichosuri genotype successfully ‘invaded’ a population of possums already 
parasitised with an earlier form of the worm, and it was concluded that P. trichosuri had ‘all the 
attributes of a highly effective vector’ for a GM fertility control (Cowan et al. 2008, pp 573, 575). 
224 Potential losses to the meat and dairy sectors from bovine Tb were estimated at up to $1.3 billion 
annually (Ralston et al. 2002, p 2), or $5 billion over ten years (Environmental Risk Management 
Authority 2007b, p 11).  New Zealand is a member of the Office International des Epizooties (OIE), 
the world organisation for animal health, which imposes strict requirements for management of bovine 
Tb;  non-compliance with OIE standards could lead to trade barriers against New Zealand exports, or to 
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agency responsible for managing bovine Tb, the Animal Health Board (AHB), 
coordinates intensive pest control programmes using conventional poisoning methods:  
‘Reducing possum population densities in the wild remains the key to maintaining 
low overall herd infection rates’ (Animal Health Board 2010, p 6).225  However the 
justification for this work is focused on possums as carriers of bovine Tb, not on the 
damage they cause to ecosystems and wildlife.  While there is considerable practical 
synergy between the two frameworks of value and intended benefit – biodiversity 
conservation and protection of dairy and beef herds – there is also a significant 
disjunction.  An AHB manager, formerly a senior advisor for the Department of 
Conservation, interviewed for this thesis, acknowledged: 
[The two goals] mostly conveniently go side by side, or overlap… [but] in 
some areas, for example Banks Peninsula, we’ve got a history there of very 
effective possum control [and] we’ve achieved total eradication of 
tuberculosis, there’s no Tb there, none in the livestock and none in the 
wildlife.  So when we reach that point, as far as the Animal Health Board is 
concerned, that is “problem solved” and we can move on…  So that creates a 
risk that… as the Tb programme withdraws from areas where it’s been 
successful then yes, possum populations will naturally recover (Interview 28, 
18/4/2007). 
 
The respective possum control work of the Animal Health Board and conservation 
agencies such as the Department of Conservation are based in fundamentally different 
modes of value.  Tensions between the different kinds of benefit advanced as the 
rationale for the same activity – controlling possums – were recognised by some of 
the scientists researching GM biocontrols.  There was a strong sense that priority was 
given to economic concerns, in policy domains and broader public perceptions of 
environmental management, relative to more qualitative, ideals-based conservation 
goals.  As a university scientist working with the biocontrol programme explained: 
What’s really driving the possum biocontrol [research] is the bovine 
tuberculosis side of it…  The environment is a concern, yes, you can talk 
about threats to this and that and the other thing, but that doesn’t attract very 
much money.  But because there’s a threat through bovine Tb to one of the 
major industries of New Zealand, the dairy industry, then that gets people’s 
attention, yeah…  Everybody recognises [the environment] as being an 
important thing, but you can’t put a tangible sort of thing to it, you can’t give 
                                                 
consumer rejection of New Zealand dairy and meat products (Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment 2000, p 24). 
225 The AHB strategy of targeting priority areas with high densities of infected possums has achieved 
significant reductions in the levels of bovine Tb infection nation-wide;  in local areas, strategic 
intensive possum control results in the ‘disappearance ‘ of Tb (2010, pp 4, 10, 13, 29). 
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it a bottom line.  So if we lose all these native birds it doesn’t affect Joe 
Blow’s back pocket like the dairy industry does (Interview 18, 7/12/2006). 
 
The research trajectory of GM biocontrols as a potential technoscience innovation in 
New Zealand’s arsenal against possums was shaped by two constructs of perceived or 
intended benefit.  In Bourdieu’s terms (as outlined in Chapter Three), the symbolic 
capital of the economics-driven imperatives of New Zealand’s dairy sector was seen 
by some actors in the field as exerting stronger influence than other frameworks of 
social and environmental value.  The relative forcefulness of different narratives of 
benefit in key policy and sectoral domains, where decisions are made and directions 
set for technoscience R&D, is discussed in Chapter Seven below. 
 
In the end, pragmatic cost-effectiveness was a major factor in the closure of the 
possum biocontrols work in October 2010 (Green Party of New Zealand 2010; 
Wallace 2010).  The programme came to an end due to changed funding criteria;  
resources were prioritised to research into control methods targeting multiple pest 
species simultaneously, with the aim of getting more impact for the money invested 
(Foundation for Research Science and Technology 2010).  The withdrawal of support 
for GM biocontrols research highlights important questions around the frameworks of 
expectation and need underpinning technoscience innovation, and the justificatory 
benefit projections validating other GM research in New Zealand.  These issues are 
explored in the next chapter. 
 
Conclusions 
The extraordinary claims advanced for GM, as a technoscientific field that will 
deliver radically new products, techniques, knowledge, substances and living 
organisms, have established an irresistible appeal for many political, business and 
sectoral groups.  The persuasive power of this Promethean technology is asserted both 
in its capacity to intervene directly in the fabric of existence, creating new entities that 
would not be possible with ordinary scientific or production methods, and in its 
promise of enormous commercial profits. 
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From its inception GM research and the products and processes intended to be derived 
from it have been strongly associated with economic benefits – on a scale far beyond 
the resources available to many science research fields.  Not surprisingly, GM is 
positioned in policy, high-level strategic inquiry processes, and sector discourse and 
promotions as a necessary requirement for the growth and advancement of the 
nation’s economy.  The imperatives of international competitiveness, encapsulated in 
the analogy with Lewis Carroll’s Red Queen, only strengthen the perceived necessity 
for New Zealand engagement in this field. 
 
However, the benefit framings associated with GM are not solely oriented around 
commercial values.  Other purposes and intentions are significant in the shaping of 
this technoscientific field, including health and environmental benefits.  The unique 
focus of New Zealand’s research programme working on possible biocontrols for 
possums emphasised the potential of GM methods and knowledge to be applied for 
very different kinds of objectives from the economic priorities that predominate in the 
dominant modes of this technoscience.  Nevertheless, pragmatic concerns of costs and 
the protection of New Zealand’s primary production industries were inextricably 
intertwined with the more ideals-based, qualitative projections justifying GM research 
in this country. 
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Chapter Seven 
Patterns of association 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores some of the underlying patterns and implications of the work of 
benefit claims in technoscience.  The two preceding chapters focused on the benefit 
projections advanced for GM and wind energy in New Zealand, and the influence of 
expectations on research and innovation trajectories in these fields.  A focus on 
benefit claims highlights the close relationships between abstract constructs of 
intended future states and the present-time requirements of the electricity and biotech 
industries and New Zealand technoscience.  These sectors are the contexts within 
which claims for R&D and new technologies are embedded and deployed, and where 
expectations have symbolic and performative salience.  These domains are, moreover, 
competitive arenas where benefit projections are central to actors’ efforts to establish 
and maintain perceptions of the desirability, utility and worthiness of particular 
technology applications and of technoscience in general. 
 
This chapter investigates some of the underlying questions about technoscience 
paradigms and processes that run through the promotion of GM and wind energy in 
New Zealand.  What is the key to a “successful” benefit claim?  Chapters Five and 
Six have shown some constructs of expected future benefit exerting considerable 
appeal and persuasive influence in contested sociotechnical fields.  However, the 
projected beneficial outcomes of other potential technoscience applications have 
gained less traction in securing acceptance and support for those innovations and their 
diffusion.  Biotech advocates dream of the “killer app”, a product of genetic science 
offering benefits that are so irresistibly compelling it will sweep the market and make 
fortunes.  But what kinds of expectation – and what kinds of needs, imperatives, 
priorities and desires – generate the necessary momentum and ongoing commitment 
for R&D and uptake of new technologies?  What are the linkages between projected 
benefits from research and innovation, and the problems and demands for which 
technoscience is positioned as the answer? 
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The development trajectories of GM and wind energy in New Zealand show the 
importance of suitably compelling problems, failings or needs as drivers of R&D and 
innovation.  In discourse, policy, and the strategic dynamics of technoscience fields, 
these imperatives are the “other side” of benefit projections.  A range of negative 
scenarios are referenced as incentives for research and new technologies – from the 
vast scale and complexity of looming global environmental change to specific local 
threats to biodiversity, from the demands of international economic competition to the 
personal needs of individuals with debilitating diseases.  Such problems are useful 
strategic resources for the promotion and uptake of R&D and innovation, asserting a 
“problem push” to boost the appeal of a technoscientific “benefit pull”.  This chapter 
explores the significance of different framings of need, difficulty, lack and 
inadequacy in relation to the corresponding benefit claims in the legitimation of new 
research and technoscience options. 
 
Consideration of these dimensions of benefit projections also draws attention to the 
diverse registers of value that underpin the framing of anticipated outcomes from 
R&D and new technologies.  Advocacy and justification for technoscience can be 
oriented around fundamentally different priorities and criteria.  An obvious instance 
of this are the tensions between promotion of economic or commercial objectives, and 
a focus on non-monetary public-good goals.  But the mix of benefit constructs is often 
more nuanced and complicated than simple contrasts or dichotomies, and multiple 
value frameworks can coexist and overlap.  This chapter explores the heterogeneity of 
the narratives of benefit and need advanced for GM and wind energy in New Zealand.  
The development trajectories and strategic positioning of innovation in these two 
fields show the significance of different modes of expectation.  A major distinction is 
between outcomes intended for the benefit of external stakeholders or society at large, 
and research objectives focused around technoscience communities and institutions 
themselves.  This pattern is evident in the respective approaches of the two sectors to 
R&D, and the strong priority given to maintaining active involvement of New 
Zealand researchers in GM. 
 
 183 
Any prediction or projection into the future can only express actors’ intentions and 
assumptions.  Projections of benefit from technoscience research and innovation may 
prove to be less compellingly persuasive than advocates would hope;  needs, contexts 
and assessment criteria may change;  and actual events may turn out to be something 
quite unexpected.  Nevertheless, technoscience discourses typically assert a confident 
inevitability.  The desirability and advantages of a new technology or application are 
unquestionable in its representation in R&D policy and sectors’ strategic positioning 
and advocacy.  It is taken for granted that the benefits will eventuate, will be 
recognised and appreciated, and will inexorably carry the innovation forward to 
successful uptake and diffusion.  But the stories of GM and wind energy in New 
Zealand include many research programmes and development proposals where, over 
just a few years, the momentum was not sustained – usually fading quietly away in 
comparison to earlier enthusiastic projections.  In both fields, innovation projects 
were closed down, not renewed past the initial term, or never actually implemented 
despite receiving regulatory approval.  This chapter concludes with a brief assessment 
of such failures.  They reinforce the understanding that the principal importance of 
constructs of future technoscience benefit is not actually in any relation to future 
outcomes.  The primary purpose of benefit claims (and needs framings) is to provide 
leverage and legitimation for present-time R&D activity. 
 
The “dark side” of benefit claims 
The projection of attractive future benefits from technoscientific R&D and innovation 
is crucial to secure the support, resourcing and societal acceptance necessary for 
ongoing research work and uptake of new technologies.  But the visions and scenarios 
of expected benefits are often given additional persuasive impetus by their opposites – 
the problems, failings and inadequacies which the innovation is intended to address.  
A strategic symbiosis is established between problems of various kinds and their 
projected solution through technoscience (van Lente 2000, p 55; Michael 2000b, p 
22).  Sturken and Thomas (2004, p 9) describe a pattern where ‘responses to new 
technologies are… shaped by both a sense of lack and loss and a hopeful investment 
in the possibility of resolving that lack and loss in the future’. 
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Dysfunction or constraints may be evident in current technologies, systems and 
products, but anticipated future difficulties can also exert pressure for change to new 
modes, as discussed in Chapter Three.  Problems highlighted as the “other side” of the 
drive for technoscientific innovations and improvements may be framed as severe and 
intractable, urgent and unavoidable – the crisis or major failure emphasised by Kuhn 
(1996) and Perez (2002) as necessary to generate a shift to a new paradigm.  Often, 
however, the momentum comes from a more loosely-defined construct of chronic 
inadequacy or limitation, as described by van Lente (1993) and Constant (1987).  The 
compulsion for technoscientific change may be found in a generic insecurity or fears 
of possible future decline, as in the patterns described in Chapter Two as the Red 
Queen imperative.  Whether specific or broad, urgent or creeping, problem constructs 
are important for an understanding of the discursive and strategic framing of the 
intended benefits of R&D and innovation.  The trajectories of GM and wind energy in 
New Zealand show the full range of different kinds of problem constructs, from the 
immediate to more distant far-term issues, and from the direct demands of particular 
situations to more diffuse concerns. 
 
Many of the technoscience actors interviewed for this thesis acknowledged the value 
of sufficiently significant problems as imperatives to justify investment in research 
and technological change.  A biotechnology policy advisor at the Ministry of 
Research, Science and Technology admitted the usefulness of such incentives:  ‘Yep, 
that would certainly help… absolutely, a really serious problem…  The “burning 
platform” they call it in policy-speak… facing disaster’ (Interview 45, 9/5/2006).  An 
AgResearch scientist noted ruefully that:  ‘unfortunately it often takes crises before 
people come to any understanding, till they see things clearly and are willing to make 
a move or do anything’ (Interview 46, 8/3/2007).  Benefit claims and the difficulties 
demanding solution can be seen as two sides of the same scenario.  The inseparable 
nature of problem and answer was argued by the CEO of a Canterbury wind energy 
firm:  ‘The benefit is part of the dichotomy.  You have to compare it with something, 
you know, everything needs contrasts, yin and yang, black and white’ (Interview 31, 
28/4/2006).  This kind of duality is evident in both the GM and wind energy sectors 
and wider technology policy in New Zealand, linking problems or crises with 
corresponding benefit claims, to promote the need for change and justify investment 
in research and new systems. 
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The answer is blowin’ in the wind226 
The unavoidability of major new environmental challenges requiring innovative 
technological responses is a central strand in the story of wind energy in New Zealand 
and internationally.  Over the last twenty years, global climate change due to the 
effects of human activity has become generally recognised as a reality that demands 
appropriate action and change (Ereaut & Segnit 2006; Stern 2006; Dawson & 
Spannagle 2009; Quaschning 2009; European Renewable Energy Council 2010).  
“Green” has become an active verb, with diverse creative initiatives intended to shift 
production systems, agriculture, infrastructure, buildings, energy and transport to 
more environmentally sustainable modes (Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment 2002, 2004a, 2007; McNeil 2009; Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment 2011a; Mulcare 2012; Pure Advantage 2012).227  As outlined in Chapter 
Five, New Zealand is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, and has established 
legislation and policy recognising climate change and instituting measures to address 
national greenhouse gas emissions.228 
 
For the electricity sector, this has brought an increased emphasis on renewable energy 
that does not depend on fossil fuels.  The technical challenges of maintaining security 
of supply and satisfying growing demand for electricity could be addressed by 
building more coal or gas fired generation plants in New Zealand.229  But the official 
                                                 
226 With apologies to Bob Dylan.  This slogan featured prominently in the reception area of the 
Christchurch offices of turbine design and construction company Windflow Technology Ltd, visited in 
2006. 
227 Numerous campaigns and companies are enthusiastically promoting new technology options;  for 
example the UK’s Zero Energy Design (www.zedfactory.com ), Australia’s the Shaper Group 
encouraging sustainable business practices (www.shapergroup.com ), and New Zealand collaborations 
such as the Sustainable Business Network (www.sustainable.org.nz ), the Sustainable Design Group 
(www.sustainabledesign.org.nz ), and the Sustainability Society, a technical group fostering sustainable 
engineering (www.thesustainabilitysociety.org.nz ). 
228 These include the New Zealand Energy Strategy (New Zealand Government 2007, 2010, 2011a);  
initiatives around energy efficiency and sustainability such as the National Energy Efficiency and 
Conservation Strategy (New Zealand Government 2001);  and an amendment to the Resource 
Management Act (section 7(ba), (i) and (j)), adding the requirement that environmental decision-
makers must “have particular regard to… the effects of climate change” and “the benefits to be derived 
from the use and development of renewable energy” (Climate Change Response Act 2002). 
229 The National government’s revision of the country’s Energy Strategy (New Zealand Government 
2010, 2011a) was notable for its emphasis on New Zealand’s coal and gas industries;  this policy shift 
is discussed in Chapter Five. 
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recognition of climate change introduces new criteria;  using fossil fuels to produce 
electricity is reframed as part of the problem. 
 
Wind energy technology delivers a wider mix of benefits than other modes of 
generation, as outlined in Chapter Five.  The environmental benefits also translate into 
economic credits, and satisfy the requirements of New Zealand’s policy and Kyoto 
commitments.  Advocates for wind generation have maximised leverage from the 
political and environmental demands of climate change to position this technology as 
a key part of a shift to new eco-friendly energy systems (Meridian Energy 2005a; 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2005a, 2006c; Pyle 2012).  Sector 
actors interviewed for this thesis endorsed wind energy’s contributions (Interviews 9, 
13, 26, 33, 41, 43, 44, 48;  2006).  Consciousness of the scale and severity of possible 
impacts of environmental change was a key driver for many interviewees’ 
involvement in this technology.  The CEO of a small turbine company described his 
horror at Europe’s heavy air pollution as motivating his advocacy for renewable 
energy (Interview 31; 28/4/2006).  The Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment’s energy policy advisor posed apocalyptic climate change scenarios as 
an incentive for innovative thinking and societal change: 
If in the future the water’s up to halfway up Bowen Street here, which it most 
probably will be in a century or so, and we can’t grow the crops that we used 
to grow, and we’ve lost the kauri…  yes it is life-threatening (Interview 10; 
16/8/2006).230 
 
The dialectical nature of problem and solution runs through a range of contexts and 
discourse in New Zealand’s energy sector.  Some policy documents place strong 
emphasis on the severity of climate change and the urgency of taking action.  To give 
just two examples:  the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment’s 
assessment of the sector’s environmental performance is framed within ‘the shadow 
of this enormous global challenge’ (2006b, p 6);  and the energy and efficiency 
strategies developed by the previous Labour government (New Zealand Government 
2001, 2007) highlight the new global context as an unavoidable societal imperative: 
                                                 
230 The Bowen Street building in Wellington housing the PCE offices is (at present) 17 metres above 
sea level (http://www.daftlogic.com/sandbox-google-maps-find-altitude.htm ).  The iconic kauri tree 
(Agathis australis) has a limited geographical and climatic range in northern regions of New Zealand 
(www.doc.govt.nz/conservation/native-plants/kauri; www.kauridieback.co.nz/home/about-kauri/kauri-
ecology.aspx ). 
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The quest for sustainability is a defining issue of the 21st century…  Tackling 
climate change will require each and every one of us to do what we can, with 
all sectors playing their part…  the predicted costs and risks of inaction would 
prove to be unacceptably high (New Zealand Government 2007, pp 5, 14).231 
 
Climate change features in such official discourse, and also in the application of 
policy in the decision-making for particular wind energy projects.  The spectre of 
climate change, and the need to uphold New Zealand’s Kyoto obligations, provide 
justification for approval of windfarm proposals.  An example is Meridian Energy’s 
Project West Wind at Makara near Wellington.  The original consent and the later 
Environment Court appeal judgement both relied on arguments for the advantages of 
wind energy technology as a response to the problems of global sustainability.232  The 
project’s benefits are assessed in relation to climate change as an environmental, 
political and moral imperative: 
[N]ot only do wind farms assist with the contribution to national energy 
renewable targets, they also assist with the country’s climate change 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol…  Project West Wind… would provide 
10% of the national renewable energy target…  Development of wind farms is 
an environmentally responsible way of both fulfilling the economic needs of 
the community while protecting the planet for future generations (Wellington 
City Council v Meridian Energy Ltd, Joint Hearings Commissioners 
Wellington SR 131428, 21 December 2005, pp i, 7, 43).233 
 
Such imperatives have been influential in the consent processes for other windfarm 
applications.  For example, the Environment Court appeal decision for the proposed 
Awhitu windfarm south of Auckland includes discussion of the benefits of renewable 
energy in terms of New Zealand’s international commitments (Genesis Power Ltd v 
Franklin District Council [A 148/2005]).234 
                                                 
231 The 2007 Energy Strategy moves from an explanation of global climate change (New Zealand 
Government 2007, pp 15-16) to a strongly prescriptive position in favour of renewable energy, with a 
target for 90% of New Zealand’s electricity to be from renewables by 2025 (2007, pp 19, 22, 37). 
232 These approvals were made under the 2004 amendments to the Resource Management Act s7, 
which require decision-makers to ‘have particular regard to the effects of climate change [and] the 
benefits to be derived from the use and development of renewable energy’ (Meridian Energy Ltd v 
Wellington City Council, Environment Court Wellington, W031/2007, 14 May 2007, p 92). 
233 The Makara appeal decision endorses these principles.  It includes a lengthy summary of evidence 
presented to the hearing by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and offers a calculation of 
the greenhouse gases that would be produced in generating West Wind’s projected output by fossil fuel 
driven generation:  ‘If that amount of electricity was instead produced by burning coal, something like 
540,000 tonnes of CO2 would be emitted to the atmosphere, per annum’ (Meridian Energy Ltd v 
Wellington City Council, Environment Court Wellington, W031/2007, 14 May 2007, p 105). 
234 The Awhitu windfarm proposal received official consent but has not yet been constructed 
(http://windenergy.org.nz/nz-wind-farms/proposed-wind-farms/awhitu , 
http://www.genesisenergy.co.nz/genesis/about-us/company-information/history ). 
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Controversy around the Makara windfarm highlights another dimension of the 
strategic co-construction of benefits and problems in the justification of technological 
developments.  Meridian faced fierce opposition from the small Makara community, 
who sought to preserve the rural landscape and tranquil backwater character of their 
valley beneath the giant turbines.235  But the company’s promotional campaign 
emphasised benefits and values on a much grander scale – the imperatives of global 
sustainability and reducing greenhouse gas emissions (for example, Meridian Energy 
2005b, pp 5, 11). 
 
Michael (2000b, pp 26-27) identifies the ‘different rhetorical functions’ and relative 
influence of individual subjects as opposed to collective interests in technoscience 
discourse, and this imbalance was played out at Makara.  The residents’ opposition 
was countered by framing local concerns in contrast to larger regional, national and 
global benefits.  Meridian’s project manager explained the tactical isolation of the 
protest group: 
There seems to be alot of reluctance of people to accept things that may 
impose on their lifestyle for the public good, the national good…  We did a 
much wider campaign to educate the whole community about wind energy and 
the benefits…  The objective of that really was to try and marginalise the 
people at Makara…  We wanted to get the silent majority to stand up and say 
“yeah, we all think it’s a great idea, what are you people at Makara whingeing 
about?” (Interview 13, 18/4/2006).236 
 
Global environmental priorities had crucial significance in the formal consent and 
appeal processes for Project West Wind.  The consent decision acknowledged the 
‘conflict between the national benefit and the local costs’ but concluded that ‘the 
global and national benefits outweigh the local costs’ (Wellington City Council v 
Meridian Energy Ltd, Joint Hearings Commissioners Wellington SR 131428, 21 
December 2005, p ii).  The appeal process also focused on the appropriate weighting 
                                                 
235 The windfarm’s physical scale is detailed in Chapter Five. 
236 This strategy was acknowledged by others in the sector.  The CEO of a Christchurch turbine 
company, commenting on the issues for projects challenged by local interests, noted the advantages of 
mobilising broader public support for wind technology as an environmentally friendly means of 
producing electricity:  ‘What Meridian have done with Project West Wind will become more common I 
think, where it will be a bit of a popularity contest, where you… get lots of people to write in and 
support it, because the majority of people do [understand the environmental benefits of wind energy]’ 
(Interview 31, 28/4/2006). 
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to be given to the broader sustainability benefits (Meridian Energy Ltd v Wellington 
City Council, Environment Court Wellington, W031/2007, 14 May 2007, p 124).237 
 
These decisions endorse the importance – strategic, procedural and political – of a 
sufficiently major problem to justify new technology developments.  In the policy and 
discourse of the New Zealand electricity sector, the co-construction of climate change 
as an imperative, and wind energy technologies as an answer, has supported the 
introduction of this innovation.  Recognition of global climate change, and the 
statutory and moral obligations to minimise its effects, have established a powerful 
legitimation for wind energy in New Zealand. 
 
Finding a “killer app” 
Such patterns in the electricity sector have the advantage of a single, universally 
relevant problem for which wind generation and other renewable energy technologies 
are positioned as solutions.  Global climate change may be wickedly complex, 
multifarious in its implications, and persistently contested, but it is one major, well-
recognised phenomenon with potential impacts across all levels of society.  In the 
strategic discourse of the biotechnology sector, the problems which GM is positioned 
to address are more heterogeneous, and more the concerns of particular groups and 
interests.  The benefits projected from proposed applications of the GM research 
undertaken in New Zealand span a range of priorities – health, agricultural efficiency, 
biodiversity protection, new food products – as well as generic societal and sectoral 
objectives such as economic growth or the competitiveness of New Zealand’s science 
institutions.  In contrast to the wind energy story, where the problem-solution dialectic 
is focused primarily on climate change, GM technoscience is linked to multiple 
modes of presumed need and benefit. 
 
The potential of GM to provide solutions to the medicinal requirements of sufferers of 
chronic diseases features strongly in New Zealand’s transgenic livestock research.  
Project proposals emphasise the difficulties faced by individuals afflicted with 
gruesome conditions for which treatments might be developed from the milk of GM 
                                                 
237 The appeal was rejected, with some negotiation of turbine siting in mitigation of the residents’ 
concerns. 
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animals.  An early example is the 1998 field test of sheep modified to secrete the 
human protein alpha-1-antitrypsin (AAT) in their milk.  The primary intended benefit 
was the production of a biopharmaceutical for treating cystic fibrosis, congenital AAT 
deficiency, and other conditions.238  The severity of these diseases was made clear: 
Cystic fibrosis is the most common life-threatening genetic disorder… 
morbidity and mortality from CF primarily result from the effects of chronic 
pulmonary inflammation and infection…  life expectancy is about half of that 
of unaffected individuals…  Congenital AAT deficiency is an autosomal 
recessive disorder [which] predisposes affected individuals… to early onset of 
severe emphysema and premature death (Environmental Risk Management 
Authority 1998b, p 4). 
 
The rationale for research into GM options was based on claimed inadequacies in the 
existing means of production of medicines, including limited supply and the risk of 
disease from plasma-derived products (1998b, p 4). 
 
Other project applications for GM livestock work in New Zealand highlight the 
conditions for which biopharmaceuticals and new foods might be developed from 
transgenic products, and the potential commercial returns of the medicinal markets.  
AgResearch’s first application to develop GM cattle targeted multiple sclerosis and 
allergenicity to dairy products (AgResearch 1998, pp 3, 6, 14).239  AgResearch 
emphasised the debilitating effects of MS and the inadequacies of current therapies: 
MS is a chronic demyelinating disease of the human central nervous system 
that occurs in one in every 1,000 people, and is associated with clinical 
neurological signs of paralysis…  At present the only approved therapies for 
the treatment of MS are adrenocorticotropic hormone and IFN-β.  Rather than 
relying on systemic immunosuppression, methods that result in 
unresponsiveness of specifically autoreactive cells would be a valuable 
addition to treatment strategies for MS (1998, p 6).240 
 
Subsequent AgResearch projects also stressed the medical problems which its GM 
work aimed to treat.  Its 2002 application for further research with GM cattle focused 
                                                 
238 ERMA’s evaluation of these benefits included an estimation of the company revenue, based on the 
costs of similar pharmaceutical products multiplied by the number of patients globally, as $NZ1.1B for 
cystic fibrosis and $NZ900M for congenital deficiency (Environmental Risk Management Authority 
1998b, p 38). 
239 ERMA’s evaluation of this proposal included a summary of global research into treatments for 
multiple sclerosis, describing trials with bovine myelin and noting that results were inconclusive, 
despite AgResearch’s enthusiasm (Environmental Risk Management Authority 1999a, pp 39-40). 
240 When ERMA’s initial approval of this work was appealed (Bleakley v ERMA [AP 177/00]), 
AgResearch issued a media release emphasising the medical intentions of the research and suggesting 
that the appeal decision ‘will be frustrating for MS sufferers’ (McGuinness et al. 2008b, pp 32, 55). 
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on the ‘expression of large amounts of functional human and other therapeutic and 
bioactive proteins in milk’ (AgResearch 2002, p 7).  The need for this science was 
argued in relation to the scarcity and high value of the desired proteins (2002, p 8).  
An email was attached to the application from the Research Director of the New 
Zealand Multiple Sclerosis Society, endorsing the project as ‘central to resolving the 
problem of MS’ (2002, p 69).241  AgResearch’s 2007 application for work with a 
range of GM animals identified a range of agricultural and technoscientific 
opportunities, but again focused strongly around production of therapeutic proteins, 
antigens, enzymes and hormones in milk (AgResearch 2007a, pp 4-5; 2007b, pp 77-
78).242  Inadequacies in the current availability of these substances were argued as 
justification for investigating GM methods: 
[These proteins] are either difficult to produce in economically viable 
quantities using conventional systems (e.g. cell cultures) or cannot be 
produced in a biologically functional way using any other method [than 
transgenic livestock] (AgResearch 2007b, p 9).243 
 
Research work with GM livestock in New Zealand has been positioned in relation to 
the desperation of sufferers of painful, incurable diseases.  The purposes and projected 
benefits of the transgenic animal trials are strategically associated with problems for 
which existing medicine can offer little hope.  This positioning is supported by the 
discursive framing of GM as a “miracle” technology, enabling breakthroughs that 
would otherwise be impossible, discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
                                                 
241 The MS Society also acknowledged the commercial potentials, enthusing that:  ‘control of the 
supply of a standardized functional human myelin basic protein would place an organization in an 
extremely strong scientific position… the opportunities ahead for the innovative groups are real’ 
(AgResearch 2002, p 69). 
242 Other potentials included dairy products with lower fat and reduced allergenicity, and “designer 
foods” intended to reduce obesity-related health problems such as heart disease and diabetes 
(AgResearch 2007b, pp 27, 76). 
243 The scale of these opportunities was realistically assessed as a niche market, potentially involving 
only a few New Zealand farmers and sites, as ‘[t]hese proteins are required in volumes that can be 
produced easily by small numbers of specially bred animals which will be kept in containment’ 
(AgResearch 2007a, p 8).  Nevertheless AgResearch claimed significant economic returns from new 
agriculture based biotechnology industries, including processing (2007a, p 35).  Revenue from one 
currently approved biopharmaceutical product was cited as ‘more than USD$23 billion in 2006 
estimated to grow to USD$36 billion by 2012’ (AgResearch 2007b, p 84).  AgResearch argued the 
necessity for New Zealand farming to move from ‘a strategy based on low costs of production’ to the 
increased returns anticipated from biopharmaceuticals and nutraceuticals (2007b, p 9).  However the 
claimed economic benefits from biopharming in New Zealand have been strongly contested;  projected 
profits do not compare well with the projected losses in agriculture and tourism revenue, as outlined in 
Chapter Six (Sanderson et al. 2003; Kaye-Blake et al. 2007; Goven et al. 2008). 
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Like wind energy technology, the New Zealand research into GM vegetables and 
biocontrols (detailed in Chapter Six) was strategically positioned as helping to fix 
major environmental problems.  Here, however, the R&D was framed in relation to 
difficulties in current agricultural production and pest management methods, rather 
than distant future threats.  Work on crops resistant to herbicides, pests and diseases 
was justified as addressing problems of intensive chemical use in industrial-scale 
agriculture.244  A scientist researching GM vegetables at Crop & Food highlighted the 
impacts of conventional commercial growing systems: 
In most countries they’ll put on thirteen applications of pesticide a year to 
control the disease [potato blight], just do it routinely all through the growing 
season.  In New Zealand it’s usually about six or seven applications in most 
places, but up to twelve or thirteen in Pukekohe which is much more humid 
and warmer (Interview 11, 8/11/2006). 
 
The intended reduction of agrichemicals, pesticide residues in soils and ground water, 
and production costs, are key benefits argued in Crop & Food’s applications for field 
trials of GM vegetables (Environmental Risk Management Authority 1998c, p 30).245  
The proposals outlined the extent of the problems with existing growing methods: 
In New Zealand the application of 10 to 15 different, mainly toxic and 
persistent herbicides, to one crop during one season is not uncommon.  The 
use of these herbicides and other pesticides on onion crops has been identified 
by MAF as a major sustainability challenge for the New Zealand industry…  
Data indicate that New Zealand onion exporters use up to 16 L/ha of 
formulated herbicide ingredient per season to control weeds (Crop & Food 
Research 2003, pp 8-9).246 
 
The goal of developing solutions to major environmental pollution problems was also 
highlighted as a strong personal motivation for the scientists.  Researchers at Crop & 
                                                 
244 The claims of developers of GM crops that chemical applications will be reduced have been 
contradicted by actual experience (for example, Nestle 2012). 
245 Benefits for soils were also claimed from reduced tillage, and it was anticipated that growers would 
save on machinery use and fossil fuel from fewer herbicide application passes (for example, Crop & 
Food Research 2003, p 9).  Related pest control problems, such as thrips in onion production, were also 
identified as potentially being reduced via more efficient herbicide management with glyphosate-
resistant GM crops (2003, p 10). 
246 The GM onion research proposal projected savings for New Zealand growers of 11 litres of 
herbicide per hectare per season, amounting to ‘a 70% reduction in herbicide usage…  From an 
economic viewpoint this saving equates to about $500 per hectare of herbicide or about $2.6 million 
across the country per year’ (Crop & Food Research 2003, p 11).  MAF was the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, now restructured to become the Ministry for Primary Industries 
(www.mpi.govt.nz ). 
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Food, interviewed for this thesis, emphasised their focus on the benefits of reducing 
toxic chemicals in the environment (Interviews 2 and 11);  one scientist explained: 
I originally got into it [GM science] from an environmental perspective…  I 
spent alot of time working on my uncle’s farm when I was a child and I got to 
know about the inputs.  And just the books of our generation, such as Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring… and you read those books and you get influenced by 
them.  And then as a geneticist you see the power of this technology to 
actually be able to alleviate some of those issues (Interview 17, 17/7/2006). 
 
Concerns about the widespread application of noxious poisons were also a major 
focus for the New Zealand research into GM biocontrols for possums, discussed in 
Chapter Six.  The regular aerial dispersal of 1080 baits to kill possums is a fiercely 
contested practice, despite regulatory agencies’ assurances of its safety and 
effectiveness (Environmental Risk Management Authority 2007a, 2007b; 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2011b).  Furthermore, as noted by 
biocontrol researchers interviewed for this thesis, the results of 1080 drops are of 
limited duration, and control operations must be repeated after a few years to prevent 
repopulation (Interviews 14, 16, 18, 28).  As an AgResearch scientist explained:  ‘the 
basic premise is that the current methods of possum control are not sustainable’ 
(Interview 25; 6/12/2006).  The biocontrols research was strongly associated with the 
environmental and societal benefits of minimising the need for 1080 applications 
(Royal Commission on Genetic Modification 2001a, p 110).  A biocontrols scientist 
argued that:  ‘the benefit is reducing the use of those sorts of poisons, hopefully quite 
substantially, and there is also the lessening of the non-target effects’ (Interview 18; 
7/12/2006).247 
 
New Zealand GM research has been strategically positioned as focused on finding 
answers to ongoing environmental and health problems.  The benefits projected from 
this research are constructed in a dialectical relationship with dramatically negative 
scenarios.  However, as outlined in Chapter Six, New Zealand’s regulatory systems 
exclude such longer-term outcome projections from the assessment process for GM 
proposals;  only the specific outputs of the research project itself can be taken into 
account (Environmental Risk Management Authority 2000a, 2004).  Research is 
                                                 
247 Protests about 1080 often focus on its impacts on non-target species, including the native birds 
which possum control operations are intended to protect (www.stop1080poison.com/Page10.html;  
www.safe.org.nz/Campaigns/Ban-1080;  www.thegrafboys.org/poisoning-paradise.html ). 
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justified under claims of the value of scientific knowledge, and maintaining expertise 
in biotechnology.  But these project-focused benefits derive much of their importance 
and legitimacy from their claimed instrumentality – knowledge and expertise are 
valued for their intended contributions to New Zealand’s economic objectives and 
wider societal goals.  In turn, these wider generic justifications are given additional 
impetus by association with broader-level problems or threats.  As discussed in 
Chapter Two, the counter-argument to the Red Queen imperative is a chronic fear of 
economic decline and lost competitiveness.  A typical example of this pattern is the 
argument of the biotech industry (NZBio 2008b, p 3) that New Zealand should 
develop a “bioeconomy”:248 
New Zealand’s economy has been based on the primary sector for the last 150 
years.  In the past few years however… it has not been enough.  New 
Zealand’s GDP per capita and economic growth has been falling steadily in 
the OECD rankings…  If our economy is to grow it needs to diversify. 
 
NZBio frames these imperatives for New Zealand within the OECD’s judgement that: 
Those countries able to muster resources to invest in R&D and human capital 
formation… will move ahead, creating wealth within their societies and 
becoming leaders in innovation globally.  Those who fail to keep pace with 
these changes risk losing new global markets and compromising growth at the 
national level (cited in NZBio 2008b, p 3).249 
 
Such negative projections, and the dire consequences projected from a lack of 
commitment to new technoscience, assert a powerful impetus for research and 
innovation.  Benefit projections from R&D and new technologies are only half of the 
equation.  Both GM and wind energy initiatives gain legitimacy and momentum 
through the symbiotic association of their expected benefits with needs and 
difficulties of diverse kinds – the ravages of possums on native forests, the agony of 
those suffering from incurable diseases, the impacts of global warming, or the drive to 
lift the nation’s economic performance.  These imperatives range from the immediate 
to the remote, including both current difficulties and future potentials, urgent and 
                                                 
248 This term is an example of the common prefixing of “bio” to denote an instrumental dependence on 
genetic technoscience.  The concept of a “bioeconomy” encapsulates an ambitious economic 
renaissance driven by biotechnology, particularly the development of new medical and agricultural 
applications (for example, OECD International Futures Project 2009).  Some critiques offer more 
sceptical “bio” terms, such as Van Dijck’s discussion of “Biobucks and Biomania” (1998, Chapter 4). 
249 This dialectical co-construction of generic economic promise and threat is very common through 
sector and policy documents, speeches, conference presentations and media statements, both in New 
Zealand and internationally – as Leitch and Davenport (2007, p 46) observe, these discourses are 
‘highly formulaic’. 
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incremental conditions, specific local issues and global developments.  But all the 
various narratives of dysfunction share a key rationale – to strengthen the appeal of 
technoscience as the solution to society’s problems, and to ensure ongoing support 
and resourcing for R&D activity. 
 
Mixed benefits 
Innovation and R&D in GM and wind energy in New Zealand are promoted and 
justified through a range of diverse benefit projections where economic and non-
monetary value frameworks are continually intermingled.  Aims of commercial 
profitability and competitiveness are upheld alongside more altruistically-oriented 
public-interest objectives, commonly environmental or health benefits.  There are 
fundamental qualitative differences between the goals of making money and making 
the world a better place – the two basic registers of positive intention that underpin 
benefit claims for technoscience and innovation.  Yet in the discourses, policy and 
strategic positioning of actors and institutions in these fields, such differences are 
often blurred, and the two modes of expectation overlap, intertwine and support each 
other.  This section of the chapter explores some of the ways that this duality plays 
out in the stories of GM and wind energy in New Zealand. 
 
The co-existence of economic and public-good objectives is enshrined in the statutory 
and governance structures.  Technoscience research and the introduction of new 
technologies for essential services have primarily been undertaken in New Zealand by 
the Crown Research Institutes (CRIs), such as AgResearch, and State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs), such as Meridian Energy.250  As outlined in Chapters Five and 
Six, the legislation governing these government-owned entities asserts dual objectives 
for their operations – they must be successful businesses, efficient and financially 
profitable, while also acting in the interests of the community and working for the 
benefit of New Zealand.251  Policy for both the biotech and electricity sectors, and for 
New Zealand science, technology and innovation generically, establishes multiple 
                                                 
250 New Zealand’s relatively low proportion of private sector investment in science and technology 
R&D, and the heavy weighting of research funding from government, is an ongoing concern in policy 
and sector discourse (for example, OECD 2007, p 12). 
251 State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 ss4(1)(a) and (c);  Crown Research Institutes Act 1992 ss5(1)(a), 
5(2) and (3). 
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objectives for R&D and the diffusion of new technologies.  For example, the 
government’s high-profile Growth and Innovation Framework (2002, p 6), intended to 
boost research and new enterprises, recognises the importance of policies for ‘a 
modern cohesive society, a healthy population… [and] sound environmental 
management’ as well as economic objectives.  The successive versions of the New 
Zealand Energy Strategy (New Zealand Government 2007, pp 8, 26; 2011a, pp 1, 3, 
8-9) highlight societal priorities including energy efficiency, community initiatives 
and environmental sustainability alongside market management, investment 
incentives and the commercial impacts of emissions pricing.  The Biotechnology 
Strategy (New Zealand Government 2003, pp 1-4) includes recognition of the need 
for research to benefit health, the environment and biodiversity protection, as well as 
emphasising economic goals as outlined in Chapter Six.  The parameters set for the 
Royal Commission of Inquiry’s assessment of New Zealand’s potential development 
of GM were similarly wide-ranging (Royal Commission on Genetic Modification 
2001a, Chapters 3, 4 and 5). 
 
New Zealand’s regulatory systems for technologies and innovation also impose 
multiple requirements on new developments in the two fields.  The Electricity 
Commission had responsibility for managing pricing structures, ensuring the stability 
of an arcanely complicated electricity market system, and maintaining incentives for 
investment;  at the same time the Commission was required to ensure the 
environmental sustainability of the industry and its contribution to the nation’s 
climate change commitments.252  Regulation of GM research also combines economic 
and other kinds of criteria;  evaluations of proposals for new organisms research must 
consider anticipated economic benefits alongside expected impacts on the natural 
environment, public health, social and community matters, Maori cultural dimensions, 
and New Zealand’s international obligations (Hazardous Substances and New 
Organisms Act 1996 ss 5 & 6; Environmental Risk Management Authority 1998a, 
Clauses 9, 13, 14, 22). 
 
                                                 
252 Government Policy Statement, May 2009, www.electricitycommission.govt.nz/rulesandregs, 
www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC_40723.aspx.  The Commission was 
restructured in 2010 to become the Electricity Authority. 
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As seen in Chapters Five and Six, discourse and strategic positioning of agencies and 
companies in the two sectors associate technoscience innovation with an eclectic 
variety of benefit goals.  Even with research initiatives that are ostensibly aimed 
primarily towards idealistic public-good goals, the intended economic benefits are 
also highlighted.  The work on possum biocontrols was driven strongly by the 
imperatives of biodiversity protection, but the ongoing costs of existing pest 
management methods were a significant factor in the drive to develop alternative 
control technologies.253  Biocontrol scientists interviewed for this thesis described the 
intense pressure from environmental management agencies and interested sectors 
such as forestry to deliver new more cost-effective control tools (Interviews 14, 16, 18 
and 25).  The goals of saving indigenous ecosystems and wildlife from the 
depredations of possums are intertwined with the priorities of the New Zealand dairy 
industry;  for farmers, possum control is a matter of economic risk, with the dangers 
of possum-borne bovine Tb measured in potential lost earnings and damage to New 
Zealand’s international reputation and export markets.254  And, as outlined earlier in 
this chapter and in Chapter Six, the apparently altruistic purposes of research on GM 
livestock, aiming to produce proteins and other substances as the basis for 
pharmaceutical treatments for devastating diseases, are also combined with grand 
commercial ambitions.  Sector discourse and project proposals highlight the scale of 
international markets for the proposed pharmaceuticals, and emphasise the economic 
benefits to New Zealand agriculture of shifting from current commodity markets to 
such lucrative products.255 
 
Analysis of the diverse modes of expected benefit advanced for R&D and innovation 
in the two New Zealand fields shows agencies and research institutions deploying a 
kind of bricolage approach, bringing together disparate frameworks of reference in a 
patchwork of persuasiveness.  In both sectors’ discourses, and in policy and 
regulatory assessment processes, research activity and new technology options are 
linked not to any single objective but to multiple overlapping goals and benefit 
                                                 
253 As noted in Chapter Six, possum control cost New Zealand around $100 million per annum in the 
late 2000s (Cowan et al. 2008, p 573).  The national bovine Tb eradication programme cost an 
additional $87 million per annum (Environmental Risk Management Authority 2007a, p 6). 
254 A manager at the Animal Health Board, the agency responsible for managing New Zealand’s bovine 
Tb problem, expanded at length in his interview for this thesis on the huge costs and complex logistical 
problems faced by farmers when Tb is found in their herds (Interview 28, 18/4/2007). 
255 Claims of the economic opportunities of GM have been strongly contested, as noted in Chapter Six. 
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projections.  The strategic importance, for new technoscience initiatives, of 
establishing alliances and alignment with powerful and influential interests is 
discussed in Chapter Three.  Theorists of science and technology such as Latour 
(1987, 1996), Bijker (1995) and Kaplan and Tripsas (2008) stress the necessity for 
such connections between a project or research field and the social, sectoral and 
political support that will provide it with legitimacy, momentum and a raison d’etre.  
The trajectories of GM and wind energy innovation in New Zealand demonstrate the 
usefulness of maximising such positive associations, and building supportive links in 
as many directions as possible, as these sectors assert the utility, importance and 
desirability of their work. 
 
Although the legislative, institutional and policy frameworks establish multiple 
objectives and expectations for R&D and innovation, one orientation is widely 
valorised, accorded hegemonic priority, and automatically accepted as an inarguable 
rationale for new technoscientific ventures.  The increasing dominance of economic 
framings of purpose and benefit for R&D and new technologies has had enormous 
influence on innovation trajectories (Cartner & Bollinger 1997; Leitch & Davenport 
2005; Motion 2005; Goven 2006; Cronin 2008; Macdonald et al. 2011).  Motion and 
Weaver (2005, p 64) analyse the promotional framing of biotechnology, strategically 
‘rearticulated as an economic discourse in order to align GM with the “superordinate” 
agenda of mainstream New Zealand politics’.  As Henderson (2005, p 130) observes: 
[D]iscourse about science and technology has been colonized by economic 
discourse… reflect[ing] the concerns of organizations whose identity is 
associated with, and prioritizes, economic discourses centering on growth, 
profit, and market share.256 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, science and technology have long been conceptualised 
as necessary drivers of commercial profitability and progress, closely intertwined with 
Whiggish development teleologies.  These beliefs are reinforced by the frequent 
                                                 
256 Even the science research conducted with funding from the Marsden Fund, the government’s 
allocation of resourcing for “pure” or “blue-skies” research, is considered useful in terms of the 
marketable IP and new applications and products that can be developed from such work.  The criteria 
for the fiercely competitive Marsden funding focus primarily on the excellence of the science proposals 
and the contribution of new knowledge.  However, the CEO of the Royal Society of New Zealand, 
interviewed for this thesis, explained that ‘there’s as much commercialisable stuff coming out of 
Marsden good ideas as there is coming out of targeted research ideas’, and expanded on the serendipity 
principle for research discovery (Interview 49, 6/5/2006). 
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elision, in policy and sectoral discourse for technoscience and innovation, of 
economic growth with the achievement of other societal benefits.  This pattern is 
based in the assumption that qualitative outcomes – in public health, environmental 
sustainability, or general social wellbeing – will flow from financial prosperity and a 
strong economy.  As noted in Chapter Six, the Royal Commission on GM presumes a 
‘symbiotic’ relationship between economic and social goals (2001a, p 12).  Weaver 
and Motion (2002, pp 329, 330, 340) point out that: 
In a market-driven political economy the public interest and the market are 
constructed as one and the same…  [New Zealand’s research institutes] 
interpret ‘benefits’ as contributing to the nation’s economic competitiveness…  
the ‘public interest’ has been subsumed by corporate and market interests. 
 
Government policy consistently position R&D and technological innovation as 
prerequisites for economic growth and competitiveness, as noted above and in 
Chapters One and Six.257  The successive restructurings of New Zealand’s 
government agencies responsible for technoscience development reflects the 
increasing prioritisation of commercial objectives.  Over the time period covered by 
this thesis, the titles of the ministries show this trend:  from the Ministry of Research, 
Science and Technology, to the Ministry of Science and Innovation set up in 2011, to 
the new “super-ministry” of Business, Innovation and Employment announced in 
2012.  However, technoscience communities’ responses to the imposition of such 
reorientation are salutary, indicating that the dominance of economic priorities is not 
absolute (Hunt 2003; Fisher et al. 2005; Small & Fisher 2005; Small & Mallon 2007).  
The reactions of New Zealand scientists to the formation of the new super-ministry 
provide a small illustration of the tensions.  The Royal Society of New Zealand 
initially welcomed the creation of the new agency on the grounds that it ‘recognises 
the central importance of science and research and innovation in stimulating 
innovation and wealth creation’ (RSNZ media release, 15 March 2012);  but the 
RSNZ media statement also urged government acknowledgement of ‘the broader role 
of this country’s science, research and knowledge expertise… [and] the essential 
contribution that environmental, social, humanities and health research must make to 
                                                 
257 New Zealand policy assumptions are reinforced by economic thinking and processes at international 
levels, such as the OECD review of New Zealand’s systems for innovation (2007, pp 15-16), which 
recommends:  ‘fostering market-pulled innovation throughout the economy… mak[ing] the business 
environment more supportive of R&D and innovation… [and] removing obstacles to increased 
entrepreneurship and growth of small high-technology / high value-added businesses’. 
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the wellbeing of New Zealand.’258  A week later, following expressions of concern 
from its membership, the RSNZ publicly released its letter of protest to the Minister 
responsible, criticising ‘the absence of the word “Science” or “Research” in the title’ 
of the new agency.  The RSNZ argued that: 
Undoubtedly, science and research are very important to New Zealand in 
stimulating innovation & [sic] wealth creation.  There are, however, many 
other reasons for the public investment in research, including protecting public 
health, sustaining land-based industries, managing our natural resources and 
informing evidence based policy…  the absence of the word “science” could 
send an unfortunate signal giving the impression that science and research 
may somehow be overlooked (22 March 2012, letter from Dr Garth Carnaby, 
President of the Royal Society of New Zealand, to Hon Steven Joyce, Minister 
of Science and Innovation).259 
 
The assertion of economic framings of meaning and value as a primary rationale for 
technoscience R&D in New Zealand has had significant effects on the trajectories of 
research and innovation in GM and wind energy.  Chapters Five and Six outline the 
dominance of business and commercial projections in the benefit claims that justify 
new developments in these fields.  Assumptions of profit and improved sector 
competitiveness are prominent in the promotion of GM innovation, both in New 
Zealand and internationally, as detailed in Chapter Six.  Business priorities are evident 
in the expectation that wind energy technology will only be adopted in configurations 
that are compatible with the commercial bottom lines of generation companies – the 
“Big Wind” model discussed in Chapter Five.  But, as outlined earlier in this section, 
the intended economic outcomes from R&D and innovation are not the only modes of 
appeal that are advanced in the performative work of benefit claims for technoscience.  
As the RSNZ’s defence of New Zealand research indicates, other kinds of value and 
other societal priorities are also crucially important. 
 
                                                 
258 See www.royalsociety.org.nz . 
259 Nevertheless, the Royal Society also actively promotes the economic benefits of science research 
and technological innovation, through such initiatives as the 2012 Transit of Venus summit, including a 
high-profile session on ‘Science and Prosperity’ (www.royalsociety.org.nz/events/2012-transit-of-
venus-forum-lifting-our-horizon/ ), or a panel discussion on Radio NZ (12 August 2012) where Sir 
Peter Gluckman, Chief Science Advisor to the Prime Minister, and prestigious representatives of 
business, economics and academic research institutions debate the role of science in providing ‘an 
answer to New Zealand’s economic problems’ (RSNZ Alert, Issue 729, 
www.royalsociety.org.nz/category/alert-newsletter/ ). 
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The heterogeneity of the different benefit projections that create meaning and 
legitimacy for research activity and the introduction of new technologies in New 
Zealand can be seen in itself as evidence of the limitations of economic value 
frameworks.  Associating an R&D project or technoscience field with altruistic 
public-good ideals offers significant advantages in terms of creating meaning for that 
innovation and establishing positive symbolic value.  These dimensions matter not 
only for publics and societal groups with a particular interest in the issue, such as the 
patient advocacy organisations who supported research aiming to develop new 
pharmaceuticals.  Perceptions of the worthiness of a technoscience field, and of the 
ethical importance of the problems research is intended to address, are also central to 
the motivation and identity of practitioners, and to the corporate branding of agencies 
and firms.  For example, Meridian’s strong positioning as an environmentally 
conscious provider of renewables-derived electricity is embodied in its innovative 
sustainable office building, described in Chapter Five.  The scientists working on 
possum biocontrols and GM vegetables are driven by a commitment to environmental 
protection, as detailed in Chapter Six. 
 
Projections of qualitative and ethics-based societal benefits from R&D and innovation 
provide, in Bourdieu’s terms (discussed in Chapter Three), powerful symbolic capital 
for projects and fields.  Although Bourdieu acknowledges the convertibility of 
different forms of symbolic capital, the framings of non-monetary benefit that are part 
of the strategic advancement of GM and wind energy in New Zealand serve a distinct 
purpose in the legitimation and promotion of these innovations.  The value of these 
qualities is not entirely covered by their translation into the corresponding economic 
value, such as increased market share from the appeal of a “green” brand, revenue 
from carbon credits under the emissions trading scheme, or research funding secured 
via the lobbying of patient advocacy groups.  The qualitative intangible benefit 
constructs offer satisfaction of deeper human and societal needs for purpose, 
worthiness and relevance, that the reductive quantitative frameworks of the “dismal 
science” simply cannot deliver.  These ideals-based benefit frameworks give 
technoscience and innovations a kind of credibility, a rationale that is more than just a 
balance sheet or profit calculation. 
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Theorists of science and technology have developed models of the dynamics of 
processes and structures in fields where the gestalt is created or comprised in a 
fundamental duality – two different aspects or qualities interacting, each defined in a 
symbiotic dialectical relationship with the “other”.  Latour (1987) offers a series of 
“Janus-faces” to explain the coexistence of radically polarised meanings, norms, 
assumptions and principles in the practice and representation of science;  he argues 
that to understand the workings of research and technology fields, ‘we will have to 
learn to live with two contradictory voices talking at once’ (1987, p 13).  Latour 
shows how – through various discursive, epistemological and strategic aspects of the 
legitimation and development of R&D activity and new knowledge – both sides of the 
“Janus-face” are useful and important in the overall processes and construction of 
technoscience.  Rip (1992, pp 231-233, 252) uses a metaphor of science and 
technology as ‘dancing partners’, stepping forward and backward together in a 
dynamic tension to give each other momentum;  he describes the two domains as 
inextricably complementary, ‘intertwined and form[ing] a complex’.  Van Lente 
(1993, pp 154-157) analyses technology discourses in terms of ideographs, or broad 
symbolic constructs of meaning and value.  He outlines the ways these flexible 
concepts are ‘defined in relation to each other’ – either positively strengthened, or 
attacked, weakened and compromised, in processes of mutual positioning or 
‘horizontal strategies’.260 
 
These analogies can be adapted to help understand the coexistence of economic and 
ideals-driven benefit projections in the promotion and legitimation of R&D and new 
technologies.  This duality indicates the necessity for technoscience to establish its 
beneficence, desirability and worthiness across many fronts simultaneously to ensure 
ongoing acceptance and support in chronically uncertain, contested fields.  Both kinds 
of benefit claim are necessary;  each gains meaning and momentum from its not being 
its opposite.  Each appeals to different audiences and interests in the heterogeneous 
domains of technoscience innovation – business managers, investors, farmers, 
environmentalists, mothers of sick children, or politicians looking for a photo 
opportunity or a regional rejuvenation programme. 
                                                 
260 Van Lente contrasts these relational strategies with ‘vertical strategies’ where an ideograph’s 
meaning is determined in associations with past historical events and conditions (1993, pp 152-154). 
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Despite the confidence and presumed inevitability typical in policy and sectoral 
discourse, this “Janus-faced” pattern reflects an underlying vulnerability, uncertainty 
or fragility of benefit claims.  Van Lente (1993, 2000) models the progression of 
confidence through technoscience development processes, building from expectation 
to promise to requirement and commitment.  But the performative forcefulness of 
benefit projections is not necessarily always so reliable.  The final section of this 
chapter will explore some examples in the stories of GM and wind energy in New 
Zealand where the arguments of need and intended benefit were not sufficiently 
convincing, or not sustained, and the research or technological projects were not 
continued.  But before that discussion, the next section looks at another dimension of 
these patterns’ influence on the development trajectories for GM and wind energy in 
New Zealand, where narratives of need and solution have taken technoscience 
programmes in very different directions. 
 
Made in New Zealand? 
The idea that GM technoscience is a crucial requirement for New Zealand’s economic 
prosperity, contributing knowledge and new “value-added” products to drive the 
nation’s future growth, has itself provided significant benefits for the biotechnology 
research community and institutions in this country.  Belief in the necessity of GM to 
lift performance in production sectors and develop new health-focused industries has 
legitimated the provision of significant government funding and other support, as well 
as prestige and influence, for actors and agencies engaged in this research.261  These 
forms of Bourdieu’s symbolic capital can be distinguished as endogenous benefits to 
technoscience communities, relative to the exogenous benefits projected for other 
groups or sectors, such as the expected customers or users of the technology and 
products derived from it, or the wider societal, environmental and intergenerational 
benefits also claimed for GM. 
                                                 
261 The prominence of genetics-related research in New Zealand’s science portfolio is proudly reported 
in a government research strategy document (Ministry of Research Science and Technology 2007, p 3):  
‘The importance of biotechnology research to New Zealand is reflected in the proportion of 
government research funding spent on it.  At 25% of total government R&D investment (or around 
$195 million per annum), this is proportionally the highest share of government-funded biotechnology 
research in the OECD’.  This total includes biotech work that might not necessarily involve GM per se. 
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The assumption that New Zealand must maintain a credible active involvement in this 
technoscientific field goes back to the report of the Royal Commission on Genetic 
Modification (2001a, 2001c), discussed in Chapter Six.  This position was a 
foundation of the RCGM’s recommendation to ‘preserve opportunities’: 
The Commission considers that a strong research base is essential if New 
Zealand is to be able to pursue all possible opportunities.  The acquisition and 
application of new knowledge, to develop new technologies and new 
processes, is basic to the establishment of a knowledge economy.  A skilled 
research workforce contributes to… the growth of the economy in diverse 
areas.  Without a cutting-edge research capability, New Zealand’s ability to 
[undertake GM work] would be limited (2001a, p 333). 
 
As outlined in Chapters Two and Six, the Red Queen imperative runs strongly 
through policy, industry and science institutions’ discourse around GM applications 
for food production and biopharmaceuticals.262  The perceived rapid pace and 
dizzying profit projections of international developments combine to create a field 
where competitive participation is seen as essential to avoid the ignominy of being 
“left behind”.  The focus of much international GM research on agricultural 
applications, and the dependence of the New Zealand economy on our primary 
production sectors, left little doubt for many policy and sector decision-makers that 
active engagement with this technoscience is an unavoidable priority (Royal 
Commission on Genetic Modification 2001c, pp 33-35, 152; Ministry of Research 
Science and Technology 2007, pp 3, 25-26, 31, 38-39).  The government’s 
Biotechnology Strategy (New Zealand Government 2003, p 17) commits to the goal 
of ‘growing’ the sector, insisting that: 
To achieve a world-class biotechnology sector in New Zealand, we must make 
sure that New Zealand has the underlying capabilities…  The needs of a 
dynamic sector like biotechnology call for high general levels of science, 
research and commercial skills, as well as specific specialist skills. 
 
                                                 
262 These patterns are notably absent from the strategic framing and promotion of the research on GM 
biocontrols for possums.  The biocontrols work was understood as offering benefits primarily for the 
management of New Zealand’s biodiversity and ecosystems, rather than any commercially marketable 
export products – although the potential to develop innovative control technologies for other pest 
species was acknowledged, as noted in Chapter Six.  This research focused on a uniquely New Zealand 
problem, and the work could only be undertaken in this country;  issues of international science rivalry 
were not relevant. 
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Maintaining a strong research base, increased funding, supportive sectoral and 
institutional frameworks, and active recruitment and retention of scientific talent are 
highlighted as necessary commitments (2003, pp 17-20).  Other policy also asserts the 
need to foster the sector, but acknowledges that New Zealand is a small country with 
limited resources relative to global biotech players.  The logical policy is to identify 
niche research areas to keep an international profile in the field (Ministry of Research 
Science and Technology 2007, pp 6, 14-18).  The comparative scale of New 
Zealand’s research is not seen as a reason not to keep actively involved: 
Given that the vast majority of biotechnology research and applications are, 
and will always be, developed off-shore, New Zealand must maintain 
research… to remain connected to the global network of biotechnology (2007, 
p 49). 
 
Sector actors interviewed for this thesis endorsed the importance of sustaining New 
Zealand’s capacities in GM technoscience, however humble.  A Crop & Food 
research manager explained: 
The reason we work with crops like peas and onions and potatoes is… we 
don’t grow much cotton [or canola or soya] in New Zealand…  Biotechnology 
is global, the whole industry, and for us to have a part in it is very important…  
we’re part of that total community (Interview 2; 26/5/2006). 
 
Some interviewees sketched the scenario of a future where GM crops and products 
are widely accepted and profitable;  keeping an active New Zealand role in this 
technoscience was argued as necessary to have the capacity, if or when such markets 
obtain, to compete against other countries’ exports.  A scientist at Crop & Food 
explained the reasoning behind research on GM vegetables: 
That was the justification for doing it, you know, in the belief that some time 
in the future we’ll need this technology and it’ll be acceptable, therefore we 
should be investing in it now to learn what we need to learn…  So it was really 
making sure we could retain capacity, keeping ourselves usefully doing things 
in terms of research, maintaining capability in the Institute and the country for 
this technology, because in time it will be useful, and we don’t want to lose 
the people and the skills (Interview 11, 8/11/2006). 
 
A sector manager for Horticulture New Zealand, the industry body for commercial 
vegetable growers, reiterated the rationale for maintaining expertise in GM as a kind 
of insurance against future international market requirements (Interview 22, 
20/4/2007).  An AgResearch science manager endorsed these principles, arguing that 
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the role of the CRIs is ‘to show some sort of scientific leadership’ on behalf of the 
nation, and to anticipate future developments: 
Who knows? – in five or ten years when Switzerland’s producing five times 
more dairy products than New Zealand because of transgenics, we’ve got to 
get into a position where we can handle that and remain competitive.  So we 
can’t become too Luddite about developing future technologies in case our 
markets just come round and bloody flatten us, you know – we’ve got to be 
there… to do some of this cutting-edge stuff (Interview 24, 18/8/2006). 
 
The arguments for a national science capacity in GM also refer to the need for New 
Zealand to have knowledge and technical skills to assess the risks and environmental 
effects of GM, and ensure safety of any introductions of modified organisms into the 
country (Royal Commission on Genetic Modification 2001a, pp 132-133, 142).  
Another Crop & Food researcher insisted: 
You’ve got to know how that technology works… what the potential impacts 
are, we do have unique flora and fauna, we do have unique conditions…  
We’ve got to have skilled personnel to use [GM technology], to work with it, 
the stewardship issues, the management issues, the control issues, so you’ve 
got to have skills available to do all that (Interview 17, 17/7/2006). 
 
These narratives of anticipated need for expertise in GM technoscience establish a 
framework of benefit for active New Zealand engagement in research in this field.  
The activity and capacities of New Zealand’s researchers are valued in themselves, as 
important for the reputation and credibility of the nation in international science 
arenas, and as instrumental support for the benefits GM is expected to deliver to other 
sectors of the economy.  The anticipated eventual acceptance and diffusion of GM is 
the cornerstone of this framing of the need to maintain capability.  This is an 
interesting twist on Constant’s concept of a presumptive anomaly, discussed in 
Chapter Three (Constant 1987, p 225; van Lente 1993, pp 51, 86-87; Bijker 1995, p 
278).  Rather than the projection of a future technological inadequacy or limitation 
providing the impetus for R&D, here it is the assumption that GM will be widely 
successful that drives the demand for engagement in research. 
 
The introduction of wind energy technology to New Zealand, however, has followed a 
totally different pattern.  Wind turbines are now well established features in many 
New Zealand landscapes.  But the deployment of this technology has largely been 
based on international knowledge and technical development, with turbines and 
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associated technologies provided by European manufacturers.  A few local companies 
design and make their own small innovative turbines, as noted in Chapter Five.  There 
has been some advocacy for the potential economic benefits of developing cutting-
edge alternative energy technologies and fostering a renewables industry here (for 
example, Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2006c, pp 7-8, 40; 
Winitana 2008).  But the dominant form taken by wind energy in New Zealand – 
using the latest giant turbines for maximum efficiency and competitiveness – is an 
unashamed import. 
 
The strategy of being a “fast adopter” of international expertise and products in wind 
energy technology is rationalised in terms of New Zealand’s limitations as a small 
country with modest resources for R&D in new energy technologies.  Policy for the 
sector recognises these constraints and the importance of following closely behind the 
international leaders in the field.  The Parliamentary Commissioner (2006c, p 65) 
admits that ‘for many of the [new energy] technologies, New Zealand will be in a 
receiver role, a “technology taker”, rather than an instigator or developer’.  Research 
in wind energy innovation focuses on adapting imported technologies to best fit local 
conditions (Ministry of Economic Development 2006a, p 11.3; 2006c, pp 64-65).263  
The Ministry of Economic Development (2006c, p 65) outlines the logic: 
As a technology taker, New Zealand needs to make the most of its engagement 
with the international community leading the development of innovative 
energy technologies and practices… so that we are well placed to rapidly 
adopt energy technologies for use in New Zealand. 
 
An energy policy manager at the Ministry, interviewed for this thesis, highlighted the 
relative scale of New Zealand’s possible investment compared with global R&D: 
Our general view in terms of new technologies is that we should be fast 
adopters, rather than really focus on developing new technologies…  
Whenever we try to do things here in New Zealand… we haven’t got 
sufficient wealth to give it sufficient funding…  Overseas they’re given 
millions and things happen a hell of a lot faster (Interview 19, 7/12/2006).264 
                                                 
263 Policy for energy sector research in New Zealand highlights modelling regional meteorological 
patterns and energy resources and use, and work to support New Zealand adoption of knowledge and 
technologies from overseas (Ministry of Research Science and Technology 2006a, pp 5-6, 18, 36-40). 
264 The dominance of the established major international wind technology corporations in the industry 
globally is recognised as related to the scale and technological sophistication of today’s systems and a 
continual drive for improved, more cost-effective turbines (Pernick & Wilder 2008, p 60; Ngô & 
Natowitz 2009, p 220; Vasi 2010, pp 143-144).  Danish company Vestas Wind Systems, supplier of 
Meridian’s turbines, is one of the biggest turbine manufacturers internationally, with (in 2010) 41,000 
turbines installed in 65 countries across five continents.  Vestas promotes its R&D centre as ‘the largest 
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It is generally accepted in the electricity sector that New Zealand’s most realistic 
course with wind energy is to import the latest turbines and associated technologies 
from overseas (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2006b, p 9; New 
Zealand Government 2010, p 4).  New Zealand’s major generation companies are 
pragmatic about the strategic efficiencies of utilising others’ designs, knowledge and 
experience;  as a Meridian project manager explained: 
We don’t see ourselves as technology developers.  We want technologies that 
already work and are proven, and that we can install and operate in New 
Zealand…  With wind energy now it’s a huge international business… and it’s 
just a waste of time trying to [compete], I mean, why bother?…  The products 
are improving every year, getting better and better all the time, bigger and 
more efficient and more effective, so yeah, we’re just riding on the back of 
that wave (Interview 13, 18/4/2006). 
 
At the smaller-scale end of the wind industry, a few companies, such as Windflow 
Technology in Christchurch, build turbines to their own designs.265  But other 
engineers working with independent turbine installations happily accept the role of 
“technology taker” as a cost-effective approach.  For example, a Canterbury 
developer of local stand-alone generation systems explained his company’s approach: 
[We] use second-hand equipment from Europe which makes it affordable… 
When we talk about bringing in turbines for small scale community stuff my 
analogy is:  hey, I drive a second-hand Japanese car, and I own a second-hand 
European turbine, same thing! …  It’s cheaper and I get exactly the same 
service out of it, cheaper (Interview 33, 11/5/2006). 
 
New Zealand energy policy, and the majority of electricity companies, sector actors 
and research agencies involved in wind energy in this country, have no problem with 
the strategy of following international developments and importing technologies and 
expertise as required.  It is understood that New Zealand just too small to support a 
significant competitive R&D programme in wind energy.  But this does not prevent 
                                                 
in the world’ (http://www.vestas.com/en/about-vestas/profile.aspx).  In 2008 the company claimed it 
was installing an average of one new turbine every four hours (Pernick & Wilder 2008, p 82). 
265 The CEO of Windflow explained the differentiating features of his company’s product:  ‘Our 
particular solution uses a couple of technologies that are different from the rest of the wind industry… 
giving a lighter, more cost-effective design’ (Interview 31, 28/4/2006).  The Windflow turbine uses two 
blades rather than the conventional three, and features a “teetering” hub to accommodate turbulence 
and sustain operation at higher wind speeds (The Windflow 500: Towards a Sustainable Future, 
undated pamphlet, Windflow Technology Ltd, Christchurch). 
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New Zealand from benefiting from innovation in the field, or hinder the use of turbine 
technologies both in large commercial windfarms and independent sites. 
 
This pattern is in marked contrast to the GM sector, where active New Zealand 
research activity and capacities are insisted upon, despite local efforts being dwarfed 
by the relative scale of international research programmes in GM.  The two fields 
have completely different strategies and expectations of the necessity for “hands-on” 
research to be undertaken in New Zealand.  Obviously a range of factors are pertinent;  
for example, the potential for GM work to be kept “ticking along” in manageably 
modest niche research programmes on species of low priority for major international 
science groups.  However, I would argue that the respective framings of purpose and 
benefit of these two innovation fields also have significance for their different 
approaches to New Zealand-based research activity. 
 
Both fields position their innovation work as providing benefits in the form of new 
products and services intended to contribute to the growth, efficiency and profitability 
of other sectors and the New Zealand economy.  Each works to ensure support and 
legitimacy for R&D and new technologies through simultaneous appeals to both 
economic and public-good frameworks of value, as discussed in the preceding section 
of this chapter.  But the strongest associations of each field – the framings of intention 
and benefit which are dominant in public, policy and sectoral perceptions – establish 
fundamentally different expectations of the importance of active participation. 
 
Bijker (1987, 1995) shows how the very meaning of a technology is based in social 
interactions.  And Latour’s analysis (1987) of technoscience development processes 
highlights the networks of linkages with social groups that constitute the trajectories 
of R&D activity, artifacts and scientific knowledge.  These ‘heterogeneous chains of 
associations’ create meaning and credibility for the object or practice, although some 
links are more direct, influential and durable than others(1987, pp 136-144).  Latour 
insists that: 
We are never confronted with science, technology and society, but with a 
gamut of weaker and stronger associations…  The only question in common is 
to learn which associations are stronger and which weaker (1987, p 140; 
emphasis in original). 
 
 210 
Latour’s insight is useful in distinguishing the frameworks of meaning and value that 
are dominant in the purposes associated with the two New Zealand technoscience 
sectors.  In turn, the dominant associations of the respective fields help to explain the 
different approaches to maintaining research activity in this country.  The primary 
association of GM with projections of economic and commercial benefit is central to 
the recognition in political, sectoral and regulatory domains of the necessity for New 
Zealand to sustain active R&D capacity in this field.  The prospect of dazzling profits 
– and the prestige and glamour promised by GM as cutting-edge “high” technoscience 
that can transform humdrum reality – are justification for official and institutional 
enthusiasm and investment.  The primary association of wind energy with non-
monetary value frameworks – the moral principles underpinning societal obligations 
in response to a remote, uncertain future environmental problem – links this 
technology with green idealism, the constraints of sustainability, and abstract concepts 
of duty such as intergenerational equity.  The potential benefits of innovative energy 
solutions are primarily associated with modes of value which, compared to GM’s 
lucrative potentials, have relatively limited leverage for policy and sector decision-
makers.  The strong and weaker benefit associations of the respective fields are 
illustrated in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2: 
 WIND ENERGY GM 
STRONG 
ASSOCIATIONS 
 Environmental 
sustainability 
 Clean renewable energy 
 Reduced greenhouse gas 
emissions 
 NZ’s clean green 
reputation 
 Duty to future generations 
 Economic growth and 
competitiveness 
 Commercial profits 
 Lift performance of primary 
production sectors 
 Development of NZ biotech 
sector 
 Marketable IP 
SECONDARY 
ASSOCIATIONS 
 Business competitiveness 
and efficiency 
 Returns to generators 
 Carbon credits 
 Pharmaceuticals to relieve 
suffering 
 Improved environmental 
management 
 
Wind energy has its dominant meaning as an ideals-based “do-good” or “feel-good” 
option, whereas GM is understood by key groups as primarily offering economic 
advantages and new industries and exports.  The importance of strategic alignment of 
the projected benefits of R&D and innovation with the interests and assumptions of 
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powerful groups is discussed in Chapters Three and Five.  The contrasting trajectories 
– support for an active New Zealand research capacity in GM, and acceptance of a 
“technology taker” role in the wind energy sector – are shaped by the strongest 
framings or modes of benefit associated with the respective fields. 
 
The next section of this chapter looks at some of the consequences when projections 
of benefit from technoscience and innovation are relatively weak and ineffectual.  
What happens when benefit claims are unconvincing?  Why are some problem 
scenarios less than compelling as motivation for wider public recognition of the 
benefits of change and uptake of new technologies? 
 
When benefit claims are not enough 
The benefit projections advanced for technoscience and innovation are typically 
articulated as confident certainties.  These narratives frame the beneficial outcomes of 
R&D as inevitabilities – sweeping aside opposition, alternatives, qualifications, or 
questions around the implementation and integration of new technologies in complex 
societal contexts.  The task of advocacy and promotional discourse is to affirm not 
only the desirability of a new research or technology, but also its achievability, 
effectiveness and acceptability.  Mulkay’s (1993, pp 724-725) analysis of ‘rhetorics of 
hope’ highlights the assurance of ‘strong future-claims’, even though these optimistic 
constructs are ‘extrapolations that go beyond the existing evidence’.  Such discourse 
is based in the presumption that resistance or scepticism will easily be overcome by 
the eventual demonstrated benefits of the innovation (1993, p 727).  Winner (2004, p 
37) observes wryly: 
As is typical in the grand tradition of techno-enthusiasm, the operative verb 
tense in such projections is will.  These things will happen.  If there were ever 
a comprehensive history of the rhetoric of technological utopia, an appropriate 
title for it would be “The Triumph of the Will”.  The very language used to 
convey the message insists that wondrous blessing on the horizon is 
ineluctable.266 
 
                                                 
266 These patterns of the presumed inevitability of the benefits projected from technoscience might 
seem to echo theories of technological determinism, which conceptualise innovation and diffusion as 
driven by an uncontrollable momentum (for example, Winner 1977; Smith & Marx 1994; Wyatt 2008).  
However the ideas put forward in this section, of the confidence typical of benefit claims, are focused 
specifically on the performative function of those claims. 
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These patterns of assumption and rhetorical assertion are widespread in the framings 
of future benefit advanced for GM and wind energy in New Zealand, as outlined in 
Chapters Five and Six.  In policy documents, institutional and corporate statements, 
and sector promotions the benefits projected from R&D and innovation are often 
presented as beyond doubt.  It is largely taken for granted that the intended benefits 
will eventuate, will be appreciated by a grateful society, and will justify the risks and 
the investments.  Sector actors interviewed for this thesis expressed their confidence 
in the recognition of the utility of their technoscience and its products.  Researchers 
and policy actors in the GM field spoke in anticipation of a steadily increasing 
acceptance of GM products in global markets.  Many emphasised the importance of 
offering direct consumer benefits, rather than benefits to producers, to overcome 
public resistance and secure wider societal uptake of GM (Interviews 2, 11, 20, 22, 
24, 34, 45 and 50).  A university scientist suggested a strategic approach for 
incremental introduction of controversial new technologies:  ‘Over time people will 
become more comfortable with genetically modified organisms… the usefulness of 
them, how to utilise them’ (Interview 18, 7/12/2006).  And a scientist at Crop & Food 
predicted: 
[GM is] going to slowly pervade through society, one product at a time…  
there’s probably twelve crops that make up 90% of the world’s food, and 
before you know it those everyday crops will be GM, and so most of the world 
will be eating GM stuff (Interview 17, 17/7/2006). 
 
Energy sector actors are also confident that the benefits of wind energy will come to 
be more widely recognised.  The CEO of the Wind Energy Association recently 
projected increases in generation capacities from wind technologies from the present 
0.6 GW to reach 3.5 GW by 2030:  “Wind generation will expand to at least 20% of 
[New Zealand’s] generation…  [This is] definitely achievable’ (Pyle 2012).  A 
Meridian executive interviewed for this thesis explained the industry’s advocacy 
efforts for wind energy as ‘the future of New Zealand… those sorts of messages are 
getting through, generally people are very supportive of wind energy’ (Interview 13, 
18/4/2006).  The manager of a Meridian windfarm described responses to the 
company’s display at the rural field days:  ‘Nearly every farmer in [the region] was 
there, and every second farmer was: “hey, how do I get one of these on my 
property?”’ (Interview 26, 21/11/2006).  The Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment included information on the Swift turbine, a UK household-scale design, 
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in his audit of New Zealand’s electricity system (2006b, p 46);  the PCE’s energy 
advisor described the enthusiastic reaction: 
Where we got the most takeup [of the ideas in the report] was on the Swift 
turbine…  I’m still getting emails from people wanting me to sell them a Swift 
turbine, I feel I should be on a franchise to the Scottish company that makes 
them…  there’s obviously a huge demand (Interview 10, 16/8/2006). 
 
However, the stories of GM and wind energy in New Zealand include many situations 
where the narratives of need and benefit advanced to promote technoscientific 
innovation have limited appeal.  Interviewees in both sectors were frank about the 
lack of persuasiveness or traction of some benefit framings for many people.  A key 
factor is the relative immediacy of the projected benefit – or the associated problem 
that the technology is positioned to answer.  This demonstrates Michael’s argument 
(2000b, pp 24-25) of the differing performativity of closer or more remote futures. 
 
The strategic usefulness of environmental crisis in providing legitimation of wind 
technologies, via formal policy, statute and international treaties, was acknowledged 
by energy sector actors interviewed for this thesis.  But some argued that (at that point 
in time, the mid-2000s) the projected impacts of climate change were not seen by 
most New Zealanders as an urgent enough problem to generate sufficient momentum 
and political leverage for more widespread uptake of renewable energy technologies.  
A policy analyst at the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority commented: 
Alot of people don’t actually value the climate change benefit enough for the 
government to be able to put that funding into [renewable energy 
technologies].  So when the real pull or push comes from people saying “we 
want more of this,” then that funding would be made available…  You need 
that balance of people wanting it (Interview 43, 6/12/2006). 
 
A Meridian wind energy project manager suggested that raising public awareness of 
climate change would take time;  political and sector commitment for investment in 
new green technologies would require wider recognition and pressure: 
It’s just going to take a whole bunch of evidence, and a whole bunch of 
different events and occurrences, which gets Joe Blow in the street to raise 
their head up and go: “oh, this is actually a problem.”  And then once Joe 
Blow understands it as a problem, then most of the decision-makers will go: 
“oooh, we actually need to do something about this.”  And so it does have to 
build a sense of momentum (Interview 40, 8/12/2006). 
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Some interviewees’ experience of broader public and political perceptions of climate 
change was that this problem was seen as too vague, remote and distant in time, and 
too uncertain in its effects, to have much influence on energy technology choices.  As 
the EECA policy analyst explained: 
It is a real challenge for renewables though.  The cost hits us now, the benefit 
really happens in avoiding something that could happen down the track in fifty 
years, a hundred years’ time (Interview 43, 6/12/2006). 
 
An AgResearch scientist summed up perceptions of the broad, ‘amorphous’ character 
of problems on the scale of climate change, limiting its effectiveness as a driver for 
innovation uptake and public commitment: 
You can’t see any direct causal connection between your own behaviour and 
the end result, and in fact you can’t even see the real crisis, and unfortunately 
the timespans in which our consciousness functions aren’t appropriate for the 
ecological events (Interview 46, 8/3/2007). 
 
The CEO of Orion Energy suggested that many people have far more immediate and 
pressing concerns than far-away future environmental problems: 
If you’re a mother at home with two small kids and you’re living in a cold 
damp house that faces south, what sort of a life are you going to have?  You 
know, we can talk about saving the planet, but if you can’t get your kids to eat 
and they’ve got continual asthma, who gives a shit about saving the planet? 
(Interview 48, 18/7/2006). 
 
The relative urgency of economic criteria was considered a more significant driver for 
the public’s energy choices than far-off abstract issues such as climate change.  A 
consultant engineer found that cost was the principal determinant of technology 
decisions for his clients:  ‘When push comes to shove, people’s behaviour will be 
governed by their wallet much more than feel-good factors’ (Interview 33, 
11/5/2006).  And the PCE’s energy-sector advisor asserted that:  ‘Climate change, at a 
gut level, won’t work [to change public attitudes about energy sustainability].  What 
will work is peak energy.  Nothing hits people harder than in their pocket’ (Interview 
10, 16/8/2006).267 
                                                 
267 Bourdieu’s recognition of the dominance of frameworks of economic value underpinning other 
kinds of qualitative symbolic capital, discussed in Chapter Three (Lash 1993, pp 200-201; Bourdieu 
2004, p 55; Grenfell 2004, p 113), takes a slightly different twist here.  As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, qualitative, ideals-based criteria – the long-term benefits of environmentally-friendly energy 
technologies, and our obligations to future generations – are often outweighed by pragmatic monetary 
calculations.  Even when framed in association with powerful moral imperatives and global-scale 
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Another argument running strongly through sector discourse and the interviews was 
that motivation for innovation in the electricity industry would need the impetus of 
some dramatically catastrophic failure event with more inescapably obvious impact 
(Interviews 9, 12 and 53).  The prospect of loss of electricity supply to major centres, 
and the impacts on communities and business, are major concerns (Canterbury 
Manufacturers' Association 2006).268  People suffering in cold winters without heating 
is a powerfully evocative scenario;  as a consultant for independent wind technologies 
suggested: 
Change will be invoked by some sort of crisis which will be negative in its 
connotations…  Someone somewhere doesn’t want to turn on their heater and 
dies one cold night, or there is a brownout or a blackout because of a lines 
failure, that sort of thing.  Then there will be an enormous outcry (Interview 
33, 11/5/2006). 
 
The issues of motivation for change to more sustainable innovative technologies in 
the energy sector appeal to distant ideals rather than the immediate societal contexts.  
Similar dissociations between projected benefit and problem were identified as 
limiting the influence of some arguments for GM research.  The work on GM 
vegetables focused on the reduction of pesticides and herbicides in conventional 
agricultural regimes, as discussed earlier in this chapter.  However sector actors 
interviewed for this thesis considered that the majority of the public were not aware of 
the scale of the problems with agrichemicals;  this raises a further issue in the 
reluctance of the horticulture industry to highlight the present application levels and 
potentially compromise public perceptions of their products and environmental 
practices.  A research manager at Horticulture New Zealand, the industry body for 
vegetable growers, commented on the complications of trying to promote Roundup-
ready onions on the basis of the benefits of reduced pesticide inputs (Interview 57, 
20/4/2007).  As a science manager at Crop & Food explained: 
                                                 
problems, benefit projections for technological innovation can have weaker influence than the simple 
economics of the immediate context. 
268 The economic effects of energy shortages or failures are highlighted in Meridian’s advocacy for the 
Makara windfarm:  ‘New Zealand’s energy shortage in the winter of 2001 is estimated to have resulted 
in a loss of more than $200 million, while the power crisis in California during 2000 – 2001 cost the 
American economy between US$16 billion and $18 billion.  The blackout that hit the eastern United 
States and Canada in August 2003 cost New York City US$500 million and Michigan employers 
US$700 million in lost output and revenues in just three days’ (Meridian Energy 2005b, p 12). 
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People are amazingly ignorant of what goes on in agriculture…  and the thing 
is, the growing industry doesn’t want to tell them: “well yes, that onion there 
has had fourteen sprays of chemicals” (Interview 2, 26/5/2006). 
 
The relative remoteness for many New Zealanders of the impacts of possums created 
similar difficulties for promotion of the research into GM biocontrols.  Scientists 
working in this field found that the majority of the ordinary public had limited 
awareness or interest in the problems of pest management, protection of indigenous 
biodiversity, or the risks to the dairy industry posed by possums.  A Landcare 
Research manager explained: 
It’s part of the general disconnect between urban communities and rural…  
For most people who live in towns, [possums] don’t exist.  For some people 
they’re a nuisance but the fact that they threaten New Zealand’s meat and 
dairy export trade is not even on their horizon (Interview 14, 23/4/2007). 
 
A senior science advisor at AgResearch also argued a lack of public awareness of the 
extent of the damage caused by possums, as a limitation on the usefulness of this 
problem as justification for research into new biocontrol tools: 
You’re looking at possums and bush despoliation, but how many people really 
are close enough to the bush to realise what’s happening?  When you look at 
urban populations they have an intellectual or kind of imagined outrage about 
what’s going on, but not that many people really see that, really understand it.  
So the degree of engagement around the importance of transgenic biocontrol 
agents for possums is pretty theoretical (Interview 24, 18/8/2006). 
 
Technoscience research and innovation are strategically associated with problems 
such as global climate change, agrichemical pollution or biodiversity losses, as 
constructs of need that require solution through the R&D or new technologies.  But 
these dialectical relationships between projected benefits and pressing problems are 
not necessarily widely persuasive.  The problems identified as targets for innovation 
work may be formally recognised in legislation and policy, and bring considerable 
leverage at those levels.  But sector actors acknowledge that, for many New 
Zealanders, such issues are far from compelling, and unlikely to exert much 
momentum for attitude shifts or levels of support for new technologies.  The benefit-
problem nexus may strengthen the performative influence of benefit claims, but it can 
also be relatively ineffectual when the issues at stake are low in publics’ priorities or 
remote from everyday realities. 
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The stories of the work of benefit projections in the promotion and diffusion of GM 
and wind energy technologies in New Zealand offer ample evidence of the fragility of 
the effects of these discourses and strategic claims in the ongoing dynamics of 
contested fields.  Social and sectoral acceptance of the need for change, and the 
benefits of new technoscientific options, is neither absolute or enduring;  the appeal of 
innovation may seem strong for a time, only to fade away or be overtaken by other 
issues or developments (Konrad 2006; Konrad et al 2012).  This section closes with a 
brief assessment of how benefit constructs can fizzle and fail. 
 
In both innovation fields there are salutary cases of projects discontinued, scaled 
down or never even begun.  The decision of Meridian Energy to withdraw its 
controversial proposal for the large Hayes windfarm is one example of the numerous 
wind energy projects where approval has been granted but the actual construction 
deferred.269  But the most dramatic falling-away of confident benefit projections is in 
New Zealand’s GM research.  Strong sector activity at the time of the Royal 
Commission has significantly declined, as outlined in a recent report from the 
Sustainability Council (Howard 2012).  In 2001 New Zealand institutions were 
conducting 48 field trials of 15 GM species, but by 2012, only two research 
programmes remain – trials of GM pine trees at Scion, the forestry-sector CRI, and 
AgResearch’s biopharm livestock work (2012, p 6).  Although some biotech industry 
advocacy attributes this pattern to the claimed disincentives of regulatory constraints, 
there is increasing recognition that the projected benefits have simply not eventuated: 
Explanation for the lack of commercial success from New Zealand’s state-
funded agricultural GM R&D effort is certainly needed.  Since the 1980s, tens 
of millions of dollars of public science funding has been invested in the 
development of GMOs…  Yet despite promises of major economic returns 
and imminent or certain commercialisation, not a single GM crop variety has 
reached the market or is likely to do so within the next decade (2012, p 13). 
 
Optimistic benefit projections have sustained the GM technoscience sector for many 
years, as discussed earlier in this chapter and in Chapter Six.  But GM’s under-
                                                 
269 Meridian’s CEO explained the withdrawal as the consequence of a company review which led to 
other projects being given greater priority (www.meridianenergy.co.nz/company/news/media-
releases/community/meridian-withdraws-resource-consents-for-project-hayes/ , 19 January 2012).  See 
also www.odt.co.nz/regions/central-otago/194989/meridian-ditches-project-hayes , 20 January 2012.  
A list of proposed and consented windfarm projects not yet undertaken is at 
www.windenergy.org.nz/nz-wind-farms/proposed-wind-farms/ . 
 218 
performance on those promises reflects a fundamental disjunction between the 
frameworks of the industry and policy-makers, and actual publics.  Howard (2012, pp 
6-19) details many New Zealand GM research projects that failed to find support from 
the relevant sectors (pastoral farming, forestry and horticulture) or from the intended 
markets.  The general lack of consumer acceptance for GM products is an 
unavoidable obstacle;  major international food industry groups such as retailers and 
food processors have established policies to keep their products GM-free.  Another 
recent study on public attitudes to innovation in food production (Cronin et al. 2012, p 
18) also finds a rejection of GM:  ‘Opposition to GE sits upon a cluster of deeply held 
values underpinned by risk aversion, environmental safety and sanctity, and concerns 
of human health impacts’.  Howard (2012, p 19) concludes that GM research is ‘out 
of step with… the wider community from whom it must gain [its] license to operate’.  
Or as Froggatt and Rankine (1999, p 466) observe: 
The arguments that the biotech industry is the industry of the future fail to take 
into account the significance of the lack of public demand for the end products 
of this industry in the markets of the UK and Europe…  Even Dan Glickman, 
the US Agriculture Secretary, one of the most bullish supporters of the GE 
industry, recently stated:  “Ultimately, if the consumer doesn’t buy, the 
technology isn’t worth a damn”. 
 
Failure to deliver usable and saleable products was also implicated in the closure of 
the possum biocontrols research programme (Green Party of New Zealand 2010; 
Wallace 2010).  The Foundation for Research, Science and Technology, the principal 
funder of this work, announced a shift in focus in its 2009/2010 Request for Proposals 
for environmental pest management research (Foundation for Research Science and 
Technology 2010).270  Work on single-species control tools, and on GM biocontrols 
for possums, was explicitly excluded (2010, p 7).  This new orientation was explained 
as due to the lack of new products from the years of work on possum control options;  
the importance of delivering ‘tangible outcomes’ was firmly asserted:  ‘a focus on 
controlling a single target species (possum) will not meet the needs of a broad 
spectrum of end users’ (2010, p 5).  Funding would be available only for studies into 
control methods applicable to multiple pest species.271 
                                                 
270 The Request for Proposals processes (RfPs) were the means by which FRST (subsequently 
restructured into the Ministry Science and Innovation) signalled government’s research priorities, goals 
and criteria to New Zealand research institutions. 
271 The range of pest species impacting on New Zealand’s natural ecosystems and biodiversity include 
stoats, ferrets, rabbits, wild cats, deer, pigs, rats and mice, as well as possums.  Research into non-GM 
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The biocontrols research programme had demonstrated the effectiveness of GM 
immunocontraceptive methods (Duckworth et al. 2004; Duckworth et al. 2005; 
Duckworth et al. 2007; Walcher et al. 2008; Duckworth et al. 2009; Cui et al. 2010b), 
and of different delivery options (Cowan et al. 2006; Cowan et al. 2008).  Positive 
results from the research were enthusiastically highlighted in the media as a 
breakthrough for New Zealand’s possum problem (Eckery 2007; Easton 2009; Keene 
2009; TV One 2009).  But progress towards an actual marketable management 
product was slow;  furthermore, as explained in interviews with project scientists, the 
necessary trials and comprehensive safety testing for a proposed GM biocontrol 
would have taken years of further work (Interviews 14 and 18). 
 
The trajectory of New Zealand’s research programme on GM biocontrols for possums 
ended in a fundamental disjunction of expectations of benefit from the work – 
between the science team’s focus on steady scientific advance, and the short- or 
medium-term demands of funding agencies and projected users.  Without something 
applicable to present needs, the projected eventual benefits of the biocontrols research 
were not sufficiently compelling to sustain support over the long term. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the dynamics of technoscience benefit claims in the 
strategic positioning of research and new technologies in complex, contested fields.  
The diverse demands of funders, technology consumers and users, commercial 
markets, production sectors and policy domains all impose considerable pressure on 
R&D proponents.  Linking projections of technological benefits with societal needs, 
problems and difficulties, in a dialectic of positive and negative futures, helps to 
establish a sense of necessity for the innovation work.  Such imperatives may be 
direct and immediate, or remote and uncertain, but the stories of GM and wind energy 
                                                 
control methods, toxins, and cost-effective application strategies for multiple pest species has been 
undertaken by Landcare Research from the early 2000s, concurrently with the GM biocontrols work, 
and is ongoing (www.msi.govt.nz/update-me/who-got-funded/ projects CO9X0910, CO9X1007, 
CO9X1008, CO9X0505, CO9X0507, CO9X0209). 
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in New Zealand both show technoscience promotions appealing to scenarios of a 
“problem push” as drivers for change to strengthen the “benefit pull”. 
 
In order to secure acceptance and to sustain support and momentum for research and 
innovation activity, the projected outcomes and intended benefits must satisfy the 
expectations and needs of multiple groups.  Both exogenous benefits, intended to 
accrue to external users of technologies and their products, and endogenous benefits 
supporting the ongoing work and symbolic capital of practitioner communities, are 
key assets in securing acceptance and investment.  Alignment with the interests of 
dominant sectors is crucial, and this chapter has explored the importance of economic 
framings of future benefits in positioning research and innovation programmes 
favourably in relation to key policy and business groups.  However, New Zealand’s 
GM research and wind energy developments are also strongly associated with 
purposes intended to benefit the public interest, notably the efforts towards 
environmental sustainability and the minimisation of greenhouse gas emissions in 
response to global climate change.  Both registers or modes of intention are valuable 
in the performative work of benefit claims in generating and maintaining confidence 
in the desirable benefits of R&D and innovation. 
 
However, as seen in the last section, there are limitations to the appeal and momentum 
of projections of need and benefit that are deployed in discourse and strategy to justify 
technoscience.  Some benefit framings are stronger than others, and the downward 
trajectories of some initially confident claims demonstrate the vulnerability of these 
abstract constructs to the demands and pragmatic realities of markets, business, 
interested sectors and publics. 
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Chapter Eight 
Somewhere over the rainbow?272 
 
The future is a locus of human dreams and aspirations, the place where our good 
intentions can be made into realities, and where the various dissatisfactions of the 
present can be resolved or overcome.  Although we live in the here and now, we are 
continually projecting ahead (and also reviewing behind).  The irresistibly seductive 
appeal of tomorrow is that it might – if things go well and the gods are kind – be 
better than today.  Of course, there is also the potential for negative futures to occur, 
and the exponential rise of the risk analysis industry in recent decades is evidence of 
society’s consciousness of the importance of preparing for difficulties and disasters of 
various kinds.  The experience of living through the series of major earthquakes that 
devastated Canterbury, New Zealand, in 2010 and 2011 has given a particularly acute 
focus to the future’s inherent unpredictability.  But the need to plan, to anticipate, to 
imagine and to improve is a fundamental human characteristic – and science and 
technology are very often central to such forward-focused activity. 
 
This thesis explores the workings of projections of future benefit in the advancement 
of technoscience innovation in two New Zealand fields.  The stories of wind energy 
and GM development in this country provide a rich array of constructs for analysis – 
scenarios of the outcomes expected to be delivered by particular R&D programmes 
and new technological applications.  These claims are created and deployed in 
discourse, sector advocacy and policy;  they exist in the realms of rhetoric and the 
strategic positioning of actors, projects, interest groups and institutions;  and they 
reflect and perpetuate the values and norms that prevail in those social contexts.  
Chapter Two discussed the ways that benefit projections are products of their 
environments, reifications of the ideals upheld as important and worthy by that 
community.  The meanings of technoscience – whether research knowledge, a product 
or artifact, or a comprehensive technological system – are forged in the practice of 
fields, and in the broader assumptions and beliefs of the people who design, build, 
manage and use those technologies.  Expectations of the benefits of science and 
                                                 
272 With apologies to Judy Garland. 
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technology are embedded in the ideological frameworks of particular groups, 
professions and wider society, and deeply internalised in the identities of actors and 
institutions.  Such patterns are effectively rendered subliminal in discourse and 
practice, thoroughly naturalised in the objectives and purposes towards which activity 
is oriented, and taken for granted as desirable, worthy and appropriate.  This 
normalisation is part of the influence such frameworks of assumption exert on the 
development trajectories of science research fields and new technologies.  Policies, 
sector strategies, funding provisions, regulatory systems and public perceptions of 
technoscientific innovation are all shaped within the narratives of possibility and 
utility that comprise Bourdieu’s habitus (1990, 1999, 2002, 2004) or Foucault’s 
regimes of truth (1972, 1980, 1994).  This thesis has frequently identified such 
hegemonic patterns in the meanings and benefits commonly attributed to R&D and 
innovation, in discourse and policy for GM, energy and technoscience generically, 
and in the interviews conducted with sector actors. 
 
Many narratives about the benefits, beneficence and qualities of science and 
technology have achieved the status of myth, widely accepted as both explaining and 
guiding orientation and development (Winner 1986; Sarewitz 1996).  Chapter Two 
describes three such myths that both enable R&D and innovation and constrain them 
into certain pathways.  The old tale of the Golden Goose frames science and 
technology as the sources of societal prosperity, wellbeing, wealth and abundance.  
Lewis Carroll’s neurotic character the Red Queen sets R&D on a frantic race to avoid 
being left behind and missing out on that prosperity.  And (shifting the metaphors to 
classic country-rock music) Johnny Cash provides the analogy of “walking the line”, 
where technoscience is framed as a reliably rational linear progression towards 
teleological goals.  These narratives are strongly influential in the promotion and 
positioning of GM in New Zealand.  Chapters Six and Seven follow advocates’ 
framing of research into potential GM applications, and the maintenance of expertise 
in this field, as necessary requirements for the country’s economic growth and 
international competitiveness.  Appealing to such projected benefits of GM 
technoscience has in turn benefited the New Zealand biotechnology sector, helping to 
secure significant government funding, supportive regulatory frameworks, and 
political recognition. 
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Technoscientific innovation domains such as the GM and wind energy sectors in New 
Zealand are, moreover, fraught with contestation and competition, besieged by protest 
and opposition, and stalked by chronic insecurity and uncertainty.  Chapters Three 
and Seven address the strategic dimensions of R&D and innovation processes in fields 
characterised by fierce ongoing struggles for credibility, acceptance, funding and 
authoritativeness.  Chapter Three focuses on the performative work of benefit 
projections in establishing the grounds for societal support for research work and the 
diffusion of new technologies (van Lente 1993; Brown et al. 2000a; Brown et al. 
2003; Borup & Konrad 2004; Sturken et al. 2004; Sunder Rajan 2006; Dattée & Weil 
2007; European Commission 2007; Vanloqueren & Baret 2009).  Suitably persuasive 
and plausible benefit claims are, in Bourdieu’s terms (2004), valuable symbolic 
capital – crucial strategic resources for actors, institutions and projects to establish 
legitimacy and maintain a positive profile.  The projected benefits of research work 
and new technologies are articulated as the rationale for supportive policy and 
legislation, generous funding, institutional status, and the presumed public 
acceptability of unproven, heavily contingent R&D programmes. 
 
Analyses of the dynamics of technoscience development highlight the importance of 
strategic alignment of a project or field with the interests and value frameworks of 
significant groups (Bijker 1995; Latour 1996; Kaplan & Tripsas 2008).  The need to 
accommodate research and innovation within the expectations of powerful sectors 
leads to the dominance of a particular form or application of the technology that 
satisfies the requirements of key users or decision-makers.  This is similar to the 
negotiation of closure of scientific controversy and the often painful process of a 
paradigm shift as theorised by Kuhn (1996).  The dominant mode, and the suite of 
benefits associated with it, become the norm, soon leading to inertia in the field, and 
lock-in of R&D approaches around the established frameworks of expectation 
(Utterback 1994; Gooley & Towers 1996; Garud & Karnøe 2001b; Rogers 2003; Van 
Merkerk & Van Lente 2005; Van de Ven et al. 2008). 
 
Possible alternatives that are perceived as radical or disruptive gain little recognition, 
despite offering other kinds of benefits and returns (Latour 1996; Christensen 1997; 
Franklin 2003; Rogers 2003).  These patterns are strongly evident in the trajectory of 
wind energy in New Zealand, detailed in Chapter Five.  The mode of this technology 
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that has found wide acceptance and uptake is the large commercial windfarm feeding 
the national grid – the form of wind utilisation that is most compatible with existing 
infrastructure and sector requirements.  Possible alternative ways of using wind 
technologies, such as distributed networks of independent small-scale generation or 
local community-based systems, have been dismissed as unrealistic or relegated to 
minor fringe applications that do not threaten the mainstream paradigm. 
 
The anticipated benefits of new research and technologies are often associated with a 
contrasting problem scenario to enhance their persuasive force and generate a 
momentum and motivation for change.  Chapters Three and Seven outline the 
imperative of imperatives – the importance of strategic leverage achieved via a 
suitably urgent need or looming disaster for which research and technoscientific 
innovation are positioned as solutions.  This pattern plays out in revealingly different 
ways in the respective stories of wind energy and GM in New Zealand.  The 
advancement of wind energy technologies is framed in relation to the necessity of an 
active response to the threat of global climate change, an obligation formally 
recognised in legislation and New Zealand’s international commitments.  Chapter 
Five shows the close justification, in government policy and sector discourse, of the 
benefits of renewable electricity generation in terms of the demands of this enormous 
environmental challenge.  GM research in this country, however, has been legitimated 
in relation to a diverse spectrum of needs, discussed in Chapters Six and Seven.  
Objectives of finding GM solutions to medical and environmental problems are 
important in the strategic positioning of the work, but must be disregarded in New 
Zealand’s regulatory processes for new organisms research;  projects are approved on 
the basis of claimed generic benefits for the economy and the improved performance 
of our export sectors.  This rationale, and the maintenance of active New Zealand 
capabilities in this field, are framed in relation to the Red Queen imperative of the 
need for competitiveness in ruthless international technoscience contests. 
 
The heterogeneity typical of the benefit claims advanced for research and innovation 
in the two New Zealand sectors is an indication of the diverse range of interested 
groups and parties involved in development and diffusion processes.  Chapter Five 
follows the discursive construction of wind energy technologies in relation to an 
eclectic mix of benefits – protecting the long-term future of the planet, demonstrating 
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the government’s commitment to its Kyoto targets, giving independence and 
satisfying personal green principles for environmentally conscious individuals, 
avoiding the prohibitive costs of grid connection for homeowners in remote locations, 
bringing in revenue for the generation companies as a nil-input source of electricity 
and in the form of carbon credits, and offering significant consumer appeal and 
increased market share for those companies with attractive green branding strategies.  
The range of benefits projected from the potential applications of GM is similarly 
diverse, including health, environmental and biodiversity protection benefits and 
commercial profits from new high-value products.  However, GM work in New 
Zealand has so far been confined to laboratory research and contained field trials and 
therefore the benefits promised for this field remain conjectural. 
 
The typical association of research and innovation with multiple overlapping framings 
of expected benefit and need also indicates the inherent fragility and contingency of 
these future constructs.  Technoscience advocacy must assert positive associations 
with key interest groups, and positive frameworks of meaning and intent, to secure the 
necessary support and legitimacy for their activities (van Lente 1993; Latour 1996; 
Sarewitz 1996; Greenberg 2001; Rogers 2003; Van de Ven et al. 2008).  The diverse 
arrays of benefit claims advanced for GM and wind energy in New Zealand reveal a 
basic duality or dialectic between economic or commercial goals and ideals-based, 
societal-interest objectives.  The dominant prioritising of economic framings of 
anticipated benefit from R&D and new knowledge and technologies is rarely 
questioned in policy and sector discourse.  But it is salutary that technoscience fields 
and projects also assert a range of altruistic, public-good goals in justification of the 
worthiness and beneficence of their work, seeking to appeal in different ways to 
different groups and publics. 
 
Research and innovation are deeply uncertain processes, and the effectiveness, safety, 
marketability and diffusion of new technologies and products can not be guaranteed 
despite the most confident projections at the outset of the development programme 
(Tenner 1997; Collins & Pinch 1998a, 1998b; Geels & Smit 2000a, 2000b; Franklin 
2003; Rogers 2003).  The fields of GM and wind energy in New Zealand include 
many examples where the initial momentum could not be sustained, and the research 
programmes were not continued – including, notably, the work on possible GM 
 226 
biocontrol methods to combat the plague of possums infesting New Zealand forests, 
the starting point for this thesis as outlined in the Prologue.  This vulnerability of 
benefit projections, and the ignominious fading away of the original enthusiasm and 
claims, indicates that the real work of future claims for technoscience is not actually 
in relation to the future.  These optimistic constructs have their main relevance in the 
present-time strategic requirements of R&D communities and the demands of survival 
for new ideas and development initiatives in chronically contentious and under-
funded fields. 
 
What is the significance, for interested groups and actors in technoscience fields, of 
the findings drawn from this analysis of the promotion and evolution of two 
innovations in New Zealand?  There are several ways forward – both in scholarship, 
and in the possible application of the lessons of the GM and wind energy stories to 
innovation processes in other fields and real-world situations. 
 
The attractions of various theoretical models as potential ways of deconstructing the 
intricacies of my two case study fields are mentioned in Chapter Four.  While 
following the methodologies that I decided were most appropriate for the material, it 
was clear that there would also be rich opportunities in other conceptual approaches.  
In particular, the tools of Actor Network Theory offer a perspective on technoscience 
processes that could be productively applied to the critical analysis of constructs of 
expected benefit and their complex associations with R&D actors, epistemological 
and natural phenomena, artifacts and physical entities (Latour & Woolgar 1979; 
Latour 1992; Law 1992).  Such a study might range from huge turbines to domestic 
appliances designed for greater energy efficiency, from the arcane dynamics of 
international food markets down to the molecular level of the reconfigured DNA of 
GM vegetables, and from global environmental change down to the tiny crustaceans 
impacted by agrichemical leachates from a coastal farm and the business models of 
that farming community. 
 
Other avenues for possible further development of this research might consider the 
significance of benefit claims in the promotion and legitimation of other new R&D 
fields.  Nanotechnology is an obvious candidate for such scrutiny (Sarewitz & 
Woodhouse 2003; Wilsdon & Willis 2004; Macnaghten et al. 2005; Kearnes et al. 
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2006).  The projections of intended environmental benefit advanced on behalf of 
innovative green technologies might also provide interesting material for an 
assessment of the relative forcefulness of non-monetary objectives relative to 
economic frameworks in positioning new areas of R&D.  The insights drawn from 
this study’s analysis of the work of expectations in the evolution of GM and wind 
energy technologies in New Zealand would be a possible starting point for academic 
critique of development processes and sector rhetorics in other innovation fields. 
 
There are other ways the findings of this thesis might be taken forward, particularly 
with respect to the practical challenges of implementation and application of new 
technologies and the design and promotion of new research.  The rationale for this 
thesis, as discussed in the Prologue and Chapter One, is that there has been a lack of 
critical scrutiny and understanding of the “upstream” origins of technoscience 
trajectories.  Relatively limited attention has been given to the influence of projections 
of future beneficial outcomes from R&D and new technologies, or the implications of 
benefit framings for innovation processes and the kinds of products, systems, 
knowledge and practice they deliver.  I contend that in order for technoscience to be 
made truly effective, relevant and meaningful, and for R&D to productively address 
real societal needs and priorities, we need a more thorough critical understanding of 
the ways technoscience is framed in discourse and sector strategy, and the patterns of 
assumption, expectation and priority that shape and constrain these framings.  This 
will involve proactive, informed engagement with technoscience processes and the 
relevant policy and institutional domains.  I would like some of the insights from this 
thesis to contribute to improving such interactions and helping both interested groups 
and sector actors to work thoughtfully towards better outcomes from science and 
technological innovation. 
 
To come back to the physical location of my research, there are immediate 
opportunities for the findings of this thesis to be useful right here at home in 
Canterbury.  The daunting technical requirements and complicated social and political 
issues of the post-earthquake reconstruction process are already strongly influenced 
by frameworks of expectation and assumptions of the desirability and benefits of 
various technological modes.  With the loss of most of central Christchurch’s 
buildings and infrastructure, there are extraordinary potentials for innovation – 
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indeed, for a Kuhnian paradigm shift for the whole city.  There is energetic advocacy 
for new green technologies to be creatively deployed in the rebuild, including such 
radical possibilities as shared energy systems where efficiencies are gained by street-
scale networking between buildings.273  However, the multiple contending interests 
and values involved, and the enormous costs, create significant challenges for 
innovators and decision-makers.  Determining the best way forward for Christchurch 
and greater Canterbury will require a deep and comprehensive understanding of the 
social and strategic dynamics, and the opportunities, of technoscience.  The lessons 
drawn from this thesis’s exploration of the benefit claims advanced for GM and wind 
energy are a contribution to that learning process, and to the negotiation of multiple 
expectations, ideals and possibilities in the construction of new futures. 
 
 
                                                 
273 See www.café.gen.nz/projects, www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/christchurch-earthquake-2011/city-
blueprint, www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU1206/S00640/energy-design-grants-for-christchurch-rebuild . 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1:  Interviews 
As outlined in Chapter Four, the confidentiality of individual interviewees has been 
protected in the interests of their positions in their respective fields.  Interviewees are 
identified here by their role and organisation. 
 
1.  Science & technology 
policy 
Ministry of Research, Science 
and Technology 
6/12/2006 
2.  Research manager – GM 
crops 
Crop & Food Research 26/5/2006 
3.  Distributed wind energy 
systems 
Orion Energy 6/10/2006 
4.  Energy policy & 
innovation 
Energy Efficiency and 
Conservation Authority 
SCOPING – 
early 2006 
5.  Regulatory policy – GM 
foods 
Food Standards Australia NZ 24/4/2007 
6.  Distributed wind energy 
systems 
Independent Consultant 18/7/2006 
7.  Science funding policy & 
processes 
Foundation for Research, 
Science & Technology 
18/4/2007 
8.  Science communication 
 
AgResearch 8/3/2007 
9.  Energy sector policy & 
regulation 
Electricity Commission 31/10/2006 
10.  Energy sector policy & 
wind energy 
Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment 
16/8/2006 
11.  GM science research – 
vegetables 
Crop & Food Research 8/11/2006 
12.  Energy sector policy & 
wind energy 
Orion Energy 17/10/2006 
13.  Wind energy strategy & 
project management 
Meridian Energy 18/4/2006 
14.  GM biocontrols research 
 
Landcare Research 23/4/2007 
15.  Environmental & energy 
policy 
Green Party of New Zealand 8/12/2006 
16.  GM biocontrols research 
 
Landcare Research 17/5/2006 
17.  GM science research – 
vegetables 
Crop & Food Research 17/7/2006 
18.  GM biocontrols research 
 
Victoria University 7/12/2006 
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19.  Energy sector policy & 
innovation 
Ministry of Economic 
Development 
7/12/2006 
20.  GM science research – 
foods & pharma 
Auckland University 7/3/2007 
21.  Environmental risk 
management policy 
Ministry for the Environment SCOPING – 
early 2006 
22.  GM science research – 
vegetables 
Vegfed / Horticulture NZ 20/4/2007 
23.  Distributed energy 
systems  
Industrial Research 19/10/2006 
24.  GM science research & 
policy 
AgResearch 18/8/2006 
25.  GM biocontrols research  
 
AgResearch 6/12/2006 
26.  Wind energy project 
management 
Meridian Energy 21/11/2006 
27.  Biotech research – 
innovation 
AgResearch 8/3/2007 
28.  Policy for NZ dairy 
sector – biocontrols 
research 
Animal Health Board 18/4/2007 
29.  GM policy and 
regulation 
Environmental Risk 
Management Authority 
16/8/2006 
30.  GM policy and 
regulation 
Environmental Risk 
Management Authority 
16/8/2006 
31.  Distributed energy 
systems  
Windflow Technology 28/4/2006 
32.  Innovation in energy 
systems 
Canterbury University 1/12/2006 
33.  Distributed wind energy 
systems 
Energy 3 11/5/2006 
34.  GM science research – 
livestock 
AgResearch 8/3/2007 
35.  Innovation and 
entrepreneurship 
Canterbury Employers’ 
Chamber of Commerce 
15/2/2007 
36.  Venture capital 
investment 
Endeavour Capital 1/12/2006 
37.  GM biocontrols research 
 
AgResearch 22/11/2006 
38.  Innovation in energy 
systems 
MainPower 20/4/2006 
39.  Science policy & 
communications 
Ministry of Research, Science 
and Technology 
24/4/2007 
40.  Wind energy policy & 
project management 
Meridian Energy 8/12/2006 
41.  Wind energy policy & 
regulation 
Electricity Commission 7/12/2006 
42.  GM policy and 
regulation 
Environmental Risk 
Management Authority 
16/8/2006 
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43.  Energy policy & 
innovation 
Energy Efficiency and 
Conservation Authority 
6/12/2006 
44.  Alternative energy 
innovations 
Independent sector lobbyist 20/4/2006 
45.  GM policy and 
regulation  
Ministry of Research, Science 
and Technology 
9/5/2006 
46.  Science communities & 
innovation 
AgResearch 8/3/2007 
47.  Science funding policy & 
processes 
Foundation for Research, 
Science & Technology 
26/4/2007 
48.  Energy systems & 
innovation 
Orion Energy 18/7/2006 
49.  Science & technology 
research sector 
Royal Society of NZ 6/5/2006 
50.  Innovation & 
entrepreneurship 
Biocommerce Centre, Massey 23/4/2007 
51.  Research institution 
communications 
Crop & Food 24/7/2006 
52.  Innovation & change 
processes 
Crop & Food 26/5/2006 
53.  Energy systems & 
entrepreneurship 
Canterbury Manufacturers 
Association 
15/11/2006 
54.  Biotechnology sector 
policy & strategy 
NZBio 9/5/2006 
55.  Energy innovation & 
system management 
Electricity Commission 7/12/2006 
56.  Energy policy Energy Efficiency and 
Conservation Authority 
6/12/2006 
57.  GM science research – 
vegetables 
Vegfed / Horticulture NZ 20/4/2007 
58.  Science innovation & 
entrepreneurship 
Auckland University 7/3/2007 
59.  Wind energy innovation 
research 
Canterbury University 9/10/2006 
60.  Energy sector policy & 
innovation 
Ministry of Economic 
Development 
7/12/2006 
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Appendix 2:  Research outline sent to interviewees 
 
 
RONNIE  COOPER 
 
Research for PhD, University of Canterbury, Political Science Department 
rco28@student.canterbury.ac.nz 
03-341-5445 / 021-204-5905 
 
 
PERCEPTIONS  OF  BENEFIT  FROM  RADICAL  NEW 
SCIENCE  AND  TECHNOLOGIES 
 
 
INTRODUCING  THE  PROJECT 
 
 
Background: 
 
Some new technologies are characterized by considerable uncertainty − both as to their effectiveness 
and potential unpredicted effects − yet attract significant support from powerful sectors including 
government, commercial and research institutions.  Structures of production and development, and 
the formal policies and strategic directions of government, are central to the advancement of these 
technologies.  Broader concepts of progress and modernity, and the marketing and presentation of 
these technologies, also help to shape perceptions of benefit and confidence. 
 
Other kinds of transformational technologies are developed with equally problem-solving 
orientations, yet have not attracted equivalent levels of political support and resources.  
Characterized by strong environmental priorities, requiring new infrastructure and systems for their 
application, and perceived as having limited effectiveness and profitability, they have as yet a low 
profile both in policy and research arenas and with the public. 
 
International work in science and technology studies (STS), and in risk assessment in relation to 
radical new technologies, has focused predominantly on issues of risk and perception of risk, on the 
recognition of uncertainty and unknowns, and on developing processes for communication and 
dialogue between experts, regulators, and the public and concerned groups.  Understandably the 
discourse thus far has focused around the potential for negative consequences from a new 
technology − and thus around managing the protests and opposition of concerned groups.  The issues 
arising with risky new technologies can became polarised into adversarial stand-offs with consequent 
damaging erosions of public trust in science, the institutions and corporations developing new 
technologies, and regulatory bodies. 
 
The orientation of STS and risk assessment work towards the potentials for negative outcomes, 
whether from the application of a new technology or from adverse public perceptions, has resulted in 
an imbalance in attitudes and understanding of science and technology that is potentially risky in 
itself. 
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This research project: 
 
My research will explore the other side of the paradigm – the concepts of benefit, value and 
purposeful improvement underpinning the development of and support for radical new technologies, 
including: 
 Confidence in the efficacy and profitability of the technology 
 Confidence in the manageability of risk and uncertainty, and of change processes to new 
systems and ways of doing things 
 Confidence in eventual public acceptance of the new technology 
 The appeal or attractiveness of some technological options rather than others. 
 
I will explore these questions through a comparative analysis of two technologies and the New 
Zealand government policies and regulatory systems, research institutions, funding structures, sector 
group support, and communications upon which their development depends.  Interviews will be 
undertaken with scientists, with regulators and government agency personnel, and with practitioners 
and sector representatives.  Their views, ideas and experiences will give a basis for evaluating relevant 
theoretical models drawn from political studies, STS, risk management and communications 
disciplines. 
 
The technologies selected for study are: 
 Genetic modification − pesticide-resistance, bioactives, biopharming, biocontrols 
 Energy alternatives − solar (water heating and photovoltaics) and wind power. 
 
These technologies each involve substantial paradigm shifts from the status quo, and are derived from 
cutting-edge science and research.  They are each influenced by – and in turn affect – a diverse range 
of social, environmental, ethical, economic, technical, and infrastructural factors.  And they have each 
attracted controversy and resistance. 
 
Questions to be pursued include: 
 How each technology is framed, positioned and promoted 
 What ideals and principles shape the development of the technology, and help to enhance 
its appeal to the public, interested sectors and decision-makers? 
 What benefits and profits are envisaged from the technology, and to whom? 
 What problems is the technology intended to address? 
o What is the position re alternative potential solutions to those problems? 
o What is the response to opposition or resistance to the new technology? 
 What roles do official policy and government strategies, science institutions and regulatory 
agencies play in the development of the technology? 
 What obstacles (resourcing, institutional, infrastructure, mindsets) impede acceptance and 
uptake of the technology? 
 What communications and public relations are undertaken to position and promote the 
technology and its intended benefits?  What more could be done? 
March 2006 
 
 
